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Reviews the process leading to the adoption of the first regional policy regulations of 18 March
1975.
Identifies, from archive documentation:
• The historical emergence and the nature of a substantial regional concern for the Community
(Chapter I).
• The Commission's determinant role in die emergence of a regional policy dossier (Chapter II).
• The terms of proposed regional intervention by the Community and its most disputed aspects
(Chapter III).
• The fuelling of the regional dossier by die EMU Programme (Chapter IV).
Argues:
1. The emergence of a fundamental regional concern, particularly beyond a sectoral continuation of
agricultural reform and die control of regional aid schemes, occurred back in 1968. A search lor
economic and policy convergence justified regional action. Such an objective remained valid in die
upgrading from an economic union to an EMU.
2. Within die context of die exercise of medium-term economic policy co-ordination, die
Commission formulated and launched at her own initiative the regional dossier. Such formulation of
a regional objective took a radier technocratic character and involved fundamental policy choices.
3. The Commission considered regional financial solidarity as marginal and dependent on an action
of co-ordination of regional policies.
4. It was not enlargement into die Nine diat settled die acceptance by all delegations of a regional
competence, but its linkage to die programme of EMU.
INTRODUCTION
The regulations of 18 March 1975' defined for the first time a regional objective for the Community.
They laid down both a conceptualisation of a regional concern and a precise form of intervention.
Although the operation of regional interventions has been periodically adjusted, in fact, since 1968
the fundamental justification of a Community concern on regional disparities has not substantially
changed. A concern for the effect of regional unbalanced structures on economic and policy
divergence appears as a leitmotif in the history of the European Union. That is, a concern about wide
differences in regional competitiveness and their detrimental effects on economic and policy
convergence -necessary for both the common market or for an economic and monetary union (EMU)-
appears as a recurrent concern from the end of the constitutive period to the present.
Since the end of the 1960s this fundamental regional concern has been present alongside alternative
sectoral conceptualisations of a regional objective, particularly side by side with a definition of a
regional objective subsidiary to the reform of agricultural structures. A dominant agricultural agenda
did temporarily eclipse a wider concern for economic and policy convergence, yet, the continuity in
the substantial nature of a regional concern is undeniable. Especially the launching of EMU in the
early 1970s and the first enlargement ended the domination of the regional dossier by agriculturally
related objectives and established a global structural conceptualisation of regional factors for the
common market, which can be considered, in a longer perspective, as the start of a trend towards a
decline in agricultural policy predominance.
This thesis is a study of the emergence in 1975 of a competence for the Community on regional
economic policy i.e. a study to understand a policy development. Although the latter raises important
theoretical questions and such a study could also serve as a testing ground for various theories of
integration, the purpose of the thesis is not to offer a case study for confronting theoretical models
but, rather, to examine the history of the emergence of a regional competence for the Community; to
trace and discover what happened; and to supersede some clearly unsatisfactory accounts.
Indeed, the truth is that the history of a regional concern does not seem to have been dealt with in a
fully adequate manner. Certainly the contours of EU's regional and cohesion policy have been
mapped out in a large body of literature; sound material deals with the justification and the nature
' That is, Council Regulation (EEC) 724/75 of 18 March 1975 establishing a European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF); Council regulation (EEC) 725/75 of 18 March 1975, on the transfer to the ERDF of 150 million
u.a. out of the appropriations held in reserve by the guidance section of the EAGGF; Council financial
regulation of 18 March 1975 supplementing the financial regulation of 25 April 1973 applicable to the general
budget of the European Communities (75/184/Euratom, ECSC.CEE); Council decision to apply Regulation
(EEC) 724/75 establishing a ERDF to the French overseas departments (75/186/EEC) and Council decision
185/75 setting up a Regional Policy Committee.
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of a regional competence2, and a lot has been written from the economic and political science points
of view about the operation, the implementation and the policy evolution of the structural funds3.
Yet, all in all, beside the considerable attention which has been given to (mostly) the operation of
EU's regional policy, it is still noticeable that an account for such a policy development has been
largely overlooked. Firstly, no thorough study exists on the historical emergence and construction of
a regional objective for the Community and, secondly, as far as the negotiations over the regional
dossier are concerned, accounts have concentrated only on the final stages of that negotiation, and
particularly, on the disagreements over the setting up of the ERDF in 1975.
Concerning the first aspect (the emergence and construction of a substantial regional objective for
the Community) either chronologies4, or segmented accounts on how the common market came
across regional objectives prevail, often reducing the historical emergence of a regional dossier to the
process of negotiation over financial instruments, and also often missing significant internal
processes, in particular the Commission's role of impulse in this policy expansion and, above all, the
fundamental policy linkages operating and which, ultimately, determined the acceptance of a
regional objective lor the Community.
As far as the second aspect is concerned i.e. the negotiations among member states, scholarly work
has reduced the regional dossier to the negotiation on the setting up of the ERDF, and has also
concentrated on the period starting from October 1972, that is, the period beginning alter the
Conference of Heads of State and Government in Paris, when the agreements of principle among
delegations for the creation of a ERDF and the co-ordination of national regional policies had
already been made5. Admittedly, it has become a widely accepted explanation that regional policy
became a competence for the Community as the UK Government found unacceptable to contribute in
net terms to a Community budget which favoured mainly those economies undergoing considerable
2 For the objectives and the justification of a regional competence for the Community diachronically see
especially: Cros J., 'Les desequilibres geographiques dans la CEE face aux objectifs de l'union economique et
monetaire, Revue d'Economie Politique. Mars-Avril 1974, no.2, Editions Sirey, Paris; Cros .1. (1977),
Introduction a I'economie Europeenne, Paris, Series Etudes et Perspectives Europeennes, chapitre III, p. 38-48;
and Van Ginderachter J., 'La politique regionale de la Communaute, justifications, modalites et propositions',
Revue du Marche Commun. Paris n. 170, Decembre 1973, p. 468-486.
3 Some have argued the emergence of new patterns of governance in the field of structural policy and, in
particular, in the implementation and operation of structural funds. See Marks G., Hooghe L & Blank K.
'European Integration from the 1980s: State centric versus Multilevel Governance', Journal of Common Market
Studies, vol. 34, No.3, September 1996, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
4 Chronological expositions have often been provided with largely reference purposes. See for instance p. 242-
255 of Romus P. (1974), £conomie regionale Europeenne, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles; or p. 385-393 of
Vanhove N. and L. H. Klaassen (1980), Regional Policy: A European Approach, Saxon House, London; or Lind
H. & C. Flockton (1970), Regional Policy in Britain and the Six. The problem of development areas, Dtndon,
Political and economic planning European series no. 15, Chatham House.
5 For well documented accounts on the period starting from the October 1972 see Talbot R. B. 'The European
Community's Regional Fund. A study in the politics of redistribution' in Progress in Planning. 1977, Vol. 8,
Part 3, pp. 183-281, Pergamon Press; and H. Wallace 'The establishment of the regional development Fund:
Common Policy or Pork Barrel?' in Wallace W., H. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.) (1977) Policy making in the
European Communities, London, John Wiley & Sons.
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agricultural reform6. By this account, regional competence emerged as the result of the UK's
insistence on financial compensation to which the Community consented, with the support of mainly
the Irish and the Italian delegations, through the creation of a ERDF. However, the process of
acceptance of such a new objective for the Community, particularly through its deliberate linking to
the development of EMU and to the developments in the agricultural domain, have not been raised
sufficiently. In fact, literature on die history of EMU has 'dropped' comments on the policy linkages
between the regional dossier and die EMU Programme8, but bodi die parallel progress of bodi
dossiers, and particularly die nature of die fuelling of Community regional action provided by die
commitment to EMU, has been neglected. This diesis aims to fill diese gaps.
In order to address die emergence, construction and negotiation of a regional policy dossier, diis
thesis began widi a search for die trigger(s) to regional concerns in die Community in the historical
archives of bodi die Commission and the Council. It has to be acknowledged diat previous to
commencing die search for documentation, a deliberate restriction was self-imposed in order to
delimit the universe of data on die emergence and construction of regional aims into a manageable
size. Thus, effectively, die search was conducted on documentation spanning from 1959 to 1975 in a
handful of policy areas, namely:
• dossiers catalogued under die search key 'regional',
• dossiers relating to medium-term economic policy,
• dossiers relating to EMU,
• documentation concerning die control of regional aid schemes'.
This deliberate choice for the latter policy areas was informed by a preliminary exploration of those
domains where, directly or indirectly, die genesis of a regional concern appeared to have begun
and/or been nurtured.
6 See p. 50-70 of George S. (1990) An awkward partner. Britain in the European Community, Oxford, Oxford
University Press; or p. 6-7 ofWallace W. (ed.), (1980) Britain in Europe, London, Heinemman.
7 This rather prosaic view has been put forward by the Press as well as by concrete remarks of high civil
servants in the Commission. See for instance Europe. Thursday 1 February 1973, no 1213 (new series) p. 9,
where former Commissioner for DGXVI states in front to a British audience 'that it was only after a very
vigorous intervention by Mr Heath that the Summit was able to agree on this requirement for a regional
development fund'. This explanation has been largely followed (Clout H. (1976) The regional, problem in
Western Europe, Cambridge University Press, p. 54; Denton G. 'Regional divergence and policy in the
Community with special reference to enlargement' p. 141 in Hodges M. & W. Wallace (eds.) (1981) Economic
divergence in the European Community, London, George Allen and Unwin; etc.).
8 See for instance: Tsoukalis L. (1977), The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration,
London, George Allen & Unwin.
9 Concerning documentation on the field of regional aids control the results of the search cannot be described as
fully successful, at least in comparison with the results attained with both medium-term economic policy and
the EMU dossiers. Although good documentation was collected, some particular meetings of national
representatives and experts on state aids and the Commission were searched in vain, and some seemingly
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Thus, as regards the method and the data used for this thesis, the contents and arguments below are
the product of a study and interpretation of historical records, namely, of primary archive material
from the Commission and the Council. Importantly, the arguments developed in this thesis are
informed principally by source material i.e. primary documentation rather than interviews, or
published sources, newspapers or secondary material. Internal documentation seemed a more
transparent, un-mediated and reliable source than information available in the public domain or the
information gathered in interviews (particularly since internal documentation is neither subject to
deceptive wording nor to audience constraints); and resort to secondary bibliography and newspaper
sources was made only where original archive data was unavailable10. It is also worth noting that the
information emerging from internal preparatory documents, working papers, or minutes of
Commission and Council meetings, as opposed to final published texts, in the majority of cases
revealed insights and trade-offs which, clearly, would not necessarily have been obvious from the
final texts.
Thus, through official procedures11, access was gained to a large number of unpublished internal
documents ranging from minutes of sessions of tire Council, Coreper and the Commission, to
working documents of these institutions, internal correspondence, etc. previous to January 1974. The
bibliography lists all the declassified material which has been used for this thesis, noting the nature
and the types of documents which were used as data sources. The contribution of the thesis,
therefore, resides on the collection of a large cross-policies sample of original documentation, and on
its interpretation.
Indeed, among this universe of detailed data, the research involved a subjective identification,
evaluation and selection of information, the drawing of connections between policy areas and tire
important sessions gathering the Commission and national representatives concerning proposals for the
development of policy guidelines in the examination of compatibility were never found.
10 Interviews were, in fact, also conducted but they did not result very fruitful Those interviewed ignored the
details of the process of emergence and negotiation and, second, the whereabouts of civil servants involved on
the regional dossier during the 1960s and 1970s proved difficult to find.
11 Generally speaking, the access to both Council and Commission documents is broadly and pervasively
regulated by the so-called 30 years rule, which -as in many member states- imposes such a period of seclusion
before internal documents can be released for public access. But things are not so simple for, concerning some
type of documents such as verbatims or documents from the Legal Service, the 30 years rule does simply not
seem to apply. Here an ad hoc and specific request for access has to be submitted even if the document in
question is no longer under the 30 years veil. The access to Council documents is regulated by Council decision
of 20 December 1993 [Council decision on public access to Council documents (93/731/EC), OJ L 340/43 of
31.12.93], The access to Commission's internal documents was first regulated by a code of conduct subscribed
by the Council and the Commission [Code of Conduct concerning public access to Council and Commission
documents (93/730/EC), OJ L340/41 of 31.12.93] and completed by a Commission decision of 8 February 1994
[Commission decision (94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom) of 8 February 1994 on public access to Commission
documents, OJ L46/58 of 18.2.1994] -modified on 19 September 1996 [Commission decision of 19 September
1996 modifying decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom concerning public access to Commission documents]. A
resolution of transparency was also made in Declaration no. 17 of the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference;
and on February 2000, on the basis of article 255 of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission transmitted to the
Council a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [COM(2000) 30 final/2].
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explaining of events. Misinterpretation or missing factual information, etc. may have been
responsible for errors. Unfortunately, there has not been sufficient research to allow a comparability
or a confrontation of the various developments examined, particularly in so far as Lhe period before
1972 is concerned12. Nonetheless, the bibliography will convey, first in the size of the sample
collected, and second, in die quality of the data, the effort made in trying to minimise the scope of
misinterpretation and the failing to hit vital information.
The thesis has not entered into the domestic politics which determined national positions, and when
occasionally it has discussed a national policy position, it has done so by resorting to secondary
bibliography -as in the case of national interests concerning the EMU Programme13.
Although the role of the Commission and of some of its DGs is analysed in detail, this diesis has not
tried to map out inter-institutional dynamics in die Community. The particular emphasis that has
been put on the Commission is due to its decisive role in die emergence and construction of a
regional dossier. On die odier hand, the Council is fundamentally presented from die point of view of
its role of defender of national interests and scrutiniser of die Commission's proposals. The thesis
has spelled out the positions of mainly diose national delegations most influential in die negotiations
over the regional dossier, but the analysis has not entered into the domestic politics behind die
recorded national preferences. As regards die European Parliament and die Economic and Social
Committee, die internal documentation on which this diesis is based simply did not provide any
evidence to allow one to conclude any defined influence in either the process of construction or
negotiation. This does not mean that a form of influence did not occur; radier, diat from die
documentation collected no definite statement can be made on their influence in the process leading
to die adoption of die regulations of March 1975.
As far as die contents of each chapter are concerned, Chapter I identifies die historical background
and die emergence of a specific and fundamental regional concern, notably as conceptualised for die
first time by 1968-1969 in die context of a Community at risk of internal divisions as a result of a
situation of divergence in bodi economic evolutions and economic policies of its members. Such a
regional objective for die Community was defined as die need to approximate regional structures for
dieir effects on economic and policy convergence.
Chapter II examines die role of die Commission in die process of construction of a regional dossier.
Chapter II places die eventually successful conceptualisation of a regional objective in die context of
die range of possible alternative formulations arising from various policy considerations prevailing at
12 This seems to be the case in so far as the development of a regional aid policy is concerned, but also on the
interactions with the EMU ups-and-downs of the early 1970s, or on the cradle that Medium-term economic
policy Programmes were for substantial regional aims.
13 The history of EMU is not the history of regional policy but, nonetheless, the progress of the regional dossier
proved to be dependent on EMU developments in the early 1970s and, therefore, it simply was necessary to
identify the interaction between the two dossiers.
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the time. It reveals the terms in which various Directorate Generals (DGs) of the Commission had
(or developed) an interest in regional policy and the varying interactions between these various
policy perspectives in a regional policy dossier under construction. Rather than aiming at inferring
about this complex institution, Chapter 11 delimits the concrete historical and step-by-step manner in
which the power of initiative, formulation and triggering by the Commission, and in particular, of
some of its DGs, was exercised in the concrete case of the regional dossier, while outlining the
overall technocratic character of this exercise.
Chapter III identifies the core elements of the competence that the Commission proposed to give to
the Community regarding regional policy, and those among them which proved to be more
controversial throughout the long process of negotiation spanning from 1969 till 1975.
Finally, building on die previous chapters, Chapter IV proceeds dirough die history leading to die
adoption of die regulations of 18 March 1975 by which, for the first time, die Community acquired
bodi a responsibility to co-ordinate regional policies and die capacity to transfer resources in support
of national regional policies. Chapter IV links die histories of die regional policy dossier and of
EMU to account for the acceptance of an extension of Community competence into regional
objectives. Starting from the examination of die I Barre Plan by the Council and ending in die
adoption of die regulations of March 1975, die chapter follows die process of die acceptance of a
regional responsibility. Chapter IV argues that not only bodi die emergence of a regional concern
and die acceptance by national governments of regional action was previous to and occurred beyond
the influence of die process of enlargement but that, fundamentally, die linkage of the regional
dossier to die EMU Programme was the determinant element which allowed a unanimous acceptance
of a Community regional agenda. From 1973 to 1975 die Nine negotiated die technical details of
Community intervention and some of its most political aspects i.e. die size of regional appropriations
from die Community's own resources and dieir geographical distribution.
The unfolding of a regional responsibility for die Community is a tightly tangled matter involving
the influence of various policy agendas (economic policy co-ordination, agricultural reform, control
of regional aids, enlargement and die EMU Programme). To display this web of interactions among
policy areas and dieir overlapping historical sequence leading to die regulations of March 1975 is
certainly a challenge. As a whole, diis diesis's contribution is an attempt to fill in a gap in die
literature, namely, a lack of a documented account on die emergence, construction and negotiation of
a first policy competence widiin die Community. The thesis offers an account based on declassified
internal documentation which follows die formation of a regional responsibility for die Community
from a cross-sectional analysis, and which identifies bodi die main actors and those determinant
factors leading to the first form of regional responsibility for the Community.
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1. THE EMERGENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL REGIONAL CONCERN FOR THE COMMUNITY
By 1968 the Community started to experience a situation characterised by the different economic
evolution of the economies of those States who had decided, about a decade before, to merge their
markets into the EEC6. In fact, not simply a different economic evolution but a divergent economic
evolution became manifest, with the Federal Republic ofGermany and France at opposite ends of a
wide range of diverse economic performances. This situation was significant because it was
jeopardising the continuation and the existence of the common market itself. At an early stage the
Commission urged for the recognition that such divergent economic evolution was neither fully
accounted for, nor reversible, unless action was taken on a substantial factor, namely, on the uneven
evolution of the economic structures of the Six. Beyond an explanation of the observable
asymmetrical economic evolutions confining to both macroeconornic analysis and rnacroeconomic
solutions, the Commission conceptualised a structural concern, an actual Community-specific
regional concern.
1. The scenario of divergent economic evolutions
The designers of the common market noted, in the Preamble ol' die EEC Treaty, the wish dial die
removal of trade barriers resulted naturally in a convergence of national economies i.e. in a balanced
and harmonious progress of die economies of its members. Yet, before die completion of die customs
union it became clear diat die economies of the States forming die common market were overall
performing too differently. By 1968, a divergence in die evolution of the economies of die Six
became distinctly manifest. For France and for Germany in particular, die economic scenario
appeared, comparatively speaking, extremely divergent. Each country facing different economic
problems, the customs union was certainly not bringing about an approximation of economic
performances14:




1st 2nd 3rd term 4th 1st term 2nd 3rd January-
14 The following figures were put forward by the Commission for debate with national governmental officials.
See Annexe to Commission's Memorandum on appropriate policy in the Community on current economic and
monetary problems or Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil au sujet de la politique susceptible d'etre
poursuivie au sein de la Communaute pour faire face aux problemes economiques et monetaires actuels,
Bruxelles 5 decembre 1968 [SEC(68) 3958 final]. This Memorandum of 5 December would become the core of
the Memorandum of 12 February 1969 (also referred as I Barre Plan).
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term term term term term September
EEC 167 167 170 176 177 173 (186) + 6.3 %
Germany 157 155 160 168 165 173 181 + 10.0%
France 156 153 157 159 164 134 167 - 0.3 %
Italy 220 226 224 231 231 237 (238) + 5.4%
Netherlands 185 186 185 200 208 208 (207) + 12.1 %
Belgium 155 152 150 156 162 163 (165) + 7.2 %
Luxembourg 122 119 120 121 121 123 129 + 3.3 %
b) in relation to unemployment figures -in thousands:
Table 1.2
1967 1968 1968/1967
1st 2nd 3rd term 4th 1st 2nd 3rd January-
term term term term term term September
Germany 409 517 467 446 407 318 240 - 30.7 %
France 167 188 203 227 238 255 270 + 36.6 %
Italy 1056 1048 1013 975 961 958 - -
Netherlands 75 85 85 88 88 83 75 + 0.3 %
Belgium 75 85 87 96 100 106 103 + 25,5%
c) as regards consumer prices:
Table 1.3, Indices 1958= 100
1967 1968 1968/1967
1st 2nd 3rd term 4th term 1st term 2nd 3rd January-
term term term term September
Germany 123.2 123.8 123.6 123.1 124.8 125.1 125.0 1.1 %
France 138.2 138.8 139.7 141.7 143.6 144.6 146.3 4.3 %
Italy 136.1 137.0 138.0 138.5 138.8 139.2 138.9 1.5 %
Belgium 121.7 123.4 123.7 124.7 125.6 126.2 127.1 2.8 %
Luxembourg 116.9 117.5 119.0 119.8 120.6 121.1 121.1 2.8 %
Netherlands 134 139 138 137 139 141.8 142.6 3.1%
d) balance of trade (in million US $):
Table 1.4
1967 1968
1st term 2nd term 3rd term 4th term 1st term 2nd term 3rd term
EEC + 167.8 + 284.6 + 124.0 + 187.4 + 662.5 + 164.1 + 447.2
Germany + 1098.0 + 1167.0 + 1022.1 + 1093.3 + 1121.0 + 882.8 + 1090.1
France -410.9 - 140.6 -212.8 -237.9 - 115.1 - 336.4 - 220.8
Italy - 156.5 - 191.6 - 309.6 - 282.0 + 66.5 -77.3 - 82.2
Netherlands - 286.1 - 289.0 -212.4 -260.1 - 329.0 - 220.2 - 212.4
Belgium/ -5.2 - 46.4 - 58.4 -8.5 -47.2 + 50.7 - 14.5
Luxembourg
19
The figures above (Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4) displayed a particularly striking divergence right at
the core of the Community i.e. between Germany and France, as well as asymmetrical performances
among the other countries15. In fact, they exposed an alarming trend from a European perspective.
Although the late 1960s were characterised by increases in the costs of production and in price levels
together with high levels of demand, what was becoming an increasing worry for the Community
was the divergent evolution of those elements. Indeed, from 1966 notable differences in the evolution
of the costs of production started to appear among the EEC countries16, and price levels started to
evolve in a largely divergent fashion from one member state to the next. In other words, besides the
absolute increases in costs and in price levels across the common market17, more importantly, costs
and price levels were increasing unevenly and, as a result, the gap between higher and lower
increases was widening. The relevance of this situation resided on the margin created between price
levels when in contact, particularly, at both ends of the spectrum i.e. the differential gap between the
countries where price levels were the lowest and the ones where prices levels were the highest. A
comparison of price rises between Germany and the other member countries during the period 1966-
1969 presented the following picture:
Table I. 5: Differentials in price increases18
Germany - Italy 1,7
Germany - Belgium 5,5
Germany - Netherlands 7,0
Germany - France 8,4
In addition, there were no grounds to expect a change to this scenario. Indeed, the national
hypothesis i.e. the governments' forecasts, of price levels in the medium term were revealed to be
largely disparate. The national economic projections for the period 1966 to 1973/1975 on the
evolution of prices were as follows: for Germany an annual increase of 2%, for France an annual rise
of around 3%, for Italy a figure of 1.7%, for the Netherlands a 3%, for Belgium a hypothesis of circa
3% per year and Luxembourg would align with the main commercial partners19.
15 For an exposition of the main features of the French and German economic evolutions, see part 111 p. 449-472
of Boltho A. (ed.) (1982) Tlte European Economy. Growth and crisis, Oxford University Press, or p. 261-303 of
Denton G.R. and J.J.N Cooper (eds.) (1977) The European economy beyond the crisis: from stabilisation to
structural change, College of Europe, Bruges, De Tempel.
16 Avis du Comite rnonetaire sur le Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil du 12 fevrier 1969, 9 mai 1969,
p. 2.
17 In Italy and in the Netherlands the annual increases in salaries were eventually higher than those resulting
from the events ofMay and June 1968 in France.
18 That is, Hausses dijferentiell.es des prix (indice prix du PNB) cumulees (en %). See p. 6 of Commission,
Strategies alternatives d'evolution a moyen terme du niveau des prix et leurs consequences pour le marche
commun, Bruxelles 24 janvier 1969. [21535/11/68].
19 Figures are collected from the preparation of the III Medium-term economic policy Programme (1971-1975),
hereafter referred as HI MTEP Programme.
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But, why was this situation of divergence in price levels for the common market worrying? The
Commission sentenced with accurate premonition:
There are grounds to expect that, all conditions remaining the same, but retaining the hypothesis
of a removal of the protective measures recently adopted, the accumulation from 1966 to 1975 of
the annual divergences in the levels of prices of the member States will provoke external
disequilibria. Even though the general evolution of prices does not determine alone external
trade, the differences appearing from now till 1975 (particularly between Germany and Italy on
the one hand, and between France and the Benelux countries on the other) would be too
important to be able to reconcile these evolutions without involving disturbances in the intra-
Community balance. One can also deduce that the disequilibria that can be expected in the area
of external trade would be reinforced by sudden speculative movements20.
In odier words, to start with, the divergent evolution of prices posed a threat in so far as wide
differentials in price levels were likely to affect external balance. Indeed, the real risks of divergence
were posed in the medium term since although certainly national competitiveness was not solely
dictated by price levels, in die medium and long term, large differences in price levels were bound to
have an effect on external balance i.e. on bodi the balance of trade and die balance of payments. But,
secondly, payments imbalances in die longer term were likely to be accompanied by speculative
movements, which were going to demonstrate diat first, a position of surplus in die balance of
payments of a country could be reversed very rapidly, and second, diat the reserves of a country could
drain away swiftly in a very short period of time. Indeed, in January 1968 price divergences were not
posing a direat to die fundamental equilibrium of national payments since die position of die balance
of payments of all members had been in surplus and also countries held considerable reserves21 -and
occasional monetary adjustments in France, Germany and die Netherlands had compensated for die
divergences in price levels22. Yet, by November 1968 speculation attacked mainly die FF and die DM
(point 17.1, chapter IV) provoking die abrupt exhaustion of gold and reserves in one country and
dieir accumulation in die odier, dius calling for protective measures and/or exchange rate
adjustments.
Indeed, situations of severe external imbalance were particularly pernicious to common market rules
since die most likely national reaction aiming at recovering equilibrium (while tariffs, quantitative
restrictions or equivalent measures were now ruled out) had become the resorting to currency
adjustments23, which, certainly involved alterations to exchanges and distortion of competition
20 See Commission, Strategies alternatives, p. 8. See original French text in Appendix.
21 See p. 10 of the Commission Memorandum of 12 February 1969 (I Barre Plan).
2~ See the parity modifications in footnote 25.
23 In case of disequilibria in the balance of payments within a common market, national governments could still
resort to: certain commercial restrictions, control of the exchanges, modification of parity, or to adjustments by
the mechanisms of costs and revenues i.e. by manipulation of demand. Other possible measures to
counterbalance disequilibrium in the balance of payments were, according to the Commission, measures for the
movement of labour and capital among member States. But these seemed difficult to attain: movement of labour
was intrinsically limited and long term movements of capital were unrealistic. Furthermore, these deliberate
movements would not escape to need to tackle the divergences in prices. See Commission, Strategies
alternatives p. 11-12, or see p. 9-10 of the draft of second Commission Memorandum on medium-term
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conditions with the risk of provoking a de facto fracturing of the common market. Clearly a
fluctuation of currencies meant a straight modification of the conditions of competition, punishing
commercially, diose countries where, comparatively, die currency value had increased -the latter
being die general case for all goods except for agricultural products which enjoyed compensatory
measures. In sum, national reactions to disequilibrium in the balance of payments -resulting from
accumulated differentials in die evolution of prices- were likely to result in severe disruptions to
intra-Community trade, which in turn would have an effect on optimal national and Community
growth and undermine die economic policy objectives of interdependent partners.
Thus, from late 1968 it became apparent diat, apart from die external sources of monetary instability
(the increasingly obvious shortcomings of the post-war monetary system (pointl7.1, chapter IV)), die
divergent evolution of prices within die Community was effectively putting in question the
maintenance of stable parities; or in odier words, that there were internal economic causes for
monetary turmoil. Notably, die Community became entangled in a succession of monetary crises
which, according to die Commission, were largely die expression of the persistence of substantial
divergences in die internal economic evolutions of die member states24. Indeed, not only from 1966
price evolutions widiin die common market members followed very different routes but, moreover,
by the end of 1969 diis process was followed by a subsequent disparate evolution of European
currencies in relation to die US dollar -notably regarding the FF and die DM. A recurrent pattern
was observable: revaluations of DM and Dutch guilder and devaluations of FP5. Indeed, die
evolution of die price rate of a gold dollar in relation to die European currencies offered die
following picture for 1971 and for 197226:
Table 1.6: Value of a gold dollar expressed in national currencies:
1 January 1958 1 January 1971 Variation 1 January 1972 Variation
1958 -1971 1958 - 1972
Germany 4,20 DM 3,66 DM + 14.8 % 3,2225 DM + 30,3 %
guidelines i.e. Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen teime, Objet: Projet de memorandum sur
les orientations a moyen tenne, Bruxelles 7 Novembre 1969 [17902/11/69].
24 See p. 1 of Projet de memorandum sur les orientations a moyen tenne [17902/11/69], that is what it would
became on 15 December 1969 the Memorandum on medium-term guidelines for economic policy in the
Community (1971-1975).
25 The dates and rates of the monetary adjustments are the following: for Germany, 6 March 1961 (1$= 4.0DM,
that is +5.0%) and 27 October 1969 (1$= 3.66 DM, that is +9.29%); for the Netherlands 7 March 1961 (1$=
3.62 Fl., that is +5.0%); whereas for France for 11 August 1957 and 29 December 1958 (1$= 4.93706 FF, that
is -29.11%) and 11 August 1969 (1$= 5.55419 FF, that is -11.11%).
26 Commission, 'Regional policy and economic and monetary union, Geographical disequilibria in the light of
the implementation of fundamental economic equilibrium', Brussels 19 October 1971, page 4, hereafter
referred as Cros Report [XVl/137/71 ]. For the data regarding 1972 see: Commission, 'Politique regionale et
Union economique et monetaire', Expose de M Jacques Cros, Directeur general de la Politique regionale a la
Commission des Communautes Europeennes, lors du Deuxieme Symposium Europeen de Management a Davos
le 25 janvier 1972.
From 1.1.1958 to 1.11.1974 the real value of currencies evolved as follows: DM= +30.4%, FF= -28.6 %, Fl =
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£0,357143 £0,416667 - 14,3 % £0,38379 - 6,9 %
Ultimately, parity fluctuations of the currencies of those forming the common market were
irreconcilable with the unity and continuation of the common market; or in other words, there
appeared that there was a limit for currency oscillations within the common market. The
Commission estimated that parity fluctuations between the currencies of the Six of more than 0.75%
could produce severe setbacks on the free movement of intra-Community exchanges.
Finally, the risk of divergent evolution of prices also posed a problem for common policies,
particularly for the common agricultural policy (CAP). Notably, in tire common agricultural market,
up and running since 1962 and based on common prices (which were expressed in units of account
(u.a.) and which remained unmodified) a uniform fluctuation of currencies to the US dollar and the
gap between the fluctuation in the member states trespassing a range of 2% below and a maximum of
2.5%27, would call for measures of compensation -in the frontiers of the countries affected by the
fluctuations- thus hampering exchanges and fracturing the internal agricultural market2'.
In sum, from December 1968 the Commission raised the alarm on the threats that a scenario of price
divergence meant for the common market. On a general level, die evolution of prices revealed a
scenario of widening differences between die economies of die member states; and, on more concrete
grounds, a situation of a large divergence in price levels in die medium term bore the risk of
unleashing a spiral of detrimental effects which could put in jeopardy die continuation of the
common market and its main policies.
2. The underlying problem of incompatibility of national policy options with the functioning of
the market and the exercises of confrontation of medium term economic policy choices.
Over and above the fact diat die divergence in die evolution of price levels were, according to die
Commission, putting the common market at risk, die trudi was that by no means were the level of
27 Commission, seance du 8 mai 1971 [COM(71) PV162] p. 25, 26 noted: 'If the gap between the fluctuations of
the different countries in question remains below a level of 2 % or of maximum 2.5% it would be possible to
avoid the introduction of compensatory measures, and therefore, avoiding the fractionating of the agricultural
market without creating noticeable perturbations in the agricultural markets'. Original French text in appendix.
See also p. 10 of Commission, Consequences pour la Communaute de la situation actuelle dans les domaines
monetaires et commerciaux, Bruxelles 13 septembre 1971 [SEC(71) 3274 final].
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prices (or should they be considered) as a fixed given. In fact, first, the evolution of prices were an
indicator of tensions29, but second, and more importantly, the general level of prices30 was certainly a
projection, a hypothesis, ultimately, the result of a political decision reconciling economic objectives.
From a national perspective, price levels were an outcome, a product, which encapsulated a
deliberate political weighing of some major interrelated macroeconomic factors -economic growth,
employment, balance of payments.
Furthermore, beyond the national choices and from a Community perspective, price levels involved a
deliberate positioning between domestic internal objectives and external equilibrium. Although
during the late 1960s particularly large countries had prioritised internal objectives over external
stability31 (and, thus, underestimated consequent side effects at Community level, such as wide price
differentials and monetary adjustments), by the end of die transition period, in a scenario of
interdependence, economic policy choices had started to bear immediate consequences on
commercial partners. But, in which precise terms did die question of interdependence arise?
The first most obvious form was commercial interdependence. Indeed, during die period 1958-1968
i.e. during the establishment of the customs union, intra-Community trade increased firmly'2. But,
particularly once die customs union brought along an increasing commercial inter-flow, striking
fundamental equilibrium in die balance of trade and the balance of payments gained vital
importance. In turn, in such an increasing openness of the economies, national policies and
subsequent measures arising from national conceptions regarding price evolution could alter the
conditions of exchanges and modify fundamental equilibrium nationally but, also could affect die
conditions of equilibrium of commercial partners. Most noticeably, if a situation of national
disequilibrium appeared, unilateral policies restricting intra-Community trade -either in die form of
commercial or, particularly, parity protection- would have a direct effect 011 plans of production, of
28 Thus, the devaluation of the FF of 11 August 1969 led to an insulation of the French agricultural market and
to the introduction of a system of border taxes in order to avoid, as a consequence of the devaluation, the raising
of French agricultural prices in domestic currency terms. Tsoukalis L. (1977), Op. cit., p. 76.
29 In Commission's words: 'The rise in the general level of prices represents a criterion, although somehow
rough, of evaluation of those tensions which intervene in the processes of production and of distribution of
revenues occurring due to economic, structural or political reasons. The rise in price levels shows the degree of
success with which the claims of different social groups and of public administrations have been satisfied in
relation to the gross national product in real terms'. Commission, Strategies alternatives, p. 1-2. Original
French text in appendix.
30 By 'general level of prices' the Commission understood the implicit index of price of the gross national
product at market prices as it is defined in the framework of national accounts. Regarding the conventional
criterion of evaluation of prices i.e. the index of the cost of living, it was applied only to a part of the national
product. Original French text in appendix.
31 Commission, Memorandum of 15 December 1969 on medium-term guidelines for economic policy of the
Community, p. 6-7.
32 The share of intra-Community trade within the total EEC trade moved from 30% in 1958 to 45% in 1968.
Intra-Community trade reached an average 8% of GNP of the member countries and 1/12 of the members'
incomes came from products exported to the partners and another 1/12 from imports from the partners. See
these figures on p.7 of draft of the Commission Memorandum of December 1969 on medium-term guidelines
[17902/D/69],
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sale and of investment of the economic agents in other members apart from undermining business
confidence in die irreversibility of the establishment of the conditions of an internal market. In
particular, national policies to prevent the loss of reserves and other exceptional safeguard measures
not only affected the freedom of transactions and the circulation of the factors of production, but also
bore consequences on the rhythm of growth of both the country in disequilibrium and of its most
dependent trade partners, and forced sudden modifications of economic policy by partners. In sum,
by die end of die transition period, nationally conceived economic policies no longer bore dieir sole
effects widiin national boundaries; radier, it was emerging that not solely national projections for
price levels in the medium term -being substantially die result of different national preferences and
priorities regarding various general economic objectives- had, in increasing conditions of
interdependence, immediate effects on the functioning of die common market but, notably,
underestimating die effects of national priorities on die Community was proving pernicious for the
adequate functioning of die common market.
Price levels being die result of national policy choices, the corollary was obvious: national policy
options had to be confronted and co-ordinated -especially a priori- at Community level, for die
functioning of the market in die medium term was at stake. That is, not solely for die effects of
interdependence but, rather, for die scenario of divergence was putting die unity and die functioning
of the market at risk, the need for embarking the Community on an actual elaboration of reconciled
global objectives of economic policy had become an imperative:
If an effective harmonisation of the orientations in the medium term becomes impossible in the
course of the following years, the development of the Community would risk to be compromised,
either by the adoption of protectionist measures which would undermine the common market
and lead finally to a slow down in the growth of the whole of the Community, or by rigorous
policies of adaptation to the evolution of partner countries, by which the economic and social
consequences would be harmful, or by modifications in the monetary parity, which are in
principle contrary to the market logic and to the principle of an EMU, or finally by resort to new
forms of relations of exchange that would compromise the continuation of the monetary
integration.
The harmonisation of the orientations in the medium term, likewise as the co-ordination of
policies in the short term, is the inevitable consequence of the choice made by the member
States of the Community in favour of the establishment of customs union that would embrace
their economies. To refuse such harmonisation means to put into question that choice33.
In sum, die convergence of national economies required the co-ordination of national economic
policies.
But, in fact, since April 1964 a forum to confront national economic policies as well as an accepted
mediod to facilitate economic policy co-ordination for die medium term existed, namely, die
Medium-term economic policy Committee and die elaboration of medium-term economic policy
33 See p. 9-10 of the draft of the Commission Memorandum of December 1969 on medium-term guidelines
[17902/11/69]. Original French text in appendix.
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programmes34. Tlie Medium-term economic policy Committee had come to light, from Commission's
initiative35, as a forum of consultation and of debate on national economic policy options36. It
gathered the economic ministers of the Six countries under the chair of a national representative and
Commission's secretariat37. Indeed, since 1964 member States had approved to undertake exercises
of study and review of national economic policies as the groundwork for an effective co-ordination of
short and long term economic policies, and also had agreed to the elaboration of Programmes as the
method to materialise such co-ordination of national economic policies in the medium term. In fact,
for ten years38, the Medium-term economic policy Committee's main task was the preparation of
programmes and the evaluation of the implementation of co-ordinated policy guidelines. Indeed, in
April 1964 the medium term programmes were agreed to be solely indicative in the sense that they
would state governments' key economic projections and intentions regarding major economic policy
areas. Medium-term economic policy programmes would depart from a confrontation of already
espoused national economic policies and, upon them, common denominator guidelines would be put
forward to guide national economic policies within a Community framework for the following five
year period. In short, the confrontation of the policies was post factum, secondly, the programmes
34 See Decision du Conseil (64/247/CEE) du 15 Avril 1964 creant un Comite de politique economique a moyen
terme, JO 1031/64 du 22.4.64.
35 In 1962 the Commission presented its programme of action for the second phase as directed towards an
objective: the co-ordination of national economic policies. See all the documentation in the run up to the
creation of the Medium-term economic policy Committee in bibliography under the heading: The origins of
medium-term economic policy co-ordination.
36 Commission, La politique economique a moyen terme de la Communaute, Note d'infonnation Porte-parole
de la Commission, 31 Juillet 1963. Procedures aiming at the co-ordination of short-term economic policies and
of budgets were already in place in 1963, but an additional examination in common in the medium-term was
judged necessary by the Commission on various grounds, notably, ensuring balanced expansion and monetary
stability, facilitating the co-ordination of short-term economic policies and developing a more efficient long
term view of public finances to ensure internal and external economic equilibrium. Co-ordination of economic
policies in the medium-term would also allow governments to be aware of the policies of the commercial
partners and, in some specific cases, to prevent detrimental effects caused by unilateral policies such as
structural measures on particular sectors in decline
37 In its first legislature (1964-1966) the Medium-term economic policy Committee gathered: -president- Dr. W.
Langer (Staatssekretar in Bundesministerium ftir Wirtschaft); -vicepresidents- Prof. G. Brouwers (Secretaris-
Generaal van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken) and P. Masse (Cornmissaire General au Plan
d'Equipement et a la Productivite)\ and Dr. O. Schlecht (Ministerialrat in Bundesministerium fiir Wirtschaft),
M. Kervin de Lettenhove (Secretaire General du Bureau de Programmation Economique), Dr. G. Landriscina
(Vice Segretario Generate del Comitato Italiano per la Ricostruzione, Ministero del Bilancio), J. Schmidt
(Conseiller du Gouvernement au Ministere de I'economie nationale). From the Commission: R. Marjolin and L.
Levi-Sandri (vice-Presidents of the Commission), H. von der Groeben, and as alternates F. Bobba (Director
general of DGII) and A. Prate (Director General of DG III). During the elaboration of the III MTEP Programme
the representative of the Commission in the Medium-term economic policy Committee was normally Raymond
Barre and an alternate.
38 That is, till it merged on 18 February 1974 with the Conjuncture Committee and the Budgetary Committee to
form the larger Economic policy Committee.
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constituted a set of recommendations without binding value, and third, the drawn guidelines were
qualitative -rather titan quantitatively defined39.
These guidelines laid down in the programmes rested on national projections and on a forecast of the
economic evolution in the medium term for the whole of the Community. The preliminary economic
analysis of the most likely economic perspectives was undertaken by a sub-group of the Medium-
term economic policy Committee i.e. the Group for quantitative economic projections. The Group for
economic projections would study the hypothesis of diverse economic policy options, and would
display, resting on the intended national projections, the most likely economic evolution and the
consequences for the Community of national decisions40. Clearly the task of this Group was not the
co-ordination of economic policies but the detection and indication of the long term effects of
national decisions; in other words, once the consequences of the national hypothesis had been laid
open, it was for the Medium-term economic policy Committee to draw conclusions and, finally, for
the Council to decide upon the co-ordination of policies. The forecasts of the economic evolution in
the medium term comprised the perspectives as regards employment, growth, national budgets,
monetary and financial stability, external equilibrium as well as the evolution of major economic
sectors and their relationship, so that emergent inconsistencies could be revealed and incompatible
decisions avoided. In its I and II MTEP Programmes41, the Medium-term economic policy Committee
confronted national objectives of economic policy in the medium term, but in these both cases the
programmes were not much more than a set of statements regarding the Governments'
macroeconomic intentions as well as particular conceptions of various policy domains which had
already been adopted nationally12.
By 1968, however, the severe threats of a scenario of economic divergence were going to call for
upgrading the scope of the exercises of economic policy co-ordination beyond the narrow nature and
reach of the I and II MTEP Programmes. Indeed, it was at the time of the preparation of the III
MTEP Programme that the divergence in economic policy orientations and the risks for the
continuation of the common market erupted as evident43. Notably, national projections for the period
39 A very clear exposition of the stages of qualitative programming is given by F. Bobba to the European
Parliament, see EP's Commission economique et financiere, Proces-verbal de la reunion du jeudi 15 Novemhre
1962, Bruxelles, p.2-3 [PE 8959].
40 See Conseil, Aide-memoire de la reunion du groupe des questions economiques, tenue les 22 novembre 1963
concernant la recommandation de la Commission au Conseil sur la politique economique a moyen tenne de la.
Communaute, 20 Decembre 1963, p. 2. [R/1204/63 (AG 445) (ECO 46)].
41 See Premier Programme de Politique economique a moyen tenne (1966-1970), JO 1531/67 du 25.4.67; and
Deuxieme Programme de Politique economique a moyen tenne (1968-1970), JO L 129 du 30.5.69.
42 See Conseil, Troisierne programme de politique economique a moyen tenne (1971-1975), JO L 49 du 1.3.71.
43 In fact, however, at the time of the adoption of the I MTEP Programme the Commission had already noted
that the coherence of national projections had only been examined in a rather superficial manner. Marjolin put
in question both the significance given to Community perspectives and the procedures for establishing the
perspectives for the Community and denounced contradictions among national projections. See p. 6-7 of
Commission, Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen tenne (1966-1970), Bruxelles 29 Avril
1966 ]II/G(66) 186],
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1970-1975 for the preparation of the III MTEP Programme revealed a serious divergence in the
national hypodieses regarding price levels, namely, a disparate domestic appreciation of the
conditions for 'juggling' with major macroeconomic objectives of economic growdi, prices,
employment and external balance. The confrontation of national projections revealed diat
Governments aimed at embarking on widely different economic strategies in order to attain a
different range of priority economic objectives and, in particular, the accumulative effect of these
differences in the medium term was what brought serious grounds for alarm.
In fact, already in 1965, diat is on the eve of the adoption of die I MTEP Programme, die
Commission had warned of gaps and contradictions in the confrontation of national economic
policies44 and had also clearly exposed such a scenario of divergence in its Memorandum of 5
December 196845. But, by die beginning of 1969 die compatibility of national preferences and
priorities was, for die first time, overtly put in doubt by the Commission and raised directly to the
Council in die form of a Memorandum which, raising the risks of divergent performances and
policies, proposed actions on various fronts, notably, 'to flock' national policies togedier into a set of
inter-compatible macro-economic objectives, to improve the co-ordination of short term economic
policies, to set up mechanisms lor monetary co-operation and, for the first time, to outline actions to
act upon sources of divergence i.e. structural and regional factors.
3. The Commission's Memorandums of 1969
As stated earlier, knowledge of die divergent national projections and dieir potential risks arose in
die context of the preparation of die III MTEP Programme, but it was die Commission who -on its
own initiative- acted to bring the Council's attention to the potential risks arising from die
divergence in die evolutions, as well as the economic policies, of the Six. Concretely, die
Commission collected the evidence and die analyses from die confrontation of the national
projections for die period 1970-1975 and brought up die concern about the likely risks to die Council
via two subsequent Memorandums: the first in February 1969 and the second in December 196946.
44 Indeed, in the I MTEP Programme -which had been an exercise of stating and commonly debating a handful
of economic policies intended to be followed by national governments for the period- the Commission had
warned member states that the hypothesis and previsions on which their economic policies rested upon were
fragile and raised reserves both in relation to the compatibility of the orientations taken in the medium term and
regarding the coherence of the national orientations themselves. See Commission's introduction to the I MTEP
Programme and particularly: Projet de recommandation de la Commission an Conseil, presente par M.
Marjolin an avant-projet de Premier programme de politique econornique a moyen tenne, Bruxelles 22 avril
1966, p. 6-8 [H/G(66) 186] [or p.56 in II/(G) 186 rev.].
45 Memorandum on appropriate policy in the Community on current economic and monetary problems i.e.
Commission, Memorandum au sujet de la politique susceptible d'etre poursuivie an sein de la Communaute
pourfaire face aux problemes economiques et monetaires actuels, Bruxelles 5 Decembre 1968.
46 The first Memorandum of February 1969 was: Commission, Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur
la coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute, Bruxelles
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Besides depicting such a scenario of economic and policy divergence, the Memorandum of 12
February 1969 on die co-ordination of economic policies and monetary co-operation -prepared by
DGII's Commissioner Raymond Barre and so-referred as die I Barre Plan- put forward a multi-
stranded set of proposals, notably, co-ordination of national economic policies in die medium term
(policy compatibility), better co-ordination of short term economic policies (improvement of
consultation procedures), the creation of a mechanism for monetary co-operation and, crucially for
our purposes, structural actions. But no draft proposals -apart from a draft decision on die co¬
ordination of die current economic policies of die member states- were appended to die I Barre Plan;
radier, die memorandum was presented as die wide policy backdrop from which to launch action in
various interrelated fields.
3.1. Economic policy compatibility
Concerning the convergence of evolutions and of policies, Barre proposed to define a priori die
limits of tolerability of policy divergence or, in odier words, to define die confines of mutual
compatibility of national economic policies. The compatibility of national economic policies with
diat of the partners was proposed to be measured and operate on the basis of four major
macroeconomic indicators; growth rates, employment, prices and balance of payments. These
indicators not only had the quality of conveying a syndiesis of economic policy orientations, but diey
were also, in diemselves, global objectives in die medium term47. These four indicators offered a
picture of die national options taken in dealing with die 'magic triangle': prices, growdi and external
balance. Also crucially, die search for die compatibility of die above national macro-economic
objectives was proposed, for the first time, to be a priori, namely to operate on die national
hypothesis, on die economic projections, so that to lay ex ante the path widiin which national
economic policies ought to gadier and converge in order to prevent disruptions in the common
market. Such compatibility of global objectives did not mean die definition of identical or unique
objectives for all countries but, radier, die definition of a range of values within which, if national
policies conformed, the risks of imbalances or monetary adjustments could be prevented18.
12 fevrier 1969 [COM(69) 150], An English version in Bulletin of the EECC. 1969 Supplement 3. The second
Memorandum was originally entitled 'sur les problemes que font apparaitre pour la Comtnunaute les
perspectives d'evolution a moyen tenne dctns les pays membres' (evolution of production, of prices, current
account and global balance ofpayments) to finally become: Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur les
orientations globales a moyen tenne (1971-1975) de la politique economique dans la Communaute, Bruxelles
15 decembre 1969 [COM(69) 1250], An English version of the second Memorandum is annexed to Bulletin of
EECC 1970.
047 Commission, Memorandum sur les problemes et les orientations de la politique economique a moyen terme.
Schema Preliminaire, 19.9.69, page 4 [ 16335/H/69].
48 The margins of compatibility of each of the indicators varied and, thus, the margins of tolerability of divergent
evolution of prices were narrower than those of growth since, even though prices and production costs did
certainly not determine the relative position of each partner in the exchanges, it was the persistence of
substantial divergences what was likely to put in question the maintenance of parities.
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In the February Memorandum, or I Barre Plan, apart from proposing that the Council held a debate
on the perspectives of evolution in the medium term and agreed to bind national economic policies to
reconciled global objectives in the medium term, the Commission also proposed control and
consultation measures directed towards short term economic policy, particularly to allow
consultations before any adoption of unilateral protective measures running against the common
interest of the functioning of the common market.
While in the Memorandum of February 1969 the Commission proposed a solution of compatibility -
among other strands of action- and asked the Council to hold a debate in autumn 1969 on the
perspectives of economic evolution for the Six, in the Memorandum of 15 December 1969 the
Commission proposed the concrete ranges for the four above-mentioned indicators demarcating the
mutual compatibility of national economic policy choices. Before (lie Commission submitted its
second Memorandum, the Council -on 17th July 1969- agreed to hold a debate on the problems
raised by the divergence of national economic evolutions by the end of 1969. Then, in December
1969 the second Commission Memorandum laid down in a second Memorandum the quantitative
projections in the four domains which compatibility was suggested to pivot upon i.e. prices, growth,
employment and balance of payments. Unlike the February Memorandum, the second Memorandum
of December 1969, providing the concrete global objectives figures was prepared in close
collaboration with national representatives at the Medium-term economic policy Committee; clearly
the attempt to define convergent objectives in the medium term could only be effective with the
acquiescence and support of this co-ordination committee. From the examination of the
Memorandum of December 1969, on 26 January 1970 the Council agreed to the co-ordination of
national policies through the definition and the operation of compatible objectives and charged the
Medium-term economic policy Committee to prepare the III MTEP Programme for the period 1971-
1975 on the basis of these quantitative compatible orientations. By so doing, the Council was
agreeing to elaborate at Community level a concerted and mutually compatible policy strategy for
price stability and growth. On 9 February 1971 the Council adopted the III MTEP Programme, and
with it, the commitment to comply to a quantitative global co-ordination of national economic
policies in the medium term.
3.2. The response to currency adjustments: monetary co-operation
Closely linked to the proposals for stronger co-ordination of economic policies, and more 'realistic'
than previous approaches launched by the former DGII's Commissioner Robert Marjolin49 (notably,
changing the stress from irrevocable fixed exchange rates to, instead, parity changes only by
49 See 'Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community for the Second Stage', 24
October 1962.
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agreement, and no longer engaging on the creation of a reserve fund but on a mutual assistance
system) the I Barre Plan aimed at monetary 'co-operation' rather than monetary 'integration'50.
The I Barre Plan envisaged two types of action in die monetary domain: an improvement in the
existing consultation arrangements, and second, die intervention of mechanisms of monetary
support. Concerning consultation arrangements, die Commission suggested to move beyond the
existing consultation procedures widiin the Monetary Committee. Concretely, the I Barre Plan
proposed that parity changes could be made only by common accord as die a priori consultations had
clearly failed to be effective and Governments had proven to largely disregard common opinions51.
Besides procedural improvements, the I Barre Plan also suggested to examine die possibility of a
complete elimination of infra-EEC margins of fluctuation and also die setting up of 'Community
machinery' to allow for short term monetary support and for medium term financial assistance. In
both cases diese mechanisms of monetary aid would intervene under certain conditions and limits,
subject to a previous stage of consultation and in cases of severe external financial difficulties.
In fact, the I Barre Plan was going to became by die end of die year, at die Hague Conference, die
basis for die launch of die EMU Programme52. The EMU programme will be examined later on
(point 17, chapter IV), we will just stress now diat in die I Barre Plan die Commission was putting
forward a multi-faceted package ofmeasures covering short-term policy co-ordination, medium term
policy compatibility, monetary co-operation and also structural actions in the aim of responding to
die widening differences between die economies of die Six. The multi-stranded nature of diis
package was going to be contested and substantial divisions in terms of strategies between mainly
France and Germany, namely a conflict over die prioritisation of economic over monetary measures
or vice versa, was going to emerge. The Commission, however, presented currency adjustments and
their divergent behaviour as being largely a consequence of economic evolutions. In odier words, a
share of responsibility of die monetary turmoil undergone by the European currencies (Table 1.6) was
stemming not only from external causes (speculative waves and die gradual crisis of die Bretton
Woods system), but were, ultimately, a reflection of an underlying pattern of economic divergence
conspicuously visible from 1968, if not earlier. But, over and above, for die I Barre Plan, neidier die
fracturing of the common market nor currency adjustments could be prevented by either solely
devising a compatible set of policies aiming at price stability, nor by improving consultations among
member states; inescapably, ensuring monetary stability -and subsequently die eventual convertibility
50 See Dyson K. (1994), Elusive Union. Tlte process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, Longman,
London, p. 72.
51 Even if consultation in case of change of parity was already functioning, the deficiencies of these
consultations was revealed in the monetary turmoil of November 1968. See Tsoukalis (1977) Op. cit. p. 69 and
76.
52 The Hague Conference of 1-2 December 1969 embraced the Commission proposal for a 'Community of
growth and of stability' and charged the creation of an ad hoc committee gathering national ministers under the
presidency of Pierre Werner to draft a plan to attain EMU by stages.
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of the Six currencies- involved the creation of the adequate economic conditions to deliver
convergence.
4. Actions on the structures: regional policy within convergence measures
From 1968 the Commission consistently defended the thesis that the divergent evolutions of the
European economies, and the subsequent monetary adjustments of the monetary turmoil during the
period 1969 to May 1971 were, partly but fairly, due to structural disparities within member states:
When one looks at the causes of the divergences observed in the course of these previous years,
it is necessary to note unpredictable factors and, notably, unexpected changes in the internal
social and political conditions of the member States. On the other hand, perturbations of the
international monetary system have not occurred without influencing notably the elements of
internal and external equilibrium. But the essential cause of these divergences are, on the one
hand, the disparities in the structures and the differences in the behaviours and, on the other, the
diversity of attitudes in relation to the conception of objectives of economic policy in the
medium term53.
According to the Commission, from 1968 structural disparities within member states started to
compromise external balance, optimal and sustained growth, and the proceeding of the integration
process.
4.1. The unveiling of the structural factor ofdivergence
To evidence the true effect of national structural conditions into the final divergent economic and
monetary evolutions at Community level, the Commission first borrowed the terms and accounts of
classic macroeconomic analysis so that to reveal that a deeper element 'manufacturing' divergence at
Community level existed, but which was not picked up by classic macroeconomic analysis based on
the evolution of prices. The Commission showed numerically that die gap of 20% of differential
between die best and worst performing currencies, reached between 1958 and 197154, could not be
accounted for without raising and considering forms and processes of disguised and contained
inflation which, although not directly showing up in macroeconomic accounts on die evolution of
consumer prices, did effectively involve a consumption of national capital. Let us see diat in more
detail.
The Commission gave evidence of the fact diat in France price levels had certainly been higher than
in die odier EEC members in die period 1958 to 1969. Indeed, macroeconomic indicators showed
diat in France and in the Nedierlands die explicit consumer price index had increased more than
elsewhere:
53 See point 4 of draft of Commission Memorandum of December 1969 on medium-term guidelines
[17902/11/69].
54 See the values of the adjustments in Table 1.6 and in footnote 25.
32
Table 1.7: Evolution of consumer prices (average annual percentage of increase)55
% 1960-65 % 1965 - 68 1969 % 1970 %
Germany 2,8 2,3 2,7 3,8
France 3,8 3,3 6,4 5,3
Italy 4,9 2,3 2,6 5,0
Netherlands 3,5 4,3 7,5 4,4
Belgium 2,5 3,2 3,8 3,9
Luxembourg - - - -
United Kingdom 3,6 3,7 5,5 6,4
The degree of observed extra inflation would certainly reflect in the final currency values, however, if
one was considering the average annual rates of growth at constant prices from 1960 to 1970 one had
to conclude that it was in France and in Italy where productivity had increased the most:
Table 1.8: Average annual rates of growth 1960-197055
Price index of the GDP at GDP per person employed GNP at constant
current prices at constant prices prices
Germany 3.47 % 4.44 % 4.92 %
France 4.46% 5.07% 5.81%
Italy 4.42% 6.13% 5.66%
Netherlands 4.85% 4.04% 5.13%
Belgium 3.45% 4.03% 4.89%
Luxembourg 3.74 % 2.67 % 3.41 %
EEC «5.00% 5.32 %
United Kingdom 4.08 % — 2.81 %
Correcting the measure of productivity by taking into account the duration of the average annual
number of working hours, the growth of German productivity in table 1.8 would be underestimated
and, in fact, it would be at the same level as for France.
All these accounts showed, therefore, that between 1960 and 1970 there had been between Germany
and France a gap in the evolution of prices of an average of 1.1% per year. An average of 1.1% a
year resulted -for a 10 year period- in a differential of 11% by the end of the period which was clearly
not grasping the full reality. Indeed, the actual monetary gap between France and Germany was one
of over 20% in 197157. So, macroeconomic analysis could only explain about half of tire currency
adjustment underwent between the two major countries in the EEC. This discrepancy in the figures
arising from national macroeconomic analysis and tire figures of the actual currency adjustments
provided the Commission with tire evidence that there had to be other factors which were not grasped
55 Commission refers to source: O.C.D.E. Les politiques actuelles de lutte conlre /'inflation, juin 1971
56 Commission, Expose de M. J. Cros, Politique regionale et union economique et tnonetaire. p. 8.
57 That is, the gap between August 1969 to October 1969: 11.11% + 9.29% = 20.40%. See these figures in
footnote 25 above.
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(or whose consideration was omitted) by macroeconomic indicators, but, which, ultimately and
effectively, did have an effect on currency instability.
Recognising the role played by speculative capital movements in the monetary dislocation of this
period, the Commission certainly acknowledged the monetary interpretation of currency adjustments.
In other words, although the usual explanation of these currency imbalances between the major
European countries in monetary terms (i.e. by arguing that short-term speculative capital movements
could, in a system of convertibility at fixed parity, exhaust abruptly tire gold and exchange reserves of
one country and accumulate them in another) remained (lie major explanation for the changes of
parity of European currencies against tire US dollar, ultimately, tire Commission argued that a share
of blame had to reside in economic causes. Indeed, even running die classic comparison of economic
performance by tire actual recollection of macroeconomic indicators i.e. especially those of price
evolution, productivity and rhythm of growth, the large disparity in economic performance and.
particularly, in the evolution of tire currencies could still not be satisfactory accounted for. The
Commission reproached monetary explanations to be partial and argued that there were deeper
economic causes inducing divergence in tire economic and monetary evolutions of the common
market members. Notably, tire full stretch of tire gap between Germany and France could be
completed and better explained by regarding an element not appearing in macroeconomic accounts
but, nonetheless, having a hidden effect on tire value of nation's capital: die evolution of die
economic and social structures.
So, what was diere -in the underlying structures of die Community- provoking divergent economic
and monetary evolution among die Six? What were die structural roots of asymmetrical (divergent)
growdi widiin die Community?
4.2. Structural inelasticities of the supply and external equilibria
The 1950s and 1960s recorded pervasively high output and productivity gains, even if (as shown in
point 1) the performances of die Six, comparatively speaking, displayed divergent degrees of success.
Widiout entering into die motives of die post war economic boom, it seems to be unquestionable that
one of die reasons accounting for Western Europe's good performance had to do with die high and
sustained levels of demand enjoyed in diis period. Widiout aiming at taking a position on whether
die high demand was die actual major reason for diat good performance (Aldcroft 1978)" or not. nor
on die determinants of such high demand, what is relevant is diat die literature seems to admit that
especially demand for exports, was high and sustained during die 1950s-1960s5\
" See p. 179, chapter 5 of Aldcroft D. H. (1978) The European Economy 1914-1980, London Croom Helm.
59 The literature on all these debates -whether demand was an autonomous element which induced changes in
supply, whether it was supply which governed the rate at which demand increased, whether growth was export
led or not- is wide-ranging: some authors argued for a strong weight of a high demand together with
governments' growth stimulation policies (see Maddison A. (1964) Economic growth in the West. p. 43. A.
The nature of a substantial Community concern on regional imbalances was brought up by the
Commission in 1969 and considered in dteir relationship to external equilibria60; notably, dtey were
portrayed as geographical manifestations of structural inelasticities coupled with a situation of high
levels of demand not being able to be satisfied by national production potential. In such situations
where, in addition, the liberalisation of exchanges had been institutionalised, demand in national
markets found itself inevitably exposed to imports from EEC commercial partners and, thus,
unsatisfied national demand was met with Community imports. The consequences of such a route
were not harmless: excessive demand coupled widi inelastic structures resulted in a loss of external
equilibrium. Moreover, under the common market, involving the removal of restrictions on imports
and equivalent measures, countries under disequilibrium were left to resort to exchange rate
modifications as a means of correcting both commercial and payments imbalances. Yet, as monetary
adjustments were a direct threat to competition, the requirement was arising to address a global
regulation of both demand and supply.
This takes us back to the I Barre Plan and to another element of the convergence 'package' which
has been left aside so far: structural regional action. Indeed, the Commission's package aimed at a
better consultation on short term measures, a reconciliation (compatibility) ex ante of national
macroeconomic policy preferences in the medium term and at monetary co-operation. But also the I
Barre Plan attempted to act upon the conditions which would make such convergence possible, for no
compatibility or nominal macroeconomic convergence could withstand in the longer term unless the
conditions for external equilibria of its members were addressed. In other words, only from a global
regulation of both demand and supply sides, situations where pronounced disequilibrium in the
balance of payments of a member could be a catalyst for adopting protectionist or distorting measures
such as currency adjustments, could effectively be avoided. The structural action envisaged by the
Commission constituted one part of a two-sided strategy towards die convergence of economic
evolutions: one addressing the regulation of global demand by proposing orientations regarding
public finances, revenue, budgetary and fiscal policy, and the other strand, addressing the supply side
i.e. the problems of the production apparatuses.
The aim of the regulation of demand would consist of adapting excessive demand to Lire possibilities
of the productive potential. Such a regulation of high demand was to be brought about by the
instruments of revenue and fiscal policy. However, the control of high demand was a double-edged
tool: even if demand ought to have been halted, in some cases, equally, the drive of high demand
could also work as a factor of 'modernisation' i.e. the regulation of demand could be determinant to
Boltho (ed) (1982), Op. cit.). Other authors put forward a supply-push account (C.P. Kindleberger (1967)
Europe's Post-war growth, N. Kaldor (1966) 77ie causes of the low rate of economic growth of the UK)
stressing the role of labour abundance. Others provided particularly relevant national experiences and situations
(Denison E.F.(1967) Why Growth rates differ The. Brookings Institution, Washington D.C).
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boost an adaptation of the production apparatuses, thus bypassing and avoiding direct State
intervention61. Furthermore, within a common market, the pressures of demand would expectedly
have die tendency to spread and become uniformly high all throughout, thus placing an increasing
pressure on the supply side.
On the supply side, according to the Commission, regulation would have to address the problems of
production capacities. The majority of the structural difficulties boiled down to problems of rigidity
of the production apparatuses, resistance to mutations and, ultimately, the defensive positions of all
those affected. Regional imbalances being understood by the Commission as geographical rigidities,
a structural policy 'of progress' ought to frame and guide mutations to the evolution of market needs
i.e. capital and labour ought to be stimulated towards those activities with higher returns and. only
exceptionally, intervene to accompany mutations. Thus, a 'market friendly' structural policy shaping
and guiding national regional responses in their addressing of structural rigidities and which w ould
guarantee the adequate functioning of the common market as well as being an economic policy
instrument towards the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty was being proposed.
Thus, structural action was portrayed as a constitutive element of a global co-ordinated policy
regulating the situation of excessive demand and inelastic supply which was partly determining the
negative position of balances of payments in some countries, and which translated, at die Community
level, into economic divergence and monetary instability. In sum, action in the structural domain had
an instrumental and complementary character towards the attainment of harmonised economic
evolutions, without which (he common market could not adequately continue. In other words.
Community structural actions were conceptualised by the Commission with a specific objective: as
instruments for attaining fundamental national equilibria and in the pursuit of an equilibrated
expansion of the Community. In sum, the Memorandums of February and December 1969 pointed
out for the first time at a substantially structural understanding of regional imbalances conceived in
the context of economic convergence. Notably, not solely structural actions should accompany and
facilitate the co-ordination of national economic policies, but, for the first time, regional concerns
were understood in structural terms as part of a package searching for die convergence of the
economies of die Six. Upon diis substantial conceptualisation of a regional concern stemming from
die Memorandums of 1969, DGXVI elaborated its understanding of a fundamental regional objective
for die Community.
60 See this exposition of the Commission's diagnosis in p. 1-10 of draft of Commission Memorandum e>f 15
December 1969 on medium-term guidelines [17902/11/ 69].
61 Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Avant-projet pour le chapitre III du III
Programme de politique economique a moyen tenne: 'Les orientations pour la politique economique' .
Bruxelles J Juillel 1970 [10325/11/70]
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5. The demarcation of structural and regional objectives for the Community
5.1. The implicit structural objectives in merging the markets, the uneven scenario of structural
transformations and beyond: the problem of the gap between structural evolutions
From 1958 the members of the common market experienced a period of economic expansion with
rates of growth of an average of 6% per year. Irrespective of whether or not these levels of growth
were largely a result of the establishment of die common market, important transformations were
triggered in the domain of the structures of production and demand. It had been expected that die
merging of six markets had an effect on economic structures, but how far had die intended structural
objectives, as laid down in die blueprint for die establishment common market i.e. in the Spaak
report, been realised?
The scenario of structural mutations a decade after die signing of die EEC Treaty offered a mixed
balance sheet (Cros 1977), by 1969 a series of structural mutations had taken place but. equally,
odier expected structural outcomes had not occurred. A very clear outcome of die common market
was die boost experienced by exchanges among EEC members. Conspicuously, as well, some key
sectors of die economy, notably die agricultural and steel sectors, had begun a diorough structural
transformation -even if diose transformations were not let run free but oriented and regulated
dirough public interventions. However, odier structural transformations originally bodi intended and
expected had not spontaneously occurred, to mention only a couple of diem, die realisation of larger
dimensions and a larger specialisation of production units were not occurring extensively61. Equally,
the concentration of capital to exploit economies of scale was more dian patchy63 and. in fact,
multinational enterprises from outside die EEC6 had taken advantage diis situation. For odiers as
well (van Ginderachter 1975, p. 58) there have been significant economies of scale, but little
specialisation effects resulting from the EEC.
As will be seen later (point 7, chapter II), die EEC Treaty was conceived conspicuously silent
regarding die elaboration of a regional or industrial development policy which would intervene to
encourage and/or direct all diese mutations", when, in fact, die merging of the markets and their
organisation on die basis of equalised competition rules was expected to work as a structural weapon.
62 In fact, it was present from the beginning of the European project -and the Spaak Report had made explicit
reference to it- the disadvantaged competitive position of European enterprises in relation to their US
counterparts in terms of enterprise dimension. Certainly, achieving larger enterprise magnitude was expected to
allow a greater technology input and, subsequently, productivity increases, but this dimension implied a decree
of specialisation which had not been fully realised. Even if a share of the increase in intra-Community
exchanges could be attributed to the specialisation of certain production processes, in other sectors, what had
occurred was a multiplication of the available supply rather than a specialisation. Cros mentions the car
industry as an example of such un-realised specialisation. See Cros J. (1977), Introduction a I economie
europeenne, part II, p. 4.
63 Cros noted that the steel sector seemed to show a trend of concentration, but whether than trend was
motivated by an effort of rationalisation or by a movement of national defence was also open to debate
64 For the Treaty provisions concerning structural and regional imbalances see point 7 (chapter 11).
as an efficient instrument for undertaking major structural mutations in sectors, in enterprises, in the
work force and last, but not least, in the regional economies. The Treaty signatories seemingly
trusted that either the free interplay of market forces would not pose severe regional consequences or
that structural evolution would ensue optimally or that, in any event, the conduction of structural
policies was a matter of Governments' responsibility65.
By 1968, however, structural rigidities started to emerge across the Community, although in a
disguised and uneven manner. To pin down the scenario of the emerging structural rigidities we will
turn to die diagnosis made by the II Medium term economic policy Programme66. The II MTEP
Programme dealt thoroughly with structural mutations, gave a general conception of the principles of
structural policy and exposed the national orientations concerning a structural policy for die
adaptation of enterprises, industry and services sectors, agricultural structures and scientific and
technical research67. The basic reasoning exposed in die II MTEP Programme was that die economic
evolution of die recent years had raised evidence of an acceleration in die structural mutations and of
die need to introduce vast reforms in die structures of die national economies. The II MTEP
Programme forecasted die probability of accelerated structural mutations under die effect of die
completion of die customs union, of increased competition from third countries, of an acceleration of
technical progress and of modifications in the structure of demand. Meanwhile, however, die actual
processes of structural adaptation -of sectors as well as of enterprises- seemed to be insufficiently
advanced and, notably, were running into delay in relation to die realisation of the customs union
and of die liberalisation of world trade. More concretely, die Medium-term economic policy
Committee pointed out diat sectors in difficulties occupied, comparatively, a far too important place
and weight in die structures of die Community's economy, whereas die most promising sectors w ere
hardly represented -particular mention was made of die electronics sector. Like sectors, enterprises
had not adapted sufficiently to die new conditions eidier. In general, enterprises in die common
market showed insufficient profitability and dynamism and poor innovative capacity. Enterprises had
not taken advantage of die larger market and had remained comparatively small, insufficiently
specialised and ill-adapted to competitive standards in an international market68. The I and II MTEP
65 That is apart from the provision for financial support from the EIB and from stating the pertinence and
opportunity to raise regional objectives at the time of the elaboration of the CAP and for the attainment of its
objectives. See point 7.1 (chapter II) for the Treaty provisions concerning a policy for regional structures.
66 On 20 March 1968 the Commission -without modifying the text drafted by the Medium-term economic policy
Committee- submitted for adoption to the Council the project of II MTEP Programme. The draft projects were:
Comite de politique economique a tnoyen tenne, Avant-projet de deuxieme progranune de politique economique
a moyen tenne, Bruxelles 15 mars 1968, [COM(68)148/3] and the Commission's Projel de deuxie-me
programme de politique economique a moyen tenne, Bruxelles 20 Mars 1968 [COM(68) 148 final],
67 The II MTEP Programme adopted by the Council on 12 May 1969: Conseil, Deuxieme Progntm/ne de
Politique economique a moyen terme, JO L 129 du 30 Mai 1969.
68 Chapter II deals with the needs for adaptation of enterprises and fingers at the legal and fiscal obstacles
impeding the achievement of plurinational character enterprises. It also defends the attaining of a definition of
an status of European society, a European patent, the harmonisation of taxes on societies' benefits and the
progressive establishment of a European capitals market.
Programmes also pointed out the need for an increase of factors of production. That is, an increase
on the offer of the labour force and of its professional qualifications and re-adaptability69. In general,
die Commission argued, rigidities arose from insufficient geographical, professional and sectoral
mobility of die factors of production70. Regionally speaking, suffice it here to mention die accusation
diat national governments had not achieved a sufficient implantation of new and sound economic
activities in backward regions or in diose suffering from a regression in employment.
The Commission certainly subscribed to die II MTEP Programme's statement diat resistance to
structural mutations was emerging and dial die pace of reform was not sufficiently mastered.
However, for die Commission, die problem went beyond: underlying asymmetrical growdi. was die
fact that structural transformations were occurring in a far from harmonised manner comparatively
speaking. In fact, what was emerging was a growing gap between die evolutions achieved in die
supply sides of die European economies. It was, ultimately, this increasing gap between die adapted
economic structures from diose ill-adapted diat was at die root of die divergent growdi performances
widiin die Community. ThuS, some countries, about a decade after die signing of the Treaty, showed
from their economic evolution, to have effectively undergone necessary structural transformations
and managed (better) to reduce rigidities in die supply side of dieir economies. Others, on die
contrary, were characterised by a severe resistance to structural adaptation. These resistances
translated into growdi levels. The reasons why die structures had responded and evolved differently
since 1957 were to be found, to start widi, in die original collage of national structural situations. To
diose roots die Commission added various national factors: such as die differences in national
temperaments, in die domestic behaviours of economic and social agents, die diversity of attitudes in
die governments' choice of economic policy priorities", and finally, die actual orientations and die
intensity of governments' actions when addressing and dealing widi structural evolutions i.e. die
problems of national structural policies.
For die Commission, die relationship between structural transformations and growdi was straight
forward; just as structural transformations had not occurred harmoniously, neidier was growth
ensuing harmoniously across die members of die common market. As die evolutions in die structures
grew apart, economic performances diverged. The Commission was implicitly saying, without
69 The annual rate of additions to the labour force were modest: an annual 0.6 % between 1960 and 1965 and a
smaller increase of 0.4% for the period 1965 to 1970. Plus in 1968 an stagnation in the active population in
Germany was foreseen (see Commission, Politique economique ci rnoyen tenne, Bruxelles 2 decembre 1 ?68
[V/20200/68]). The I MTEP Programme had dealt with various possible measures to increase the supply of
labour force such as through the management of compulsory education and of the legal retirement age, by an
increase in feminine work force, by immigration policies and through the possibility to intervene in the Juradon
of work. See I MTEP Programme chapter IV.
70 Certainly, agricultural labour force went into the industry sector but its share of employment remained fairly
constant. Ultimately, partly due to the fact that the service sector maintained low rates of productivilv growth,
that redundant agricultural force entered the services sector. See Aldcroft (1978) Op. cit.. p. 164).
71 See quotation by the Commission in the introduction to this section B). or point 6-8 of Commission's
December 1969 Memorandum.
denying the importance of other external factors, that an uneven pattern of structural evolution
between France and Germany was amongst the original causes of the divergent paths taken by these
economies since 1966. In other words, the element of dispersion of the economies resided partially in
the diverse degree of adaptation -of elasticity- of the national supply to a high demand which,
incidentally, was becoming uniform -even if at different paces- across (lie common market members.
Equally, the relationship between the adaptation of production structures and the external balance
was immediate. In those countries not adapting to high levels of demand, national demand turned
into a high demand for exports which materialised into external disequilibria. Ultimately, within a
common market, inelasticites and rigidities in the supply side compromised competitiveness and the
ability to respond to national high demand for exports. In short, the inelasticities of tire national
supplies were likely to provoke external disequilibria, particularly, where a large stretch between the
degree of a national rigidity and tire capability of a partners elastic supply was occurring.
So, while the establishment of tire common market had put in contact a patchwork of structural
situations, and although tire EEC Treaty laid down no provision for intervention in tire evolution of
tire structures, by 1968 tire Commission claimed in global structural terms for tire first time, die need
to intervene in what had been until then a spontaneous evolution of die structures of the Six. For die
first time in die life of die Community since die signing of the EEC Treaty, die unevenness of die
structural transformations in member states was threatening die continuation of die European
venture -die monetary dislocation was proving it. Concealed but effectively, die underlying and
uneven structural inelasticities became manifest in die form of divergent evolution of die economies
of die Six, in die form of asymmetrical growdi. Since un-regulated structural transformations were
fuelling a divergent evolution of die economies of the Six diere was emerging a need for some form
of 'harmonisation' of die structural evolutions72. Such 'harmonisation' would prevent both external
disequilibria and policy divergences. The urgency had come, according to die Commission, for a
deliberately intended approximation of structural evolutions, a certain positive harmonisation' of the
structures of the Community.
Let us note that for die Commission, 'harmonisation' did not mean homogenisation but a reduction
of die disparities between disparities i.e. a reduction of distortions73. Indeed, die Commission did not
raised die alarm on a manifest different economic evolution, nor 011 die perceived asymmetrical
growdi of die economies of die Six per se but, radier, on an excessive growing gap in die economic
evolutions of its members. Indeed, it was die excessive gap between adaptation and ill-adaptation to
72 Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne. Premieres indications sur le content possible
du Memorandum de la Commission sur les problemes que font apparaitre pour la Communaute les perspectives
d'evolution a tnoyen tenne dans les pays rnembres, (Note des sendees de la Commission1 Bruxelles 2 mai 1969
[9000/11/69].
73 See Cros 'Les Desequilibres geographiques dans la CEE face aux objectifs de I union ecoiu mique el
monetaire', Revue d'Economic Politique. Avril 1974
market conditions of its members which posed a threat to external equilibria and could provoke
speculative movements and unravel monetary instability. The Commission argued that such
'reduction of tire disparities between disparities' was a direct and legitimate Community concern, for
its consequences in the form of external disequilibria were critical for the continuation of the
common market. Hence, die concern being one relating to the excessive dispersion of national
structures, and without renouncing to eliminate structural disparities altogether, the task for the
Community ought to pragmatically set the priority on the elimination of the largest disparities among
(not within) countries74.
So where were the largest structural disparities residing? According to the Commission's analysis,
the divergent evolution in the national structures were markedly revolving around: disproportionate
differences between the sectoral composition of the economies of the common market members;
social disparities i.e. demographic imbalances, gaps between the degree of adaptation of die labour
markets and levels of labour productivity across die EEC6-; and finally, disparities in die adaptation
of die regional economies75.
5.2. The nature of regional disparities for the Community: structural geographical imbalances
So in which sense die Commission talked of regional disparities? What was die nature of this gap,
the nature of diese geographical imbalances? The Commission raised a correlation between the level
of development of a given region and die level of productivity of each of its grand economic sectors,
i.e. in its agricultural, industrial or services sector75. Thus, most developed regions displayed die
highest levels of productivity in each of dieir sectors whereas die lowest productivity rates were
found in diose less developed regions. In odier words, bodi die industrial and the agricultural sectors
were most productive in industrialised regions. Geographical (regional) imbalances were,
consequently, neidier determined by die type of economic activity predominant in a given region noi
by die dominance of agricultural activities over the industrial sector or vice versa. Rather,
geographical imbalances were apprehended as consisting of differences -of imbalances, of
disparities- in productivity levels77. Based on diis correlation between development and productivity
74 Cros (1974) Op. cit., p. 147.
75 The Commission says in the Memorandum of 15 December 1969, p. 6:'The structural disparities between
member states result notably from the demographic situation (particularly of the pyramid of ages), from the
level and the content of industrial development and, finally, from the amplitude and nature of regional
disequilibria'.
76 See p. 11 of Cros Report [XVI/137/71], An extended exposition of the basic notions and conceptualisation.* on
this report of 19 October 1971 can be found in Cros J. (1974) Op. cit., p. 147.
77 Obviously the existence of low levels of productivity did not necessarily equate with a regional disparity.
Indeed low productivity of a sector which was not geographically concentrated did not translate in lower GDP
per capita. That is, a structural disparity relating to an economic sector or to a branch was regional or not.
depending on whether the sector -for instance coal or textile industry respectively- were geographically
concentrated. Equally other apparently geographic disparities such as the case of frontier regions could in reality
consist of a type of disparity arising from general problems of economic, social and monetary organisation. Cros
(1974) Op. cit., p. 148.
levels, regional disequilibria played a role in the structural disequilibria of the economy i.e. in die
productivity and income differences between sectors and within sectors. Therefore, one could more
accurately refer to 'regional imbalances' as 'structural geographical imbalances'78. Indeed, die
Commission understood regional disparities as geographically based inelasticities and rigidities of
the structures of supply. Such inelasticity or rigidity was conveyed in terms of productivity
differences for each of die sectors of die regional unit, notably, regional disparities conveyed die
geographically based lower productivity in all the sectors enclosed in a delimited unit.
But still, where was die Community dimension or die Community concern about what could be, after
all, considered a national problem? To start widi, geographically based structural and sectoral
inelasticities could mlluence die evolution of die economy in die short term and have implications on
general economic development and 011 subsequent short and medium term policy choices. But more
specifically for a Community concern, and analogously as in overall structural disparities, it was die
large disparities between regional disparities which were more likely to have an effect on national
external equilibria. Indeed, by 1969 die Commission described a bleak picture on die regional state
of affairs in die Community: die gap between industrialised regions and less developed regions had
increased since die founding of die common market. Aldiough undoubtedly, less developed regions
bad grown, die recorded widening of die gap was die result of comparatively faster growth in
concentration areas79. For die Commission, die aggravation of regional disparities since 1958
indicated that regional economies were growing at different paces. In turn, die different pace of
economic growdi indicated diat die structural effects of die merging of die national markets i.e. die
process of division of labour, specialisation, modernisation, enterprise mutations, competitive
capacity, labour adaptation, etc. had not been achieved harmoniously across die regions of the
Community. In die global expansion of die economies, some regional economies were -
comparatively- not transforming and dius, far from evolving harmoniously, the productivity of their
sectors, and consequently incomes, were growing apart. Regional imbalances, and particularly their
intensity, was one of die structural factors accounting for the divergent structural and economic
evolutions and for incompatible policy orientations of member States. In sum, die Community
concern on national structural inelasticities was one of avoiding flagrant disparities i.e. of avoiding
distortions at Community level.
78 This terminology is used by Cros (1974) Op. cil.
79 Thus was expressed by the cabinet of Commission's vice-president Levi-Sandri: 'The situation is so much
worrying as the existing gap at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty has not only not been bridged, but
rather, a clear tendency to accentuate has been registered even if all less developed regions made a considerable
progress. This tendency is due in a large part to the fact that the acceleration of progress in the industrialised
regions has been larger than originally foreseen'. See p. 1-2 of Commission, Cabinet of vice-president Levi-
Sandri, Note au secretariat general, Objet: Politique regionale, Bruxelles 20. VI. 69.
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Indeed, nationally the disparities in productivity and income were conspicuous*0. The Commission
gave evidence of tire different degree of geographical structural imbalances within each of the Six by
examining the distribution of the population across each of the Six, and by displaying the income
and productivity deviations according to three types of region in the Community: agricultural, semi-
industrialised and industrial regions (see table II.9). It became clear that national disparities in terms
of incomes and productivity were large and significant for the FRG, France and Italy whereas for the
Benelux countries the deviations were either very slight or concerned only a small percentage of the
population of these countries.
For Germany the significant deviation was appearing between the industrial and semi-industrial
regions -since a 90% of the population lived in these regions- being of a value of 16.9% for income
and 20.1% for productivity. For France, the deviation between agricultural and industrial regions,
accounting for 70% of the population, was of 33% for income and 29.4 % for productivity: and the
deviation between industrial and semi-industrial regions was of 15.6% for income and of 9.3% for
productivity. In Italy, where 58% of the population lived in industrial and agricultural regions, the
deviation between agricultural and industrial regions were of 45.9% in income and 38.0% in
productivity; and that between industrial and semi-industrial regions was 29.8 % for income and
23.1% for productivity.
Table II.9: Income-Productivity and deviations according to the types of region in the Community*1
(u.a. current prices) value 1970s2.
80 'A great inequality is observable, among Community countries, in the intensity of the regional disparities
affecting their economies. This inequality is found in the distribution of the total population and the active
population, as well as in the disparities of incomes and productivity', p. 20, Cros Report [XVI/137/71'.
*' The selected regions are, for statistical purposes: the provinces in the Benelux, the Regierungsbezi rice in
Germany, programming regions in France and the regioni in Italy.
82 Source: Cros Report [XVI/137/71] p.23bis, or also reproduced in Cros (1974) 'Les daequilibres






















































































































































So national regional disparities were significant. Bui, crucially, taking those national disparities at a
Community level, die gaps and dieir intensity increased even further. Namely, at the aggregate
Community level, the gaps between the most productive regions of die Community and the less
productive appeared as effective distortions. Thus, on the ground, aldiough the delimitation of the actual
Community concern on regional problems was refined and reformulated diroughout the years8', two main
issues reflecting on Community equilibrium mattered to the Community, namely, low revenues per
capita -low productivity- and inadaptation. Thus, regional policy would convey die public effort to pursue
a faster development ofeidier regions lagging behind general expansion -i.e. regions to develop-, or to
solve structural problems of regions already industrialised but in decline84. Underdeveloped regions were
understood to be diose regions where all economic activities -although often predominately agriculturally
based- were characterised by low productivity, and by unemployment or underemployment of die labour
force. Regarding die problem of inadaptation, it covered various forms of industrial regional decline: die
decline of certain traditional industrial activities which were geographically concentrated, or die ageing
and slowing down of regions of ancient industrialisation85. In other words, it concerned objectives of
industrial reconversion and of industrial adaptation and the tackling of unemployment clusters, die fall ot
revenues and die finding of economic relays for already industrialised regions under structural mutations.
Recapitulating, in an effort to distinctly demarcate the nature of a specific and substantial Community
concern on regional imbalances, according to die Commission, structural geographical imbalances
mattered to the Community in so far as die gaps in productivity among regional economies, effectively
8j Since 1961, and at various instances, typologies of geographical structural inelasticities for the Comxnunitv were
produced, namely, at the 1961 Conference (Commission (1962) Documents de la Conference sur les economies
regionales, Bruxelles 6- 8 Decembre 1961, vol. I, II), in the reports of three groups of experts of 1964 (Commission
(1964) Rapports de groupes d'experts sur la Politique regionale dans la CEE. Bruxelles juillet 1964). in the 1965
Communication (Commission, Premiere Communication de la Commission sur la Politique regionale dans la
Communaute liconomique Europeenne, Bruxelles 11 mai 1965 [D/SEC(65) 1170 final]), in the regional chapter of
the I MTEP Programme, in the Note on regional policy (Commission (1969) A Regional Policy for the Community.
Brussels, Office for Official Publications) and in the III MTEP Programme. The inventory of regional problems for
the Community provided from the early stages did not vary drastically although some developments took place
through the late 1960s and early 1970s such as the emergence of the problem of overbidding, over-concentratiom. the
acuteness in which industrial regions faced transformations (the industrial crisis in the Ruhr in 1967) and what its
seemed the maximum absorption of agricultural labour force by the industrial sector. See also point 14.1 (chapter
HI) on the issue of the priorities for regional Community intervention.
84 See the introductory report by R. Marjolin -vice-president of the Commission- at the Conference sur les economies
regionales, vol. I, p. 21. The distinction is maintained by the Three Groups of experts of 1964 and largely by the
1965 Communication [p. 12 II/SEC(65) 1170 final] which overall was based on the three Reports of the experts;.
85 Group II of the experts of 1964, charged by the Commission to examine the problems of regions atready
industrialised with an ageing structure, distinguished two different types of structural disequilibria. Notably, it
distinguished between sectors in regression and regions with an ageing structure, see Commission. Dhisior
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apart l'rom a Community perspective, were likely to lead to fundamental disequilibria and, thereafter, m
economic and policy divergence.
6. From economic union to EMU and the continuity in the conceptualisation of regional concerns
By 1971, however, the EMU venture was launched. The Hague Summit of Heads of State or Government
of December 1969 (point 17, chapter IV) expressed the wish to see the Community develop into an EMU
through the implementation of a phased plan. Yet, the conceptualisation of a regional objective for the
Community and the role of regional policy as a constitutive element of a search for convergence of
economic evolutions and economic policies did not lapse with the resolution to move into EMU by
stages, rather, it remained valid in its purpose throughout the 1970s and was, in fact, re-enforced by the
EMU programme. Indeed, while in terms of the analysis of the I Barre Plan, disparate structures were
putting into question both the effective harmonisation of economic policies and tire convergence in the
evolutions necessary for the attainment of an economic union, EMU was now imposing, as an
imperative, the full observance of the defined global orientations in the medium term and tie
harmonisation of underlying economic priorities. In absolute terms, EMU was indirectly making of the
correction of tire largest disparities an 'inevitable' requirement. Such requirement rested not only on the
need for economic and policy convergence for EMU, but also on the detrimental direct contribution of
structural geographical inelasticities to -besides economic and policy divergence- monetary instability.
As economic union moved into EMU, DGXVI developed on the relationship between regional
imbalances and exchange stability, inflation in particular, by portraying structural geographical
imbalances as both creators and amplifiers of inflation as well as being antagonistic to the economic and
the monetary objectives of the EMU programme. Indeed, with the upgrading of the economic union into
an EMU regional action not only remained part and parcel of the attainment of economic policy co¬
ordination, but the direct relationship between regional imbalances and exchanges stability, and thus
with a programme of EMU, was intentionally raised by DGXVI. DGXVI, without abandoning the
conceptualisation of the nature of a Community concern on regional issues, upgraded its analysis by-
raising the aspects of disruption susceptible to arise from large disparities in regional development h
Community level, namely, the problem of inflation and its likely conflict with EMU objectives.
The entry of inflation into the casuistic and advocacy for Community action regarding structural ar»i
regional disparities did not occur fully till 1971, although tire Note on regional policy had already
Reconversion Industrielle. Note d'Archives, Objet: Reunion du 22 fevrier 1963 Groupe 2: charge d examiner Its
problemes des regions deja industrialisees a structure vieillie, Luxembourg 27 Fevrier 1963.
mentioned it86. Some authors (Vanhove & Klaasen 1980) have pointed out that it was to the
Commission's merit to have analysed in depth the relationship between regional disequilibrium and
inflation in the early 1970s87.
The problem of inflation, and broadly speaking, the problem of price stability was during the late 1960s
and 1970s perhaps the most significant economic problem faced by Western economies, their 'number
one priority'88. Keeping an upward trend since the mid-1960s, inflation was affecting national growth,
employment and external balance and, at Community level and particularly for a programme of EMU.
fixed exchange rates could not be expected to endure within a group of countries in which national price
trends diverged (as seen in point 2) and which experienced wide cumulative rates of inflation. From
1969, and particularly in 1971, awareness of the complexity of the inflation phenomenon seems to have
gain momentum. Surely price rises had different nature in the late 1960s and early 1970s, yet. even
though from the second half of 1971 external factors spread inflation to the Six. provoking disparate
national responses8'', the analysis and tire lessons drawn by the Commission regarding tire internal
structural factors fuelling inflation would not lose their validity.
It has been seen before (point 4.1) how tire Commission maintained that tire disparate European
monetary adjustments against tire US dollar could not be simply explained by resorting to a comparison
of major macroeconomic indicators. Macroeconomic indicators could display and account, although only
to a certain extend, for the inflationist tendencies distorting currency values. Yet, structural causes of the
monetary adjustments were fingered by tire Commission as being responsible for a share of disguised and
contained inflation -inflation larvee- neither explicitly accountable nor reflected in classic
macroeconomic accounts but effectively developing underway90. According to tire Commission, tire
86 Commission, 'Note on regional policy' p. 32.
87 To expose the Commission defence of the share of structural causes of the final inflation see: Commission. Cros
Report p. 7-29 [XWl 37/71], and Expose de J. Cros Politique regionale et union economique el monetaire on 25
January 72.
88 Aldcroft (1978), Op. cit., p. 255.
89 In fact, a new externally driven form of inflation developed by August 1971, namely, an inflation by conr.agior
which followed the US government's protectionist measures of 15 August 1971.
90 The Commission vindicated the inflationary tendencies of ill-adapted structures and sectors in Strategies
Alternatives, p. 19, 20 [21535/U/68] and in the Memorandum of December 1969 [p. 3 COM(69) 1250], But in
October 1971 we find the Commission coming up with actual figures, at a stage where the original proposal of
monetary co-operation of the Memorandums of 1969 had turn into an actual first stage of a programme for economic
and monetary union. This being within the first stage of EMU, the Commission's DG for regional policies (DG XVI
produced a study (which in the end remained internal) on the contribution of geographical imbalances to
fundamental economic equilibria where the Commission argued how geographical disparities worked as epicentre^
of inflation, that is, what we have referred as the Cros report (Commission, 'Regional policy and economic anc
monetary union, Geographical disequilibria in the light of the implementation of fundamental economic equilibria
[XVI/137/71]). Because the Community had embarked into EMU, from 1971 the relationship between rezionai
disparities and external equilibria is treated in relation to EMU objectives. Therefore, from 1971 the terms on which
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various forms of supply's inelasticities did not surface directly, neither immediately, nor at all times.
Rather, structural inelasticities were working underway and became manifest in die national accounts in
their due time as consumption of the nation's capital and in the final national performance.
According to the Commission regional disequilibria created or amplified inflation. In particular, tw
categories of inflationary factors developed -as such- from Lire actual existence of geographical structural
imbalances. A share of inflation developed in concentration zones and another in less developed regions,
with the effect that die greater die regional disparities widiin a country die greater die propensities to
inflation. The first inflationary trend was revealed as emerging from a process of cost-push in what the
Commission called 'concentration areas' whereas die dynamics of inflation in less developed regions
were seized as die dynamics of demand-pull.
What was the Commission referring to by a cost-push inflation in concentration zones? The cost-push
referred to eidier die costs of die factors of production or die costs of infrastructures. Certainly die cost of
die factors conditions the productivity of economic activities and in periods of high demand, such as the
1950s and 1960s, die most productive activities located in concentration zones tended and were able,
because of dieir level of productivity, to attract production factors (labour, capital, raw materials,
services, etc.) at high prices. This process of attracting factors of production at high prices was net
inflationary insofar as competition pressures checked die rise of die factors' prices widiin the limits of
die growdi achieved in productivity. Even if concentration zones were able to maintain such
remuneration of die factors, die problem was posed by die sheer fact of diffusion to odier sectors within
die same concentration area which did not have die same chances to increase dieir productivity. When
concentration zones inevitably encouraged a rapid diffusion of diose higher costs to eidier other activities
in die same branch or to diose activities -like by being obliged to match wage increases to those in the
most productive sectors- but into sectors and branches which did not have the same possibilities of
productivity, there, inflation emerged. Therefore, die exporting or die diffusion of high costs by i
tendency of wages tending to become uniform even where die productivity was not offsetting high costs
was a factor of inflation. This form of cost-push price increase was reflected eidier directly in prices cr
was temporarily incorporated in die form of a potential inflation -in a consumption of die enterprise's
own capital.
But die diffusion effect of diis type of inflation also affected odier regions by the fact of intra-sectorial
relations. That is, as high costs, prices and wages tended to become uniform, geographically speaking,
those higher costs were eidier reflected directly in the final prices, or were temporarily incorporated a_s
regional and structural factors affected price levels was addressed in terms of their contribution to monetary
divergence -rather than only as having an effect on the divergence in price levels.
diffusion within a given branch. The Commission noted that although immigration of labour could halt
die diffusion of inflation by offering die possibility of maintaining low wage costs at a time of price
increases and, dierefore, diat die inflationary trend of wage costs in concentration zones could be halted -
as indeed inflationary tendencies had been corrected by die immigration of workers in West Germany
and in Italy in die 1960s- she dashed out to state that diese two responses were not appropriate solutions
to die problem of labour costs pressures and dieir diffusion.
Yet anodier form of high costs was at play in concentration areas: die cost of infrastructures. Aldiough
die inflow of labour could check inflationary tendencies in concentration areas, it also involved an
investment in social capital for public audiorities in order to accommodate die incoming population in a
relatively short time, when die existing social capital was already utilised to capacity. Investments in
social infrastructure carried die risk of inflation in concentration regions mainly due to die high costs of
economic infrastructure in the concentration area such as the price of die land, die complexity of die civil
engineering involved and die high interest rates diat public authorities had to pay on borrowed capital. In
odier words, the cost of infrastructure in concentration zones became inflationary when die optimal size
which allowed die development of external economies on which economic activities take advantage -in
terms of proximity of suppliers, offer of services- passed diat direshold whereby any further enterprise
demand for more infrastructure involved a volume of public cost die financing of beyond public
audiority's reasonable financing capacity. This inflationary character of die infrastructure costs in over-
concentrated zones was also expressed directly in prices or, odierwise, remained temporarily contained.
Thus, as a conclusion emerging from die consideration of factors' prices: concentration zones constituted
a source of declared or potential inflation, bodi from die point of view of cost of infrastructures and diat
of cost of production factors, widi a diffusion effect towards die less developed regions91.
In less developed regions die Commission noted that price rise tendencies were taking die form of a
process of demand-pull which had their source in both the phenomenon of uniformisation of demand -
whereby the population in diese regions demanded levels of consumption equal to those enjoyed in the
concentration zones- and in higher infrastructure costs. The desire for consumption as well as the vivid
perception of developed regions led to claims for higher remunerations where productivity levels in all
sectors were, in fact, lower. Thus, die uniformisation of the pressure of demand would tend to eliminate
different minimum wage zones in relation to regional economic development even in regions where
productivity levels were low. A rise in wage levels in less developed regions which besides, were
quantitatively speaking, more labour dependent dian production in concentration areas, would have
severe repercussions for die local enterprises by narrowing profit margins and dius halting investments
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lor further productivity. Ultimately, what was happening was that the original demand-pull turned into a
dynamic of cost-push inflation. Thus, the Commission concluded that the less developed regions were
not only, by their very situation, at the origin of inflationary tendencies, but they generally felt the
repercussion of them with greater intensity92.
Apart from inflationary tendencies arising from the uniformisation of demand pressures, a second form
of demand pull was occurring regarding the provision of infrastructures and, particularly, their higher
costs in less developed regions. In such regions, where population density was low and economic agents
were geographically dispersed infrastructures were a cause of inflation because they did not allow cost-
efficient production and because the costs of construction and maintenance of those infrastructures were
not offset by an optimal efficient use. Thus national regional aids granted for infrastructure provision
would generally generate inflation unless laid down around poles of development.
So, structural and, more especially, geographical disequilibria, i.e. disparities in productivity, and
therefore in income, contributed to create inflation or to amplify external inflationary factors and to
develop provisionally contained forms of inflation. The situation was as follows: although costs and
demand were exported and tended to became uniform, geographically speaking, productivity levels were
neither exported nor harmonised. In brief, tire contact between different levels of productivity in
concentration and in less developed regions meant a uniformisation of demand not matched by
productivity levels.
Indeed, there was for the Commission a share of inflationary tendencies arising from tire unevenness of
the geographical distribution -across the national territory- of the structural rigidities of production both
in sectors and in branches. Yet, ultimately, the inflationary potential of the geographical dimension of
these rigidities -even if they were, admittedly, sources of inflation- was subsidiary or additional to what
was ultimately a background of structural deficiencies. That is, inflation was emerging from a scenario of
rigidities in the structures, from tire inability of insufficiently productive sectors -either in concentration
zones or in less developed regions- to respond with productivity gains to the uniformising rise of
production costs. So, underlying the actual appearance of inflation and its enlargement by the sheer
existence of geographical structural imbalances, was the problem of the rigidities of the production
apparatuses. The internal factors contributing to price rises were, ultimately, a problem of insufficient
elasticity of structures in relation to the pressures of demand93 provoking, besides, price rises with mcst
91 Cros Report [XVI/137/71 ] p. 17.
92 Cros Report [XVI/137/71] p. 18.
93 Diagnosis of DGXVTs director general, see p. 13 of Politique regionale et Union economique n tnonietain
Expose de M Jacques Cros.
propensity and acuity were economic structures displayed a situation of imbalance of economic structures
and productivity rates:
It is in fact a problem of elasticity of structures in relation to the necessities of demand.
The more substantial are the geographical disequilibria within an economic entity, the greater is the
propensity to inflation there, either because the entity creates it or because it amplifies the
inflationary movements it receives (e.g. of monetary origin).
And hence in view of the fact that the characteristics of demand tend to become uniformised in our
societies, the importance -in an economic entity- of geographical disequilibria which are the most
rigid tends to determine the propensity to inflation in this economic entity94.
Bui not only did inflationist factors developed furdter where economic activities and population were
unharmoniously spread throughout the national territory, rather, an 'inflationist dialectic' between the
different types of regions would be unleashed which would gain further strength where marked
differences between regions were most severe95. Thus, the Commission concluded that the countries with
a territorial pattern of disparities in the levels of productivity, income and population showed a greater
propensity to develop inflation dtan those where economic activity was more evenly distributed
throughout the national territory.
Besides, given that the characteristics of demand tended to become uniform, the wider the geographical
imbalances -these also being the most rigid-, the larger the propensity to inflation. Bearing in mind the
types of regions in the Community, their preponderant economic activities and their active population,
die Commission concluded that all Community members had an inflationist structure. However, the
geography of structural inelasticities was not translating automatically or unconditionally into inflation.
In some cases the inflationary structure related to die importance of die concentrauon zones
(Nedierlands), for odiers it was due to large imbalances between industrialised and underdeveloped
regions (Italy, France, Germany). However, even diough Italy was die country with die most inflationist
economic structure, traditional lifestyles in underdeveloped regions halted demand at least fill 1969. It
was in France where die geographic structures of die economic apparatus and the national behaviours
had been die most inflationist of all the Six96. In brief, aldiough all countries were susceptible to develop
inflation arising from die existence of important concentration zones, die propensity to either openly
manifested inflation or to hidden inflation were very different and linked to die additional reasons just
spelled out. All in all, however, the countries showing most propensity to develop the largest inflationary
tendencies, even if for different reasons, were Italy and France.
94 Cros Report p. 20, [XVl/137/71 ]
95 Cros (1974) 'Les desequilibres geographiques dans la CEE..J, p. 11.
96 Politique regionale el Union economique et monetaire, Expose de M Jacques Cros, p. 17.
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Recapitulating, within a programme for EMU the correction of large disparities in regional imbalances
would work in favour of keeping at bay inflationary dynamics which indeed had direct consequences c-n
monetary stability. But besides the inflationary effects of regional imbalances, die existence of regional
disparities were antagonistic for the attainment of both the monetary and of the economic objectives of
EMU97 -as defined by the Heads of State and Government at The Hague Conference of 1-2 December
1969 and in the first Resolution on the establishment ofEMU by stages of 22 March 1971.
Notably, regarding the monetary objectives the EMU programme required the attainment of a complete
convertibility of the members' currencies based on a permanent fixing of exchange rates. Quite clearly,
the intensity of structural geographical imbalances -influencing the propensity to inflation in the Six.
even if in each in a different manner, as just seen above- risked currencies developing in divergent
directions. In other words, a sufficient equilibrium in the structures of the countries that formed tie
monetary union was argued as necessary to attain the elimination of the margins of fluctuation and the
irrevocable fixation of parity relations.
Regarding global macro-economic objectives (point 4), the Council had so far approved a search fir
compatibility among national economic policies in terms of growth, employment, (price) stability ani
external equilibrium. So, how did regional disparities affect each of them? First, the Commission
considered that the correction of regional disparities would contribute to growth in quantitative terms, in
qualitative terms and in the foundations of Community growth. In terms of volume, developing growth
potentialities of production and of consumption where these were dormant as well as efficiently reducing
the excessive and un-optimal investment costs in over-concentrated zones was a contribution to economi;
growth. The achievement of a growth of quality meant to balance the activities geographically to Lb;
fullest extend. The adaptation of regional economies meant also an extension and a diversification of the
economic foundations of the Community. Second, the objective of full employment could not he achieve;
without a reverse in the situation of underemployment or unemployment in backward and declining
regions. The full utilisation of labour potentialities was linked to a qualitative and harmonious growth
Third, landscapes of contiguous over-concentration and underdevelopment risked tire achievement cc
stability of prices and of monetary parities as shown just above. Furthermore, propensities to divergen:
currency evolutions posed the threat of governments undertaking special measures which would render
more difficult or even run counter to the co-ordination of the economic policies necessary for EMU
Forth, ultimately, tire presence of structural geographical imbalances in their effect on growth,
employment and price stability did have a direct effect on international competitiveness. Lower
97 See Cros Report, part 0 p. 30-38 |XV1/137/71],
competitiveness at a time where economies consolidated their dependency on external trade meant a risk
of disequilibrium in the balances of payments.
Finally, let us stress that although the Commission developed and elaborated the relationship between
regional imbalances and EMU, ultimately, Community action on regional disparities was not 'simply" an
EMU requirement -even if indeed EMU required a correction of the largest structural geographical
imbalances for both inflationary and for monetary and economic purposes; more at heart, EMU required
a convergence of economic evolutions and a convergence of economic policies, and these were,
ultimately, the original and fundamental reasons for regional intervention. As it will be seen later (point
16, chapter IV), this conceptualisation of a regional concern at Community level in the context of the
risks of economic and monetary divergence was endorsed by member states on 26 January 1970. On this
date the Council agreed in principle on the striking of macro-economic compatibility in tire medium
term, on a more effective policy co-ordination in the short term, on some structural action to be spelled
out by the Medium-term economic policy Committee and, in tire monetary domain, on tire laying down of
fundamental options for Lhe attainment of EMU by stages, which tire Council commissioned to a Group
of experts under Pierre Werner's presidency in March 1970,s.
From this moment onwards EMU was going to preside tire agenda of tire Community. Action on regional
structures started to be seen against tire background of a final fixing of currency values and thus, as
instrumental to this end. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that tire Commission's conceptualisation
of monetary action, as well as structural action, was always linked and responding to tire problemati;
scenario of economic divergence for tire functioning of tire common market.
Conclusions
It was not till 1968 i.e. ten years after tire signing of the Rome Treaties, that tire economies of the Six
displayed clear signs of having evolved divergently. Due to both internal and external factors, economic
and policy divergence started to manifest clearly from various indicators, particularly from price levels
According to tire Commission, a scenario of economic and policy divergence carried a real risk for the
continuation of tire common market. Annual divergences in price levels could in tire medium term leal
to external imbalance which, likely to be accompanied by speculative movements, could result in a quia;
loss of gold and exchange reserves in those countries in disequilibrium. In turn, situations of sever;
disequilibrium in national balances of payments were likely to instigate unilateral and protectionist
98 Decision du Conseil du 6 Mars 1970 relative a la procedure en matiere de cooperation economique e: rnonelairt
JO L 59/44 du 14.3.1970.
national reactions -such as the resorting to parity modifications. Not least, exchange rate instability was
likely to distort both competition and agricultural pricing and, ultimately, fracture the common market.
Until 1968 the issue of the convergence of national economies had clearly been alien to the development
and functioning of the common market. Precisely in this context of economic divergence of the late
1960s a specific regional objective for the Community i.e. substantial and distinct, was conceptualised for
(lie first time. The Commission took in part the neo-classical view that divergent economic performances
were, ultimately, the result of uncoordinated macroeconomic policies and that, therefore, the need for
convergence was calling for the definition in common of compatible macro-economic global objectives
aiming at stability in the balance of payments, a control of national demand and. ultimately, at attaining
an optimal functioning of the common market. In other words, the risks of a scenario of economic
divergence were bringing along the need for embarking on an actual harmonised conception of macro-
economic objectives in die medium term so Uiat to attain a degree of compatibility of national policy
choices and engineer an optimal policy strategy of price stability and growth for die Community as a
whole.
But beyond a pure macro-economic account of die scenario of divergence, according to die diagnosis of
the I Barre Plan, die spontaneously and unregulated realisation of structural transformations explained
also to a good degree, die divergence in economic policies and performances which die common market
underwent in die late 1960s and which were putting die common market and die attainment of the
economic union in jeopardy. Applying a traditional dieory of international trade, according to the
Commission divergent evolutions and, to an extent, currency adjustments, were die culmination of a
persistent situation of disequilibrium in die balance of payments in some countries, which was partly the
result of a national situation characterised by an excessive national demand not matched by national
production capacities. Certainly widiout denying, nor diminishing, die role of external factors in
provoking the economic divergence and monetary instability of die late 1960s and early 1970s, according
to die Commission, fundamental structural reasons were contributing to the divergent economic
performances and policy evolution of die Six. The extent and die nature of regional imbalances in each
of die Six was one amongst a number of internal factors accounting for die divergence which was putting
die continuation of die common market at risk. Seen within its wider framework. Community structural
involvement was perceived as a complement to die solution of compatibility and originally motivated by
a search for attaining national fundamental economic equilibria.
Indeed, by 1968 die first signs had emerged diat die common market could neither continue functioning
nor delivering its economic benefits unless die levels of productivity and competitiveness of its regional
economies and sectors attained a certain harmonisation. According to the Commission, from die initial
merging oi' the markets of the Six, structural transformations had proceeded unevenly across tire common
market. Such uneven structural evolution i.e. the uneven presence and intensity of structural rigidities
were explaining, to some fair extent, both the asymmetrical growth and the economic policy divergence
that the Community experienced since 1968. A form of regulation of the structural evolutions at
Community level i.e. a deliberate intervention to ensure a certain degree of approximation, of
harmonisation in the evolution of the structures of the Six was becoming an imperative for the
continuation of the common market.
Substantially, regional imbalances were treated as productivity imbalances on the basis of a clear
correlation between the level of development of a given region and the level of productivity of its sectors.
By geographical structural imbalances the Commission conveyed, mainly, the geographically delimited
lower competitiveness of regional economies in comparison with those most adapted. Thus, the task of
approximation of structures boiled down to an elimination of the wide deviations in productivity and in
income levels appearing at Community level when national regional disparities were compared. While
the national disparities and Community distortions revealed the uneven geographical consolidation of
structural mutations, the specific Community concern had to consist of the reduction of the gap created
between those geographically better adapted structures and those most rigid ones. In sum, rather than an
abstract and general correction of relative income differences, a regional objective for the common
market was argued for its contribution to economic and policy convergence. The upgrading of the
economic union into a EMU would not alter the justification for regional actions by the Community; in
fact in pure theoretical grounds, a programme to attain EMU reinforced the need for harmonising
structural conditions across the Community.
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II. the Commission's determinant role in the emergence of a policy
competence (1959-1972)
Ar seen in the previous chapter, the Commission came up with the conceptualisation of a
fundamental regional objective for the Community in the context of the economic divergence of
1968-1969. That conceptualisation was not the first attempt made by the Commission, nor the only
possible one, nor even the last. Before this attempt, in fact from 1959, the Commission took up a
pro-active stance towards this area ofpublic policy not explicitly earmarked by the EEC Treaty as
of Community competence. Indeed, although the Treaty paid no concrete determination to regional
objectives, nonetheless a number of references and tangential incursions into regional issues were
made from various policy domains. These opportunities opened by the EEC Treaty were explored by
the Commission in an attempt to elaborate on a regional direction and to launch a regional agenda
for the Community.
The emergence of a regional policy competence was a process not solely characterised by the
determinant influence of the Commission but, ultimately, it meant the demarcation of a new policy
domain in relation to other policy areas, particularly in relation to agricultural policy and
competition policy. The formulation of a regional objective was a deeply disputed and internally
divisive dossier for the Commission up until the Paris Summit of October 1972 when new policy
developments (EMU and enlargement) would enter into play and finally settled what can be
described as a contest of conceptualisations, ofobjectives (point 17, chapter IV).
A) The regional aspects of the EEC Treaty
7. The Treaty's scope to accommodate a regional objective
So how could that emerging fundamental and specific Community regional objective -as being
described in chapter I- be translated into a competence? On which legal basis could that emerging
regional objective be pursued by the Community? But, first of all, what was the Treaty's treatment of
regional objectives?
7.1. The EEC Treaty provisions relating to regional policy
The most direct provisions in the EEC Treaty relating to regional issues were the following:
a) The preamble: a concern for the unity and the balanced development of die economies of the Six.
A Community concern for the long term economic development perspectives of the regions was laid
down in tire preamble of the EEC Treaty linked to a wish to attain tire unity and tire harmonious
expansion of tire economies of its members. Thus the signatory States declared themselves to be:
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Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development
by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the
less favoured regions,
The text seems to convey Uial in view of a harmonious development of the economies of the member
states the gap (in development) between regions ought to be reduced and the backwardness of those
less favoured ones be remedied. In odier words, in principle, the Community had an interest in or a
concern for tire long term economic perspectives of its regions in so far as the Community aimed at
the unity and development of the economies of the countries belonging to it.
Precisely to this objective i.e. to ensure die conditions of an equilibrated development die Spaak
report1 defended die creation of an Investment Fund. The recommendations of die Spaak Report are
seen below.
By 1965, on die grounds of die need for the Community to pursue a steady growth of quality and
without breaks, die Commission argued in die draft of I MTEP Programme die need to undertake a
co-ordination of national regional policies and programmes. Notably, widiout a policy aiming at die
expansion of die economic base and at quality of growdi die high levels of growth attained up to
1965 were at risk of being interrupted since geographical disequilibria conditioned a balanced
growdi in die medium term (point 8.2).
b) Article 2: a task of promoting harmonious development of economic activities entrusted to die
Community.
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of member States, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increase in stability, accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between
the States belonging to it.
This article is commonly interpreted as laying down a political concern for regional policy: namely, a
concern for a distribution of economic activities in a harmonised manner across die Community
territory. In contrast widi die preamble -which referred to die development of the economies of the
member states- in article 2 die Treaty is not alluding to die expansion of die national economies as a
whole, but to die expansion of economic activities. Neverdieless, aldiough article 2 laid down a task.
' That is the report mandated by the members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) a:, the
Conference of Messina of 1-2 June 1955 in order to study further plans of economic integration, particularly. the
creation of a common market, and which set the broad guidelines of the process of negotiation leading tr. the
adoption of the EEC and Euratom Communities. Comite Intergouvernernental cree par la Conference de
Messine, Rapport des Chefs de Delegation aux ministres des Affaires litrangeres. Secretariat, Bruxelles. 21
Avril 1956.
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if this task is compared with the recommendations of the Spaak report, one has to admit that article 2
was eventually a rather general and vague statement.
Indeed, the Spaak report advocated -apart from establishing rules and procedures for the control of
state aids- a deliberate action of economic development. This deliberate action would be
accompanied by the creation of a Investment Fund2 which would mainly support projects of
infrastructure provision in underdeveloped regions, projects of industrial reconversion and creation
of new economic activities.
A development in common of the less favoured regions, as in fact one finds in each of the
participating countries, is a fundamental necessity for the success of the common market (...) the
gap can on the contrary increase cumulatively if the fundamental conditions for a development of
productions are, to start with, not created by public means, that is: infrastructures of roads, ports,
and communication means, operations of draining, irrigation and an improvement of the soils,
the creation of schools and hospitals. A positive and collective action is on the contrary a
common advantage for. the regions where development is sought as well as for the best favoured
regions (,..)3.
The Spaak report was arguing for a deliberate and positive public action in order to ensure that the
basic elements for tire development of regions were present everywhere. This -common action was
conveyed as an indispensable 'condition' for a common expansion i.e. to avoid tire ever widening of
differences in development -which, takes us back to tire concerns of tire preamble of tire Treaty.
In addition, tire Spaak report defended tire co-ordination of national development plans in order to
avoid contradiction of national efforts and to allow national plans to develop in co-operation:
It is important here to recall that certain regional development plans are in progress and that
others could be undertaken in the time being. The problem of the co-ordination between the
development of these plans and that -progressive- of the common market will have to be
regulated so that the different efforts do not conflict among each other but, on the contrary,
regional plans can favourably develop in a framework of European economic co-operation and
unity. Propositions could be presented by member States or by the Commission in this respect*.
In sum, the Spaak report envisaged a regional task for the common expansion of the common market
and of its economies; it defended the co-ordination of development programmes and advocated for
2 The resources and the credit capabilities of this Investment Fund were foreseen by the Spaak report to be
constituted by a initial input in capital by member states of a size of one billion US dollars. See p. 150 of
Romus P. (1975), 'La creation du Fonds Europeen de developpement regional: debut de la politique regiotnale
europeenne? Revue du Marche Commun. no. 184, p. 149-152, Avril 1975, Paris.
3 Spaak report, p. 77-78. French text in Appendix.
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Spaak Report, p. 18-19. French text in Appendix.
tiie creation of an investment fund which, essentially conceived with a banking character, became
instead the EIB5.
Not sufficient research seems to have been made on die policy conceptions and then on the real
negotiation of the Spaak report leading to the signing of the Rome Treaties6. Still, strictly for our
needs, it seems clear that if one confronts (lie recommendations put forward in the Spaak report
against the actual Treaty provisions regarding regional policy, one has to conclude that die EEC
Treaty did, by no means, honour die recommendations of die report -apart from the notion of
expansion of die economies in die preamble and, as it will be seen later, die task of surveillance of
slate aids. Indeed, no deliberate policy of economic development as a condition for die success of die
market, no co-oidiualion of national regional programmes and 110 creation of a regional fund -apart
from die EIB resources- was taken 011 board by die Treaty signatories. In sum, neidier the co¬
ordination nor the promotion were taken 011 board in die final Treaty. Instead, in die form of a
general statement and widiout engaging on any type of instruments, article 2 laid down an abstract
concern for a harmonious development of economic activities.
It does not seem valid enough die general remark diat die lack of interest at die time 011 a regional
agenda was due to die fact diat only Italy suffered from regional problems since, even diough a
comparison on die relative dimension of die regional problems across die common market seems to
concede to the Italian case a particular gravity, regional problems were a pervasive problem in each
of die Six. That is, die importance of die imbalances regarding die distribution of population and of
economic activities was, in die years immediately before die signing of die Treaty, a commonplace.
Thus, aldiough certainly diere were enormous differences in prosperity at Community level, other
reasons, such as the fact diat regional policy included a range of measures in economic, transport and
infrastructure policy of a country, seems to have been perceived by member states as an involvement
which would create an excessive burden on Community duties, which would grant excessive power
of scrutiny to die Commission and which, besides, would presumably alter channels of political
allegiance between national authorities and dieir electorates7.
All told, admittedly, article 2 can be interpreted as laying down a general concern diat die economic
development ensuing from die common market ought not to benefit only some countries, or some
regions of particular countries, but radier, the whole of die Community. The Community had. at
most, a generally stated obligation to vigil -widi unspecified means- that a harmonious
(comprehensive) development followed after die six markets had merged. However, diis task was
5 According to P. Romus the idea of a Regional Fund had been put forward at the Messina Conference of 1966.
Romus (1975) 'La creation du FEDER ...', p. 149.
6 See accounts from policy insiders: in p. 274-303 of Marjolin R. (1986), Le travail d'une vie. Memoires 1911-
1986. Editions Robert Laffont, Paris; Spaak P.H. (1969), Combats inacheves. vol. 2. p. 84-100. Bruxelles.
Fayard.
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plainly, and ultimately, a deserted statement without laying down any concrete capacity for the
Community to facilitate or promote (concretely: by co-ordination or by financial means) regional
objectives.
c) Articles 80, 92-94 and 226: allowing for particular and exceptional derogations of the rules laid
down in the Treaty in favour of regional difficulties but always under Community control.
Concerning the domain of transport, the Commission would examine exceptions to the general
prohibitions of support, or of protection, granted to specific undertakings, or specific industries, on
the grounds of either national regional policy objectives or on tire grounds of (lie needs of
underdeveloped areas. That is, the Commission would examine both national price rates and
conditions of transport, bearing in mind appropriate regional policy requirements and the needs of
under-developed areas (article 80). An explicit particular reference was made (in article 82) for the
derogation of the common transport rules for those national measures 'required in order to
compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany' and of assistance to
the 'economy of certain areas affected by that division'.
In a similar line, although advantages to specific beneficiaries were incompatible with the common
market (article 92.1), particular aid to enterprises or particular industry sectors could be compatible
with the common market under certain conditions (article 92.3 a) and 92.3.c)) and always subject to
control procedures (article 93).
In the field of international and intra-Community trade, the Treaty provided as general rule: the
establishment of a common external tariff -regarding third parties- and tire elimination of duties and
of quantitative restrictions -within the Community. Against this background, article 226 provided as
a transitory measure, exceptional derogations to be able to hold imports on either sectoral or regional
grounds. Thus, in the case of difficulty in a sector or in the case where the above rules were likely to
provoke serious alterations in a given regional economic situation, the Commission could set
exceptional conditions for the application of safeguard measures8.
Altogether, the object of the articles above are national regional (and sectoral) measures which can
be authorised as exceptions and derogations of Treaty rules. But, how to understand the derogations
of common rules for the protection of regional economies? They seem to convey the acceptable room
for legitimate national policy priorities while remaining in the context of the common market and of
a competition system as comprehensive as realistically possible. The allowance of regional
derogations is circumstantial, conditional and surveyed -in their use or abuse- by the Commission. In
other words, regional derogations involve a conditioned waiving, a circumstantial priority -not
7 See p. 82 of Hans von der Groeben (1985), The European Community. Formative years. Brussels. European
Perspectives Series, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
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supremacy per se- for national regional measures over competition and common market general
rules. They provide for the proceeding and reconciliation of common objectives with sovereign
national concerns via an appraisal of die invoked derogations at Community level. Indeed, on die
one hand, the removal of barriers and obstacles could create or aggravate situations of regional
disequilibria, which eidier reaching Community importance or not could entail a grave national
economic or political impact. On die odier hand, beyond die legitimacy of national measures for die
protection of regional economies, die use of these regionally-aimed measures, and their effects on a
parallel adequate functioning of die common market, made necessary a surveillance of their use.
The case of die Community control of state aids with regional purposes has been dealt widi
separately (in point 9). It is important to observe now, however, diat all diese tools were "negative" in
die sense diat diey did not automatically imply die use of these mechanisms of control as tools for
conducting actual regional policy objectives. Notably, they were instruments of control in die form of
procedures of appraisal, but die Treaty did not lay down dieir superseding into criteria, their
development into objectives, dieir outgrowdi into guidelines of an aid policy for die Community.
d) Articles 39.2 and 49: attaching regional aspects to sectoral policies.
Articles 39.2.a) and 42, on structural agricultural policy, allowed for die consideration of natural and
structural disparities among die various agricultural regions at die time of elaboration of die CAP.
Particularly, article 39.2 states:
In working out the common agricultural policy and the special methods for its application,
account shall be taken of:
(a) the particular nature of agricultural activity, which results from the social structure of
agriculture and from structural and natural disparities between the various agricultural regions:
Equally, as regards die elaboration of a policy for free movement of labour, article 49.d> permits
taking into account - 'by die setting up of appropriate machinery'- die balance of supply and demand
in die employment markets of some regions. So, bodi articles -radier dian concerning die control of
national regional measures as the ones just seen in c)- referred to Community policy objectives,
notably, to die parallel consideration of regional development concerns at die time of die elaboration
of Community policy in die fields of agriculture as well as in die pursuit of free movement of labour.
Now, if Article 39.2.a) states diat, in die elaboration of die common agricultural policy, structural
and natural differences ought to be taken into account, does that imply diat die Treaty allowed for a
regionalisation of agricultural policy -if by 'regionalisation of agricultural policy' it is meant the
making of a differentiated common agricultural policy on die basis of diverse regional agricultural
0" For instance, article 226 was invoked by Italy to allow protective national measures for the support of the
Italian sulphur industry on regional grounds, namely, for the South of Italy.
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and structural situations? How much does a common policy allow for specific and diverse situations?
In other words, how can common and regional be reconciled if they seem in principle opposed in
terms? No regional differentiation applied to pricing nor to common rules. The Treaty provided for a
unique and single organisation of the agricultural markets of the members based on the removal of
customs duties and quantitative restrictions to agricultural products and a geographically all
encompassing price policy. Indeed, the regionalisation of CAP could never consist of fracturing the
agricultural market. Rather, the provision for the consideration of diverse regional and structural
conditions was envisaged in the establishment of the CAP objectives (39.2) via the establishment of
funds (Guarantee and Guidance) and by the actual setting up of the conditions of operation of those
funds. Indeed, the role of the funds is defined by the Treaty as a complement to market policy so that
the common organisation of the markets can meet the objectives set up in article 39.1. So what did
that 'account' that ought to be taken, that parallel 'consideration' exactly mean? A compensation? A
policy differentiation? In general terms, such 'consideration' seems to mean that structural
adaptations ought to bear in mind regional realities. In practice, the materialisation of that
'consideration' was left open, possibly allowing for the Community institutions to reach an
agreement on its actual scope. Still, clearly, a consideration of regional realities does not imply an
actual pursuit of the regional development of a region.
In fact in both fields -agricultural and social policy- the Treaty had foreseen the creation of financial
means. Obviously, however, both the EAGGF or the ESF had a sectoral purpose or, in oilier words,
their use was restrained to their specific sectoral policy targets. Still, the Commission was going to
propose and eventually succeeded in adapting the modalities of the intervention of both the ESF and
of the Guidance section of (lie EAGGF for operational regional development purposes while both
Funds would still pursue their own sectoral targets (point 13.3, chapter III).
e) Article 130: financing of investment projects by the European Investment Bank (EIB).
The task of the EIB shall be to contribute, by having recourse to the capital market and utilising
its own resources, to the balanced and steady development of the common market in the interest
of the Community. For this purpose the Bank shall, operating in a non-profit-making basis, grant
loans and give guarantees which facilitate the financing of the following sectors of the economy.
a) projects for developing less developed regions;
b) projects for modernising or converting undertakings as for developing fresh activities called
for by the progressive establishment of the common market where these projects are of such size
or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual
Member States;
c) projects of common interest to several Member States which are of such size or nature that
they cannot be entirely financed by the various means available in the individual Member
States.
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National governments -before 1957- used a variety of financial instruments to promote regional
development: low interest loans, guarantees, interest rebates in already accorded loans, capital funds,
state participation in the capital of enterprises, creation of development societies, etc.9. Indeed the
banking system played in 1957 a crucial role in regional development tasks. In some countries banks
were performing the actual selection of projects, notably as result of governments' demands -like in
the FRG- that loans accorded by the treasury for development and reconversion purposes were
guaranteed by a sound -in most cases regional- bank10. The setting up of a EIB which would support
regional development actions was therefore not a novelty".
Within a wide choice of financial instruments the Treaty chose the granting of low interest loans and
of guarantees. Interest rebates or guarantees offered, on the one hand, the advantage over capital
funds of resources not being lost but able to be recovered eventually. But crucially, the choice for EIB
granting loans and guarantees seems to imply that the selection of projects would be made primarily
on die grounds of economic soundness, rather than on a policy which the Treaty had not really laid
down any basis. The banking organisation would guarantee the economic viability of die projects
financially assisted while the procedure for granting EIB resources allowed die Commission to chip
in to give its opinion on Lhe EIB financed projects. Notably, die procedure for deciding die granting
of resources provided diat the administrative Council had the power to decide on the granting of
loans or guarantees subject to die Commission's opinion. In die case of a negative opinion by die
Commission, die Administrative Council of die EIB could only proceed if unanimity was reached 2.
0 The Protocol on Italy13.
The Protocol on Italy laid down, and made of common interest, die attainment of die objectives
pursued by an ongoing ten-year plan designed by die Italian audiorities for die correction of
structural disequilibrium. The Protocol also recommended die use of Community financial means -
ESF and EIB- towards diis purpose and empowered Community institutions to use all means and
procedures under die Treaty to assist die Italian Government in its efforts to establish an equilibrium
in die national economy, notably through aids to die Mezzogiorno"1. The Protocol, ultimately, could
be recalled by die Italian government as a waiver there where die application of die Treaty could lead
9 For an account of the national preferences on regional incentives see report of group III in Commission (1964)
Rapports de groupes d'experts sur la politique regionale dans la CEE.
10 Against an argument on the excessive central role that the banking system played in regional development, it
was argued that the responsibility of the choices did not rest uniquely on the banks, rather, a verv particular
encouraging role was performed by the local and regional authority who contacted businessmen -ultimately
responsible for the choices of enterprise creation or enterprise location.
" The EIB statutes provided that EIB had legal personality and its members were the member states and
resources were to be made up by national contributions. For the details on the workings and borrowinz capacity
of the Bank see Prolocole sur les Statuts de la Banque Europeenne d'investissement. Protocol annexed Co the
EEC Treaty.
12 See article 19 and 21 of the Protocol on the Statutes of the EIB.
13 Protocol annexed to the EEC Treaty, Protocole concernant I'ltalie.
14 Flockton (1970) Op. cit. p. 28-29.
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to a dangerous situation of unemployment and ol' a deficit in the national balance of payments. In
other words, the regional imbalances of Italy were going to be taken into consideration to an extent
of waiving the application of Treaty rules, if necessary and so resolved by the Commission.
So, if the above were the most direct provisions relating to regional objectives for tire EEC Treaty,
what can we conclude? The Treaty mainly contained: 1. a concern for long term balanced expansion
of the economies of its members (preamble); 2. a non-concrete task of promotion of harmonious
development of economic activities (article 2); 3. derogations to Treaty rules for regional purposes
(articles 80, 92-94, 226); 4. die possibility of attaching regional objectives to sectoral policies (39.
49) and 3. financial resources from die EIB. Yet, while die Treaty laid down -at its most- a weak
regional ambition, at the same time, it implicitly enclosed -deliberately or not- various possible
definitions of a regional objective for die Community.
Indeed, on die one hand, the Treaty did not do much more than state a general concern of balanced
and harmonious development. Or, in odier words, if one accepts -as a premise- die difference
between stating vaguely an objective of harmonious development (in preamble or in article 2) and
actually pursuing die development of particular regions which could be left out of die main flow of
exchanges, one has to conclude diat die EEC Treaty did not recognise a concrete and deliberate
action of development to be pursued by die Community. Even diough die Spaak Committee
considered die direat of die opposite scenario'5, and also various odier public voices expressed their
anxiety about die impact of die process of economic integration on die problem regions within each
country and in die EEC in general (Vanhove 1980, p. 227-228), die Treaty signatories seemed to
have believed diat die functioning of die market would not pose a serious regional direat, nor diat the
economies of the Six would grow apart. Article 3, which listed die policies into which die
Community would develop made no mention of a regional policy and, incidentally, die EEC Treaty
did not define 'region' eidier -even diough various policies put to use a regional framework of
application: CAP, transport, competition, employment and labour formation". Certainly also, one
15 Thus the Spaak report states on p. 18: 'The third condition that is important to recognise is that it i> not true
that, among regions unequally developed, a sudden putting in contact allows by itself the catch up in their delay
of those less favoured ones. It is only if they are provided, by a deliberate policy, with the neces.sary
infrastructure for their development, that they will benefit in full from the differences in labour costs or of a
larger productivity of the investments. There resides the importance of regional development actions and of
employment creation on the ground, the only one which could avoid a cumulative increase in the gap between
the levels of production and the standards of living of the different regions'. Original French text in appendices.
See also p. 77-78 of Spaak report.
16 It was in September 1959 that the Commission first placed on its agenda the definition of large socio¬
economic regions as an attempt to reach a more operational sectioning of the Community territory. The
Commission aimed at obtaining a mapping of the Community territory whereby the borders of the policy units
were identical for Community and national policy purposes arguing that as regional policy was increasingly
becoming a synthesis of specific policies applied to a given territory, the dimensions of those units upon wibich
national and Community interventions confined to ought to be -if at all possible- identical irrespective of the
particular policies being applied. Avoiding a definition of the notion of region, the Commission defended a
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ought to concede the fact that some financial means -the EIB- were available; yet, one also lias to
remember that, after all, the EIB was going to reward specific investments on a profitability basis
since no actual provision for the spending into particular Community regional guidelines -and their
elaboration- was made. Furthermore, where some Community instruments (sectoral means or
procedures of control of derogations) could have served a regional objective, the Treaty simply
neglected such potentiality. Concerning derogations to common rules (articles 80, 92-94. 226).
although they conveyed the legitimacy of a national regional concern and a respect for national
regional measures, their control by the Community was not conceived as a policy instrument.
Equally, as regards sectoral policies, regional considerations seem rather to be understood as
subsidiary and restricted to the pursuit of agricultural or social objectives (articles 39.2, 42). In sum.
an unequipped concern to ensure the harmonious expansion of the economies of the member states,
an ethereal and ambiguous task to promote a harmonious development of economic activities, and a
dispersed and un-targeted collection ofmeans are what the Treaty left to the Community institutions.
Overall, either the signatories took a neo-classical stance by which both the establishment of a
common market and die progressive approximation of economic policies would expectedly result in a
development of economic activities in harmony at bodi regional level and among national
economies17; or die signatories simply considered the solutions to regional problems a national
assignment. In any case -or odier- neidier a provision for a deliberate Community acfion nor a
concrete regional purpose was ever laid down in die Treaty.
However, alongside such weak regional ambition of die Treaty signatories, two more aspects ought to
be noted, namely, die fact diat die Treaty was, ultimately, equivocal about regional aspects while
offering, at die same time, an effective range of foyers from where a regional dossier could be both
forged and launched. Indeed, a number of possible significations of a regional objective seem to be
eidier implicitly retained in die Treaty or potentially leading to it. Notably, first, in die preamble a
radier global concern on a balanced expansion of die economies of die members is laid down which
regional mapping of the Community for pure operational purposes [see 'Essai de delimitation regionale' in
Commission, Documents de la Conference sur les economies regionales vol. 11. p. 65-166; and also point 8.1
below)]. The delimitation drawn in 1961 was never used and, therefore, regional units retained their boundaries
as relative to the policy area under consideration. For an appraisal of this exercise see Romus P. Absence d'une
definition communautaire de la region p. 143-145 in VVAA (1971) La politique regionale du Marclie
Commun, Centre d'Etudes Europeennes, Universite catholique de Louvain, Editions Vander. In 1969 the
Commission defined region under an operational perspective too: 'Beyond the institutional, administrative and
geographical limits which come to mind immediately, it is important to understand what accounts for the most
basic realities of the region. It would appear that if the region is seen as an entity constituted by a group of
communities which in varying degrees are closely linked by the effect of a number of factors determining
location, this makes it possible to account both for the characteristic features of the traditional regions and for
the changes they are undergoing. This approach, which is an operational one, brings out botli the population
element and the location factors. It immediately draws attention to the role played by the location factors'. See
Commission, Note on regional Policy, chapter II. point 1.
17 As Vanhove summarises it, the neo-classical theory of international trade considered that the establishment of
a common market would narrow down differences in 'per capita' income between countries because (a.) free
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would conform with the structural conceptualisation of a regional objective as emerging from the
scenario of divergence of the late 1960s. Second, in article 2, Lhe Treaty claimed a duty towards a
harmonious development of economic activities on a regional base. Third, a sectoral conception of a
regional objective could also be galvanised from article 39.2 and 42, whereby, in the pursuing of
sectoral objectives -agricultural or social- either a link or a continuation into regional objectives
could be explored. Fourth, the negative surveillance of regional incentives could lead to the
definition of aid policy guidelines arising mainly from competition considerations. As it will be seen
in the rest of this chapter, by 1968 these departure points above, even if clearly conveying alternative
significations of a regional objective for the Community, were not theoretical but real. But before
dealing with their expansion let us note some Treaty provisions which became instrumental to forge
and launch the regional dossier.
7.2. The Treaty possible channels for incorporating a fundamental regional objective
Contrasting with both the weakness and the ambiguity in regard to a regional objective for the
Community, the Treaty offered a number of different channels for enshrining a regional concern,
namely, articles 155, 145 and 235.
g) The Commission's license to organise co-operation and to conceptualise at its own initiative:
Article 155.
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market, the
Commission shall: (...)
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this Treaty, if it
expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;
Article 155 granted the capacity for the Commission to start up -at its own initiative- the
consideration of issues relating to the ensuring of a proper functioning and development of the
common market when the Commission so considered it necessary. In practical terms and for our
purposes, article 155 entailed a capacity to set up and initiate internally -and in co-operation with
member states- the construction of specific Community views on regional issues and, subsequently,
hiking those positions to the Council.
Indeed, the Commission, at an early stage, started a search and an appraisal on where, how and in
which terms various DGs were coming across regional policy related issues'*. Thus, in September
markets in principle would lead to the equalisation of the factor prices and (b) because free movement of goods
would be a substitute for free movement of factors. Vanhove and Klaassen (1980), Op. cit. p. 23.
'* See Commission, Groupe de travail Inter-Directions Generates: Politique regionale. Note. Objet: Cornpte-
rendu de la reunion n.l du 16.9.59 au Bureau du Directeur General II. Bruxelles 21 Septembre 1959
[11/2226/59], Commission, Reunion des responsables nationaux des politiques regionales, Projet de comple
rendu de la reunion n.l du 25 septembre 1959, Bruxelles 6 Novembre 1959 [11/5038/59] and letters by B-obba
and Marjolin of September 1959 in particular.
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1959 DGII set up an Inter-services Group in order to collect the reactions of various DGs regarding
the need for a regional approach to certain of their specific problems and to forge a common
conception of regional policy in the Community (point 8.1).
The Commission reported to consider such capacity to initiate as a duty19, an obligation to fulfil the
responsibilities laid down on the Treaty -no matter how abstractly asserted. Thus in 1959 the
Commission felt that die Preamble and article 2 put it under die obligation to consider differences of
economic development among regions in view of ensuring an harmonious development and
unhampered growth of die economies of die member states10. Certainly die general responsibility laid
down in die preamble and in article 2 did not convey a specific and deliberate Community task and
what die Commission first undertook was a duty of formulation, of definition of actual possible
regional objectives to be undertaken by die Community.
But beyond die construction stage, die obligation towards die functioning and development of die
common market involved also die capacity to bring up directly and unmediated its completed views
to die Council's attention. The Commission brought up a specific conceptualisation of a regional
dossier to die Council table in the I Barre Plan of 12 February 19692'.
h) A task of co-ordination of economic policies: article 145.
In die field of general economic policy die Treaty restricted the scope of intervention of Community
institutions to merely a task of co-ordination.
• Article 3 g):
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided
in the Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein [...]
(g) the application of procedures by which the economic policy of member States can be co¬
ordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments remedied;
19 The 'First Communication by the Commission on regional policy' of 1965 justified the taking up of regional
considerations in the following terms: 'The Commission, by virtue of article 155, has the obligation to be
concerned about the effects of national and common policies on the development of economic activities in the
different regions and to undertake the necessary initiatives so that a concerted action of regional and national
institutions on the one hand, and of the Community institutions on the other, ensures the harmonious
development of the regions of the Community'. Commission, Premiere Convminication de la Commission sur
la politique regionale dans la Communaute europeenne, p. 1 [II/SEC (65) 1170 final]. See original French text
in appendices.
20 Notably: 'M. Bobba (director general of DGII at the time) ouvre la seance (of the 1 st meeting) en rappelar.1 la
disposition contenue dans le preambule du Traite, de reduction des ecarts de developpemenl entre les regions
de la Communaute et done d'obligations de la part de la Commission de propositions sur ce probleme a faire
aux litats membres, quitte a en preciser les modalites puisque celles-ci ne sonl pas inscrites dans le Traite'.
See p. 1 of Commission, Reunion des responsables nationaux des politiques regionales, Projet de cotnpte rendu
de la reunion n.l du 25 septembre 1959, Bruxelles 6 Novembre 1959 [11/5038/59].
21 The I Barre Plan noted the Commission's obligations in the following terms: 'The Commission, which the
Treaty entrusts with responsibilities for the Community, would be failing to its duty if it did not inform the
Council of its concern and submit its opinions on problems facing the Community in all fields relating to the
life of the Community'. Bulletin of the EECC 1969, Supplement 3, p. 4.
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• Article 6.1:
Member States shall, in close co-operation with the institutions of the Community, co-ordinate
their respective economic policies to the extent necessary to attain the objectives of this Treaty.
• Article 145:
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty:
— ensure co-ordination of general economic policies of the Member States;
— have power to take decisions
Certainly, these articles concerning the Community capacity to co-ordinate -in the context of the
Council- national economic policy options for the sake of the achievement of the Treaty objectives
do, by no means, allow us to conclude that the drafters of the Treaty implicitly envisaged an
assignment for Community institutions to co-ordinate regional policies. Indeed, article 145 does not
lay down a general power of decision over economic policies; rather, the actual domains of economic-
policy where such co-ordination applied were explicitly to be attributed in a case by case basis.
In fact, although by the time of the signing of the Treaty regional policy in most of the member states
largely responded to a rationale of assistance and social concerns, in tire late 1960s and early 1970s
regional policy grew into becoming a part of general economic policy. It was not, broadly speaking,
until the late 1950s -in a couple of cases- and until the 1960s -in the rest of the countries- that
regional policy started developing into a more complex economic response to nation-wide revenue
and population imbalances22, to finally acquire an intrinsically integrated or co-ordinated nature
which was going to characterise its interventions in the following years. Indeed, and tire Commission
itself stressed it23, the conception of regional policy and of its public task evolved hastily -and
asymmetrically- in the EEC members in the late 1950s and 1960s. The Netherlands and Italy were
die first countries in 1950 to make die first steps towards a regional policy whereas Belgium and
22 The Netherlands devised for the first time long term co-ordinated plans in 1958. Yet possibly, the most firm
move was taken by France who in 1958 reformulated the task of regional policy as one of pursuing the
development of regional economies as an element of national economic development. By 1965, French regional
policy had become systematic, concentrated, co-ordinated -vertically and horizontally- and part of national
programming. Throughout successive reforms and the regionalisation of the Plan regional policy became
increasingly a constituent part of a national economic policy for growth. Elsewhere, in Germany, up to 1956
regional policy consisted of remedying urgent situations. Corresponding to the gradual achievement of full
employment, criteria for regional type interventions moved from social objectives to a reinforcement of the
economic potential of the weakest areas. Germany was always suspicious to economic development
programming and by 1965 it had developed a poor system of vertical co-ordination. Italy did not start its
medium and long term plans with vertical and horizontal co-ordination in a national perspective till the 196-6-70
Plan. Finally, regional policy in Belgium was not launched till 1959 and Luxembourg's till 1962. See a recap of
national regional conceptions in Marjolin's final summary report in p.60 vol. II of Commission, Conference sur
les economies regionales, 6-8 December 1961 or in Parlement Europeen, 'La politique regionale dans les etats
membres de la CEE', janvier 1966 [PE 15.044].
23 The Commission scans through the trends towards which regional policy is evolving in each of the Six in the
Appendix I to the Note on regional Policy of 1969.
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Luxembourg did not adopt their first regional legislation till 1959 and 1962 respectively. It is not the
intention of this thesis to enter into a thorough analysis of the nature of domestic regional policies in
1957 and their evolution in the following decades; however, what it is relevant to point out is that at
the time of the adoption of tire EEC Treaty, regional policy -where it existed- was a patchy policy of
public intervention targeting either urgent social objectives or relieving and rescuing severe
situations by often ad hoc actions directed simply to the severely hit areas. In other words, regional
policy in tire Six originally operated independently of the formulation and organisation of policies for
national economic expansion, independent of policies for national growth.
However, throughout the 1960s especially, domestic policies targeting geographical imbalances of
revenue became gradually an aspect of national economic policy. Even then, this development in the
conception of regional actions did not consolidate until, at least, 1965 and, still, it did so at different
paces in each country. According to a Commission judgement of 1969, broadly speaking, national
regional policies consisted of independent measures, isolated in relation to other complementary
policy areas, and inconsistent with national economic policy guidelines -even contradictory to
policies for growth". In fact, there is evidence of this judgement by the Commission already in
19612S. In any case, once regional policy started embarking on the distribution of economic activities
across the country -not necessarily in the less favoured regions only- and as part of an strategy of
national economic development, regional policy measures started to fit into wider national economic
policy perspectives. Thus regional policy started to be understood as an aspect of a policy for national
growth i.e. as 'part and parcel of the range of measures employed by governments to manipulate the
level and rate of growth of demand and to influence the organisation and exploitation of resources so
as to attain a rapid growth of national output'26.
In sum, as regional policy became an aspect of economic policy, it also would become susceptible to
become the object of Community co-ordination to the extent necessary for the attainment of the
objectives of the Treaty. As seen before (point 3, chapter I), to a neo-classical approach, ihe
correction of regional imbalances ought to purely be addressed by economic policy co-ordination i.e.
by a common examination and if possible a co-ordination of national regional policies.
24 See the Commission's account of the evolution of the conception of regional policy in each of the Six in
Annex I to the Note sur la politique regionale [COM(69) 950 Annexes], The Commission fingers at problems
of co-ordination between industrial policy and infrastructure policy in Germany (p. 14). to problems of co¬
ordination between regional policy and national industrial policy as well as to problems of integration of
programmes and measures of the regions with national plans in Italy (p. 34 and 40 respectively), to problems of
dispersion of the means used in Belgium (p. 55), etc.
25 Marjolin states in 1961: 'Some points have particularly struck me. The first (...). The second is the tendency
of regional policy to become everywhere an integrand of national economic policy, while up to now regional
policy was rather a type of correction that one applied to national economic policies once the latter bad
produced their centralisation effects. Peripheral regions losing their population, governments were led to act: a
regional policy was elaborated, distinct, different, isolated of national economic policy'. See Commission,
Conference sur les economies regionales, vol. II, p. 60. See original French text in Appendix.
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i) Article 235: the expansion of Community competence.
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the
market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
In other words, article 235 provides for the Council to adopt appropriate measures in order to achieve
objectives -of the Community- in cases where the Treaty did not provide the necessary powers of
action. Thus, article 235 allows for the extension of Community powers while avoiding the recourse
to an intergovernmental convening should action arise as necessary. It concedes to the Commission
the capacity to make concrete proposals to the Council for an expansion of powers. Although a priori
this provision seems to grant to the Commission a colossal power of initiative, as a matter of fact,
and particularly since 1972, article 235 was successful there where this article was used to follow suit
or implement agreements previously struck at Summit level -regional policy being one of these
cases27.
Regarding the invocation and operation of article 235, various conditions order its application
(Tizzano: 1981 )28: (1) tire attainment of one of the 'objectives' of tire Community -understood as
those referred to in article 2, but also including new developments from the original objectives such
as EMU; in which case, article 235 is understood to require that tire innovation proposed is actually
and indisputably linked to one of tire Treaty's objectives. (2) Article 235 is restricted to proposals
concerning 'tire operation of tire common market'. In other words, proposed new measures are
restricted solely to tire cases where there is a clear functional connection between the new measures
to be introduced and tire actual attainment of tire common market. However, as tire Community
evolved this restriction has been extended to mean the Treaty itself i.e. free movement and the
common policies intended by tire Treaty. (3) Article 235 requires that a necessity arises for new
powers: such necessity being ultimately confirmed by a Council decision or a Summit conclusion. (4)
There ought to be an absence of provisions in tire Treaty for the necessary powers. And a final
condition (5) the proposed measures should be 'appropriate', that is, once tire action has been judged
necessary in order to attain one of tire objectives of the Treaty, a subsequent step has to be met
consisting of tire consideration by tire Council on how appropriate or proportional tire measures
proposed by tire Commission are.
26 See introduction to Allen K. & M.C. Maclenann (1970) Regional problems and policies in Italy and France.
London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
27 For the institutional consequences of an resort to article 235 which became common from the Paris S'lmmil of
1972 onwards, see Tizzano, 'The Powers of the Community', p. 51.
28 See Tizzano, 'The Powers of the Community', p. 50-60 in VVAA (1981), Thirty Years of Conviunity law.
Commission, The European Perspectives Series.
Strictly regarding the gain of a Community competence on regional policy, tire Commission took
recourse to article 235 in order to submit to the Council proposals for a regional competence, namely
for both the 1969 and 1973 proposals -both dealt with in the following chapter. The 1969 proposal
argued Uiat article 2 had given the Community die mission to promote a harmonious development of
economic activities while the Treaty had not foreseen the required power of action to this effect and
while the expansion of Community powers was necessary in order to promote actions which had
became indispensable given the necessities and the implications of the establishment of die common
market and of die progressive approximation of die economic policies of die member states2. In 1973
however, the situation was much simple: the Paris Summit of October 1972 had mandated die
Commission to submit proposals for bodi die co-ordination of national regional policies and for die
creation of a ERDF. In odier words, die decision on die necessity to extend Community intervention
into the regional field had already been made by die Heads of state or government. The 1973
proposals plainly referred in die motives to die mandate of die Summit and to die fact that die Treaty
had not provided die necessary powers.
To recapitulate, die Treaty had, on die one hand, left die Community with no concrete powers to
undertake regional policy objectives; but on die odier hand, the Treaty provisions had left a range of
routes from where to take up a regional dimension (from an agenda towards balanced development
from various common policies, from die control of regional derogations) as well as various
instruments from where to build up and launch concrete proposals (Commission's initiative, co¬
ordinate regional economic policies, resort to article 235). It was in diis imprecise and open field
where die Commission's attitude, power of initiative and of formulation of a regional dimension for
die common market and last, but not least, its managerial command of a regional policy dossier
proved decisive.
B) The making of a regional policy dossier: the nature and influence of the regional interests
across the Commission's Directorate Generals
As revealed in chapter I, by 1968 the Commission picked up and modelled a fundamental regional
objective understood in global structural terms in die context of economic divergence among the Six.
This conceptualisation put forward by die Directorate General for economic and financial affairs
(DGII) was going to remain die fundamental conceptualisation of a regional objective for the
Community. However, such conceptualisation had not been die first attempt by die Commission to
29 However, according to M. Zuleeg the limitation of the resort to article 235 to measures aiming at the
realisation of one of the objectives of the Treaty prevented the use of article 235 for a regional policy since the
latter was not a Treaty aim. According to Zuleeg, the 1969 proposal refers to article 235 not for normative acts
but for decisions concerning aids. See p. 38 of Les repartitions de competences entre la Commun.iute et les
hats Membres in La Communaute el ses hats Membres, Acles du Vletne Colloque de I'lnstitu: d'htides
Juridiques Europeens, Liege 1973.
remedy the substantial absence of regional considerations in die Treaty nor the only possible one.
Before 1968 (lie day to day running of various policy areas had come up and encountered regional
aspects. By 1966 the Directorate General for Competition (DGIV) was inspecting possible guidelines
on regional aid policy while also the Directorate General for Agriculture (DGVI) was developing an
interest for a regional dimension of agricultural policy -for (lie reform of agricultural structures in
priority regions was calling for measures other than strictly agricultural. In fact, other Directorate
Generals (DGs) -transport, social policy or internal market- even if touching upon regional issues,
did not observably make of their regional dimensions a strong claim on a regional objective. Mainly
DGII, DGIV and DGVI were the directorates leading and bringing regional considerations up to the
attention of both tire Commission's college and to the Council. Finally, in 1968 a new DG was
established to take up specifically on regional issues. The directorate general for regional policies
followed up mainly along the line of the path opened by DGII. The making of a regional dossier was.
as a matter of fact, going to implicate various DGs and, crucially, revolve around alternative
conceptualisations. Let us see the nature of the regional dimension of each of the four above-
mentioned DGs and the role of each of them in (lie building of a Community regional objective.
8. The active internal and external search for a regional conception and DGII's structural
conceptualisation (1959-1970)
By 1968 the Commission was well experienced and aware of diverse interdepartmental interests on a
regional agenda. Such awareness had emerged from a task on introspection started off in 1959, under
the direction of DGII, and with the aim of defining an overall conception of regional policy for the
Community. At least one reason for such search seems to have been a perceived need to cover a gap
in the Treaty, namely, a gap resulting from the fact that the Treaty made explicit references to a
regional dimension and to a regional objective in various places, and yet, it left opened,
undetermined, a concrete task to be performed by the Community institutions. Indeed, from tire
earliest days a regional task for the Community was not an unequivocal dossier and through tire
1960s DGII performed a task of leadership and consensus building both within tire Commission and
externally with national representatives and tire other European Communities. However, by 1968,
and beyond tire regional dimensions of various sectoral policies, DGII would define a substantial
regional objective for tire Community.
8.1. The first internal and external activism: the search for an overall conception of regional policy
(1959-1965)
The very first initiatives within tire EEC Commission were launched in 1959 by vice-president
Marjolin who, from the basis of his personal authority, requested tire agreement of the Commission's
College to launch two parallel types of action on tire regional domain. One type of action consisted of
a task of internal co-ordination among all DGs with an interest in regional aspects -within their
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respective policy fields. A second initiative was one of co-operation among governments which
would target the searcli and lite sussing of national reactions for an eventual possible configuration of
a definite regional responsibility for the Community30. Often literature has identified the origins of
the enterprising attitude of the Commission on a regional dossier in die latter i.e. on the setting up of
the group of national regional policy representatives under the presidency of Robert Marjolin. for litis
was Ute first form of co-operation on the regional domain organised by die Commission widt
national officials; but, the parallel work of interdepartmental policy building -started also in 1959
and led by DGII as well- and which must have provided die first evidence of die various and
alternative regional interests emerging from various DGs, is often not raised.
Thus, 011 9 September 1959 die College of Commissioners, after being presented with a
'Communication on die problems of regional policy'31 by Marjolin, agreed to set up bodi an internal
Group Inter-services chaired by DGII's director general widi die task to study die objectives of die
regional policy of the Community, die means of action in this field and the possible initiatives to
launch and, second, a group composed of high ranking civil servants responsible nationally for
regional policy -hereafter referred as die 1959 group- under die presidency and leadership of
Marjolin itself and die secretariat and services of DGII. Up to 1965, DGII carried out dirough these
two channels a policy of gadiering expertise and of search of support and consensus building among
national officials on minimum common denominators. By 1965 die results of diis initial campaign -
launched back in 1959- gave die first results in two forms. On die one hand, die Commission
released its 'First Communication to die Council on regional policy in the Community' which put
forward the overall conception resulting from die successive exercises of co-operation undertaken in
diis period and, second and more importantly, die Commission had gained die confidence to stand
independently before the Council on a regional agenda in die context of die adoption of die I MTEP
Programme.
From die very beginning die objective of the creation of die 1959 Group was the preparadon of an
overall conception of regional policy in die Community. The members of the 1959 Group were
national policy makers involved in die actual formulation of national regional policies depicting -
radier dian directly representing- national interests33. Indeed, given die lack of concrete regional
provisions in die Treaty, the convening of national representatives on a matter outside the
Communities' jurisdiction was made under die name of die vice-president and was presented as
responding to an incipient and experimental co-operation exercise.
30 See Commission, Ext rait du Proces verbal de la 72eme reunion de la Commission le 9 Septembre 1959.
Problemes de politique regionale, Bruxelles 17 Septembre 1959.
31 This Communication is based on preliminary work: Les regions dans la CEE (COM(59) 113] and Les
politiques regionales des litats metnbres de la CEE [COM(59) 114],
32 They were: W. Langer (Germany), P. Masse (France), Massaccesi (Italy), Detroz (Belgiuml. Van Os
(Netherlands), P. Camy (Luxembourg). The first two officials were also members of the Medium-term
economic policy Committee.
On 9 September 1959 the Commission adopted the agenda of work on regional policy proposed b\
Marjolin which included the following entries: a delimitation of regions in the EEC, a search for
comparable statistics, a comparative study of national regional policies and a study of the regional
implications of common policies. The first product of the 1959 Group was an 'Essay of regional
delimitation of the EEC'" which although it was sold as a trial run it was, nonetheless, an attempt to
map out the EEC space from the point of view of regional economies. The delimitation aimed at
agreeing on objective criteria and defining the geographical contours for the delimitation of
operational regional units -'socio-economic regions'- upon which both national and Community
policies would apply14. The Essay was the first effort to establish comparable regional statistics as
well as a mapping of regional spaces beyond national mapping. Second, it offered a first typology of
regional problems at Community level, and third, it provided a Community perception of tire
unbalanced distribution of economic activities and economic performance. But die delimitation was
never put into use for it raised strong reservations in the home countries.
Still, while the essay was being discussed by the 1959 Group, a new initiative was proposed15: die
organisation of a 'Conference on regional economies' in December 1961. Marjolin justified diis
Conference as an effort to gadier expertise in die field, build up knowledge about common grounds
and transfer experience among participants, namely, national and regional representatives as well as
non-governmental individuals and the Commission. The Conference made die core of die
discussions from die confrontation of national cases and experiences on two main types of problems:
agricultural regions and problems in already industrialised regions.
The debates opened up in die Conference were purposely followed up widi die creation in December
1962 of diree ad hoc groups of experts widi the intention to release in die shortest term a document
putting forward an overall conception of regional policy in die Community16. The diree ad hoc
groups gadiering governmental experts on regional policy were set up under Marjolin's presidency
and an agenda of work designed by die Commission. Group 1 was charged to study on the case of
regions to develop, Group 2 concentrated on die regions already industrialised and Group 3 dealt
widi an appreciation of die efficacy of various advantages granted in die member states with die aim
of favouring regional development. The three Groups were to prepare diree reports. These reports
were approved by die 1959 Group and, on dieir basis, die Commission draw up a Communication
addressed to die Council.
33 Commission EEC, Essai de delimitation regionale de la Communaute economique europeenne. Bruxelles 2C
Juin 1961, [II/747/1/61 ].
34 See p. 1-2 of Commission, Document reserve a 1'attention de Ms. Marjolin el Bobba. Objet: Decisions
auxquelles il serait desirable d'aboutir lors de la Reunion des Responsable Nationaux des politique regionales
Bruxelles 10 Septembre 1959 [11/10/BB/2122].
35 Commission, Groupe de travail des experts nationaux des politiques regionales, Projet de compte rendu de la
reunion no.5 du 7 Fevrier 1961, Objet: Delimitation regionale. Bruxelles [D/2129/61 ].
The 1965 Communication37 explored (lie objectives, the methods and die means of regional policy
within die Community and concluded die need for co-operation and concerted action -among all
levels of government including die Community- on two manners: in die undertaking of specific
regional actions and on a better orientation of economic policies towards regional objectives. The
1965 Communication understood regional policy first of all as an aspect of economic policy, that is.
radicr dian a juxtaposition of economic policy objectives regional policy ought to have a structural
dimension permeating many economic policy fields. Marjolin -who had prepared die
Communication- made a number of recommendations addressed to member states, put forward a
programme of action for die Commission and suggested some procedural formulae. The
recommendations to member states -drawn from die three reports of the experts of 1964- included:
die establishment of programmes of orientation and socio-economic studies, encouraging die
participation of regional audiorities, learning lessons about die efficiency of means deployed by
national audiorities, etc. The Commission committed itself to work to facilitate the devising of
regional programmes and dieir confrontation at Community level and declared its intention to use
the powers at its hand to pursue a co-ordination of sectoral policies touching upon regional aspects
including financial resources. On the organisational aspects DG11 proposed procedures of co¬
operation at die level of medium term economic policy, die continuation of die 1959 Group,
gadiering opinions from experts and regional audiorities, etc.
But die Commission saw and wanted to consider die 1965 Communication as a "first
communication' and tried to avoid excessive publicity on its release. The Commission decided to
transmit die 1965 Communication -as a 'working paper'- first to die Medium-term economic policy
Committee and later -and depending on die reaction of die Medium-term economic policy
Committee- to die Council for information38. Finally, the 1965 Communication was submitted to the
Council for information but it had a radier unfortunate timing: bodi die empty-chair policy adopted
by die French delegation in the second half of 1965 and also die fact diat die 1965 Communication
saw die light when die preparation of a I MTEP Programme was already underway, made the 1965
Communication a year after its release -in June 1966 - if not obsolete, certainly superseded by die
regional chapter in die I MTEP Programme (point 8.2)39.
36 See letter of 19 February 1965 by Bobba -director general of DGII- to Mr. Vink -director general of the ECSC
'Problemes du travail, assainissement et reconversion' [II/C2/AC/gv/16/11].
37 That is, Commission, Premiere Communication de la Commission sur la politique regiona'.e darts la
Communaute europeenne, Bruxelles 11 mai 1965 [II/SEC (65) 1170 final],
38 Indeed, the Commission resolved that if the Medium-term economic policy Committee made notable reserves
to the 1965 Communication then the Commission would review on whether to proceed with an official
communication both to the Council and to the European Parliament. See Commission. Extrait du Pieces verbal
de la 317eme reunion de la Commission le 11 mai 1965, point VT1I.
39 See Conseil, Comite des Represenlants Pennanents Projel de compte rendu sommaire de la 388eme reunion
tenue a Bruxelles les 11 el 12 juillet 1966, Bruxelles 20 Juillet 1966 [899/66 (KP/CRS 24)].
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All these early stages of devising a common conception of regional policy in the Community were
not solely the result of co-operation among national representatives, but also, the effect of an exercise
of internal examination. Indeed, apart from the above more visible acts of co-operation among
national representatives, during this period the Commission was also engaged in an indoors search
for possible policy channels and for attaining a degree of consistency in actions bearing a regional
incidence across the EEC directorates and across the three Communities. The Group Inter-services
gathered under DGII's presidency the DGs for agriculture, competition, social affairs (DGV).
transports (DGVII) and internal market (DGIII). The Group Inter-services confronted the regional
dimensions of each of the above policy areas and sought to offer the necessary consultation and co¬
ordination among the dispersed nature of regional concerns of tire various DGs.
On the other hand, the attempt of working in an integrated, co-ordinated manner among die services
of tlie three Communities was undertaken by simple measures. Regular contacts between die 1959
Group and die Euratom and High Audiority DGs were organised, co-ordination in relation to die
undertaking of studies was deliberately pursued and mixed working groups were established4". By
linking and co-ordinating die EEC and Euratom Commissions and die High Audiority of die ECSC -
plus die EIB-, DGII was aiming at performing a role of co-ordinator towards a united Community
position on regional issues'".
Clearly from die early days Marjolin saw die role of die Commission as a 'catalyst" in die
development of a regional competence for die Community42 while DGII assumed bodi die instigation
and die management towards die construction of a regional policy dossier. In die form of internal
and external co-operation and interdepartmental co-ordination, DGII provided die poliucal drive
which gave die first results by 1965. Namely, from diis stage onwards, die Commission as a whole
had gained by itself an own stance on regional policy, a Community perspective of regional issues.
Indeed, die first evidence diat DGII had superseded die initial searches for a consistent conception
among DGs and had acquired a degree of confidence and self-assurance appeared in April 1966.
40 For instance the Common working Group of industrial reconversion of mining regions who started meeting in
early 1961 or the 'Groupe des problemes de l'economie generale'.
41 Concerning the Euratom DGII of the EEC Commission kept in regular contact with the Euratom's DG for
Economy and industry. So what were the regional dimensions of the Euratom? By 1959 regional problems did
not present for the Euratom Commission a very defined interest for the nuclear industry was in a pre-
development stage. By 1965 however, as this situation changed totally and nuclear installations spread across
Europe, the Commission's Euratom became more interested in regional policy issues in a very defined field,
namely, to determine the eventual incidence of the location of nuclear industry on regional development. See
letter of 1.7.1965 by B.R von Geldern -director general of Economy and Industry at the Euratom Commission-
to F. Bobba -DGII's director general. However, The collaboration of DGII with the High Authority was stronger
than with the Euratom's Commission, particularly with the DG 'P.T.A.R' (Problemes du Trenail
Assainissement el Reconversions) and DG Economy-energy
42 Indeed 'catalyst' is the word used by Marjolin at the first meeting of the 1959 group when offering a role for
the Commission, notably, the Commission pourrait jouer un role de catalyseur, ajin de degager
progressivement une vue commune des problemes, meme si la solution de ceux-ci appartient aux pars metnbres.
See p. 2 of Commission, Reunion des responsables nationaux des politiques regionales. Projel de coir.pte rendu
de la reunion n.l du 25 septembre 1959. Bruxelles 6 Novembre 1959 [11/5038/59)
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8.2. The first independent standing: April 1966
In April 1966, in the context of the adoption of the I Medium term economic policy Programme,
DGII made its first independent stand pressing in favour of a regional responsibility for die
Community. Concretely, DGII proposed to die Council an engagement of principle for a task of co¬
ordination to be performed by the Community on national regional policies.
Indeed, die Commission enjoyed -by the Council decision of 15 April 1964''- various chances of
influencing die contents of Medium term economic policy Programmes. One of them concerned die
capacity to propose amendments to the draft text of die Programme prepared by the Medium-term
economic policy Committee before being examined and adopted by die Council'4. So, in March 1966
die Medium-term economic policy Committee adopted the preliminary draft of the 1 MTEP
Programme. From die audiority so conferred to die Commission by the Council decision of 15 April
1974, die Commission agreed overall widi die preliminary draft of die I MTEP Programme as
drafted by die Medium-term economic policy Committee (even though Marjolin certainly pointed out
some deficiencies as regards die elaboration of the economic perspectives and the subsequent
economic policy priorities) but die Commission departed resolutely from die Medium-term economic
policy Committee in one aspect: regional policy. Concrete amendments -diree in total- were put
forward by die Commission on chapter VI -die chapter on regional policy45.
By 1966 DGII understood regional imbalances in similar terms to die structural conceptualisation
diat two years later die I Barre Plan would put forward. The difference widi die Barre Plan resided,
however, in understanding regional action not so much as a contribution to die convergence of
economic evolutions, but as a contribution to balanced expansion and long lasting growdi levels
across die Community i.e. as a part and parcel of general economic development strategies. Indeed,
incontestable evidence of die divergent evolution of the economies of die Six did not surface till the
late 1960s. For DGII, insufficient regional and sectoral integration and inflationary were prone to
disrupt die economic expansion attained in the 1960s and its permanence. That is -die Commission
argued-, diose high levels of grovvdi could not be maintained unless a positive and deliberate effort
was made to harvest a growdi of quality i.e. one resulting from die tackling of tardy productivity
improvements in various regions and sectors across die common market. All in all, die elaboration
and die undertaking in common of a set of measures to ensure the integration and adaptation of
regional economies appeared as a requirement for high and sustained growdi.
43 That is, the decision concerning the creation of a Medium-term economic policy Committee which also laid
down the procedure for the adoption of medium term economic policy programmes. Decision dn Conseil du 15
Avril 1964 cream un comite de politique economique a moyen lenne (64/247/CEE), JO 1031/64 du 22.4.64.
44 See article 2 of the Council decision of 15 April 1964 where the procedure for the adoption of medium term
economic policy programmes is laid down.
45 See particularly p.2 of Commission, Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen lenne (T966-
1970), Bruxelles 29 Avril 1966 [II/G(66) 186 rev.] and Conseil, Extrait du proces-verhal de la 202cme session
du Conseil CEE lenue a Bruxelles le 20 decemhre 1966 [R/1527/66 (MC/PV/R 13)].
So, which were those amendments submitted by the Commission to the text of the Medium-term
economic policy Committee? Three amendments were proposed and these amendments, for their
political character, were submitted under the personal authority of Marjolin in the form of a
Communication accompanying the transmission of the preliminary draft of I MTEP Programme of
the Medium-term economic policy Committee to the Council. The first amendment aimed at making
the Council make an engagement of principle on the co-ordination of national regional policies at
Community level. Concretely, where the preliminary draft stated that national policies ought to be
confronted (i.e. compared or examined in common) and co-ordinated in so far as possible, the
Commission suggested replacing die notion of 'confrontation' as just defined with an unequivocal
engagement for close co-ordination46. Marjolin argued that this first amendment was directed
towards providing certainty on the actual meaning of co-ordination:
The Commission suggests, to start with, that while the Committee (i.e. Medium-term economic
policy Committee) foresees a confrontation of regional policies and, if possible a co-ordination,
the term co-ordination could be used unequivocally. The latter rests on various provisions of the
Treaty, particularly article 3 g), 105, 145 for which member states engage to co-ordinate their
economic policies and consequently, their regional policies, if one admits -as is normally the
case- that regional policy is an economic policy47.
The second type of amendment concerned the concrete operation of such proposed responsibility of
close co-ordination. The Medium-term economic policy Committee had stated in the preliminary
draft that 'it was desirable that regional policies are confronted and harmonised at Community
level'. Instead, Marjolin was proposing to actually confront and harmonise, not the regional policies,
but regional programmes. The third amendment, less (directly) important for our exposition,
suggested by the Commission consisted of the insertion of a last paragraph to the regional chapter
which tried to involve regional authorities in both the consultation between member states and the
Commission on both studies and programmes for some regions and in the co-ordination of regional
policy measures. Marjolin pointed out that the Commission had no intention to address itself directly
to sub-national representatives but to those representatives appointed by national governments for
dial purpose48.
The Council's reaction to the three proposed amendments was immediate and categorical: the
amendments were ruled out altogether in one blow and without discussion at the Coreper session of 1
46 So, the text (first sentence of point 9 chapter VI) would no longer read as an intention to make national
regional policies I'objet d'une confrontation, et si possible, d'une coordination au niveau communaulaire as
the Medium-term economic policy Committee suggested but rather would state that national regional policies
would be I'objet d'une coordination etroite au niveau communautaire.
47 Conseil, Extrait du proces-verbal de la 202eme session du Conseil CEE tenue a Bruxelles le 20 decerribre
1966 [R/1527/66 (MC/PY/P/R1)]. Original French text in appendix.
48 See page 59 of Conseil, Extrait du proces-verbal de la 202eme session du Conseil CEE tenue a Bruxelles le
20 decembre 1966 [R/1527/66 (MC/PV/R13)].
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December 196649. Concerning tlie close co-ordination of regional policies no delegation was ready to
replace the word 'confrontation' by the words 'close co-ordination'. In fact, the French. Belgian and
Dutch delegations particularly pointed out that regional policy remained die sole competence of
member states. The second amendment -to operate the co-ordination of regional policies by a co¬
ordination of regional programmes- was refused by five delegations, while the Italian delegation
declared that it could have accepted it. The third amendment to make the representatives of die
concerned regions participate -whenever suitable- in the consultations between member states and
the Community was emphatically rejected by all delegations.
Clearly, by chopping off DGII's amendments the Council refused any commitment to co-ordinate
national regional policies or development programmes. But this episode of die adoption of die 1
MTEP Programme shows diat aldiough DGI1 was unsuccessful, clearly die amendments proposed by
DGII had a political character and were understood by all parties as openly departing from die
Medium-term economic policy Committee and attempting to alter political choices made by national
representatives in the preliminary draft of die Programme50. The success of die organisation and die
instigation pursued by die Commission during diis trial period is questioned by some (Allen and
Maclennan 1970) for it did not manage to attain a Community-accepted view on regional objectives.
Certainly, die categorical refusal of national governments to die Commission's amendments is a
proof of die failure of the Commission to gain an acceptance by governments on regional issues.
Nonedieless, from die perspective of die construction of a regional objective for die Community, and
die role of die Commission in diat process, it is meaningful to point out diat by being behind all
initiatives in die field of regional policies during this period, namely, acting as policy organiser
(internally), as policy instigator (externally towards national policy makers and also towards an
organisation of actions across die three Communities: ECSC, EEC, Euratom) DGII did develop an
independent conceptualisation of regional objectives. The events of April 1966 were die first
evidence of success in developing independent policy formulations in die domain of regional policy.
8.3. The raising of a regional concern in the context of the preparation of the III Medium term
economic policy Programme (1968-1969)
As seen just above, the independent stance diat DGII had started to formulate during the period
1959-1966 was, indeed, unsuccessful in die sense diat DGII did not manage to rally die support of
49 Commission CEE, Secretariat executif Note a 1'attention des MM les membres de la Commission. Objet:
Reunion du Comite des Representants pennanents du ler decembre 1966, Bruxelles 3 Decembre 1966 SEO'66
3789
50 Thus the secretary executive introduced the first draft of the communication written by Marjolin as follows:
Le present document, en raison de son caractere politique, est presente sous I'aulorite personnelle de M.
Marjolin. Celui-ci a assure les liaisons convenables avec les membres de la Commission qui participent aux
travaux du Comite pour la politique economique a moyen tenne. See: Commission. Secretarial execute du
DGII, Premier Programme de politique economique a moyen tenne (Projel d'une recommandation de la
Commission au Conseil), Bruxelles 22 Avril 1966, [II/G(66) 186],
82
governments. By 1968 however, this situation changed. Managing and administrating the regional
policy dossier, DG1I brought up and proposed again to the Council to consider Community action in
the field of regional structures, this time within the context of the preparation of the 111 MTEP
Programme. Thus, in this exposition of the role that DGII had performed as policy formulator since
1959, we have come to 1968 to meet die scenario of economic divergence and the structural
conception of a substantial regional objective for the Community as understood in the 1 Barre Plan -
and spelled out in chapter I. Unlike the attempt of April 1966, this time tire risks of disruption
arising from a scenario of economic divergence made national governments reconsider the
Commission's proposals, and January 1970 saw the first Council acknowledgement of principle in
favour of regional action at Community level. Let us pin down, now in detail, (lie role of DGII in this
finally successful formulation of a regional objective in the context of the preparation of the III
MTEP Programme.
Conceding defeat after the Council refusal of the proposed amendments to the preliminary draft of I
MTEP Programme, DGII withdrew its amendments without renouncing and explicitly stating die
intention to bring up its stance at a subsequent occasion51. Over two years later, by mid 1968. die
preparation of die III MTEP Programme had started52. The I and die 11 MTEP Programme had bodi
covered die period 1966-1970. To a large extent die II MTEP Prognunmc had been a continuation of
die 1 MTEP Programme and bodi (I and II MTEP Programmes) rested on economic projections for
die period 1966-1970. The III MTEP Programme would cover die period 1971-1975 and, thus,
would require new economic projections. As argued before (point 2, chapter I), the elaboration of
quantitative projections for the preparation of medium term programmes was delegated to a subgroup
widiin die Medium-term economic policy Committee: die Group of quantitative projections. This
Group studied die national projections i.e. die various hypodiesis and economic policy choices and
ran a forecast of die most likely evolution of die economy of die Community in die medium term.
Upon diese quantitative projections an indicative programme of economic policy in die medium term
was dien elaborated by die Medium-term economic policy Committee53.
51 As a matter of fact, Coreper had previously discarded the examination of the 1965 Communication on the
grounds that the regional chapter of the I MTEP Programme superseded the 1965 Communication. The
Commission originally accepted Coreper's decision but as the Commission's amendments were dismissed, it
asked once again to re-open a discussion in the Council on the 1965 Communication. Concretely the following
declaration was added to the minutes of the Council meeting adopting the I MTEP Programme: 'Afin de ne pas
retarder I'adoption, par le Conseil, de 1'ensemble du premier Programme de politique econoinique a maven
tenne, la Commission declare qu'elle renonce a maintenir ses amendements, mais se reserve d'en re: rendre le
contenu lors de la discussion de la premiere communication sur la politique regionale donl elle dernande
I'inscription a une prochaine session du Conseil'. See Conseil, Proces verbal de la reunion restreinte lenue a
/.'occasion de la 207ememe session du Conseil de la CEE (Bruxelles 8. 9 Fevrier 67) [R/179/67 (MC/PV/R 2)
final du 6 fevrier 68],
52 Commission, Cornite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Reunion des suppliants du 10 mai 1968.
Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 13 mai 1968 [6980/11/68].
53 This sub-Group for quantitative projections was analogous in its institutional structure to the committee to
which it responded i.e. to the Medium-term economic policy Committee. That is, it was formed b> national
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It was in Lhe preparation of the projections for the III MTEP Programme within the Group for
quantitative projections that DGII found solid grounds to argue for a fundamental Community
concern with regional structures. Indeed, in October 1968 the confrontation of national hypotheses
within the Group of quantitative projections revealed the incompatibility of various medium term
objectives, particularly, as regards the evolution of prices. Perceiving die incompatibility of economic
and policy options, as brainstormed within the group of quantitative perspectives, DGII did not wait
to prepare a document directed to the Medium-term economic policy Committee to raise die alarm
on die risks of incompatibility for die common market in die medium term54. In January 1969 die
Group of quantitative projections stated diat 'even if the gravity of die situation ought not to be
exaggerated, die recent evolution of die prices and die first attempts at projections made appear a
real danger of divergence' and dial a solution could be found by aiming at compatible objectives so
that divergence could be constrained under acceptable limits. Odierwise, protectionist measures or
parity modifications could occur55.
However, die task of the Group for quantitative projections was simply to report on die findings to
die Medium-term economic policy Committee, and indeed, it was in this latter committee, and
ultimately die Council, from whom die acknowledgement of die risks of divergence had to be gained.
Indeed, DGII had raised die alarm widiin die Medium-term economic policy Committee54 but.
ultimately, for die package of solutions to die risks of economic and policy divergence which DGII
was envisaging, die approval had to come from die Council. On 12 February 1969 die Commission
submitted at its own initiative a Memorandum (the I Barre Plan) where, against die risks of
divergence, DGII proposed a package solution consisting of striking compatibility among die
national hypothesis for growdi, prices, employment and balance of payments togedier with an
improvement in die procedures of consultation of short-term economic policies, monetary co¬
operation and, particularly for our purposes, regional actions. The I Barre Plan noted diat more light
ought 'to be dirown on die structural problems facing each country in its growth and stability policy
and that die Medium-term economic policy Committee ought to put in hand preliminary research to
representatives chaired by a government representative while DGII represented the Commission and also
provided the services of secretariat. During this period the Group of economic perspectives in the medium term
or also referred as the quantitative subgroup was chaired by Prof, de Wolff. The representative of the
Commission was normally R Barre and an alternate.
54 That is, Commission, Strategies alternatives d'evolution a moyen tenne du niveau des prix et tears
consequences pour le marche cornmun, Bruxelles 24 janvier 196S [21535/11/68]. See also: Commission.
Premiere synthese sur les projections en valeur pour 1970, Bruxelles 11 decembre 1967 [17015/1/IL/67]:
Groupe d'Etude des perspectives economiques a moyen tenne, sous-groupe 'Projections', Organisation des
travaux pour les projections 1973-1975, (Note du Secretariat, Bruxelles 10 avril 1968 [5680/IL/68]:
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la 2Seme
reunion du Comite (16-17 mai 1968), Bruxelles 10 juin 1968 [6983/11/68].
55 See p. 1-2 of Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Reunion des suppliants des 30 et
31 janvier 1969. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 7fevrier 1969 [2576/11/69].
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prepare solutions which could be co-ordinated at Community level in line with the guidelines of the
medium term programme'57. Finally, in January 1970 the Council approved the Commission's views
of the I Barre Plan and instructed that the III MTEP Programme spelled out practicable actions in the
regional field (point 16, chapter IV). With such a sign of acknowledgement from the Council the
structural conceptualisation of a regional concern for the Community seemed solidly grounded.
In conclusion, although the Commission found in the Medium-term economic policy Committee an
ally in raising tire weight of structural factors in the scenario of divergence of the late 1960s5s. it took
an independent act of the Commission to trigger the launch of a fundamental regional agenda
understood in structural terms. Indeed, it was at its own discretion that DGII decided to bring up die
problems of convergence to tire table of the Council and, by doing so, raising awareness on structural
and regional factors and on the need for Community action in this field.
9. DGIV: the development of guidelines for national regional aid policies
Apart from DGII, one of the DGs coming across most directly with regional issues was the
directorate general for competition. DGIV encountered national regional policies in the running of
appraisals of compatibility of national regional measures. However, beyond the strictly sectoral
evaluations, and besides various attempts to enhance the appraisal of national regional aids. DGIV
and DGII endeavoured to forge a link between competition considerations and regional policy.
9.1. The nature and scope of the appraisals of regional measures from competition considerations
The EEC Treaty (article 3.f) instructed 'the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the
common market is not distorted' and, particularly, it assigned to the Commission the guaranteeing of
the functioning of this system. Beyond the opening of national frontiers, the setting up of a system of
competition as the organiser of relations within the common market was not simply conceived as a
tool to overcome trade discrimination but also as an instrument to attain both the conditions and the
unity of a truly internal market and the intended economic policy objectives of the Treaty. Such
deliberate duty (central to the Community interest) would act chiefly upon two main fields of
intervention: practices of undertakings and state aids.
As seen in point 7, the Treaty confers on the Commission, in co-operation with member states, the
responsibility for controlling the compatibility of national systems of aid with the common market,
56 That is at the session of 11 October 1968: Commission, Coinite de Politique economique a rnoxen tenne.
Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la 30eme reunion du Comite (11 octobre 1968), Bruxelles 28 octobre 1968
[18085/11/68].
57 See p.9 of Commission Memorandum to the Council on the co-ordination of economic policies and monetary
co-operation within the Community, Brussels 12 February 1969. Bulletin of the EECC 1969. Supplement 3.
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and among them, those with a regional or sectoral purpose. Article 92.1 of the Treaty defines as
incompatible with the common market any manner of advantage granted by States to either certain
enterprises or to certain sectors. Thus, in order for a measure to be regarded as state aid. it must,
therefore, assist specifically certain firms or certain products, which means that what the Treaty is
addressing in articles 92 to 94 are concretely specific aids -rather than those aids that a national
government can use as a form of economic policy59. Equally, aid for infrastructure investments is not
considered as falling under article 92.1, for infrastructures normally oiler a universal -rather than a
specific- advantage.
On the other hand, incompatibility is the distortion or the threatening of distortion of competition
conditions to an extent which affects trade among member states60. Thus, for the EEC Treaty aids are
not incompatible per se\ what makes them incompatible are their consequences at Community level.
Still, beyond their consequences, although compatibility appears as the condition of not distorting
trade and competition among member states, the same Treaty specifies nuances of incompatibility in
so far as their purpose is concerned. That is, for a number of categories of aid, the Treaty foresees
derogations per se (92.2) as well as conditional derogations (92.3) to the overall definition of
incompatibility. Notably, and among others, it envisages derogations under certain conditions for
those national actions aiming at economic development: either regional or structural, that is. either
aiming at the development of a region or at the development of a particular sector.
The drafters of the Treaty seem to have sought to strike a reconciliation of national regional
objectives with the functioning of the common market. In this context of the potential conflicts
between competition -as being of Community interest- and national regional objectives is where the
directorate general directly responsible for competition came across regional considerations. The
trespassing of DGIV into national regional policies (in the form of a control of the compatibility of
regional measures) concerned, in particular, regional financial incentives.
58 This is reflected in the opinions of the Medium-term economic policy Committee on both the I Barre Plan and
on the Commission's proposal for the organisation of means of action in the field of regional policy t$ee point
16, chapter 111).
59 Indeed, although measures of economic, taxation or general social policy may give a competitive edge to firms
in the country implementing them, they are not covered by the competition rules on state aids as they constitute
general measures which may be subject to the Treaty provisions on the approximation of laws. No intervention
is advocated in article 92.1 as far as the pursuit of economic policy objectives are concerned: general measures
and state aids are two different things.
60 The Commission and the Court had often appraised both aspects of the criteria of incompatibility i.e. the
distortion of competition and the affecting of exchanges, together while the first seems to aim at protecting a
level playing field among competing enterprises and the latter seems to point incisively on the effects on
exporting capacity of the enterprises aided.
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So how exactly does the Treaty pose the task of control of compatibility of national regional actions
with the common market? Two categories in article 92.3 arc relevant to regional policy*1:
The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally
low or where there is serious underemployment;
(...)
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas,
where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest.
Concerning national regional development actions, the Treaty makes a qualitative distinction
between two types of regional problem in relation to the relative gravity of regional circumstances.
Unlike subparagraph a) above, subparagraph c) lays down a particular condition: aid may be
compatible if it does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest. The absence of a condition in subparagraph a) does, by no means, imply that aid to regions
where standards of living are abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment are
exempted from an examination of compatibility. Rather, at least in principle, the lack of a condition
in subparagraph a) seems to concede that the Treaty allows development actions with an incidence
more considerable in a) than in c)62. The condition to be met by development actions in regions oilier
than those less favoured in order to be deemed compatible is one of 'not adversely affecting trading
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest'. In odier words, the limit for national
development actions in regions under 92.3.c) is not the affecting of trading conditions as such but the
degree of such contravention in relation to the 'common interest'. In short, compatibility of
development actions in these regions is, therefore, conditional on the observance of that common
interest. In both cases, however, and allowing for such a different degree of incidence, the appraisal
of national regional measures had to be made from the point of view of the effects of those measures
on exchanges and on competition conditions and directed towards interdicting inadmissible negative
effects at Community level.
Thus, the control of compatibility appears, first, as a search for actual incidence of national regional
measures -or potential incidence if those aids had not yet been put into effect- and second, as a
judgement, at its least, on the admissibility of the measures from a Community point of view. i.e.
from a consideration of unacceptable Community effects arising from national measures. In fact, the
61 Although the national incentives for regional development are the main concern in this thesis, a.s i matter of
fact, often development of regions conveys a sectoral aspect, either because some sectors may be geographically
concentrated or because regional aids can undoubtedly have a sectoral incidence.
62 Still, as DGH defended, there is no reason to believe that development aid in regions other than chose
characterised in subparagraph a) would require a quantitatively or qualitatively less stronger action ;n a given
time.
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interpretation by member states of the regional related notes of article 92.3, particularly, the control
of those least favoured regions was, from the beginning, considered inopportune. The notions of
'abnormally low standard of living' and 'serious underemployment' were certainly not defined by the
Treaty but member states considered themselves incontestably the only responsible authorities on
regional matters in their national territories, and therefore, no control of regional measures was of
Community business, especially in the most severe cases of regional imbalance". Thus, DGIY was
going to direct a stricter attitude towards aid cases under 92.3.c).
Article 93 provided the procedure and the types of examination to be undertaken at Community
level. The Treaty laid down that existing aids were to be examined permanently (93.1) and that new
or modified aids were to be subject to a preventive (a priori) examination (93.3). By existing aids are
meant either aids already notified preventively -and to which the Commission had raised no
objection- or aids put into effect without being notified -a rather common situation. From tire letter of
the Treaty, article 93.1 regulates the permanent examination of aid systems i.e. of general aid
framework regulations. Concerning these systems of aid the Commission is charged to propose
modifications to member states arising from die consideration of die functioning of die common
market and its requirements and development. This examination of systems of aid was multilateral
and dius member states and die Commission would put forward observations and suggestions to die
aid systems under review.
Besides die permanent examination, article 93.3 provided for a priori or preventive notification so
diat die Commission were bodi informed and able to present observations on eidier new or modified
aids before they were put into effect by national audiorities64. The preventative examination was
exercised by the Commission and member states could intervene. From die early days member states
solely accepted and interpreted die appropriateness of a preventive examination as falling on aid
systems and not on individual decisions of application of regional aid systems. That is, only regional
framework laws were to be examined a priori. As seen below diis narrow capacity of appraisal
started being challenged by DGIV in 1964. Notably, DGIV tried to extend die preventive
examination to die individual decisions of application i.e. beyond die capacity to examine general aid
systems.
Concerning both situations -existing and new aid systems- die Commission was granted by article
93.2 die capacity, not simply to draw recommendations, but to open a litigant procedure against a
member state if eidier existing or new systems of aids were presumed incompatible or any individual
application abused die conditions of compatibility of a framework law. Abuse commonly was
63 See p. 3 of Commission, Note resumee des problemes et des resultats de la reunion des Id el 14 or.obre 1966
[ 13494/IV/66].
64 In any case, even if the Commission raises no objection to new or rmxlified aid, the aid still remains subject to
multilateral permanent examination.
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understood as consisting of either a situation where aids had an effect different than the one for
which they were declared compatible, or where an accumulation of advantages was altering
substantially the intensity approved as compatible. The EEC Treaty gave the Commission the
capacity -after opening a consultation with parties interested- to decide the suppression or tire
modification of an aid system which envisaged the granting of aids incompatible with the common
market or tire abusive application of a given aid system. In tire first case, the Commission would hold
tire capacity to oblige member states -through a decision- to inform tire Commission of certain
projects of aid in individual cases in sufficient time so that take a position. In fact, a Commission's
decision in this latter direction, being a lesser constrain for member states than tire suppression of a
framework law altogether, was a route which tire Commission was often going to resort to. In tire
second case, the use of the provisions for tire examination of abusive application of individual cases
was, in fact, a rather occasional matter i.e. tire examination of cases of abuse were of rather flagrant
abuse and brought up by third parties rather than investigated by tire Commission. Where aids were
already into effect the Commission could still decide modifications a posteriori.
Although DGIV was tire directorate directly responsible for die management of aids dossiers, aid
systems were also examined by other DGs, notably, those relating to the policy domains directly
involved. Thus tire final decisions on tire compatibility of aid schemes involved also tire participation
of other DGs, and particularly among them DGII which raised wider economic and regional policy
considerations.
Recapitulating, the examination of compatibility involved the examination of national regional
incentives, notably, from tire point of view of their incidence on competition and exchanges. But,
what was that examination of regional aids boiling down to concretely? What were tire terms and the
nature of tire appraisals conducted on national regional measures in tire mid and late 1960s? As said
before, tire Treaty considered regional purposes as a (possible) derogation to tire general prohibition
of distortion of competition and exchanges. Thus, the preliminary analysis was a confirmation that
the aid in question fell under Community interest i.e. that by granting specific advantages, regional
aids had an incidence in competition and exchanges. Having confirmed a situation of
incompatibility, the examination proceeded to confirm that a derogation for a regional purpose was
justly applicable. Over and above, tire confirmation that tire finality of such disruption was legitimate
i.e. that tire drive behind specific advantages was regionally motivated and, thus, falling under the
Treaty's envisaged derogations, did not confer compatibility automatically. Regional purposes were
not considered by tire Treaty as compatible per se i.e. unconditionally compatible. The conditions for
the conferment of a derogation related to the extent to which tire common interest was compromised.
Indeed, it has been seen above that tire Treaty made a distinction between degrees of relative regional
imbalance (subparagraphs a) and c) of article 92.3), and particularly for regions where tire standard
of living was not abnormally high or where underemployment could not be considered serious
enough, a degree of accommodation to be struck between regional and Community interest had been
explicitly referred to. The fact that the Treaty did not explicitly stated a condition of observance of
the common interest seems to be explained simply as a granting of larger leeway for national
incentives. So all in all, beyond the confirmation of die regional purpose of specific national
incentives, the appraisal of regional aids took a furdier step, that is, an appraisal of die degree to
which, what in principle were distortions to an adequate functioning of the common market, could be
considered compatible widi die common market -or 'customised' so that to be made compatible with
the common market.
In sum, die appraisal of national regional aids seems to have fundamentally consisted of an
examination of incidence, of purpose and of intensity. In other words, once advantages were
confirmed to be driven by regional purposes a furdier appraisal came to play, namely, one of
proportionality, that is, an appraisal by which die intensity of die national advantages was considered
from a Community perspective so diat die importance of die national means engaged -or to be
engaged- were not compromising die common interest. DGIV's task was, dierefore, not one of
questioning national regional aid policies but solely to raise, in a case by case basis, die limits of
acceptable distortion and, in so far as possible, try to accommodate regional and competition
concerns. Far from eidier lecturing member states 011 regional policies or aiming at a Community
regional development, die Community intervention on national regional aids seems to have been
devised to attaining a reconciliation, an accommodation of national and Community objectives65.
Appraisals were substantially aimed at ensuring diat a system of competition was as extensive as
possible.
9.1.1. The Commission's power of objection to regional measures, its shortcomings and the final
solution ofco-ordination of regional aid schemes
Beyond die nature and die terms of die appraisals carried out on national regional measures, the
Commission held a power of objection, consisting of a power of taking decisions -addressed to
member states- to modify the modalities of intervention of a national system of aid or to abolish a
regional aid altogether66. To improve such capacity of appraisal and of objection to incompatible
national regional measures was DGIV's aim throughout die 1960s.
Indeed, die EEC Treaty gave the Commission the power of deciding (in co-operation with member
states) on die admissibility of regional measures. Such power of objection was a power of censure, a
power to rule out regional measures for not observing sufficiently die common interest or to propose
modifications to die modalities of intervention of national aid systems so diat competition rules were
65 See point 134 Commission, Premier Rapport sur la politique de concurrence. 1971.
66 The weight of Commission's decision was backed by the provision that in case of non-compliance either the
Commission itself or any other interested State could refer the matter to the Court of Justice. On the other hand,
a member state could also attempt (in what the Treaty refers as exceptional circumstances) to gain a unanimous
decision of compatibility by the Council (article 93).
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taken in consideration. The Commission certainly had been granted a power to object to regional
measures but, as a matter of fact, rather than scenes of conflicts and wrestling between regional and
common interests, until 1971 the control of regional aid systems was a rather ineffective matter for
practical reasons: tire Commission was 'technically' unable to object to regional measures. From tire
early 1960s the Commission denounced that its power to object was hindered by various
shortcomings in the appraisal stage, notably, its power of objection to national regional aid systems
proved to be dependent on problems of opacity and measurability.
A classification of aid into certain categories and a standard information procedure had been reached
by 1960 between the DGIV and national government experts on state aids". The examination of aids
granted by member states with a regional and/or structural purpose would rest on an examination of
general aid systems. Hence general aid systems were to be submitted for an examination of
compatibility both before being introduced as well as throughout their implementation to control any
possible abuse of compatibility. Crucially member states interpreted the obligation to inform the
Commission on the granting of specific advantages as consisting of submissions of general aid
regulations, of framework laws, in other words, of general aid documents spelling out broadly the
rules, the objectives, the intentions of the envisaged aid policy, the features of domain of application,
the general range of intensity of the aids eligible, etc. These legislative texts with insufficient
specification on their concrete application i.e. regarding conditions for eligibility and possible
recipients implied two major difficulties, on the one hand, their generality prevented an accurate
evaluation of their degree of compatibility for no clear idea of the incidence on exchanges and on
competition could be made a priori. But, on the other hand, even if guidelines were made in die
framework regulations, the large scope of the authorisations left a large discretion in dieir execution
by any level of national audiority which, inevitably, raised suspicion of possible abusive applications.
This risk of a wide departure of individual decisions from die general objectives of regional aid
systems was most unacceptable for regions falling under die category of 92.3.c) -since there the
chances to distort competition and exchanges where higher.
In order to imprint a more rigorous appraisal of regional aid systems, and dierefore, tighten the
control of dieir application, from 1964 DGIV proposed a sdaight-forward solution: examine the
application of general aid systems. Notably, DGIV proposed diat die Commission ought to be
informed not only on regional aid systems but also on the most significant decisions of application of
die general aid rules. To support its proposal DGIV argued diat die Treaty gave die Commission,
first, the capacity to proceed to an evaluation of regional aid systems but. nonedieless and
additionally, a responsibility to ensure diat diese systems were not applied in an 'abusive manner'.
DGIV denounced diat die knowledge die Commission had from national individual decisions of
61 See p. 64 of H. Von der Groeben, (1985) The European Conununity. The fonnative years. Brussels, Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities, European Perspectives Series.
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application was rather unsystematic and random68. Concretely, DGIV was proposing that the
Commission ought to be able to prevent in a more systematic manner any possible abuse in the
application of a regional aid system been considered compatible by the Commission. That is. in order
to prevent abuse of the compatibility of a regional aid system, the Commission ought to be able to
take the position of not objecting to the regional aid system as such -although a presumption of
incompatibility had been raised- but, nonetheless, demand that the national government inform the
Commission of those most important individual decisions of application falling under a given
general aid system before they were actually granted. This a priori examination was necessary for
ruling out in anticipation any likely damage where chances of abuse were likely, so that actions a
posteriori -such as decisions of incompatibility or actions of recovery- could also be avoided ".
Let us stress that the ultimate target of a preventive examination of individual decisions of
application was the upgrading in the procedure of appraisal of aids so that a tighter control resulted.
In fact, the problem of the control of regional aids had become by 1967 a pressing issue. Aids were
revealing a trend of increase in their importance70. Unquestionably a tighter control of regional aids
aimed at the prevention and exclusion of inadmissible distortions to the rules of competition, yet
these increases seemed to reveal the difficulties and the acceleration of the structural adaptation
provoked by the increasing pressure of competition and the development of the common market. In
other words, as a result of the structural mutations provoked by the establishment of the common
market as well as the loss of traditional trade protections, national governments were apparently
resorting increasingly to regional derogations in order to smooth out transitions. The increase was
68 Notably, DGIV noted that in some occasions it had learnt from cases of abuse either from the Press or from
complaints: see p. 21 of Commission, Note d'infonnation pour la Commission, Objet: Essai d'interpretation de
la disposition d'exception de I'article 92.3.c) du Traite CEE et possibilites d'action de la Commission cut litre
de cette disposition, Bruxelles Avril 1966.
69 At the same time, noting that this preventive examination of individual decisions would immediately mean an
avalanche of submissions of concrete cases, DGIV specified that a small sample of regional cases -those with
particular significance from a Community point of view- ought to be subject to such preventive examination.
The criteria of 'significance' ought to be negotiated and agreed upon but DGIV suggested as examples: cases of
regional aids involving particular sectors, or cases which, by their size an incidence, held higher probabilities of
incompatibility, or those falling in the central areas of the Community territory, etc. Pragmatically, DGIV was
ready to admit narrow criteria of significance which would limit to a minimum the number of submitted cases
for various reasons: to dispel criticism of excessive interventionism, to be able to process dossiers expeditiously,
and not overload DGIV's services. The criteria of selection could be refined progressively to include larger
submissions while DGIV expected that from examination of individual cases jurisprudence would develop.
Indeed, DGIV calculated that around 15,000 national individual decisions of application of aid systems (sectoral
and regional in their purpose) were made per year. This figure seemed to clearly rule out the feasibility of an
examination of every single case of application. See p. 22 Essai d'interpretation.
70 In France the global volume of state subvention to enterprises increased from around FF9 billion in 1964 to
FF12.2 billion in 1967 i.e. an increase of circa 35% in 3 years. In Germany the 'visible' aids solely of the
Federal government passed from DM4.9 billion in 1964 to DM6,9 billion in 1967, that is. a little less than —0%
increase in three years. See the Commission's poignant criticisms to national administrations regarding the
implementation of the regional policy provisions at the examination on the application of the 1 MTFP
Programme: Commission, Projet de Memorandum de la Commission au Comite de Politique fcconomique a
rnoyen tenne sur I'execution du Premier Programme de Politique economique a moxen tenne, Bruxelles 13
mars 1969 [191/11/69].
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not only an increase in volume but also a geographical extension of state aids. Such an increase was
detrimental, argued the Commission, first of all, 011 economic policy grounds for it was necessary to
ensure that national regional aids did effectively work in favour of regional development, rather titan
artificially distorting competition and an optimal allocation of resources. Secondly, a process of
increase in state aids and of subsequent overbidding had started to take place by 1967 when various
member states, in order to accelerate the process of regional development, (among others
encouraging the implantation of investment from third countries) rose up subventions thus opening
up a competition on investment attraction among regions". This situation, obviously, involved
onerous budget charges which, in turn, did not resolve into an increase of the volume of investments
but rather it produced a situation of reciprocal neutralisation. The escalation of aids ultimately
meant: no link between the gravity of the regional circumstances and tire sums committed, running
counter to a better equilibrium of activities -with the chance of poorer regions being left out of a
subventions race- and involved situations of unfair competition i.e. the granting of artificial
advantages to geographically based industries was accompanied by a lack of transparency of tire
sectoral consequences of regional aid. Regional aid thus turned into support of particular productions
whose consequences were felt by producers within tire same sector elsewhere in tire common market.
The distortions of competition were, comparatively, felt more sensibly in central and frontier regions
than in peripheral regions
So, as by tire mid 1960s the control of regional aid systems became of a pressing nature, DGIV would
proved resourceful in devising and proposing different methods in order to rally member states to
accept to improve tire control of regional aids. But ultimately throughout tire remainder of the 1960s
DGIV stuck stubbornly to an approach consisting of tire preventive examination of particular
individual cases of application of general aid systems.
The first method of carrying out the examination of individual decisions was proposed in July 1964.
DGIV proposed that tire preventive examination of application of some regional aid systems could
take place by convening multilateral examinations72. Notably, national experts would notify the most
significant cases and national experts would be gathered for a multilateral examination of the
application made of general aid systems. This would take an experimental form which, if successful,
could be legally institutionalised and made operational by resorting to article 94 i.e. by adopting a
regulation determining tire conditions under which tire preventive examination of the most
significant individual cases of application of regional aid systems could take place. Indeed, article 94
71 The Commission never could give precise evidence of concrete cases of overbidding when requested by the
Medium-term economic policy Committee on 16 June 1969: see Annexe 2 to Commission. Comite de Politique
economique a moyen tenne, Reunion des suppleants du 16 juin 1969. Resume des conclusions. [OR 11-153/69],
yet the existence and the importance of the process was recognised by member states.
72 See Commission, Communication de M. von der Groeben sur les problemes de principe poses par les
regimes generaux d'aides en faveur du developpemenl economique [IV/S/01965/64 du 7.". 1964],
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of the EEC Treaty gave the Council the power to adopt regulations for the application of articles 92
and 93 and, in particular, regulations concerning the procedure of preventive control.
DGIV's suggestions seemed to initially have been welcomed. On 10 May 1965 national experts
accepted the convening of an annual multilateral meeting devoted to the analysis of the actual
application of general systems of aid". Thus national experts -maybe solely experimentally- agreed to
a first examination which would address a set of possible quantitative criteria of significance,
namely, the volume of financial or other means put into effect, the maximum amount of aid per case
of application and beneficiary sectors and regions. The examination as such would consist of a
discussion of the objectives pursued by aid systems and the degree to which the actual means put into
effect contributed to realising those objectives as well as dieir incidence on competition within the
common market. A first multilateral meeting was scheduled to take place in the second semester of
1965 in order to examine the application of general aid systems throughout 1963. The convening of
such a multilateral arrangement, however, soon entered into adjournments. From June 1965 die
empty chair crisis not only delayed such initiative but brought along a reluctance of member states to
accept what they saw as an innovation in the Commission's powers. In fact, by the second semester
of 1966 this multilateral examination had still not taken place.
The second alternative attempt was launched simultaneously. As hinted before, DG1V believed that
there was sufficient legal basis for proposing to the Council such a preventive notification via a
project of a Council regulation on die basis of article 94. Indeed, acting by qualified majority on a
Commission proposal, die Council was empowered to determine the conditions under which
preventive examinations could take place, such as determining die categories of aid exempted from
diis procedure. Thus, in April 1966 die Commission decided to push forward a project of regulation
under article 94 widi the intention to lay down more precise conditions and modalities for die
proceeding of preventive examinations74. Notably, die Commission aimed at defining notions such as
'sufficient time' so diat to be able to carry out its appraisals adequately and, more importantly, at
defining the field of application of die a priori surveillance i.e. at laying down the concrete
categories and cases where a preventive examination was appearing as necessary. Thus, while laying
down criteria of significance to narrow down die individual cases under examinadon. the
Commission was proposing diat preventive examination applied to individual cases of application of
regional aid schemes but only to diose most significant individual decisions of application75.
73 See p. 3 of Commission, H. von der Groeben, Letlre adressee le 9.7.1965 aux gouvernements de In Belgique.
de la France, du Grand Duche de Luxembourg [12803/TV/65].
74 Commission, Proposition d'un reglement du Conseil fixant en application de / 'article 94 CEE les conditions
et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93 CEE (presentee par la Commission au
Conseil), Bruxelles 30 Mars 1966 [COM(66) 95 final],
75 See p. 6-7 of Conseil, Document de travail, Objet: Proposition de reglement du Conseil fixant. en application
de Particle 94 du Traile CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de
Particle 93 du Traile CEE, Bruxelles 1 aout 1968 [T/452/68],
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The negotiation of the regulation would lead nowhere. Diametrically opposed to the Commission's
intentions, amendments to the project of regulation were submitted by the Italian and French
delegations trying to use article 94 to define certain regional situations as compatible per se. and thus
aiming at turning the Commission's power of appraisal and objection into a mere capacity of
corroborating that the submitted aids where falling under the category of aids not subject to
Commission's appreciation. Thus, the Commission found itself defending its power of appreciation
in die categories of regional and sectoral aid falling under article 92.3, that is, defending the position
that a Council regulation under article 94 could not amend the distinction between compatibility per
se (article 92.2) and conditional compatibility (article 92.3) made by (lie Treaty. Indeed, if through a
regulation die Council could turn compatible (in die sense of article 92.2) aids which die Treaty
categorised as 'may be compatible' (in article 92.3) the power of appreciation accorded to die
Commission (in article 92.3) would be reduced to a capacity of simple corroboration and, dius.
dispossessing die Commission of die power to object to aids considered incompatible on die grounds
of the affection of the common interest.
But, DGIV had foreseen, in fact, odier contingent routes if member states proved uncooperative. In a
diird more fordiright attitude DGIV argued diat widiin die setting of the litigant procedure (93.2) die
Commission, in the face of a general aid system upon which it held serious reserves, could -rather
dian deciding its abolition or its modification- opt for obliging (dirough a decision) die member state
in question to inform die Commission of certain projects of individual aids. Such decision was seen
by DGIV as certainly imposing a lesser political impact dian a decision of suppression or of
modification".
The Belgian framework law on economic expansion of 14.7.1966 'instituting temporary exceptional
aids to expedite reconversion and economic development of die coal mining regions and certain
regions confronted with acute and pressing problems'" was one of die cases where die Commission's
acceptance of a regional aid system was made subsidiary to die examination of die most important
cases of application. Since diis law is a clear-cut case of presumption of incompatibility of a
framework law it is wordiwhile examining it briefly.
Aldiough die Commission and all national experts recognised die pertinence of the assistance to
regions directly affected by die closing down of coal mining pits, a number of reservations on the
compatibility of die Belgian law of 14.7.1966 widi die common market were expressed by the
Commission as well as by die odier delegations. Notably, die Commission brought to Belgian
" See all the drawing of the alternative routes by DGIV in Essai d'interpretation p. 23-24.
77 See Annexe I to the Commission's Note on regional policy, p. 112-123 of Commission (1969) A regional
policy for the Community.
authorities' attention that both the intensity of the aids foreseen7* and die lack of geographical
specificity of the aid scheme were notorious features raising presumptions of incompatibility while
'assistance for investments and employment creation were worryingly close to centres of normal
economic activity'79. Moreover, the framework law laid down no criteria conveying that, in the
granting of incentives, a distinction in die nature and acuity of regional circumstances would be
made. That is, no modulation in die assistance -in accordance to die varying degree of regional need-
was envisaged in die framework law. From the discussions between DGIV and die Belgian
audiorities it emerged diat die delimitation of die zones of application of diis law had been
influenced by political factors, notably, by die fear to raise further dissension in an underlying
linguistic division. Too fearful of domestic divisions, die Belgian audiorities had produced a regional
law which, radier dian discriminating positively, sought in their regional interventions a linguistic
equilibrium.
In January 1967 die Commission had contemplated two possible responses hut, even in die face of
compelling evidence, die Commission opted for a non-confrontational line and conscious of the
political aspects involved, considered it inopportune to use die power of objection and oppose die
entry into effect of die Belgian aid system80. Indeed, objecting to die compatibility of die regional aid
system would had implied to open the litigant route of article 93.2 entailing a weighing up of die
point up to which die Belgian regional law respected die Community interest in its alleged pursuit of
a national regional policy objective, and where die Commission had die capacity to decide on either a
modification or the abolition of the aid system altogedier. Instead, die Commission decided to push
for die monitoring of die concrete application of die most significant cases". In fact, die first option
(of not objecting to die Belgian framework law, widi the condition diat die particular cases of
application were notified in sufficient time so diat a preventive examination could take placet was
the position of die delegations at die multilateral examination of diis aids scheme. In diis instance all
delegations (except for die French who defended an examination of only die general features of die
78 As regards intensity of the aids, the multilateral examination could not elucidate the number and the size of
the aiding practically possible for any individual case. In fact, DGIV worked out that an accumulation of various
types of advantages could represent an equivalent-subsidy of around 20-30% of the original investment which
was certainly pointing to non negligible incidence.
79 To start with, the law foresaw interventions in coal mining areas but also in 'other regions confronted with
urgent problems' which in the end covered nearly 40% of the Belgian land. See p.2 of Commission. Note
resumee des problemes et des resultats de la reunion des 13 et 14 octobre 1966 [13494/TV/66],
80 See Commission, Loi Beige d'aides (Communication de M. von der Groeben), Bnixelles 10 Janvier 1967
[G(67) 15],
81 Once decided that the Commission would not oppose the entry into force, a new dilemma appeared i.e. either
simply setting aside the application until the multilateral discussions on the setting up of a procedure for
preventive examination of applications were agreed upon, or otherwise, arrange a procedure of control a
posteriori by which every six months the Belgian government would inform DGIV of the individual decisions of
the largest size so that the Commission could still produce a decision in sufficient time in case any concrete
application of the regional law was decided incompatible. This arrangement would be applied to all member
states. The Commission decided for the second toughest option and thus reserved the right to follow the
application of this law by a control of the concrete cases of application.
application ot" the 1'ramework law) stated the need of, not only an examination of die practical
application of this new system of aids, but die ineluctable importance of die establishment of a
procedure of efficient control of regional aid systems82.
But, as a matter of fact, die Belgian case was going to be notorious from anodier point of view,
namely, the non-compliance widi Commission's decisions83. Notably, die Belgian delegation reacted
negatively to die obligation imposed by die Commission to notify preventively certain cases of
application and considered die Commission's decision unacceptable. Even if die Commission opted
for a less confrontational route to die appraisal of die law of 14.7.1966, in die following years die
Belgian government would adopt new laws effectively lengthening die application of the 1959 and
1966 laws, widiout being accompanied by submissions on the justification of die maintenance of die
field of application previously questioned, diat is, turning a blind eye to die Commission's requests84.
The Commission did not abandon its stance of making its agreement dependent on an a priori
communication of certain individual cases of application, and decided in die same direction in odier
cases of appraisal of regional aid dossiers widi similar responses of non-compliance85. However
following from die Dutch aids dossier, by early 1969, delegations had come to agree on die
organisation of a first multilateral meeting among national experts to discuss die possibilities to
establish a procedure of preventive examination. A first meeting took place on 31 March 1969
followed by more discussions on 28 May and 25 July 1969. Through die discussions, Italy and
France in particular, opposed any preventive examination and stuck to a sole appreciation of aid
systems88. But by February 1969 an alternative to die preventive examination (as put forward by die
82 See p. 8 of Commission, Loi Beige d'aides, [G(67) 15].
83 See an account of the persistent neglecting of Commission's positions up to 1972 in Bulletin des CCEE. 6-
1972 p. 56-58 and a brief account of successive regional laws in Romus P. (1974). Isconomie regionale
Europeenne, p. 142-143 or in (1979) L'Europe et les regions p. 137-138.
84 The Belgian government argued its refusal to establish a systematic control of cases of application was
because of the uncertainty it could bring about to investors and for the risk it involved in discouraging foreign
investments -which were considered by Belgian authorities as indispensable to the success of its
industrialisation policy. See p. 15 of Commission, Loi Beige d'aides, [G(61) 15],
85In the case of a new regulation in favour of regional development submitted by the Netherlands, the
Commission objected mainly to the intensity of the advantages foreseen and decided that if those molalities of
intervention were maintained there were serious doubts about the compatibility of the aid system with the
common market. On 20 April 1967 the Commission decided to open the litigant route (article 93.2) and opened
the consultation procedure with member states to gather opinions. The Dutch government did not accept the
modifications suggested by the Commission concerning the intensity of aid and on 22 June 1968 the
Commission backtracked and decided to reconsider its position and not to object to the entry into force of the
regulation with the condition of setting up a procedure for a systematic examination of the application of
significant cases of the system of aids. The Dutch government on 30 August 1968 acknowledged the necessity
of an efficient control of aids and declared to be ready to co-operate for the setting up of the procedure proposed
by the Commission. See a recapitulation of the examination of the Dutch regional aid and of the run up to the
adoption of the resolution of 20 October 1971 in p. 3 of Commission, Rapport 2/73 sur les procedures prevues
a I'article 93.2 du Traite CEE, dites 'C' et les cas d'application des articles 101 et 102 du Traite CEE. dites
D'. (Fascicule II), Bruxelles 11 Decembre 1973 [SEC(73) 4785],
86 Both delegations submitted amendments to the project of regulation that the Commission had submitted in to
establish such preventive examination by resorting to article 94. These amendments clearly aimed at exempting
from the proposed preventive notification their French and Italian regions. See the amendments proposed by
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Commission since 1964) stinted to emerge as viable. On 2 February 1969 the Commission added to
its original stance (ol' not objecting to the entry into force of an aid system with the condition of
being informed of individual decisions of application) the alternative of asking member states to
modify general systems in a way to allow the Commission to decide on their compatibility without
having to examine their concrete application. This alternative position was refined and, finally, a
resolution in the form of a code of conduct to be observed by the member states was agreed. By June
1971 an agreement of principle was reached, notably, on a solution no longer consisting of a
preventive examination of individual cases, but in tire form of a harinonisation and a better
transparency of regional aid systems as such87. The agreement struck by national government experts
and DGIV on a number of aspects of co-ordination of regional aid systems was then settled with the
official adoption on 20 October 1971 by the Council and representatives of a resolution on tire co¬
ordination of regional aid systems88.
The resolution on the co-ordination of general regional aid schemes laid down a number of
principles to which member states engaged to conform to at the time of the concrete application of
their regional aid regimes. That co-ordination was agreed to be attained progressively, that is, it was
only accepted to apply first to a category of regions defined as 'central regions' and then gradually
extended to tire remaining peripheral and more underdeveloped regions of tire Community87.
Substantially, tire co-ordination of regional aid systems consisted of four aspects. To start with, a
harmonisation at tire topmost i.e. setting a maximum limit of intensity for aid falling in 'central"
regions. That is, member states engaged themselves to respect -lor aids to their central regions- a
single ceiling of aid intensity of a maximum of 20% net subsidy-equivalent of tire original
investment. This non exceedable threshold, which would take account of all accumulation of aid and
was expected to be lowered in tire future, was expected to limit intemperate outbidding. Second,
member states committed themselves into making their regional aids transparent. Transparency
conveyed the obligation to ensure that national regional aid systems could be quantifiable, that is.
that regional aid systems contained all tire indications necessary so that a common method of
evaluation and comparison of aids could be applied upon them as well as clearly spelling out the
conditions governing accumulation of aids. Such engineered common method of quantification
Italy: Conseil, Note, Objet: Proposition de reglement du Conseil fixant, en application de Particle 94 du Traite
CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93 du Traite CEE.
Bruxelles 1 decembre 1967 [R/1677/67 (ECO 176)] and the French amendments: Conseil, Note. Objet:
Proposition de reglement du Conseil fixant, en application de I 'article 94 du Traite CEE. les conditions el les
modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93 du Traite CEE. Bruxelles 6 juin 1968
[It/1014/68 (RC 23)].
87 Communication de la Commission au Conseil, Regimes generaux d'aides ajinalile regionale, [SEC(71)2336
final du 23.6.1971], JO C 111 du 4.11.71.
88 Council resolution of 20 October 1971 concerning the co-ordination of general regional aid schemes. JO C
111 of4.11.1971.
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allowed to measure -in percentages- the relative importance of the aid in relation to die original
amount of die investment and, thus, render aids comparable. Indeed, ultimately, transparency
intended making aids measurable and, in turn, comparable. Third, die resolution of co-ordination of
aid schemes compelled to a clear delimitation of die geographical field of application of aid systems.
Plainly, general aids had to be ruled out, aids could 110 longer cover die whole country, die
geographical zones where aids applied ought to be clearly delimited, modulation in accordance to
relative gravity was to be clearly indicated, and isolated aids -odier dian for the creation of
development poles- ought to be avoided. Finally, l'ourdi, to prevent the common practice by which
advantages were given to 110 matter which sector within a region, member states accepted to inform
die Commission on die sectoral incidence of regional aids so diat the sectoral repercussions of
regional aids could be appreciated from the aid system itself. Member states resolved diat from
January 1972 all diese principles would start to be applied to bodi existing and new systems in
central areas90.
Aldiough die above principles of die co-ordination of general regional aid schemes were elaborated
closely togedier widi member states", ultimately the co-ordination was formalised under a resolution
widi no binding value. Clearly principles of a general nature were preferred to the original solution
proposed by die Commission based 011 a priori notification of major individual decisions. The
surveillance of die observance of diese principles would consist of a communication 011 die most
significant cases of application a posteriori, notably, in die form of a periodical examination widi die
national government experts of die results of die application of diese principles".
So, to what extent was die Commission's capacity of objection to national regional measures
enhanced by die co-ordination of national regional aids? The resolution seems to have provided for
89 'Central regions' comprised all the Community territory except Berlin, the Zonenrandgebiet, those French
beneficiary areas of development funds and the Mezzogiorno. See point 2 of Annex to the Communication of
the Commission to the Council on general regional aid schemes, JO C 111 of 4.11.1971.
90 Some concrete details of the co-ordination were left open to be worked out in detail such as aspects of the
common method of evaluation to make aids comparable as well as the manner of the evaluation of the sectoral
repercussions of regional aids. However, national experts accepted that an engagement sufficed to prevent an
unnecessary delay in the adoption of the resolution. Thus for instance as far as sectoral repercussions are
concerned, in awaiting for a better operationalisation it was agreed as a principle that a double accumulation -of
regional and sectoral aid- would be unacceptable. See Communication of the Commission to the Council on
general regional aid schemes.
" See p. 70, of Melchior M. 'La politique regionale de la Communaute: aspects juridiques' in L'Europe el ses
regions. Actes des Vlleme colloque de L'Institut d'Jstudes Juridiques Europeens sur les Communautes
Europeennes, Liege, 7-9 Novembre 1974.
92 After the approval of the resolution of October 1971 technical work started between the Commission and
national experts for the agreement on the modalities of the a posteriori surveillance of the resolution of co¬
ordination in central areas. On 4 December 1972 the Commission submitted a proposal of regulation on the
basis of article 94 laying down the modalities of the procedure of surveillance of the co-ordination of aid
schemes in central regions Commission, Proposition d'un reglement du Conseil fixant Vapplication de I'article
94 CEE, les modalites de surveillance par la Commission de I'application, dans les regions centrales de la
Communaute, des principes de coordination des regimes generaux d'aides a finalile regionale, (presentee par
la Commission au Conseil, Bruxelles 4 decembre 1972 [COM(72) 1523 final]. This regulation was never
adopted and was withdrawn by the Commission on 14 December 1976.
ihe first time points of reference upon which the Commission could lay its objections. From the
setting of a ceiling in central areas the Commission was going to be able to rule out accumulations of
advantages beyond a maximum percentage of support. From transparency and regional and sectoral
specificity, a more accurate evaluation of the incidence, of the legitimate claim of regional derogation
and of the extent -the intensity- to which aid was compatible, or otherwise contrary, to the common
interest could more effectively be undertaken. This factor was going to offer die Commission
concrete grounds for objecting to the extent to which aid was compatible with tire common market.
Indeed, the measurability of aids implied that a comparison of aid intensities was now possible. Also
the comparability of aids seems to pose, for the first time, tire ground for the logic of giving
analogous degrees of support to analogous structural situations. The embodiment of tire logic that to
different situations corresponded different ceilings of support was finally materialised in 1975 when
ceilings of aid intensity were differentiated according to tire nature and gravity of regional
problems93.
So what can we conclude from all tire above? First, tire solution of co-ordination of regional aids of
1971 -simply extended to all regions in 1975- upheld national discretion as regards regional
incentives. Certainly tire solution of co-ordination bore some minimal consequences on tire leeway of
member states to make regional policy and also some minimal consequences for a regional cause, but
after all, a genuine regional concern from tire field of competition was a step clearly beyond tire
narrow control of compatibility as defined by tire Treaty. Indeed, on tire one hand, tire resolution of
20 October 1971 upgraded tire Commission's power of censure over national discretion in tire sense
that tire Commission could now argue and support with a further degree of evidence presumed cases
of inadmissible effects on competition rules. Clearly also member states had accepted tire bending of
their aids to central areas into defined ceilings of iirtensity, had agreed to itemise their advantages so
that intensity could be translatable into tire common method of measurement and had consented to
abide by the principle that an aid to whatever enterprise, whatever sector or whatever ill-delimited
region or area was no longer acceptable. So, in these senses, national discretion had been minimally
curved in exchange for a reinforcement of tire rule of competition as tire market organiser. .Also,
looking at tire solution of co-ordination from a bright side, one could say that a number of positive
effects spilled over tire regional cause. Notably, while tire setting of ceilings for the central areas
would bring about a minimum arrest of outbidding in tire uncontrolled race for investments which
started in 1967, it would also entail a minimum degree of positive discrimination in favour of
peripheral regions and would tend to a higher concentration of public resources in relatively more
needy areas. On more substantial grounds, however, one has to admit that tire regional aspects of the
93 See the Commission's Communication of 26 February 1975 informing the Council of the principles of co¬
ordination valid for all regions of the Community which would apply from 1 January 1975 [COM(75) 77 final].
For the transitional arrangement of 1973 which extended partly the principles of co-ordination of 20 October
1971 to the enlarged Community see point 18.2, chapter IV.
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co-ordination of regional aids attained in 1971 were, in fact, rather anecdotal. Indeed, although the
resolution had accomplished a common method of measurement that permitted a comparison of
regional aids, such common method of measurement was confined to evaluations of impact on
competition conditions rather than being used as a tool of modulation in relation to die relative
regional disadvantage of die regions widiin die Community". In odier words, never was it die case to
make die compatibility of aids proportional to die relative situation of a given region in relation to
the counterparts. Thus, transparency and regional specificity boiled down to imposing a
differentiation in die intensity of die aids given the different nature and urgency of die regional
problems (always nationally speaking). In short widiout an accepted evaluation of die regional socio¬
economic disadvantages at Community level die resolution confined itself to stating die need for
modulation in accordance to die relative severity of national imbalances. The ceilings too were set on
the basis of diose given in national regional aid systems. In fact, by 1971 diere was 110 Community-
wide accepted appreciation of die relative regional situations across die regions of die Community
The Commission pointed out however -in October 1971-, that the Committee for regional polic>
which die Commission had proposed to set up -diat is in die 1969 proposal (point 12, chapter III)-
could undertake such a relative appreciation of regional situations'5.
So, from die co-ordination of regional aids based on the principles of 20 October 1971, bodi die
discretion of national policy makers in conducting regional policy and die consequences for a
regional cause were radier minimal. But could it have been odierwise? First, as shown above, die
purpose and die drive behind die co-ordination of regional aid schemes was the tightening of die
appraisals of compatibility, and dius, any regional concern was clearly a step beyond die control of
compatibility as defined in the Treaty. Inserting a regional concern in die control of compatibilit>
was clearly a political step beyond die terms of die control of compatibility, for, after all. die Treat)
had not defined any regional responsibility to be pursued by die Community. As noted before, die
control of compatibility of national regional aids was, ultimately, aiming at accommodating regional
measures widi competition rules and, dius, die narrow terms of die Commission's capacity to censure
regional aids had originally been devised for the attainment of a system of competition as
comprehensive as politically possible. Clearly from a look at die period of die mid 1960s to die mid
1970s it emerges diat widiin diis restricted context DGIV proved proactive in attempting to upgrade
die procedure of appraisal so diat to enhance its capacity to object to regional measures on
competition grounds. But, even more, and particularly for die interest of diis thesis, during die same
94 Romus P. (1979) L'Europe el les regions, p. 134, notes that co-ordinating regional aids in the Communit)
consists of fixing for each region a level of aid corresponding to the handicap to overcome in the area where the
investment locates. Although a first task would be to try to quantify the regional handicaps of each region, the
Community has not entered into such a difficult task. Rather, it has proceeded to the setting of levels of aids on
the basis of the levels existing in the regional aid systems of the member states.
95 See point 7 in Annex to the Communication of the Commission to the Council on general regional aid
schemes, JOC 111/12 du 4.11.71.
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period the Commission seems also to have aimed at developing its examinations and its power of
censure beyond the strict considerations of incidence of regional incentives on competition (as laid
down in articles 92-93) and to elaborate positive principles (a 'soft law') to guide member states in
the elaboration of regional aid measures while respecting, in so far as possible, the functioning of the
common market. In short, in the name of the common interest the Commission did try to forge a
doctrine on regional aid policy.
9.2. Beyond the negative power of objection to the definition of positive principles of guidance of
national regional measures
In spite of die fact that the provisions of the Treaty did not deliberately establish a relationship
between competition rules and regional policy, there is evidence that since 1962 the Commission
queried the delimitation of regional and competition considerations for competition purposes, or in
other words, queried the possibility of defining die limits of die regional derogation. Indeed, on 14
February 1962 die Commission College asked DGII and DGIV to proceed to a study of die limits
existing between competition policy and regional policy by trying to define die criteria mentioned in
article 92.3 -which certainly involved filling in with a policy content the abstract concepts evoked in
articles 92 to 94. Yet, it was felt by DGII diat defining and operating a relationship between regional
policy and competition policy was premature at die time for, on die one hand, regional policy
remained fully a competence of national governments, and on die odier, such delimitation could bind
the Commission by too rigid criteria, particularly, given die diversity of regional situations across die
Community. Thus, it appears diat die Commission opted, from die early days, for a flexible and
pragmatic attitude, while not renouncing to define and operate, at a more advanced stage of die co¬
ordination of national regional policies, a more precise relationship between competition rules and
regional policy96.
Thus, judging it more appropriate to deal widi die question of a co-ordinated use of competidon rules
from regional aims in die future, from die early 1960s die Commission opted for a gradual approach,
one based on jurisprudence. Nonedieless, even if opting for such a pragmatic, case by case approach
seems clear that neidier DGIV -nor DGII- opted for filing die development of such a link between
competition and regional concerns, but radier, die definition of an adequate relationship between
regional and competition aspects was attempted from the mid 1960s. Notably, bodi DGs intended the
superseding of die strict negative role of surveillance of national regional aid systems by the
development and formulation of principles of a 'competition friendly' aid policy which would drag
national audiorities into more compatible forms of intervention.
96 See p. 4 of DGII, Note pour la Convnission, Objet: Organisation des travaux relalifs a la politique region-ale
entre les diverses directions generates, Bruxelles 29 Juin 1962 [H/C/2/APdp/29/VI/L'i40 rev. J. See original text
in appendix.
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In this forging of principles guiding national regional aid policies the contribution of DGII appears
as crucial. Indeed, concerning tire involvement of DGII on competition policy considerations it is
worth recalling that decisions of compatibility were taken collegiately i.e. by tire Commission as a
whole and, therefore, they involved tire participation of various DGs. In fact, it seems probable that
such involvement of various DGs would call for an expansion of tire criteria of appreciation even if.
ultimately, tire examination of compatibility was a test of observance of competition rules. In a in
case, and particularly concerning regional aids dossiers, DGII and DGIV co-operated in Uteir
examination. Notably, by standard procedure, before submitting proposals to the Commission
concerning regional aids, DGIV would regularly consult DGII who provided die larger economic
policy framework97 and, principally, relevant data 011 die situation of die regions for whose
development die aids in question were envisaged or had been actually granted. Generally speaking.
DGII's contribution was one of placing die examination of specific aids within die framework of die
general objectives pursued by medium term economic policy, structural policy for specific sectors and
regional policy98. DGII believed diat this procedure provided a satisfactory examination of die
dossiers from die angle of general economic policy guidelines and competition rules as well as from
the angle of regional development. In all, it was DGII's responsibility to bring along regional
economy aspects in die examination of specific dossiers99.
But secondly, die collegiate manner of die decisions of compatibility seems likely to have nurtured an
internal unease in die carrying out of die task of surveillance of regional aids. That is. die
Commission professed in various instances to have found itself 'in a morally delicate situation" by
which, on die one hand, it was charged by the Treaty to conduct a surveillance of regional aids w hile,
in conscience, it found difficult to apply die Treaty rules rigorously, particularly in situations where it
considered diat positive measures of support were much needed and, 011 die other hand, where die
measures applied at national level brought distortions or entailed overbidding10-7. In short, die
Commission regretted possessing a power of censure alone. In many instances the Commission
declared diat it upheld a policy of leniency towards regional and structural aids, for it attached a
97 Thus, from a general economic standpoint, for instance, DGII charged against the increase in the importance
and volume of national regional incentives on economic policy grounds, for such increase not onlv threatened
the maintenance of the system of competition upon which the common market was founded but it also
compromised the intended economic policy objectives ensuing from the laying down of a system of competition.
Indeed competition as part and parcel of economic policy ought to reflect agreed economic policv nuidelines.
Thus, beyond concerns on measurability and incidence, DGII doubted that such an increase in aids to certain
industries or to certain undertakings was not impeding adaptation and preventing structural mutations -
ultimately the objectives for institutionalising competition as the principle for the organisation of the common
market.
98 See p. 56 point 38 of Commission, Deuxieme rapport general sur I'activite des Corrvnunautes. 1968.
Bruxelles Fevrier 1969.
99 Indeed at the examination of the Belgian law of 14.7.1966 one can find DGII intervening in the deliberations
of the Commission but adducing regional economic policy arguments.
100 See p. 23 of Commission, Memorandum de la Commission au Comite de Politique Economique d rnoxen
tenne sur Vexecution du Premier Programme de Politique economique a moyen tenne. Bruxelles Id mars '.969
[191/11/69].
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great importance to the objectives of regional policy101. A cynical view could point that such leniency
was rather a tendency to avoid political confrontation or the result of political powerlessness
Whether leniency or powerlessness, it seems nonetheless that DGIV and DGII aimed at superseding
Lhe largely 'negative' task of control conferred by articles 92-93 of tire Treaty.
From the early days, and in association with DGII, DGIV started collecting cases and elaborating an
inventory of regional aids granted within the Community. By June 1965 DGIV had recorded around
450 aid rules other than agricultural aids. This inventory was meant to provide a database from
which to be able to withdraw practical policy lessons. But a much clearer step to extend tire
examination of national regional measures beyond strict competition concerns was made in 1964
with tire setting up of an ad hoc group of national experts to study the merits of national regional
incentives from a Community perspective. It is certainly difficult to know which DG -whether DGII
or DGIV- deserves Lhe credit for this initiative102 but, in whatever case, this group -Group 3- was
charged with tire mandate to appreciate the efficacy of tire various advantages granted for tire
promotion of regional development103. The mandate acknowledged that although certainly measures
of aid were examined by tire Commission and national experts under articles 92-94 of tire Treaty ,
nonetheless, a common examination of experiences of tire advantages granted in each member state
would allow both national services in charge of regional development to be able to draw certain
lessons to improve tire applied means, as well as assist Lire Commission in revealing what was
possible and what was desirable in this policy field104. Group 3 confronted national measures in
general i.e. not solely financial advantages. Notably, it confronted tire types of aids employed in each
of tire Six (capital sums, interest rebates, etc.) and sought to make them comparable; it confronted
tire criteria for to determining regions and areas eligible, the functions of financial advantages (of
compensation, of capital provision to enterprises, incentive to localisation or incentive to selection of
activities), etc. Finally Group 3 extracted a number of conclusions, including among others: financial
advantages, in order to facilitate tire adaptation of tire industrial structure economic forces, ought to
be conceived as temporary and decreasing; aids ought to avoid compensatory support for non
competitive activities; and financial incentives had to be proportional to tire gravity of tire situation
upon which they acted; financial advantages alone were not a panacea but had to be coupled with
101 So says H. Von der Groeben, while Commissioner for DGIV, in a speech before the European Parliament-
See Commission, 'La politique de concurrence, partie integrante de la politique economique dans le Marclu
commun', Discours prononce par Hans von der Groeben, Mernbre de la Commission de la CEE. President du
groupe concurrence devant le Parlement Europeen a Strasbourg le 16 Juin 1965.
102 This group was one of the three groups set up in 1964 as a follow up of some of the issues raised at the
Conference on regional economies of 1961 (point 8.1).
103 See the report of Group 3 charged to examine the efficacy of advantages in Commission, Rapports dt
groupes d'experts sur la politique regionale dans la CEE, Bruxelles juillet 1964.
104 See the account of the mandate by the president of Group 3 -M. Bloch-Laine- in Commission. Groupe :
charge d'apprecier I'efficacite des divers avantages octroyes pour favoriser le developpement regional
Compte rendu de la reunion du 14 Janvier 1963, [11/865/63].
infrastructure provision, etc. The conclusions of Group 3 were taken up by the I MTEP Programme
which, in turn, was adopted by the Council in February 1967'05.
Certainly, the lessons of this exercise of confrontation carried out by the national experts could not be
expected to automatically lead to an extension of the capacity of control of national regional
incentives beyond the strictly competition terms of the Treaty. Nonetheless, the Commission hoped to
bring at the time of the appraisal of individual aids under articles 92-94 the consideration of the
merits of national incentives as far as their efficiency and their low incidence at Community level
were concerned'06. That is, rather titan aspiring to evaluate national regional incentives from a
regional point of view, DGIV attempted to be able to issue opinions or recommendations on
particular national measures which most deserved financial support, as they either offered the least
risks of distortion, or they involved most sensitive sectors where aids to enterprises in particular had
the risk of distorting competition or aggravating problems of over-production. In other words, the
Commission did not want to lose a chance to make recommendations and observations on regional
measures in the name of the common interest and tire good functioning of the common market. Thu>
through routine individual surveillance and decisions the Commission expected to build up a
jurisprudence of principles of regional economic policy in conformity with the Community interest.
To recapitulate it all, concerning the confines of tire regional concern in tire sectoral field of
competition, tire control of national regional aids, grounded on competition considerations, never
implied an intention to pursue regional objectives. In addition, tire control of compatibility never
resulted in a strict control of tire national discretion to run those regional measures that national
authorities thought most suitable. By no means were member states ready to renounce their capacity
for supporting their regions nor to weigh up national regional problems against a relative severity of
regional imbalances across tire Community. The resolution of 20 October 1971 proves how far
member states were prepared to go in tire field of control of national measures. Certainly that
resolution on tire co-ordination of regional aids improved tire capacity of appraisal and, at its most-
imposed national authorities to abide by modalities of intervention more sensitively and more easily
measurable for competition purposes, but besides tire improved capacity to object to incompatible
measures by the attaining of a better transparency and a more precise regional delimitation, DGIY
and DGII aimed at developing from a body of case law principles of regional aid policy more aware
and sensitive with tire common market. In other words, by no means did tire problems of surveillance
of aids lead -in any spillover dynamic- to tire consideration of a regional policy for tire Community.
Certainly DGII and DGIV expected to arrive in a gradual manner to a more accurate definition of the
limits of the regional derogation laid down in article 92.3 of tire EEC Treaty, but such political step
105 See chapter VI, paragraph 6 of I MTEP Programme, JO 1564/67 du 25.4.67.
106 See p. 21-22 of Commission, Premiere Communication cle la Commission sur la Politique regionale
Bruxelles 11 mai 1965 [1I/SEC(65) 1170 final].
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found no political support. From the Community responsibilities concerning the accommodation of
national regional aid measures with competition concerns arose, at its most, the principles of a
common regional aid policy but, in no way, did the problems in the field of control of regional aids
lead into the justification of a Community intervention on national regional policies in the form of
regional solidarity or in the undertaking of concerted actions of development. Clearly there was no
direct justification departing for the surveillance of state aids to accept a regional direction in die
application of the control of compatibility, let alone an actual regional intervention.
Finally, how did aid policy concerns feature within the wider perspective of die regional dossier as
being led by DGII? As exposed before (chapter 1), by 1969 DGII was conceptualising and justifying a
substantial regional objective in the context of medium term economic policy, notably, as an
instrument towards economic and policy convergence. Side by side widi a global structural
conception of involvement in regional issues, die surveillance of regional aids appeared to DGII as a
sectoral facet of Community intervention and, possibly, a sectoral tool -if a co-ordinated regional
policy emerged so diat to guide die application of die control of compatibility107. The trudi is diat
developments in die competition arena and in die field of economic policy co-ordination ran in
parallel and hardly met, except on few occasions and for radier tangential reasons'08. Indeed, die
fairly narrowly confined terms of involvement of DGIV 011 regional issues, mostly concerning die
shortcomings in the control of regional aids, followed dieir own rhydim, dieir own padi diroughout
die late 1960s and 1970s. The resolution of co-ordination of regional aid schemes of 20 October
1971, as well as die subsequent extensions in 1973 and 1975, were negotiated and agreed in
complete detachment from developments and internal disputes widiin die Commission over die
contents of die regional policy dossier109. Such detachment seems to be partly due to die fact diat die
solution of co-ordination of regional aid schemes -as emerging in October 1971- was, after all. not
much more than a fitting (but arduously worked) response to, ultimately, technical difficulties
relating to die appraisal of regional aid systems, namely, die lack of transparency of general regional
aid systems. Even diough following an independent track, DGIV believed, however, diat a true
solution for die elimination of distortions had to come from beyond die scope of articles 92 to 94.
that is, in die acceptance by the Council of a regional objective for die Community. DGIY believed
107 See also points 137-138 of Commission, Premier rapport sur la politique de concurrence 1971.
108 As it will be seen in chapter IV, only the French delegation deliberately linked and made cross-references to
the progress in the field of aids control in the context of the negotiation on the creation of a regional fund. For
most delegations, however, this sectoral element of a wider Community regional intervention was solely an
aspect of Community competence which could not hamper the progress -nor the commitment- towards a wider
involvement of the Community in regional objectives. Also by June 1973 at the time of the extension of the
principles of co-ordination of October 1971 to new members the French threatened to disrupt the continuation
of the negotiations over the ERDF unless an adequate solution was found to the delimitation of central rezions
particularly for the UK. See Europe No 1309 (new series) Friday 22 June 1973 p.8-9.
109 Particularly in the early 1970s, the regional policy dossier would undergo internal disputes over two main
and alternative conceptualisations by DGII and DGVI, but the agenda emerging from the regional aids dossiers
did not affect internal divisions nor the negotiations within the Council. Both issues developed separately.
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that to be able to apply articles 92 to 94 satisfactorily (lie Commission needed, besides a clear
delimitation, to have precise information on the situation of regions and on the envisaged regional
programmes110. DGIV defended that an optimal control of regional aids could be attained through the
examination of the compatibility of programmes -even though programming found its justification
rather as an instrument of a more substantial regional objective. Indeed, only a truly Community
regional action could effectively eliminate the distortions of competition arising from regionally
justified advantages, but clearly in no way would the control of regional aids directly (functionally)
imply such a major political step.
10. The regional continuation of a policy for agricultural structures: DGVl and the sectoral
swing (1971-1972)
Just as much as DGIV, also the directorate general for agriculture (DGVI) had a fairly specific or
sectoral interest on regional issues. The Treaty itself had drawn a connection between the
establishment of a common agricultural policy and its regional consequences (point7j and. at least as
early as 1961, DGVI put forward an interest a regional agenda"1. Such an interest grew throughout
the 1960s and early 1970s as the policy underlying the organisation of agricultural markets
increasingly revealed its shortcomings; till, as a matter of tact, for tire brief spell spanning May 1971
to the end of 1972, this conceptualisation arising from agricultural concerns took over the regional
dossier and replaced the co-ordinates of the global structural conception as put forward in the I Barre
Plan.
So, where did the appeal for regional issues reside for DGVI? From the origins of the organisation of
the agricultural markets of the Six a disjunctive on whether to opt between a policy based on the
remuneration of farmers resulting from pricing, or otherwise, following the British method of direct
income subsidies had been posed. The choice for the first option established a common agricultural
market where price support was the guarantee of a sufficient remuneration for both farmers and
agricultural workers while aiming at sound and productive agricultural enterprises. The British
method, on the contrary, was based on the principle of low agricultural prices and on support of the
work-force by aids and subsidies. Clearly, the British option was only possible where the percentage
110 Already in June 1965 DGIV was claiming that an ordering of regional aids could only be attained by regional
programming. See p. 4 of La politique de concurrence, partie integrante de la politique economique dans le
Marche commun, Discours prononce par Hans von der Groeben Membre de la Commission de la CEE
President du Groupe concurrence devant le Parlement europeen d Strasbourg le 16 juin 1965.
111 See the defence by Sicco Mansholt of the need to co-ordinate national policies for agricultural structures and
thus for the need to establish development programmes -as the degree of agricultural development depended on
the economic strength and expansion of the regions- and his calls for the need of a regional policy, for the
creation of new jobs in other sectors and for labour adaptation. See p. 10-15, Intenention de M. Mansholt
resumant les travaux de la Commission A, in Commission, Documents de la Conference sur les economies
regionales, 6-8 Decembre 1961.
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of population engaged in agriculture was low (some 4-5% of the total active population in the UK):
whereas for a Community, where around 20% of the work-force was occupied in tire agricultural
sector, the direct subvention to farmers was out of the question. Thus, after a quite short debate the
Council of agricultural ministers decided, at tire time, upon tire establishment of a common
organisation of the markets based on a price support policy"2. Besides the common organisation of
the markets, tire CAP was also to cover a policy for agricultural structures which, broadly speaking,
was to aim at improving both the structures of production and of commercialisation for tire
adaptation of those exploitations not sufficiently competitive. A policy for agricultural structures, in
principle exceptional in its interventions, seems to have been conceived as consisting of measures to
ensure that tire 'liberation' of agricultural labour would be accompanied by an adaptation of tire
structures of production which, in turn, would allow an increase in the revenue of agricultural
producers.
Soon however, tire objectives of tire CAP entered into difficulties, namely, the policy of stabilisation
of prices to ensure regular income upon conjuncture and seasonality were resulting into unintended
effects, mainly, production was being influenced by tire extension of (high price) guarantees, while,
at the same time, medium term objectives were being sacrificed to immediate domestic political
demands. Where a common organisation was supposed to increase productivity and to integrate
agricultural activities into market rules, and while a policy for structures was expected to encourage
and cushion tire necessary adaptations, the reality was in fact proving quite different. The
shortcomings and unintended effects of both a price support policy and a policy for tire adaptation of
tire structures were going to lead to advocate tire backing of tire CAP with regional development
measures.
Indeed, DGVI argued that tire problems of agriculture -revealed by tire lower incomes of tire
agricultural work-force in relation to other professions- could not be resolved satisfactorily if
measures solely and strictly within the agricultural sector were taken. By 1966 DGVI stated that the
problem of agriculture was not solely one consisting of global disparities between sectors i.e. in
relation to tire non-agricultural sectors, but rather, agricultural reform had to tackle another type of
imbalance, namely, the income disparities which occurred both within tire agricultural sector -
between diverse types and sizes of exploitations- and within agricultural regions"3. Already by 1966
DGVI was advocating for those regions suffering from rural exodus and where tire agricultural work
force was too large, tire abandonment of tire practice of isolated agricultural measures and the
espousal of combined actions aiming at an integral development of agriculture in a concrete area, at
112 Commission, Cornile de Politique economique a tnoyen lenne, reunion du 21 Mai 1965. Exp.se de M.
Mansholt: 'Problemes de la Politique agricole commune', 110272/VI/65].
113 Commission, Reponse a la question no. 9 el 10, p.4 November 66 [11019/ l/VI/66).
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the encouragement of professional and land mobility and, for our purposes, at an active support of
regional development by the development of non-agricultural sectors -industry and service sectors.
Not till 18 December 1968 did DGVI submit to the Council a "Memorandum on die reform of
agriculture in the EEC', or otherwise referred as the Masholt Plan"4. The Memorandum pursued a
deep reform of agricultural structures and, overall, it defended a closer link between agriculture and
market dynamics. The dossier contained a report on the situation of agriculture, measures in die
medium term for different agricultural markets, die Commission proposals for certain prices for die
campaign 1969/70, and a report on the national policies of structures. But particularly to our interest,
die Memorandum advocated diat die actions to be undertaken for realising die objectives of die
Treaty in relation to agricultural revenues and living conditions could not be restricted to solely
sectoral actions, but ought to encompass a wider framework, namely, one aiming at employment
creation in diose regions widi a large number of agricultural redundancies.
That the padi taken by agricultural reform was heading towards regional development actions as a
complement to the reform of agricultural structures was increasingly clear by die late 1960s. But, in
fact, such a policy development from die guarantee policy was able to be materialised dirough
various provisions in die regulation which governed at die time die interventions of die Guidance
section of die EAGGF i.e. Council regulation 17/64/CEE"5. Notably, through articles 15. 14 and 16
concerning die Guidance section of die CAP, it was possible:
• to prioritise co-ordinated objectives in assisted projects (article 15):
1. Projects which are part of a comprehensive system of measures aimed at encouraging the
harmonious development of the overall economy of the region where such projects will be
carried out, shall be given priority for receiving aids from the Fund.
2. The priority referred to in paragraph 1 may take the form of preference over other projects
which met the criteria listed in Article 14 or of more favourable conditions for the granting of
aid;
• programming was a requirement (article 14):
In order to receive aid from the Fund, each project must simultaneously meet all the following
general criteria:
(a) it must come within the framework of a Community Programme laid down in accordance
with article 16.
(...)
114 Commission, Memorandum sur la reforme de /'agriculture dans la CEE [COM(68) lOOOj. Or see
supplement to Bulletin des CCEE 1-1969.
115 Reglement 17/64/CEE du Conseil du 5 fevrier 1964 relatif aux conditions du concours du Fonds europeen
d'orientation et de garantie agricole, JO 34 du 27.2.64 586/64.
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However, for a period of two years from the entry into force of this Regulation, projects which
concern a given action may receive aid from the fund even without a Programme covering such
action until such a Programme is adopted;
• and article 16 laid down lite conditions for the adoption and the contents of programmes:
1. The Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt Community Programmes
in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 43 of the Treaty.
Such Programmes must take account of the measures adopted by the Council within the
framework of the provisions of Article 3 of the Council Decision of 4 December 1962 on the co¬
ordination of agricultural structural policies.
2. Each Community Programme must specify:
(a) the objective to be achieved and the nature of the projects to be undertaken in accordance
with Article 11.1;
(b) the areas in which action should be concentrated;
(c) the percentage or percentages of aid from the Fund in each category of projects;
(d) the total cost and the estimated duration of the Community Programme.
3. Detailed rules of application for each Community Programme shall be laid down according to
the procedure laid down in article 19.1 after the Commission had consulted the Fund Committee
on the financial aspects.
Yet, a full use of such potential was never made. In particular (by article 16.2 above), from 1966
projects financed by EAGGF Guidance ought to be inserted in the framework of Community
programmes, however, due to difficulties in their elaboration, and then in their negotiation, these
programmes were never adopted"6. While a common policy in the area of agricultural structures was
supposed to be elaborated, the Guidance section financed projects responding to die general criteria
fixed under regulation 17/64/CEE. At die end of die transitory period no programmes in die terms of
die regulation 17/64/CEE had been adopted.
Following the failure to adopt any programme, on 21 April 1970 a new financial regulation 729/70""
replaced the original 17/64/CEE almost wiping out any 'regionalisation' of agricultural structural
measures. Articles 14 and 16 were repealed and thus -programming being overdirown- new
structural actions were to take die form of 'common measures' as defined in article 6, namely:
1. Common measures decided by the Council in accordance with the procedure laid down in the
third subparagraph of Article 43.a of the Treaty in order to achieve the objectives set out in
Articles 39.1.a of the Treaty including the structural changes necessary for the working of the
common market, shall be financed under the terms of Article 1.3 of this regulation.
116 Commission, Bulletin des CCEE 1970-7, p 25.
117 Council Regulation (EEC) 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policy. OJ L
94/13 of 28.4.1970.
2. At the same time as it decides on a common measure, the Council shall determine:
(a) the objective to be attained and the nature of the projects envisaged;
(b) the contribution of the Fund to that common measure;
(c) the estimated total cost of the common measure and the estimated time required for its
execution;
(d) the economic and financial conditions;
(e) the necessary provisions concerning procedure.
3. Common measures shall be decided on in the light of the Council decision of 4 December
1962 on the co-ordination of agricultural structure policies.
Thus no requirement of programming nor even of a coherence in a set of measures was made a
requirement any more. Besides under the new proposal 729/70 the regionalisation of the
interventions i.e. to asymmetrically apply the whole or part of the foreseen measures, or of
modulating the interventions according to the regions, modifying the amounts or adapting the
conditions of application of the measures themselves (whether applying early retirement to those
under 50 or to those under 55 for instance) on agricultural structures turned from a requirement to an
option up to the governements' discretion.
Regarding the old article 15, it partly remained in the new article 6.4 but it was retained and made
dependent to the financial limits of an annual credit of the Guidance section amounting 285 million
u.a. Thus, article 6.4 stated regarding the old article 15 that it:
shall cease to apply when the annual amount for the Community financing of the common
measures referred to paragraph 2 reaches 285 million u.a.
In other words, article 15 would be effective and apply within the annual amount for as long as the
Community financing of common measures would not exceed a budget of 285 million u.a. per year.
At the beginning of 1971, however, the situation was going to change. The Council was going to
make its first political engagement regarding the measures and methods proposed in the Mansholt
Plan and, making a political and deliberate step towards tire reduction of its active agricultural force,
new policy guidelines where going to see a renewed place for regional aspects within the co¬
ordinated policy for agricultural structures. On 15 February 1971 the Commission presented to the
Council a Communication and a project of resolution on the new orientation of agricultural policy"8.
In the Communication the Commission forecasted that, between 1972 and 1976, possibly about 2
million out of the 10 million employed in agriculture would become redundant from agricultural
activities due to agricultural mutations and, according to Commission's calculations, a large number
among those 2 million were aged 55 or plus. The Commission proposed in its new guidelines that
118 Commission, Communication and draft Council resolution concerning the new guidelines of the common
agricultural policy. Bulletin of the EECC 1971-3, part I, chapter 2.
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this large share of the active agricultural population (either being main exploitants or labour force i
could, under certain conditions, profit from an indemnity of at least 600 u.a. if they gave up their
activities for either modernising their exploitations or devoting their land to non-agricultural
objectives.
In the finally adopted resolution of 25 March 1971 (not officially adopted till 25 May 1971'") die
Council defined new political guidelines for die EAGGF. Embodying as a premise die indissoluble
link between a price policy and a resolute policy of structures, die resolution laid down 'common
structural measures' -as defined by regulation 729/70- which were to guide the Community structural
interventions. Among diree types of common measures were included measures to benefit diose
wishing to eidier cease dieir agricultural activities for die modernisation of dieir exploitations or for
dieir reconversion into non-agricultural economic activity. Particularly regarding die common
measures in favour of diose wishing to leave agriculture die resolution stated:
With a view to promoting structural improvement and the transfer of the land. Member States
would introduce a system of aid to farmers, whether or not owner-occupiers, on condition that
they would leave agriculture and would allow the land they had been farming to be either
handed over to farms in the process of modernisation or made available for non-agricultural
purposes'20.
This system of aid would include mainly: early retirement, cash in relation to die area vacated and a
system of aid to farmers who wished to engage in an activity odier dian agriculture. This system
would include aid for vocational re-training and a guaranteed income for die period involved. The
renewed ESF would contribute to financing vocational re-training measures. It should not be
forgotten however, diat aldiough by diis resolution die Council gave a new political line to the
problems of agricultural structures, die Council maintained die arrangements for die functioning of
die Guidance section as defined by regulation 729/70. In odier words, neidier programming nor a
regional strategy was compulsory. Common measures were going to be based on Community criteria
and would be implemented by means of measures taken by Member states (laid down by law.
regulation or administrative action), and member states could, if diey wanted to, vary -according to
die region- die amount of die financial incentives provided for or, odierwise, refrain from applying in
certain of dieir regions all or some of the measures provided for.
But not only was agricultural reform heading towards a regional continuation in its policy for
agricultural structures, in fact, die resolution agreed by die Council on 25 March 1971 claimed
explicitly for parallel action in the regional domain in die following terms:
119 Council Resolution of 25 May 1971 on the guidelines for the common agricultural policy, OJ C 52 of
27.5.1971
120 Council resolution of 25 May 1971, HI.(a).
VII: Concerted development of the CAP and of the other Community policies
Rapid progress must be made in developing other Community policies, especially as regards
EMU, regional policy and social policy. Such progress would contribute substantially to bringing
about agricultural reform.
hi particular, the Council is agreed that Member States and the Community should introduce a
system of regional development initiative to promote the creation of jobs particularly in areas
with a large surplus active farming population. As regards social policy, the new ESF will have
to have sufficient funds to contribute to the vocational retraining of farmers wishing to engage in
another occupation.
In sum, by early 1971 developments in the agricultural domain were undoubtedly heading towards
regional action. Indeed, on the one hand, reform of agricultural structures was increasingly aiming at
the reduction of work-force and at the modernisation of agricultural activities and, thus, looking at
implementing measures towards the conversion of labour into non-agricultural activities. To this aim
the Commission was going to submit on 26 May 1971 concrete proposals (introduction, chapter IV).
On the other hand, the resolution of 25 March 1971 was making a call for progress on a regional
dossier. In addition, the project of III MTEP Programme categorised the regional impact of CAP as
one among the four types of priorities within the problems of common interest, and stated that CAP
ought to be articulated with a regional policy which would tend to promote productive economic
activities in regions affected by the evolution of the agricultural sector.
Under these winds favourable to a regional agenda (even if solely concerning agricultural priority
regions), in May 1971 progress in the agenda of agricultural reform triggered a U-turn in the
conceptualisation of a regional task for the Community away from what had been till that moment a
gradually emerging logic for the extension of a global structural policy competence. Developments in
the field of agricultural reform broke into the regional dossier and set aside the leading
conceptualisation of a regional objective until that moment, notably, the one built by DGII which
prioritised a regional objective largely conceived in global strucutral terms i.e. as a contribution to
economic and policy convergence. Let us see this shift as well as the place of DGXVI among these
policy swings, and the elements of continuity and rupture in the emergence of a regional dossier for
the Community.
11. DGXVI's consistent stance throughout the 70s
As seen in point 8, up to the creation of a specific DG for regional policy, DGII was charged with the
leadership of regional policy issues121. Up to 1968 a small division within DGII was in charge of
121 As a matter of fact, the creation of a specific directorate had already been considered in 1959 by Marjolin -
vice-president of the Commission at the time- who understood the set-up of the two groups gathering national
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regional development issues which seems to suggests that from the earliest days, and under the
umbrella of DGII, regional policy was fundamentally identified as an aspect of economic policy
After the merging of the three Community executives in 1968 DGXVI was created from die fusion of
die former administrative units of bodi die EEC Commission and of die High Authority having an
interest in regional aspects122.
Looking at bodi die Note on regional policy and die 1969 proposal123, one can stale diat from its
outset DGXVI's chief conception of a regional objective for die Community was within die orbit of
DGII's conceptualisation and in line and fully coherent widi die 1 Barre Plan124. That is, from its
establishment, DGXVI defended regional policy in global economic terms: regional policy as a
structural policy aimed at correcting regional imbalances for die effects on external equilibria and for
productivity imbalances direatened die very development of die common market and die
approximation of economic policies. DGXVI pictured die task of regional policy vvidiin die common
market, first, as part and parcel of economic policy and positively as a constitutive element towards
die attainment of an economic union.
Then in the early 1970s as die Community moved from economic union to EMU, DGXVI felt at
home widi a conceptualisation of Community regional competence as a structural component of
EMU. That is to say, originally regional policy was not argued for as a requirement for die
realisation ofEMU, but radier, as a complementary action aiming at approximating die structures for
die realisation of an economic union which was at risk -apart from odier reasons- from die divergent
evolution of die structures of its member states. Certainly, however, diere was an internal consistency
between global compatibility measures and monetary measures as presented in die 1969
Memorandums, and as EMU made an imperative of convergence, die movement into EMU did not
alter die justifications nor die nature of regional objectives as understood in 1969. In odier words, the
original 1969 proposal remained fully coherent widi die upgrading from economic union to a EMU.
But by 1971 not only did die global structural conceptualisation adopted by DGXVI conformed to
and was coherent with die EMU Programme, in fact, DGXVI deliberately opted to adhere to the
EMU Programme. By 1971 DGXVI endeavoured to define die role of regional action and it?
justification widiin the framework of medium term economic policy and as a structural component of
EMU. Thus, in October 1971 DGXVI aiming at die raising of deeper causes of monetary instability,
unveiled die contribution of regional imbalances on monetary instability as well as elaborating on the
representatives on regional policy and the group inter-services as laying the seeds for a future DG for regional
policies. Quote in appendix. See p. 3 of Commission, Document reserve a I'attention de Ms. Marjolin el Bobba
Objet: Decisions auxquelles il serait desirable d'aboutir lors de la Reunion des Responsables Nalionaux des
politiques regionales, Bruxelles 10 Septembre 1959 [II/10/BB/2122].
122 The first Commissioner for DGXVI was Hans von der Groeben and then replaced by .Albert Borschette.
123 That is, the proposal for the organisation of means of action in the Community relating to regional
development [COM(69) 950].
124 See Cros (1977) op. cit., p. 43.
antagonistic character of regional imbalances for tire realisation of economic and monetary objectives
(point 6, chapter I)125.
Then in May 1971 arrived a cut in what it had been until that moment a consistent emergence and
gradual formulation of a substantial regional objective as build up by DGII, and from 1968 by
DGXVI. As shown above, through 1971 tire agenda of tire reform of agricultural structures had been
gaining momentum (point 10) while, at tire same time, tire EMU Programme was entering crisis
(point 17.1, chapter IV). In an internal arrangement tire College of Commissioners seeing, on the
one hand, tire reluctance ofmember states to engage in regional action and, on die other hand, trying
to secure tire continuation of agricultural reform shifted its original more global regional objective in
tire context of tire functioning of a market and a EMU to a rather sector-dependent logic. The actual
Commission's shift is put bluntly by DGXVI's director general at tire time:
The new regional policy Commissioner, the Luxembourg (Mr.Borschelte) is little inclined to
pressurise Governments on the basis of the proposal presented by the DG (i.e. DGXVI's 1969
proposal).
On the other hand, Mr. Mansholt knows very well that he needs of a regional aspect to make his
propositions progress. So he offers his colleague to use 500,000,000 u.a. of the EAGGF for
regional actions in agricultural regions for a period of 5 years.
Thus arose the propositions of the Commission of 28 May 1971 abusively presented as concrete
measures of application of the general propositions of 1969 but in fact being a refutable and
regrettable deviation126.
Indeed, the Commission saw a chance to materialise the continuation of the reform of agricultural
structures by part-financing the undertaking of concrete deliberate actions of industrial conversion
there where such conversion into other economic activities was not occurring spontaneously -but
rather putting at risk the development of the region as a whole- and thus the Commission made a
collegiate decision by which it gave priority to regional actions within the framework of the sectoral
objectives of the CAP. Probably it is relevant to note that, after all, the establishment of a common
organisation of the agricultural markets of the Six was a constitutional element of the EEC Treaty
and arguably the common policy per se of the European venture. Not only in budgetary terms but
also in terms of the volume of regulation involved for the organisation of the market agricultural
policy held a heavy weight on the European agenda.
As DGVI took over the regional dossier, the original 1969 proposal i.e. the first proposal submitted
by DGXVI to organise the means of regional policy (see chapter III) was conveniently converted in
125 Crucially, DGXVI worked to develop on its contribution to EMU objectives and it expanded on the
knowledge of the effects of regional imbalances on the EMU Programme, namely, reporting how structural and
regional imbalances were creators and amplifiers of inflation. See Cros Report fXVT/137/71 ].
126 Cros (1975), op. cit. p. 41. Original French text in appendix.
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order to give die newly agreed priority to agricultural purposes and hence to agricultural regions.
Indeed, on 28 May 1971 the Commission submitted to the Council proposals which claimed to lay
down the modalities of intervention of the original 1969 proposal. Clearly, the sectoral swing did
particularly affect the scope of application of the originally proposed financial interventions, namely,
it narrowed down the application of structural solidarity to the particular regional consequences of
the common organisation of die agricultural market and hence to agricultural priority regions.
But how was this policy swing received? The European Parliament on March 1972 gave its opinion
on the proposals of 26 May 1971. In the Mitterdorfer Report127, as well as in its resolution of 16
March 1972, the Parliament criticised the lessening of the regional responsibility decided by die
Commission and stated die importance ofmaking of structural regional policy a specific Communit\
task not subordinated to a sectoral policy128. Although die Parliament accepted that die two
propositions of 28 May 1971 could be considered a first modest step forward towards a Community
regional policy, it underlined die importance of die proposals in question, particularly widiin die
context of the reform of European agriculture. At die same time however, die Parliament called for
die implementation of die conception put forward by die Council in the first resolution EMU (point
17.1, chapter IV), notably, one according to which EMU would not be realisable widiout a
Community policy on regional structures. In odier words, die Parliament demanded diat die
Commission submit widiout delay propositions for die adoption of measures of general structural
policy.
Aldiough clearly the European Parliament spotted the Commission's policy swing and die
consequences for the wider regional policy dossier, it looks as if die European Parliament could not
fully escape itself from die dilemma by which die prioritisation of agricultural structures -even if
clearly supported- meant die scrapping of a wider regional agenda:
It is important to note that there is a fundamental difference on whether one considers the
proposals from the point of view of the economic commission or the point of view of the
commission for agriculture. From an agricultural point of view the proposals appear under the
cover of the reform of the European agriculture. From an economic point of view they are no
more than a first timid step in the direction of a common policy for structures. The Economic
Commission ... recommends the Parliament to approve both proposals of regulation for their
127 Parlemenl Europeen, Documents de seance 1971-1972, Rapport fait au nom de la commission economique
sur la Communication el les propositions de la Commission des Communautes europeennes au Conseil
relatives aux actions communautaires de politique regionale dans les regions agricoles priorilaires de la
Communaute du 28 Mai 1971, Rapporteur M. Karl Mitterdorfer, 9 mars 1972 [264/71 ].
128 See point 5 of Parlement Europeen Resolution portant avis du Pcirlement europeen sur la Communication el
les proposition de la Commission des Communautes europeennes au Conseil relatives aicx actions
communautaires de politique regionale dans les regions agricoles prioritaires de la Communaute. JO C 36/28
du 12.4.72.
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importance on the agricultural field while it observes that it is not at all convinced that these
regulations have a favourable effect on the structural sense129.
In fact, the European Parliament produced a document containing separate opinions by the Economic
Commission and die Agriculture Commission as well as by other Commissions. Even if die
resolution adopted by die Parliament took a more global structural stance, and diis position was
maintained in subsequent resolutions130, nonedieless, die indications of dissent on alternative policy
strategies seem obvious.
Clearly, from die perspective of die emergence of a regional concern, die agricultural shift of 1971
broke die continuity of the conceptualisation as originally assembled under DGII's leadership and
subsequently followed up by DGXV1 from 1968. It seems fair to say, if die words of its director
general are to be credited, that such rupture was carried out at die expense of DGXVI's stance who.
in spite of die Commissioners' deal of May 1971, did not renounce to its fundamentally global
structural understanding of a regional objective and maintained and developed diroughout die 1970s
die mapping of die relationship between Community regional disparities and die preparation of EMU
Programme (Cros 1977). From its creation in 1968 a choice of conceptualisations must have been
posed to die new DG; yet die Note on regional policy and die 1969 proposal reveal diat from its
earliest days DGXVI understood regional policy substantially in relation to its contribuuon to die
realisation of external equilibria and to die necessary economic and policy convergence for die
adequate functioning of die common market. By 1971 DGXVI found a coherent and favourable
growing environment in die EMU context; but nonedieless, DGXVI failed to assert its stance at
Collegiate level as confronted widi well-established agricultural interests. In fact, all things
considered, diere seems to be sufficient evidence to allow us to state that in die years preceding die
Paris Summit of 1972 DGXVI had defined a logic and a strategy to win support for a Community
regional policy even diougli that logic was dissenting from Commission's official stance131.
The tangled interactions between a dominant agricultural agenda and EMU's ups and downs and its
consequences on a regional dossier are seen in more detail later on (point 17, chapter IV). Suffice to
note now diat by die end of 1972, and aldiough some delegations had disputed die sectoral shift of
the Commission before diis date, diis restricted agricultural approach to regional problems for the
Community was abandoned and, after the Paris Summit of October 1972, die consistent stance of
129 Mitterdorfer Report, p. 9 [264/71], Original French text in Appendix.
130 That is, the resolution concerning the Commission's proposal of 31 May 1972 (see point 14.1. chapter 111).
Parlement Europeen, Resolution portant avis du Parlement europeen sur la proposition de la Commission des
Communautes europeennes au Conseil relative a tine Communication en vue des decisions du Conseil
concernenl la politique regionale de la Communaute el a une proposition de resolution du Conseii relative d
des moyens de politique regionale de la Communaute, JO C 103/6 du 5.10.72.
131 See different account by H. Wallace (1977) Op. cit., p.146.
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DGXVI was reinstated. Notably, enlargement but also the re-invigoration of the EMU Programme
effectively brought to an end a regional agenda subsidiary to agricultural aims.
Conclusions
This chapter has aimed at raising the role of the Commission in die development of a policy
competence and at mapping out the process by which various regional agendas found their
justification from various policy areas.
To start with, the Commission's input clearly was decisive to the emergence of a regional policy
competence. Some literature (Wallace 11.1975; Talbot 1977) lias discussed the role of the
Commission, particularly during the negotiation period of 1972-1975, during which the first
decisions of principle for bodi die co-ordination of regional policies and the creation of financial
resources were made. Both commentators have remarked at die highly strategic behaviour of this
institution in trying to secure die acceptance by all delegations of a regional competence, namely by
building packages and searching for alliances. Indeed unquestionably, from die Paris Summit
onwards, die Commission role turned fundamentally into a negotiator; however, a look at the period
previous to 1972 reveals that die nature of the intervention of die Commission in die whole process
leading to die adoption of die first regional regulations of 18 March 1975 was broader and
fundamental than its role of negotiator during 1972-1975. Indeed, in die period immediately prior to
die Paris Summit of October 1972 lay a determinant process of construction in which die role of die
Commission as catalyst and detonator of a regional objective was central. Concretely, both the
formulation and die triggering of a regional objective for die Community were largely a merit of the
Commission alone.
As far as die formulation of a regional objective for the Community is concerned, die definition of a
regional objective involved a choice among alternative conceptualisations. Indeed, from the early-
days a range of starting points, a choice among strategies, and therefore between definitions of a
regional objective appeared as a real possibility. Various DGs had an interest in regional issues from
their particular (sectoral) points of view. The DG for transport was responsible for die consideration
of the link between communication axes and development centres as well as for handling regional-
type exceptions to tariffs differences and other specific advantages. Social Affairs was interested in
regional issues insofar as unemployment and underemployment related to geographical factors such
as industrial clusters. For die DG on Internal market die regional issue confined to die conversion of
industrial regions in decline and the appraisal of safeguards of article 226. In sum, however, there is
no evidence suggesting that these DGs were neither fundamentally involved nor influential in the
development of a regional policy dossier.
IIS
DGII, DGIV and DGVI disputed among themselves the leadership for the development of a regional
policy competence. Although DGIV for Competition and DGVI for Agriculture had through the mid
1960s defined regional objectives strictly linked to die pursuit of Uieir sectoral agendas, by 1968
there came a turning point. Beyond bodi competition considerations and specific problems of
agricultural reconversion, a specific and fundamental conceptualisation of a regional objective for die
Community emerged grounded on die scenario of economic divergence of die late 1960s. A
substantial structural conceptualisation started up by DGII, and later endorsed by DGXVI. differed
from die alternative sectoral strategies in that regional actions were understood from die global
perspective of pursuing die convergence of economies and policies of the common market members
and, dierefore, as a substantive component of a programme aiming at the realisation of economic
union. In odier words, a substantial difference distinguishes die conception of a regional agenda, as
put forward by DGII, and die regional concerns of DGIV and DGVI. While DGII was putting
forward a specific regional objective for the Community consisting of an approximation of regional
structures, die terms of the agricultural and competition concerns where less a regional objective and
radier more a regional dimension in the running of specific (sectoral) policies.
While the domain of state aid control of was moving alongside but remaining largely independent in
its evolution from the regional dossier, a duality of approaches to proposing regional actions divided
the ranks of die Commission. As progress on the CAP and EMU agendas had its ups and downs in
die early 1970s, in May 1971 die College of Commissioners opted for shifting away from a global
structural definition and instead to define regional objectives in die context of die reform for
agricultural structures. This duality of approaches would be settled by die Paris Summit of October of
1972 as a result of progress in die EMU programme and die influence from die first enlargement
(point 17.2, chapter IV).
Beyond die fact diat die Commission proved to be an institution lacking unity of conception, and
divided by alternative strategies pulling in different directions, a review of die internal activity in
some of die Commission's DGs shows clearly diat from die early days and resting on its power of
initiative, die Commission searched deliberately for a regional responsibility. Independently and at
its own initiative, the Commission developed die understanding and elaborated on die nature and
possible types of regional actions at Community level.
Besides such capacity of building and characterising die equivocal nature of a regional objective for
die Community, ultimately rooted in die ambiguities of die Treaty, die emergence of die regional
dossier reveals a second decisive capacity of die Commission, namely die capacity of triggering
policy expansions. It was clearly die decision by DGII to raise regional concerns in the I Barre Plan
which triggered die debate in die Council on die structural aspects of die economic union. Certainly,
for its privileged position of proximity to the Council and its committees, the Commission was able
to put forward to die Council regional concerns in a direct and unmediated manner. This privileged
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position of the Commission (not enjoyed by the other institutions) appears, in the case of die regional
dossier, as tire decisive factor determining its influence in the development of a regional competence.
A thorough study on the influence of the European Parliament on either die definition and
negotiation of a regional policy for the Community, from which a comparison against die
Commission's impulse of die regional policy dossier could be drawn, does not seem to have been
made. Even if die large number of reports and opinions conveys die weight diat die Parliament gave
to diis policy field, diere is no evidence, from die documentation collected, diat die Parliament's
influence had a determinant impact on either die Commission or die Council. Occasional references
from commentators can be found in concrete cases of influence132 and evidence regarding internal
divisions widiin die European Parliament can be collected but, in any event, neidier does die
Commission's capacity to catalyse and construct a policy agenda seem diminished, nor can its
capacity of triggering the regional dossier be denied. From a comparative institutional point of view,
die proximity to policy making bodies, and die unmediated presence at the source of policy definition
seems to have been a determinant factor in die launching of the dossier.
The influence of die Commission also involved an element of management. The timing and die
policy links to eidier the unfolding programme of EMU or to die progress in die domain of die
reform of agricultural structures were strategically considered by die Commission, and die
Commission did not shy from swinging between conceptualisations in trying to gain out from
favourable conjunctures in an entrepreneurial manner. The managerial facet of die Commission's
influence seems to have been as decisive as die power of initiative i.e. the license/responsibility to be
active, to stand independently and build up and shape die contours of a responsibility. Management
decisions necessarily concerned die College of Commissioners and, in die case of die emergence of
die regional dossier, diey set die padi and die framework in which negotiations would developed.
All in all, die particular case of die emergence and construction of a regional policy dossier appears
largely as die result of a technocratic process, notably a process dominated by the Commission and.
comparatively speaking, predominately restricted to die relationship between the Commission, the
Council and die Council's Committees. Indeed, not only did die discretionary power of die
Commission enable it to choose among alternative conceptualisations and to trigger die dossier in an
entrepreneurial manner, determinant to die launch of die regional dossier, but also die formulation
and die triggering of die regional agenda occurred in die arena defined by die relationship between
die Commission and die Council. Aldiough in die early years die Commission exhibited a receptive
open doors policy, and die encouragement of the European Parliament in die background, the actual
132 For instance W. Stabenow notes that the Commission followed the European Parliament's suggestion to
incorporate into its proposal of 26 May 1971 the possibility that regional financial interventions could take the
form of capital grants, as well as interest allowances. See p. 4 of Commission, 'Regional Policy. Summary of a
speech by Dr. Wolfgang Stabenow Head of division in the Commission during the Information Conference on
the Agricultural Policy of the European Communities' Berlin, 22 January 1973 [X/86/73J.
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detection and the triggering of a regional dimension occurred in the secluded arena of the
preparation of medium-term programmes. B0U1 the attempts of April 1966 by Marjolin in die context
of die adoption of die I MTEP Programme, but particularly the decisive raising of a structural and
regional facet provoking economic and policy divergence at die time of the preparation of die III
MTEP Programme, were bodi developments behind closed doors, developments from which die
Commission was able to influence as a result of its proximity to decision-making centres and its
access to vital evidence. Any alternative manner in which die European Parliament would have been
able to influence decisively the process of formulation and triggering are difficult to be traced from
the research mediods been used in diis diesis. From archive documentation one can only conclude
dial diere is no evidence that external influence from eidier the European Parliament, regional
authorities or odier associations were decisive, even if certainly the European Parliament upheld
resolutely a regional agenda from very early days.
Moreover, it can be argued diat die Commission's influence from the end of 1972 was less direct and
less determinant dian in die period before die Paris Summit. From 1973 onwards the success on die
completion of agreement depended on a critical mass of governmental support radier dian on the
Commission's input. Clearly, die Commission's decisive contribution appears more mighty and
effective in die form of formulating and triggering a policy dossier diat in its bargaining power at the
negotiation stages where, as it will be seen (chapter IV), die consent from national governments
proved indispensable and where die striking of agreements took place in a bold intergovernmental
fashion.
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Ill: THE CORE TERMS OF A COMMUNITY COMPETENCE: POLICY CO-ORDINATION AND
FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY
The definition ofa fundamental regional objective, as it was formulated by DGII in the context of the
preparation of the III MTEP Programme, that is, as an approximation of regional structures for the
convergence of economic evolutions and policies of the Six, did not lose its meaning nor its
significance in the 1970s. Truly, as the Community moved from economic union to a EMU the urge
for the convergence of evolutions and policies was reinforced. However, beyond the meaning and
justification of a regional objective to be pursued at Community level, what were the actual terms
and instruments that the Commission proposed to gain for the Community in order to pursue
effectively such approximation of the regional structures? Essentially, since 1969 the Commission
proposed two major strands of intervention: one aiming at the co-ordination of national regional
policies and another of concrete involvement in development actions in a conceited manner with
national authorities and accompanied by a measure of jinancial solidarity. The modalities of the
intervention of the Community in both strands of intervention were negotiated and refined in
accordance to the national reactions throughout the 1970s, and were finally resolved in March 1975
with the adoption of the first regulations on regional policy for the Community. The proposed as well
as the finally accepted terms of competence on regional policy by the Community will be the subject
of this chapter.
Let us also advance that, while this chapter deals with the core elements and instruments of
Community intervention proposed by the Commission as well as their negotiation, the next chapter
will look at the wider process ofnegotiation of a regional competence i.e. within the larger context of
EMU and enlargement, at the higher political level through which member states came to accept the
principle of a regional objective for the Community.
Introduction: a chronology of the successive Commission's proposals
Although no explicit regional objective was entrusted to the Community by the EEC Treaty, on 15
October 1969 the Commission, based on article 235, adopted a draft Council decision' (hereafter
referred as the 1969 proposal) which aimed at attaining concrete powers and instruments for the
Community in a new sphere of economic policy: regional development. The 1969 proposal was
presented to die Council accompanied widi a Memorandum (hereafter referred as die Note on
regional policy in the Community), even though die Note on regional policy was chronologically
' Commission, Proposition d'une decision du Conseil relative a I'organisation des rnoyens d'aclion de la
Communaute en matiere de developpement regionale, Bruxelles 15 Octobre 1969 [COM(69) 950], JO C 152/6
du 28.11.69.
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previous to the preparation of a draft Council decision2. The Note on regional policy exposing the
broad outlines of regional problems of common interest, the object, the objectives and means of a
regional policy for die Community had, in fact, been originally designed -by DGXVI- as a working
document to be discussed at a planned ad hoc meeting of national representatives to be conducted
under DGXVI's auspices. From such an ad hoc gadiering, DGXVI's director general -H. von der
Groeben- expected to rally regional policy ministers into the cause of a Community regional policy3.
The original plans for die Note were, however, never carried out due to internal objections widiin die
Commission4. Thus, die original purpose of the Note was abandoned and, instead, DGXVI prepared
and submitted to die Council on 15 October 1969 a draft decision by die Council which, togedier widi
a revised Note on regional policy, raised die urgency to act upon four types of regions and proposed
mainly: 1. die elaboration of regional development programmes for priority regions; 2. the co¬
ordination of diese plans through die opinions and recommendations of a permanent Regional
development Committee, to be set up too; 3. die creation of two new financial instruments for regional
development purposes, namely, an Interest Rebate Fund and a System of Guarantees on loans5; 4. and
die organisation of information on investment opportunities directed to public and private investors.
Then, while die 1969 proposal was still under Coreper's scrutiny, on 26 May 1971 -in what had
already become die first stage of EMU- and having experienced die reluctance of various member
states to create new and specific regional instruments (point 11, chapter II), die Commission
transmitted to die Council two draft regulations proposing: one die adaptation of a share of die
Guidance section of die EAGGF to part-finance regional projects in agricultural priority regions, and
a second regulation for die creation of a new financial instrument, namely, a fund to assist regional
projects in die form of interest rebates also in agricultural priority regions. Even if die Commission
presented bodi proposals as being in conformity widi die regional guidelines of die III MTEP
Programme (point 16, chapter IV), and as an action falling and responding to die first EMU
resolution of 22 March 1971 whereby die Council resolved to decide on 'appropriate resources' in die
first stage of EMU (point 17.1, chapter IV)-, die trudi is diat die Commission was radier leaning
towards a follow up of CAP developments, namely, towards die new guidelines for agricultural
structural policy set by die Council on 25 March 1971 (point 10, chapter II). Indeed, trying to gain
2 Commission, Projet de Note sur la Politique regionale dans la Communaute. [XVI/20926/1/68 rev. el
Annexes],
3 Commission, Projet Note sur la Politique regionale dans la Convnunaute. (Note d'accompagnemenl de M. von
der Groeben), Bruxelles 13 Juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2076/3],
4 Notably, some Commissioners objected to both an alleged lack of audacity of the Note and also to a likely
ineffectual method to gain national interest and backing. Particularly they were Sicco Mansholt Commissioner
for agriculture and vice-president at the time, see Commission, Politique regionale dans la Communaute
(observations de M. Mansholt sur le document SEC(69) 2076/2), Bruxelles 4 Juillel 1969 [SEC(69) 2076/10]:
but also Commissioner for development aid H. Rochereau (see p. 1-2 of Commission, Politique regionale dans la
Communaute. Proposition d'amendemenl au document SEC(69) 2976/2 presentee par M. Rochereau. Bruxelles
20 Juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2076/6]).
5 Commission, Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a /'organisation des moyens d'action de la
Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale dans la Communaute.
Bruxelles 15 Octobre 1969 [COM(69) 950],
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from Ihe momentum gathered by the Mansholt Plan, the Commission submitted to the Council two
draft regulations directed to the carrying out of regional type interventions specifically in priority
agricultural regions6.
In the first regulation concerning die financing by die Guidance strand of die EAGGF of projects
widiin die framework of operations of development, die Commission proposed the financing by the
Guidance section of three types ofmeasures: first, measures in favour of the creation and expansion of
productive investments; second, measures in favour of the provision and management of
infrastructures and, third, measures in favour of the re-adaptation and reconversion of die agricultural
labour force. Notably, die Commission was proposing to offer private investments a capital subvention
of 1,500 u.a. per job created benefiting farmers in agricultural priority regions who left agricultural
activities to reconvert into an alternative and sound form of economic activity. On the financial aspect
of die adaptation of die Guidance proposal, die Commission calculated that widi an annual provision
of 50 million u.a. to be put aside for diis type of regional actions in agricultural priority regions die
existing ceiling for die Guidance section of die EAGGF would not need to be altered; or in odier
words, diat diis type of regional common action could be financed while still remaining widiin die
existing financial ceiling for die Guidance section7.
But besides die adaptation of existing instruments, 011 26 May 1971 die Commission also submitted a
regulation laying down die modalities of intervention of a brand new financial instrument: an Interest
Rebate Fund. In fact, by 1971 there was a precedent for diis type of financial incentive: a system of
interest rebates on loans was successfully used by die ECSC in aiding to die reconversion of die coal
and steel industries8 and such and instrument was perceived by die Commission as an effective and
non-onerous system to promote regional development9. The technique of a rebate fund -consisting of
die trimming of interest points to loans previously contracted widi a particular financial institution-
basically implied a reduction in the cost of die financing of die programmes for regional economic
development and, concretely, die Commission was envisaging to offer reductions of a maximum of
6 Commission, Actions communcmtaires de politique regionale dans les regions agricoles priorilaires de la
Communaute, (Communication et propositions de la Commission au Conseil), Bruxelles 26 mai 1971 [COM(71)
500 final], JO C 90/17 dull.9.71.
7 In other words, the Commission was proposing 50 million u.a. per year for the promotion of regional projects
out of a total appropriation of 285 million u.a. per year of the Guidance section -as laid down in article 6 of
Council regulation 729/70.
8 In the Commission's words: 'Experience in conversion and retraining gained with the ECSC firms and their use
has already proven that the organising machinery is highly successful in economic and social terms. The key to
the effectiveness of the measures introduced by the Commission is the interest rebate system. It was because of
this system that the more rapid rate of conversion of ECSC plans which began in 1965 was maintained without
major difficulty although relatively modest resources were used (2-3 million u.a.)'. See p. 51 of Commission,
Note on Regional Policy.
9 The idea that the use of the form of interest rebates was a efficient way to financially support investments
engaging relatively modest amounts of resources is present in many instances. See for instance Commission
SEC(69) 2076/15 p. 6. See original quote in endnotes. Also for the same idea see: Conseil, Note. Objet:
Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en nuitiere
de developpement regionale et Note sur la politique regional. Projel de rapport du Croupe des questions
economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R/1020/71 (ECO108) (F1N223)], or see p.53 of Commission.
Note sur la politique regionale [COM(69) 950],
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three points in the interests contracted by either the EIB or any other financial institution for a period
of twelve years. The total budget appropriation for interest rebates was proposed to be the same as for
the Guidance proposal, that is, 50 million u.a. per year for a five year period.
Originally in October 1969 the Commission had proposed that this Interest Rebate Fund would apply
to all priority regions -as defined by the III MTEP Programme-, but on 26 May 1971. when the
proposal defining the modalities of application of such a Fund was effectively submitted, a swing
away from the original policy objectives had taken place and the Interest Rebate Fund was made part
of the Community package of actions of regional policy towards agricultural priority regions10 -the
latter being generally defined as those regions where the economic evolution was severely affected by
the mutations in the agricultural sector and where the active population engaged in agriculture was in
large surplus. The Rebate Fund would then intervene in the part-financing of infrastructure
investments i.e. general infrastructures as well as those closely linked to economic activities, and in
the creation of new and sound industrial, artisan and craft activities in agricultural priority regions.
The Interest Rebate Fund would part-finance projects inserted in either development plans or.
otherwise, a coherent set of development projects which proved determinant to the economic
development of the priority agricultural region in question.
Then a year later, on 31 May 1972, tire Commission proposed, also within the framework of the 1969
proposal, die creation of two further instruments". A project of resolution concerning tire means of
regional policy for tire Community12 proposed to gain tire Council's consent on tire principle of tire
setting up of a System of Guarantees and on the constitution of a Regional Development Company
while the Commission promised to submit further formal proposals once tire Council had given a
preliminary green light of acceptance on these additional instruments13. Generally speaking, a system
of guarantees was expected to facilitate tire financing of investments operations, while the creation of
a regional development corporation would target tire search for firms and information on investment
possibilities in priority areas, technical assistance to investors and the possibility of temporary and
minor Community participation in the capital of particularly small and medium enterprises created in
priority regions14. Although both proposals seem to have been largely tire consequence of tire Italian
claims that tire proposals submitted by the Commission since May 1971 were insufficient in order to
reduce tire tensions susceptible to compromise tire timely realisation of tire economic and monetary
10 Part of the Actions cormnunautaires de politique regionale dans les regions agricoles priorilaires Je la
Communaute, Bruxelles, 28 May 1971.
11 Commission, Communication en vue des decisions du Conseil concernant la politique regionale de la
Cotmnunaute, Bruxelles 31 mai 1972, [COM(72) 530 final], JO C 94/7 du 9.9.72.
12 Proposition de resolution du Conseil relative a des tnoyens de politique regionale de la Cormnunaute.
presentee par la Commission au Conseil le 19 Juin 1972, [JO C 94/7 du 9.9.1972].
13 See p. 6 of Commission, Communication en vue des decisions du Conseil concernant la Politique regionale de
la Communaute, Bruxelles 31 Mai 1972 [COM (72) 530 final],
14 See p.5-6 of Commission, Cotmnunication en vue des decisions du Conseil concernant la Politique regionale
de la Communaute, Bruxelles 31 Mai 1972 [COM(72) 530 final].
union15, these additional proposals of May 1972 were justified by the Commission as necessary
measures in the framework of the resolutions on the realisation of EMU by stages, notably, to give a
start of a solution to regional problems through tire acquiring of 'appropriate means' (points 17.1,
17.2, chapter IV).
Concerning the creation of a System of Guarantees on loans, although die Commission had proposed
the principle of its creation in its 1969 draft decision, the Commission did not submit the actual
proposal until 31 May 1972 and, as had happened with tire Interest Rebate Fund, although tire
original System of Guarantees was conceived well before tire policy U-turn of May 1971, the actual
concrete proposals were submitted once tire Commission had swung to a sectoral strategy. In short.
Lhe creation of both a Regional Development Corporation and a European System of Guarantees for
regional development purposes were also aimed at tire tackling of tire reform of agricultural structures
in agricultural priority regions.
By October 1972 the above set of successive proposals had managed to assemble some degree of
acceptance within tire Council, but did not find sufficient political will to be finalised and in July
1973, following (lie mandate of tire Paris Summit of 19-20 October 1972, tire Commission withdrew
all its previous proposals -except tire Guidance proposal of 26 May 1971- and replaced them by three
new proposals (hereafter referred as tire 1973 proposals), notably, a project of decision for tire creation
of a Committee for Regional Policy and a project of regulation for tire setting up of a new and
specifically regional financial instrument -theERDF, together with its financial regulation"'.
A fact distinguished radically tire proposals of 1973 from the previous attempts, namely, that tire
Heads of State or Government had made on 19-20 October 1972 a decision of principle in favour of
tire co-ordination of regional policies and for tire creation of a ERDF. Indeed, when on 31 July 1973
tire Commission submitted its draft decision for tire creation of a Committee for Regional Policy and
tire Council regulation creating a ERDF, in principle, what was pending to be resolved were solely die
15 Indeed the Italian delegation itself had been proposing and advocated the setting up of both instruments at
various instances. Italy had first proposed a regional development company in October 1970 [page 18 of Council
meeting minutes of 26-27 October 1970 [1954/70 (PV/CONS Extr. 1)]] and insisted in May 1971 [p.24 of
Conseil, Note. Objel: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de moxens d'action de la
Communaute en matiere de developpemenl regionale el Note sur la politique regional. Projet de rapport du
Groupe des questions economiques au Coreper, [R/1020/71 (ECO108) (FEN223)]], in Octobre 1971 [p.18 of
Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des Representants pennanents sur les texles presentes par la
Commission au sujet de I'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de politique regionale.
14 Octobre 1971 [R/1950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN 435) rev.2 and p. 16 of Conseil. Extrait de prcjet de
proces-verbal de la reunion restreinte lenue a /.'occasion de la 170eme session du Conseil. 20 Octobre 1971
[R/2217/71 (PV/CONS/R 14) Extr.l]], etc.
" That is: Proposal for a Council regulation establishing a regional development Fund, Draft decision by the
Council on the creation of a Committee of regional policy and Proposed financial regulation to special provisions
to be applied to the European Regional Development Fund, OJ C 86/7 ff. of 16.10.73.
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technical conditions for the Community interventions in either a co-ordinating or a financial
function17.
The ERDF was proposed to contribute to regional development actions by the part-financing -through
capital funds and interest rebates- of investments in industrial activities, services and infrastructures
(general as well as specific) in regions characterised by either agricultural predominance, industrial
mutations or structural underemployment. In the ERDF proposal the Commission proposed to
appropriate in total, and for a three year period, 2,250 million u.a. of the budget of the European
Communities. That total budget would be divided in instalments and incrementally appropriated, that
is, 500 million for 1974, 750 million for 1975 and 1,000 million for 1976.
On the basis of these 1973 proposals, and after a long period of negotiation, the Council on 18 March
1975 laid down, for the first time, the terms of a Community intervention on structural geographical
imbalances.
So, given the above brief chronological recap of the successive proposals submitted by die
Commission from 1969 until 1975, which were substantially the terms of the regional competence
proposed by the Commission in 1969, 1971, 1972 and 1973? In fact, rather than entering into a
detailed exposition of each of the proposals noted above (annexed at die end of this diesis), diis
chapter will make a distinction between two major strands of competence -a function of co-ordination
and a function of promotion- and will look at how die successive proposals dealt widi diese two major
tasks which die Community finally gained on 18 March 1975. Indeed, die elements of die solution
proposed by die Commission to address die objective of an approximation of national structures can
be recapitulated into two major strands of intervention: A) a function of co-ordination of regional
policies and, B) a function of promotion i.e. of financial solidarity, which was central -but not
paramount- to die proposed framework of Community involvement.
A) A function of co-ordination of national regional policies
Aldiough die element of financial solidarity was always the aspect which most caught the time and
die attention of policy makers during die negotiation of die Commission's proposals, die fact is diat
die co-ordination of national regional policies was always seen by die Commission as die
indispensable framework upon which financial solidarity rested. Not only had proposals for die co¬
ordination of regional policies been made before any concrete proposals of financial instrument were
forwarded to die Council, but crucially, die Commission itself conceived die function of co-ordination
of national regional policies as the element upon which the impact of die actions of promotion -
necessarily marginal- would depend on. As a matter of fact, only some aspects of the instruments
17 The Communique of the Paris Conference stated the will of the Nine to adopt all the regulations for the
functioning of the ERDF during the first stage of EMU, although the Fund would not be charged with own
(Community) resources till passing to the second stage of EMU, that is until 1974 (point 17.2. chapter IV).
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proposed to attain such co-ordination of policies proved substantially controversial for national
delegations, namely, programming and the institutional place of the Committee for regional policy;
but even then, neither of these discrepancies nor other minor ones were ever perceived as
insurmountable difficulties.
12. The co-ordination of policies
What was (lie Commission actually proposing by a 'co-ordination' of national regional policies?
12.1. The proposed meaning and procedures ofco-ordination
To begin with, die co-ordination of regional policies was understood as a goal rather than a task.
Namely, by a co-ordination of regional policies was meant the organisation of a permanent
confrontation i.e. a comparison of national regional policies, of budgetary projections and of regional
development programmes so that the Community could arrive in due time -and if consensus emerged-
at a co-ordinated policy for intervention on regional structures. All in all, a confrontation of regional
policies involving the comparison of actual programmes, objectives etc., was both for the 1969, as
well as for the 1973 proposal18, the lowest common denominator of departure towards a Community
regional policy. Indeed, both proposals nodded to the basic political premise that a Community
regional policy could only emerge from the detection of common denominators. This gradualist or
progressive approach -building up to co-ordinated objectives and criteria for regional intervention-
was the only acceptable way forward, particularly for the French delegation, for whom co-ordinated
objectives, means of concerted action and overall assessments of regional development in the
Community were only acceptable if progressively defined19.
For both the 1969 and the 1973 proposals, a permanent Regional development Committee was
proposed to be the body employed for such elaboration of either a co-ordinated or a truly Community
policy20. This Regional development Committee would gather the Commission and national
Governments' representatives on regional policy and be the forum where that
confrontation/comparison would take place. This Committee would be able to give opinions regarding
the comparison and the progressive development of a regional policy for the Community, either at its
own initiative or at Council's or Commission's demand.
Such permanent confrontation of various components of national regional policies within the
Regional development Committee was justifiable in various grounds, but in particular, in order to
18 See the preambles of the 'Draft decision by the Council on the creation of a Committee for regional policy'. OJ
C 86/11 of 16.10.73.
19 See Commission, Note a 1'attention des membres de la Commission, Objet: 565eme reunion du Comile des
Representants pennanents 23/7/1970, Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a I'organisation de moxens
d'action en matiere de developpement regional et note sur 1a. politique regionale de la Communaute, 25 Juillet
1970 [SEC(70) 2884],
20 See articles 8 and 4 of the proposal of October 1969 and articles 1 and 2 of the Draft decision by the Council
on the creation of a Committee for regional policy of July 1973.
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ensure that the need to approximate the evolution of the regional structures was, first, addressed and.
second, that appropriate solutions -for both the Community as well as for national Governments- were
given. Indeed, the need to approximate the structural evolutions of the members involved the
consideration of structural inelasticities beyond the national context and the attention at the evolution
of the structures for the Community as a whole. In other words, the harmonisation of the structures
meant an orientation of the structures of each country beyond the national objectives and towards a
Community optimum21.
But second, appropriate responses ought to be secured; and, clearly, the orientations and the intensity
of the actions undertaken by national public authorities in order to accompany or to facilitate
structural mutations, to eliminate structural rigidities, at overcoming productivity differences among
regions were crucial22. The truth is Unit die Commission which -mainly through the control of
regional aid systems for competition purposes- got to know national regional measures, believed Uiat
national regional policies were23, first, geographically speaking, too extensive in their application, that
is, regional policies in most countries covered a very large part of the national population and of die
national territory which, ultimately, worked to die detriment of ensuring an adequate and necessary
intensity to tackle regional problems where diey were most acutely appearing. Second, the
Commission considered diat die means used by national governments had increased considerably in
dieir intensity, in dieir widdi, and in dieir variety widiout actually being followed by successful
results24, and dius, die Commission considered diat regional policies ought to move from a deliberate
policy for investment attraction to an actual policy for amenagement du territoire i.e. ultimately, to a
policy for die equipping of regions. Notably, among a possible range of policy instruments, national
regional policies were largely relying on financial aids to attract investment radier dian giving a
priority to die provision of elementary economic infrastructure for die development of sound economic
activities. Third, due to die lack of adequate regional programming the risks of evolution of different
sectors had not been adequately foreseen. Public regional interventions had too often adopted an
inefficient and case by case approach, relying on obsolete techniques and management mediods and
often responding to short term political considerations -such as avoiding large redundancies. Fourth,
die Commission believed diat die structural policies of the member states had put. predominantly, an
21 In other words, there was appearing a case for the orientation, the direction of national structural evolutions in
a national as well as an optimal Community context, namely, towards convergent national and Communitv
structural objectives. See p. 4 of Commission, Rapport du Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne sur le
Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil du 12 Fevrier 1969, Bruxelles 10 Juin 1969 [OR 11-133/69],
22 Indeed, for the Commission the overcoming of the challenge of divergence for the continuation of the market
depended on: the orientations that countries would give to their short term and structural policies, the sensitivitv
of the national opinions as regards the new dimensions brought along by the Community context, the orientation
(or re-orientation) of Community actions in function of these new givens, notably in the field of the structures.
See Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Premieres indications sur le contenu possible
du Memorandum de la Commission sur les problemes que font apparaitre pour la Communaute les perspectives
d'evolution a moyen tenne dans les pays membres, (Note des services de la Commission). Bruxelles 2 nuii 1969
[9000/11/69].
23 For the Commission's assessment of national regional policies see, for instance, Annexe I to the Commission's
Note on regional policy for the Community.
24 For some figures on the increase in the intensity of regional aids see point 9.1.1, chapter II.
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emphasis on measures of conservation, rather than on actual measures to accelerate Lhe processes of
adaptation and of stimulation of new techniques and new productions25. The Commission seems to
have started questioning the compatibility of regional policies with the common market, that is,
believing that regional aid systems were running at times in contradiction with the principles and Lhe
functioning of the market. National measures were not facilitating sufficiently Lhe optimal allocation
of factors of production and encouraging structural mutations. Instead, national measures were too
often artificially maintaining industries and enterprises where the political costs were at stake26. Thus,
national policies were strongholds of inflationary habits and behaviours which, although neither
appearing directly nor at all times on the actual national accounts, were, nonetheless, having a direct
effect on the evolution of die national economies.
Additionally, a policy for regional structures conceived in Lhe wider context of a global regulation of
the supply side would benefit from a permanent confrontation at Community level, in tire sense that
regional measures ought to be coupled to and consistent with broader economic guidelines. The
Commission insisted that the transformation of structures did not solely concern a handful of
measures -strictly linked to financial aids to enterprises- but a larger toolbox within die control of
Governments: fundamentally market and budgetary tools. Finally, apart from these more substantial
reasons for undertaking a common examination of national policies, other particular and specific
motives such as the sectoral repercussions of regional measures, the reversing of overbidding, or the
development of a co-ordinated disincentive policy could also find treatment in such an exercise of
permanent common discussion on regional policy.
Thus, a co-ordination of regional policies meant, first, making member states accept the exposure of
their regional development policies and development programmes, as well as their budgetary
appropriations, into a Community forum in order to be examined in common. Thus, in the context of
a Community forum (i.e. the Regional development Committee) member states ought to be able to
compare together, as well as with the Commission, the main following issues:
• the economic perspectives and regional development programmes,
• the regional problems arising from the establishment of the common market and from the
implementation of common policies,
• Lhe links between regional policies and budgetary policies,
• the control of regional aid systems i.e. marrying competition with national regional policy
concerns.
So, how would such a co-ordination of national regional policies operate and materialise concretely?
Back in mid 1969, in fact during tire process of drafting the 1969 proposal, DGXVI staled that there
25 See IT MTEP Programme and Commission, Politique economique a moyen lerme, [V/20200/68] p. 11-18.
26 See p. 1-2 of Expose by J. Cros, Politique regionale el Union economique et monetaire. In 1971 DGXVTs
director general stated that while regional policy in France and in Italy was gradually superseding the dominance
of a solely social concern of 'rescue interventions' in backward regions, in Germany and the Netherlands
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was a need at Community level to (1) make member states -depending on die case and when
necessary- eidier establish, or complete, or put in practice regional development plans; and (2) to co¬
ordinate the measures of die member states and to orient diem in a Community policy27. In odier
words, die co-ordination of regional policies would operate dirough die examination in common of
national programmes and materialise in die delivering of non binding opinions.
Programming, or a request for die elaboration of programmes of regional development for (previously
delimited) priority regions, meant a request, first of all, for a systematic and integrated approach to
regional development away from pure assistance, ad hoc and isolated measures inconsistent with the
broader general economic policy guidelines. Programming was, dierefore, for die Commission, a
mediod of ensuring bodi coherence among interdisciplinary measures and consistency with
Community economic policy objectives.
By regional programmes die Commission meant national programmes 011 investments, measures,
objectives, etc. of regional development, diat is, State-approved programmes for die development of
their regions. Clearly, die elaboration of regional development programmes would, domestically
speaking, differ according to die constitutional structure and administrative systems in each country,
and besides, by 1969 not all members were using regional programming as a development mediod, or
at least not in die same manner28. Nonedieless, argued die Commission, due to die urgency of certain
cases, die implications for die functioning of die market and die need to approximate economic
policies, die Commission ought to be able to recommend the establishment, die completion or die
implementation of plans to address particular structural geographical imbalances. As a matter of fact,
in 1969 diere was already agreement among national policy representatives on bodi plans (or
programmes) being die raw material upon which to carry out co-ordination, and 011 la>ing down basic
minimal contents of development plans in order to effectively carry out an examination of
compatibility25.
regional policy was closely integrated to global economic policy and had become an actual means of a global
policy for growth.
27 Thus is exposed by H. von der Groeben in his presentation of the Note on regional policy and the 1969
proposal to the College of Commissioners. See p. 2. of Commission, Politique regionale (Communication de M.
von der Groeben), Bruxelles 7 juillet 1969 [SEC(69) 2076/12], See original French text in appendix.
28 By 1966 most of the countries had established 'regional programmes' but varying very much in nature: from ad
hoc action programmes -targeting specific regional problems such as frontier divisions or regional decline-, to
multiannual orientation programmes which were recipes of long term intentions based on a previous socio¬
economic analysis or, at the other end of the spectrum, national economic programming but regionally outlined
i.e. for France regional programming was a break down of the national planning system into smaller
administrative units. See Annex I to the Commission's Note on regional policy.
25 See the debates and the common denominator conclusions of the 1959 Group set up by Marjolin in their
preparation of the regional chapter for the I MTEP Programme (1966-1970). Indeed, by 1966 the group of high
ranking civil servants had agreed on the following: 1) that programmes were instruments to facilitate the co¬
ordination of the means at the disposal of regional, national and Community authorities; 2) the indispensability
to integrate these programmes into general economic policy; 3) to ensure the co-ordination of the different
regional programmes nationally; 4) to examine and develop a common method for establishing regional
programmes; 5) and generally speaking, the desirability that regional policies were confronted and if possible co¬
ordinated at Community level. On the other hand, there was disagreement 011: 1) the way to ensure the
accordance of these programmes at national and at Community level; 2) 011 whether regional programmes as such
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Thus, what the Commission proposed to start with in the 1969 proposal, as technically not all member
states were using regional programmes, was, rather than drawing up an outline of minimal contents,
to try out a pragmatic method by which the elaboration, completion or implementation of programmes
would be made on the spot in consultation with Community institutions i.e. in an individual case by
case basis and with the participation of the Commission and tire Regional development Committee.
Concretely, for those countries who had already drawn or established regional plans, these would be
submitted to the Commission for consultation. Any other regional measures would also be submitted
annually by member states to be examined by the Commission. The Commission would give non
binding opinions or recommendations regarding other new initiatives deemed necessary in order to
complete or, indeed, establish plans as such. So the decision to establish, to complete, or to put in
practice development plans would have to be reached in common, and on a case by case basis,
between the Commission and member states individually (article 1.3). The permanent Regional
development Committee -who could be called in to join the examination at any time- could also
propose or recommend that member states establish plans or complement diem with new policy
measures. If no common conclusion was reached between individual member states and the
Commission about die establishment or completion of die plans, the Commission would still maintain
die power to recommend die discussion of diese regional plans multilaterally at any time in die future
(article 2). In any case, neidier die establishment of plans nor die recommendations by die
Commission to member states would be binding on member states, and always would be subject to die
opinion of national government representatives gadiered round die permanent Regional development
Committee.
In 1973 die Commission abandoned the pragmatic and case by case approach of 1969 and became
more adventurous, by making regional programmes an obligation. The ERDF proposal (article 6) put
as a requirement diat, after a transition period of two years, all countries would draw up and submit to
Community institutions -once again to bodi the Commission and die Committee for Regional Policy-
dieir regional development programmes. Until the end of diat transition period, regional development
programmes, or odierwise 'specific regional objectives' where diose plans were still not existing,
would be communicated to die Commission by member states. For diose countries still not using
regional programmes, die Commission asked to be informed annually on resources made available -or
proposed to be made available- and on die development of the economic and social situation of die
regions concerned. The final specific regional objectives would be dien defined in consultation
between the Community institutions and member states30. On die odier hand, for diose countries
drawing regional programmes some minimal indications on die contents of die programmes were also
put forward by die Commission, namely, a regional development programme for a given region would
first lay down die development of die socio-economic situation of die region in question; second, die
had to be co-ordinated; 3) on the general outlines of the method for elaborating them in order to achieve a certain
degree of harmonisation and 4) on further roles of regional programmes.
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measures proposed in respect of infrastructure and the creation of economic activity; third, the
intended financing; and fourth, the authorities or institutions responsible for those measures.
The capacity to advocate the introduction of national development programmes for priority regions
does not seem a negligible political step since, ultimately, it seems to have sought for a reciprocal
engagement among member states to give to Community regional imbalances -insofar as affecting
fundamental external and monetary equilibria- a political priority raising from either their damaging
effects 011 the smooth functioning of the common market, or in the early 1970s, for die doubts which
were cast on the feasibility of EMU. Second, programming meant that member states as well as the
Commission -seating round a Committee for regional policy- would gain appropriate information and
knowledge of die domestic regional situation of certain regions and would be able to exchange
recommendations on die addressing of national and Community imbalances. In any case, die
Commission defended die adoption of programmes at Community level i.e. in consultation with
Commission and odier member states, not in an attempt to challenge die ultimate national sovereignty
of drawing plans for die development of their regions in accordance with their own constitutional
systems and administrative practices but, radier, as a mediod to ensure die attention at Community
concerns and die compatibility or die conformity of regional policies and measures widi Community
objectives. Indeed, Community competence of regional policy was always understood by die
Commission as 'complementary' to national responsibility. As it will be seen below, diis 'test of
conformity' certainly raised objections.
In bodi die 1969 and die 1973 proposal, die Commission proposed die materialisation of co¬
ordination by gaining die capacity -for die Commission as well as for any delegation- to be able to
formulate -and dierefore receive- opinions on die national programmes. Obviously, diese opinions
would remain strictly widiin die context of a Community forum created for such purpose, and dieir
acceptance would remain up to die individual members' own discretion.
In die 1969 proposal, the Commission proposed to draw recommendations -bilaterally, but subject to
die Committee's approval- regarding the national plans in die light of die realisation of the economic
union and also in order to facilitate the necessary co-ordination for undertaking concerted actions. As
a result, die Commission would be able to extend recommendations, so diat those measures envisaged
by member states would converge also towards the realisation of Community objecfives, and so diat
die choices and die priorities taken nationally were organised in a coherent fashion with die
necessities of the establishment and functioning of die common market and die approximauon of
economic policies31. Should no bilateral agreement take place, die Commission's recommendation
30 See p. 40bis of Annex of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portonl creation
d'un Fonds de developpement regionale, Bruxelles 7 novembre 1973 [2107/73 (EC0266) (FIN 687jj.
31 Thus goes the fourth recital in the preamble of the 1969 Proposal: 'whereas without prejudice to the
obligations and powers resulting for the Member states and the Community (...), steps must nevertheless be
taken to ensure that the measures contemplated by the Member states, which are responsible for drawing up and
implementing regional development plans, converge along the lines that will help towards attainment of the
Community's objectives and that the choices to be made and priorities to be established are organised in a
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would be considered multilaterally in die context of a permanent Regional development Committee if
die Commission, or die member state concerned, requested it.
So, 011 which fields did die Commission propose gaining a capacity to extend recommendations or
opinions to national governments regarding national plans? Concretely, the Commission was
proposing (article 5) die capacity to be able to address recommendations on nationally drawn plans
regarding:
(a) the need for better co-ordination of measures adopted by the Member states, especially in
frontier areas;
(b) Community needs where improvements are made to infrastructures, in particular,
communications, oil, gas pipelines, ports, airports, and where natural sites and resources are
developed;
(c) the implications of policy on agricultural structure;
(d) the demands of industrial policy in the common market and the need to avoid uneconomic
production;
(e) vocational training and guidance needs.
The Commission declared that it would restrict its opinions to the areas of its competence (control of
state aids, transport policy, ESF, Guidance section of the EAGGF, EIB) and at the level of the
principles that would have motivated its opinions or its recommendations.
The draft proposal creating the Committee for regional policy of 1973 also called for this Committee
to examine and deliver opinions on development programmes or, otherwise, on the specific
development objectives presented by member states. Less explicitly than in the 1969 proposal, the
evaluation and recommendations of programmes would seemingly be linked to the defence of die
Community perspective of national development actions, namely, in so far as die submitted
programmes would effectively aim at correcting structural and regional disequilibria likely to affect
die realisation in time of EMU, and specifically, die conformity of national programmes, or regional
objectives, widi die objectives of die Community. As a matter of fact, neidier die Commission nor die
Committee had any coercive force to amend beyond the issuing of recommendations.
Yet, apart from such a (general and non-binding) co-ordination purpose, programmes would also
serve as die framework against which individual invesdnent projects would be considered for
Community aid, particularly, in respect of eligible regions. Indeed, on die one hand, programmes
would guarantee the efficiency and die adequate employment of complementary Community
resources, while on the other, submitted projects ought to fall widiin an approved plan.
manner consistent with the requirements involved in establishing the common market and gradually
approximating economic policies; whereas for this purpose a procedure must be arranged which will enable the
Commission to gather all the information it must have in order to formulate any recommendations or opinions it
deems necessary'.
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Moving on from the examination of programmes, multilateral examination was also proposed to
extend to budgetary projections. Member states would inform colleague ministers/representatives and
tire Commission on the envisaged budget allocations for regional purposes32. The Commission thus
would be informed of Governments' plans on the width of the financial resources envisaged to be
appropriated over the medium term for regional policy actions. Budgetary previsions of member states
would be harmonised with the Community and co-ordinated among the ,Six. Seemingly, tire
Commission was fearing a misuse and an overcharging of national budgets with uneconomic, isolated
or contradictory measures. As seen later on (point 13.2), Lire Commission gave a heavy weight to this
aspect of tire co-ordination of national budget policies for public and private investment33.
Finally, tire Committee for regional policy would also work towards a future co-ordination of various
aspects of national regional policies, notably, developing a common approach on disincentive
measures in regions of heavy concentration, studying tire impact of Community financial
contributions, and examining systems of regional aid and tire problem of overbidding beyond tire strict
context of competition considerations i.e. the Committee was also expected to provide tire forum for
consolidating common guidelines on state aid policy aiming not merely at extending competition
conditions as comprehensively as possible, but at an optimal and balanced development of economic
activities across tire union. These additional agendas, apart from tire major examination of policies,
programmes and budgetary appropriations, were simply listed to exemplify possible tasks to be
tackled by tire Committee for regional policy.
12.2. The discrepancies in the terms ofco-ordination proposed by the Commission
Let us recall (point 8, chapter II), that in April 1966 tire Commission, at tire lime of adoption of tire I
MTEP Programme, had made an attempt to gain tire engagement from Governments to co-ordinate
national regional policies but, on that occasion, solely an intention to confront regional policies was
recorded. In 1969 co-ordination was defined as a permanent confrontation of national regional
policies and so-defined it did not bring up national opposition. As a matter of fact, tire 1959 group had
already carried out an ad hoc and preliminary form of confrontation of objectives, means, instruments
and criteria of regional interventions, first under the Commission's presidency and then also under
tire scope of tire Medium-term economic policy Committee in tire preparation of Hie regional chapter
of die I MTEP Programme. In other words, from die early stages national delegations accepted die co¬
ordination of regional policies as a goal i.e. as die result of die reaching of consensus on policy
aspects, and they also accepted die common examination of national policies be materialised from
regional development programmes and promoted by a co-ordinating committee i.e. a Regional
development Committee which would be able to deliver opinions.
32 See article 9 of the 1969 proposal and article 2.d of the draft decision creating a Committee for regional policy.
33 By July 1969 no clear proposition about how to operate such confrontation had been put forward by the
Commission. See point 8 of Commission, Politique regionale (Communication tie M. von tier Groeben).
Bruxelles 7 Juillet 1969 [SEC(69) 2076],
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So, if the common examination ol'policies, programmes and budgetary allocations for regional policy
as well as the principle of setting up a co-ordinating committee was an acceptable minimum to all
parties34, where were the elements of disagreement among national delegations? Concerning dtis
whole function of co-ordination proposed by the Commission, member states mainly disagreed on
some of the terms proposed concerning programming and the institutional place of the Regional
development Committee.
12.2.1. The contents of national programmes and the verification of conformity with Community
objectives
Before the submission of tire 1973 proposals some isolated voice had challenged the establishment of
programmes at Community level arguing that isolated projects responding to specific needs could be a
decisive contribution to tire development of a region and, therefore, that such obligation of
programming was unfounded35. However, tire real debate on programming emerged at tire time of tire
negotiation of tire 1973 proposals i.e. once tire decision of principle regarding (lie creation of new and
specific regional resources had been made, and discussions within Coreper concentrated more
concretely on the technical modalities of regional interventions36. Various points of disagreement
arose among delegations (such as tire date from when programmes ought to become compulsory, etc.)
but tire most substantial discrepancies on tire method of programming concerned, notably, tire
contents of programmes i.e. how extensive and which type of information regional programmes ought
to contain, and the scope of the examination of national development programmes at Community
level.
Concerning tire discrepancies on tire essential contents of regional programmes, tire Commission
claimed that it had never been tire intention to define, in neither a detailed nor a homogeneous
manner, how regional programmes ought to be elaborated and that, therefore, no rigid definition of
programming was to be attempted at Community level; rather, tire attempt was one of attaining some
degree of approximation of national programmes so that tire functions of both co-ordination and
promotion could be carried out satisfactorily. Indeed, from tire discussions on tire EAGGF Guidance
proposal all delegations and tire Commission understood regional programmes as outline or indicative
documents which ought to clearly reveal major objectives and guidelines in relation to Community
objectives37.
34 Indeed, already on 25-26 October 1970 national delegations and the Council put forward a positive reaction to
a progressive co-ordination and to the creation of a Regional development committee (point 16. chapter IV).
35 In these terms in November 1972 France did not accept that all projects to EAGGF resources ought to be
inscribed within more global operations, see p. 4 of Conseil, Projet du Rcipporl du Croupe des questions
economiques (Politique regionale) au Comite des Representants Peimanents, Objel: Politique regional.
Bruxelles 20 Novembre 1972 [T/518/72 (ECO) (FIN)].
36 By September 1972 Coreper had still not examined article 3 of the 1969 proposal where the contents of
regional programmes were proposed.
31 hi other words, no delegation nor the Commission defended to specify in detail how these programmes ou »ht to
be established but, rather, to ensure that they could be examined in common, see p. 38bis Annex of Conseil.
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As seen above, however, the ERDF proposal made a number of precise indications on information
which ought to be contained in a sufficiently detailed manner (article 6.3). Among that information,
the Commission particularly insisted on sufficient indications on the localisation of tire actions, the
geographical area and tire sectors on which measures would apply and tire objectives which drove
national measures. But tire particular indications proposed by tire Commission in 1973 were found to
be unacceptable by various delegations38.
Clearly, away from the fact that there was no intention to define tire notion of regional programme at
Community level, tire indications to be made by national authorities conveyed eventually the aspects
upon which national programmes would be examined at Community level. So, in which capacity were
programmes accepted to be examined? All delegations accepted a co-ordination of programmes in the
sense of programmes being tire object of consultation within tire Committee for regional policy. Also
delegations accepted that programmes were instrumental in tire procedure for granting Community
aid i.e. that programmes, after being approved at Community level, would serve as tire framework
against which individual projects -eligible for Community funding- and state aids would be appraised.
Indeed, tire Commission had proposed that in order to be eligible for Community aid individual
projects ought to be fall within tire framework of a regional development plan or other coherent set of
investment projects (article 3 of tire Interest Rebate proposal)39. The ERDF proposal also specified that
only investments included in regional development programmes or, if lacking, meeting regional
development objectives, would be considered for assistance (article 6.1).
Indeed, tire evaluation of tire coherence of individual projects with national programming in the
context of tire granting of Community aid was approved by all delegations, but the aspect which
caused objection through tire negotiations was tire evaluation of 'conformity of the programmes with
Community objectives'. Notably, tire French delegation accepted that national programmes were
communicated to Community institutions for information purposes but objected to an evaluation of
conformity. What was unacceptable for France was that either tire Commission or a Community
institution could undertake an appreciation of programmes which were tire result of tire close
collaboration between Government and regional representatives and of a democratic approval by tire
national Parliament. The Commission's response to tire French objection was to stress that
Community regional action was conceived as complementary to national actions and that, therefore,
there was no intention to control national programmes but, simply, to ensure that Community
interventions could effectively realise Community objectives. In other words, national programmes
Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de developpement
regionale, Bruxelles 7 novembre 1973 [2107/73 (EC0266) (FIN 687)].
38 See p. 36- 45bis of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un
Fonds de developpemenl regionale, Bruxelles 7 novembre 1973 [2107/73 (EC0266) (FIN 687)]. or p. 32 to
37bis of Conseil, Rapport du Groupe 'politique regionale' au Comite des representants permanents. Objet:
Politique regionale: proposition de reglement (CEE) n du Conseil portant creation d'un Fonds europeen de
developpement regional, Bruxelles 4 decembre 1973 [R/2910/73 (ECO 301) (FIN 743)].
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aimed at correcting national imbalances and Community actions aimed at correcting Community
imbalances. The Committee would thus study development programmes from the point of view of
being a response to the correction of the imbalances which could prevent a timely realisation of EMU
and the Commission would check their conformity with the Treaty objectives. No appreciation of
national programmes would take place; rather, it was a matter of ensuring the coherence of
Community funded projects with national programmes and of national programmes to be in
agreement with Community objectives.
12.2.2. The differences regarding the proposed Committee for Regional Policy
The proposal for the actual creation of a permanent Committee for regional policy as a device for
pursuing co-ordination was not disputed. Various precedents of co-ordinating committees established
as instruments for embarking on economic policy co-ordination were in place"' and. as a matter of
fact, a proposal as such for the creation of a committee to undertake co-ordination was rather
conventional. The core disagreements regarding the creation of a permanent Committee for Regional
Policy resided elsewhere, namely, on its institutional position. As a matter of fact, the acceptance of
tire principle to create a Regional development Committee had been gained rather early -on 26
October 1970- however, the determination of the institutional form proved a much more problematical
process, which by the end of 1973 had still not been solved (see point 16, chapter IV).
Throughout the negotiations three possibilities regarding the institutional attachment of the
Committee for Regional Policy emerged as available: a committee under the Commission's
presidency, a Council committee or, finally, a committee under national presidency but with the
Commission's secretariat41. In its 1969 proposal the Commission proposed the establishment of the
Committee as responsible to the Commission, whereas in the 1973 proposal the Commission
conceded to establish it in an analogous footing as the Medium-term economic policy Committee i.e.
as answerable to both the Council and the Commission.
The proposal of a Regional development Committee under the Commission's presidency was
supported only by Italy apart from the Commission. Italy argued that the Commission ought to be
assisted by national representatives in its general deliberations as well as in its elaboration of
39 See Coreper of August 1972. Only France objected, for this delegation had presented an altogether different
alternative to the Commission's model whereby simply eligible projects would be submitted to the EIB who
would decide upon conferment of resources rather than through the Commission.
40 Indeed, apart from committees within specific policy areas (such as the Committee for agricultural structures)
or administering committees for the management of financial means (such as the Committee of the EAGGF), or
ad hoc committees of experts set up temporarily with concrete mandates (Werner Committee), by 1969 various
co-ordinating committees under the umbrella of the provisions of article 145 were up and running: among others
the Medium-term economic policy Committee, the Budgetary Committee, the Monetary Committee, etc. Indeed,
article 145 of the EEC Treaty provided for the setting up of committees whose functions were to contribute to
economic policy co-ordination, although the capacity as such to co-ordinate and take decisions in that respect was
the Council attribute.
41 See p.9-10 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des Representants permanents sur les textes presentes
par la Commission au sujet de I'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de politique
regionale, 14 Octobre 1971 [R/l950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN 435) rev.2].
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proposals; and second, no body ought to be placed between the Commission and Coreper in the
preparation of the Council's work. But not all delegations agreed with making die Regional
development Committee work under the presidency of tire Commission. The proposal of presidency of
this Committee by the Commission was, to start with, legally awkward, for the proposed Committee
was a co-ordinating committee which, on tire basis of article 145 of the EEC Treaty, ought in fact, to
be placed within the orbit of the Council. Besides die legalistic argument, die presidency from die
Commission was interpreted by many as equivalent to granting die Commission a right of initiative.
Indeed, to approve a Committee under Commission presidency was understood as meaning diat die
Commission would be allowed to exert a right of initiative and of proposal in relation to actions to be
undertaken by die member states in certain Community regions.
The French preferred a Regional development Committee belonging to die Council which would
perform an operational task of co-ordination. Thus, die Committee would examine die policies
followed by member states; it could indulge in common deliberations and it could ponder on specific
issues at Commission's request widiout denying die right of the Commission to draw its own
conclusions, reports, proposals and participate in the deliberations of die Council. The Commission
could also retain die right of, if considered appropriate, convening alternative experts around it to
gain opinion and views on regional maters. Opposed to this French stance, die Commission disputed a
Committee solely dependent 011 the Council on die grounds diat die tasks of such Regional
development Committee ought to be of bodi reflection on a progressive development of a Community
regional policy, and of co-ordination of national widi existing Community financial means (EAGGF.
ESF, EIB), all of which implied a closer involvement of die Commission.
The German, Belgium, Dutch and Luxembourg delegations preferred a regional Committee in die
model of die Medium-term economic policy Committee (point 8.3, chapter II). Incidentally, die
Germans specified diat since regional policy was one of the elements of medium term economic
policy, the Regional development Committee ought to be a subcommittee of die former, even if
enjoying a certain independence.
All in all, die decision for die creation of a Regional development Committee became dependant on
die disagreement on its institutional place. Unanimously, all delegations accepted that the Regional
development Committee would be able to give opinions, or produce reports 011 a demand from the
Council or die Commission, but also at its own initiative; and second, once it was agreed that co¬
ordination would be reached on a progressive basis no relevant opposition to die tasks to be performed
by diis Committee was maintained. I11 fact, the core of die discrepancy in die institutional locadon of
the Regional development Committee seems to have boiled down to a perceived threat of setting up an
experts committee which, under a direct Commission presidency, would be susceptible to influence
the Council's work directly. Indeed, a regional Committee would advise, prepare and guide the
debates of die Council when dealing with regional issues and for France only a Council committee
could prepare die Council's debates. Moreover, argued die French, a right of initiative for die
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Commission was a threat in another sense, namely, in opening the door to other political voices,
since, apart from the larger conciliatory and initiator role, the Commission also recommended the
creation of methods for distributing information, engaging and gaining Lhe participation of interested
parties in economic development tasks -associations of industry, banks, regional representatives, etc.
This scenario of three possible solutions to (lie institutional aspects of the Regional development
Committee and their respective supporters remained unchanged till June 1972 when the Commission
made a first concession from its original position (in the 1969 proposal) and accepted a regional
Committee in the model of the Medium-term economic policy Committee i.e. a Committee under
Council presidency but under the Commission's secretariat42. This concession was presented in the
new draft decision creating a Committee for Regional Policy in 197343 -after having withdrawn the
1969 proposal. The Coreper response to this concession was almost unanimously positive. By
November 1973 eight out of nine delegations accepted the Commission's compromise. The French
delegation, however, maintained its original position of making the Committee for regional policy
only answerable to the Council. There the German delegation reminded the French that the Council
intervened in the adoption of the regulation creating the ERDF and that, in any event, at the
conclusion of the experimental period of three years arrangements could be reviewed. Besides the
Commission argued that the granting of a task of study regional aid schemes worked as an extra
reason to attach it to both the Commission as well as the Council.
Point 15 will deal with the settling of these proposals and counterproposals on co-ordination as finally
resolved in the 1975 regulations; but let us see before the other major strand of competence that the
Commission had proposed since 1969 to be performed at Community level and the arguments being
raised.
B) A Community aid system: a function of promotion in the undertaking of concerted actions of
regional development
Apart from the function of co-ordination of policies, the Commission proposed another type of
intervention once again in an attempt to approximate the regional structures of the members of the
common market, namely, to take up, without delay, concrete actions of regional development. Such
undertaking of regional development actions was proposed to tackle priority regional problems of
common interest and include, on the one hand, an aspect of promotion i.e. a complementary
contribution of financial resources from the Community, while, on the other, it involved an aspect of
'technical' articulation between national and Community actions. These two aspects, namely.
42 See the Commission concession on p. 4 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Travaux en maliere de politique regionale.
Bruxelles 23 Juin 1972 [R/1337/72 (ECO 130) (AGRI414) (FIN 376)].
43 See article 1 of Draft Decision by the Council on the creation of a Committee for Regional Policy, submitted by
the Commission to the Council on 31 July 1973, OJ C 86/11 of 16.10.73.
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financial solidarity as such (point 13) and the technical articulation or 'concertation' between national
and Community aid systems (point 14), proved to be truly controversial.
13. Financial solidarity: a pragmatic and limited function of promotion towards the realisation
of EMU
From 1969 DGXVI proposed the creation of specific and brand new financial means for regional
purposes, but how did DGXVI justify regional solidarity by the Community in the first place? What
was, according to the Commission, the concrete target of a function of financial solidarity performed
by die Community?
13.1 Regional solidarity as a requirement for EMU in terms of unburdening disproportionate
budgetary efforts'14
In 1969 die Commission proposed tire creation of financial regional instruments to undertake with
additional resources the necessary national mutations which put at risk the functioning of the common
market. Indeed, as argued before (point 1, chapter I), in the late 1960s it appeared distinctly how
significant it was for the continuation of the common market that its members realised external
balance and national external equilibria. Unable to quantify (due to a lack of statistical material) the
magnitude of the investment expenditure necessary in each of the members in order to achieve a
certain structural equilibrium, in 1969 DGXVI could only conclude, for the period 1956-1966, that
first, the average annual number of jobs to be created in the Community was around 1 million per
year; second, that by comparison with the previous period, the number of jobs needing to be created
would increase; and, third, that there appeared to be a tendency towards an increase in the costs of the
equipment and in the costs of labour formation involved for each job to be created. Fundamentally, die
Commission was warning diat die volume of investments needing to be undertaken in various regions
of die Community, so diat a relative competitiveness of die economies of die countries forming die
common market could be harmonised, ought to be higher than those undertaken in die past45; and
dius, die Commission was calling upon national audiorities to address die need for supplementary
efforts and to face tough budgetary choices in order to act upon die correction of die largest
disparities.
Unlike in 1969, on 19 October 1971 die Commission was able to quantify die supplementary efforts
diat some countries ought to implement bodi to ensure die continuation of die common market and to
prepare the conditions for die realisation of EMU which had been launched in early 1971 and was
44 The Cros Report is probably the most clear exposition of DGXVI's understanding and justification of regional
solidarity: Commission, Regional Policy and economic and monetary union Geographical disequilibria in the
light of the implementation of fundamental economic equilibria, Study by DGXVI, Brussels 19 October 1971
[XVI/137/71],
45 See Commission, Note on regional policy, chapter IV: point A. Towards a more rational financing, pages 45-
49, or p. 44-49 in Note sur la Politique regionale [COM(69) 950], This same core analysis was taken further and
quantified in 1971 in the Cros Report p. 39-55.
141
expected to be completed in 1980. The magnitude of the resources to mobilise, by both the
Community and by the member states, in order to reach by 1980 an adequate balance between supply
and demand sides which would permit to proceed to the fixing of currency values was, for the first
time, quantified, and also the disproportionate nature of the national efforts to reach such balance was
clearly unveiled.
Methodologically speaking, working out the approximate volume of resources to mobilise was tackled
by embarking on an estimation of the figure of new employment needing to be created for the period
1970-1980, that is until the final stage of EMU, where a certain structural equilibrium had to be
reached. The Commission put forward an estimation of the number of jobs to be created in both less
developed regions and declining regions, as well as pinning down the figures of both the necessary
private investments which such a job creation entailed, and also the public incentives which would be
required in order to attract private investments to those regions. The figures of the optimal annual
private investment were then compared with the actual net private investments realised in 1970 in
order to reveal how close countries were to meeting the target. This same analysis was extended in
1973 to cover the enlarged Community46.
On the one hand, concerning the figures of supplementary private investment necessary for both less
developed and regions in decline, in the case of Italy, a figure of close to 40% increase was given -as
opposed to a 12% annual increase for the Community as a whole. In other words, DGXVI's figures
displayed a particularly large gap in the volume of private investments to be made for die purpose of
developing less developed and declining regions until 1980, particularly so for Italy and Ireland, while
a relatively important gap and a tangible one appeared for die UK and for Denmark respectively'".
On the odier hand, die quantification of die necessary annual supplementary public effort to be made
in terms of direct aids to investments and infrastructure provision in order to cover the initial job-
creation figures, displayed an enormous gap between ideal and actual public investment provision for
Ireland, a considerable gap for Italy and a noticeable one for France and Denmark48. The Commission
drew a number of conclusions: most prominently, both private and public investments directed
towards die attaining of a structural equilibrium of die economies forming die common market and
die EMU ought to increase not only everywhere but, particularly, die necessary national effort
46 The analysis for the Six can be seen in the Cros Report (p. 39 to 53) or, otherwise, in Commission. Expose de
M. Jacques Cros, Directeur general de la Politique regionale a la Commission des Communautes Europeennes.
lors du Deuxieme Symposium Europeen de Management a Davos le 25 Janvier 1972, Politique regionale et
Union economique et monetaire, p. 21 to 24. For the data enlarged to cover the Nine see Cros. Les desequilibres
regionaux dans la CEE', p. 165-172.
47 The volume of private investment necessary for developing the less developed regions and declining regions in
the Community was estimated at 8 thousand million u.a. at 1970 prices, or otherwise a nearly 12% of the actual
investments effected in 1970. Concerning the necessary supplementary effort to be realised by the Nine the
figures were the following: Belgium (4,6 %), Denmark (10.1 %), Germany (2.5 %), France (6.1 %). Ireland
(29.3 %), Italy (39.5 %), Netherlands (3.8 %), United Kingdom (17.2 %), EEC (11.5 %). See p. 170 of Les
desequilibres regionaux dans la CEE\
48 Notably, Belgium (8.9 %), Denmark (37.2 %), FRG (5.7 %), France (44.4 %), Ireland (339.0 %). Italy 1182.3
%), Luxembourg (31.8 %), Netherlands (7.2 %), UK (18.3 %), EEC (35.8 %).
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appeared as enormous in some countries. Indeed, the effort to be undertaken by all the Six was not
only asymmetrical but clearly disproportionate as for Italy and Ireland particularly, the budgetary
effort was hardly comparable to die rest of the countries.
Yet, the problem was not solely the feet that an analysis of die necessary supplementary effort in order
to realise EMU in a decade gave a disproportionate picture for, after all, that disproportionate picture
was simply reflecting die intensity of die regional imbalances. Rather, die problem of the
disproportionate effort had to be seen in die context of bodi market conditions and the recently
assumed EMU disciplines. Indeed, die attempts to implement (nationally) such disproportionate
supplementary need for investments was likely to open breaches in the functioning of die common
market and 011 EMU engagements; or in DGXVI's words, nationally speaking,
these resources cannot be mustered by an increase of prices if their economies have to remain
competitive and their monetary parities fixed by comparison with those of their partners.
Mustering these resources by means of pressure on incomes, such as increased taxation, checking
the growth of remunerations, maintenance of longer weekly, annual and professional working
hours for an equal remuneration, very rapidly comes up against obvious political and social
limits. Indeed, the common market aims to disseminate information 011 standards and conditions
of living, thus facilitating a harmonisation accompanied by progress. Furthermore, the free
circulation of workers already, and the freedom of establishment gradually, show that perceptible
differences in the income conditions are not accepted in the long run. The phenomenon, which is
already very sensitive to frontiers, could be extended if the disparities were to be accentuated:
this would be the case if each Member State were to make independently, while maintaining its
prices and currency, the necessary investment effort for the re-balancing of its economy, a re¬
balancing which is itself indispensable for the internal equilibrium of its economy as well as for
the economic equilibrium of the Community as a whole49.
In sum, comparatively speaking, the effort to be made in some cases regarding private and the
subsequent public investments was clearly disproportionate; but especially because the
implementation of such disproportionate supplementary investments was likely to create among the
economies of the member states distortions incompatible with the common market and with the
functioning of the EMU, a degree of financial solidarity to unload the budgetary burden of some
countries was inescapable. Indeed, it was die confluence of both considerations -the disproportionate
effort and, at the same time, die keeping, particularly, of the EMU disciplines- what called for
financial solidarity.
Consequently, argued die Commission, Community financial interventions in the immediate future
ought not to target a general correction of structural regional imbalances but, rather, aim at die
correction of die largest structural distortions and, dius, aim at lightening the financial charge of
diose states which had to face, comparatively speaking, die heavier budgetary loads. In short, die
49 Cros Report p. 53 [XVI/137/71 ].
143
relative weight of the Community support ought to be drawn from the severity of the regional
imbalances and from the financial capacity of what was possible to be put into effect in each member
state. This argument would be fully endorsed in October 1972 by the Paris Summit:
The Heads of State and Government agreed that a high priority should Ire given to the aim of
correcting, in the Community, the structural and regional imbalances which affect the realisation
of Economic and Monetary Union.
(...) Intervention by the Fund (ERDF) in co-ordination with national aids should permit,
progressively with the realisation of Economic and Monetary Union, the correction of the main
regional imbalances in the enlarged Community (...)50.
For these EMU-minded purposes, the Commission proposed in July 1973 a total allocation for
regional purposes of 2,400 million u.a. -of which, 2,250 u.a. would correspond to the ERDF
appropriations for the three year period 1974-1976 and 150 million u.a. would be provided from the
Guidance section of the EAGGF. Ireland, Italy and the UK were going to claim tire insufficiency of
these resources.
But, was die Commission simply proposing net sum transfers to national Governments as a form of
readjustment -or side payment- among member states in die manner diat die Cohesion Fund would
operate from 199351? The Commission understood that side-by-side with die actions of financial
promotion the guarantee for an efficient addressing of regional imbalances in the Community resided
in a parallel capacity to co-ordinate budgetary policies and in die elaboration and co-ordination of
development programmes.
13.2. Marginal solidarity and budgetary policy co-ordination: actions ofpromotion versus actions of
co-ordination
Before entering into die actual proposals materialising financial structural solidarity, let us consider
comparatively speaking, the weight of the function of solidarity within die wider framework of
regional competence diat die Commission was proposing for die Community. A disfinction has been
made so far between financial solidarity and a competence of co-ordination, but what was the relative
weight of bodi strands widiin the overall proposed Community response towards the correction of
structural geographical distortions?
From 1969 die Commission took a pragmatic or realist approach to die actions of promotion diat die
Community was able to undertake beyond member states' regional actions. That is to say, for the
Commission, Community means, compared to die wide range of means at die disposal of national
50 Point 5 of Final Communique of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, Paris 19-21 October 1972.
51 Indeed, the European Council at Maastricht in 1991 agreed the establishment of a Cohesion Fund to assist
less-developed member states to achieve the convergence criteria required for EMU. From 1993 the Cohesion
Fund works as a transfer of grants operating independently of the Community system of aids set up for the
operation of the various structural Funds and redistributes resources directly to States' coffers.
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authorities, could only be understood as supplementary financial contributions to the national efforts".
The quantification of the budgetary efforts in 1971 re-confirmed this position for, indeed, given the
vast estimated sums of both new private investments, as well as the further public investment needs,
and considering the existing Community means -in comparison with national competence-, the
Community contribution to the correction of regional imbalances could only be -quantitatively
speaking- marginal in relation to national actions.
Yet, even if admitting that for the first stages of EMU structural solidarity had to be quantitatively
marginal, tire Commission did not renounce the aim of Community financial intervention having an
effective impact. Such impact had to rely, according to tire Commission, first, on restrained ambition,
that is, rather than targeting the vast correction of existing geographical imbalances across the
Community, solidarity ought to aim at (lie unloading of those countries with Lire heaviest public
investment needs so that distortions and unilateral actions incompatible with tire common market and
the functioning of EMU could be prevented, and thus, paving tire way for tire implementation of tire
necessary intervention measures; but second, Lire Commission saw the complementary nature of
Community resources as making a material contribution if, and only if, they were co-ordinately
managed or, in tire words of DGXVI's director general,
whatever the weight of the Fund is, given the global amounts to be put into effect for regional
actions, its interventions are marginal and, in any case, dependent on the success of the co¬
ordination to be organised at Community level53.
In other words, the co-ordination of national policies for both private and public financing were
'eminent domains of co-ordination of policies at Community level'54, that is to say, the impact of
Community action depended on tire wider framework under which Community financial support was
placed. An effective Community response could be given to such a situation of shortage of public and
private investments in tire most needed areas if co-ordination among national Governments in both
private and public investment policies was attained.
So, according to tire Commission, regarding die shortage of private investments, die Community was
able to put a large policy of loans at Community level. Thus die Community could contribute to die
nurturing of private initiatives by organising, at Community level, bodi a large policy for loans and an
information network for private and public investors facilitating the perception of invesunent
opportunities in less developed regions. On the odier hand, the use of die ElB's structure, coupled
widi an expansion of EIB's activities, could effectively have an impact on the enormous need for
private invesUnents.
52 The Commission Memorandum of 15 December 1969 already notes the disproportionate load that involved for
some countries to undertake substantial structural adjustments. See point 7, p. 6, [COM(69) 1250],
53 Cros (1974) Op. cit. p. 172. Original French text in appendix.
54 Cros (1974) Op. cit., p. 171.
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Regarding tire need for public investments, Community action was also clearly marginal. Yet,
Community involvement could have a real impact if it contributed to an effective use of the limited
public national and Community resources, particularly by engaging into a co-ordination of budgetary
policies and adopting programming methods. Indeed, the need to increase the volume of public
investment in very high proportions in some cases not only raised clear considerable budgetary
dilemmas, but raised the importance of a reciprocal examination of budgetary appropriations for
regional policy purposes. In fact, the EMU Programme had laid down that in the first stage of EMU
national budgetary policy -being an instrument of a policy for price stability and growth- had to be
conducted in accordance with Community objectives". All in all, die Commission was calling for an
internal re-organisation of public finances and advocated for their more rational utilisation which
would give a stronger consideration to the imperatives of structural mutations". Indeed, tire large
amounts of private and public investments needed seemed to lead to a certain directing of national
public finances and thus, article 9 of die 1969 proposal and article 6 of die draft decision creating a
Committee for regional policy of 1973 aimed at an evaluation of die state's budgetary projected
appropriations for regional policy actions in die framework of the Committee for Regional Policy and
as part of die progressive building up of a co-ordinated response towards structural geographical
disparities. The Commission was heading towards a co-ordination of national private and public
budgetary policies and decisions.
Besides budgetary co-ordination, die Commission also pointed out dial die success in the undertaking
of concrete concerted actions of eidier promotion and location of investments or infrastructure
provision supported by Community resources rested on die satisfactory organisation of a concertation
of national and Community actions, i.e. it was resting on die mediod of programming. As seen before
(point 12.1), die establishment and die examination of programmes widiin die Committee for regional
policy aimed at ensuring die consistency of national projects widi Community objectives.
In sum, die Commission not only considered financial solidarity as necessarily marginal to national
means but, in fact, die Commission seems to have pictured die strand of financial solidarity as
dependent on a more central and essential intervention of co-ordination. The main instruments of
55 The final Werner Report calls for the co-ordination and harmonisation of budget policies. According to the
economic situation in each country quantitative guidelines will be given on the principal elements of the public
budgets, notably on global receipts and expenditure, the distribution of the latter between investment and
consumption, and the direction and amount of balance. Finally, special attention will be paid to the method of
financing deficits or utilising surpluses. To facilitate the harmonisation of budget policies, searching comparisons
will be made of the budgets of the member states from both quantitative and qualitative points of view. From the
quantitative point of view the comparison will embrace the total of the public budgets, including local authorities
and social security. It will be necessary to evaluate the whole of the fiscal pressure and the weight of public
expenditure in the different countries of the Community and the effects that public receipts and expenditure have
on global internal demand and on monetary stability. Il will also be necessary to devise a method of calculation
enabling an assessment to be made of the impulses that the whole of the public budgets impart to the economy.
See p. 19 'Report to the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of economic and monetary
union in the Community', Luxembourg 8 October 1970, Bulletin of the EECC. Supplement 11-1970.
" More concretely, the Commission charged against the excessive weight in national budgets which coal and
railway industries as well as the agricultural sector retained. See page 48, Note sur la Politique regionale.
[COM(69) 950],
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action tor regional development at Community level were -in order- first, the organisation of coherent
and important development programmes determinant to the economic development of the regions in
question; second, an action of co-ordination to make Community means to contribute in their sectoral
specificity to the realisation of national programmes, and only third, the favouring of capital influxes
towards priority regions whatever their form -either through the EIB, or a form of interest rebate or
through capital sums57. Thus, it is not only incorrect to narrow down the proposed terms of
intervention to an action of financial solidarity, but in fact, that view was actually opposed to the
Commission's proposals. Indeed, the Commission was proposing the undertaking of both actions of
promotion and of co-ordination, and it was precisely in the co-ordination of budgetary policies and
regional programmes where the impact and the contribution of the Community intervention was
expected to reside, that is, rather than in tire actual financial resources which in comparison to both
the needs and national resources could only be marginal. In short, it was precisely to tire bulk of the
intervention of co-ordination where tire Commission seems to have given most weight.
13.3. Degrees of regional solidarity: the debate on the sufficiency of the existing means
The reluctance and opposition from some delegations to put in place new and specific means to cover
tire regional needs for an adequate functioning of tire common market and tire timely realisation of
EMU, turned tire debate on tire creation of new instruments into an analysis of tire potential of
existing means to be adapted for regional development aims. In fact, tire original 1969 proposal had
not made any proposal in this respect (i.e. for the adaptation of existing means), but rather had
directly advocated tire setting up of new and specific means for regional development purposes. From
26-27 October 1970, however, those delegations less keen to accept regional solidarity opposed die
creation of new financial instruments devoted specifically to regional purposes arguing that any
decision for tire creation of new means was premature without having proceeded to an adaptation of
existing means (point 17.1, chapter IV).
But what was the potential regional edge of the existing financial means? Following tire Council's
mandate of 26 October 1970 the Commission embarked on such a study and analysed tire existing
financial instruments (tire EAGGF, ESF, EIB, and articles 54 and 56 of the ECSC Treaty by 1970)
from tire point of view of their potentials and their shortcomings for a regional use in a concerted
manner with national means58. Below we use tire Commission's examination to illustrate tire potential
57 See Commission's intervention: p.31 of Conseil, Note. Objel: Rapport du Comile des Representants
pennanents sur les textes presentes par la Commission au sujet de /.'organisation de moxens d'action de la
Communaute en matiere de politique regionale, 14 Octobre 1971 [R/1950/2/71 (ECO 1971 tAGRl 5961 (FIN
435) rev.2],
58 The document produced by the Commission was addressed to the Council by letter of 5 December 1970. That
is: Commission, Rapport sur les moyens financiers pour le developpement regional. Bruxelles, 27 Novembre
1970 [SEC(70) 4377],
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of existing financial means and to review the debate on the sufficiency of existing financial
instruments to cover regional purposes appropriately59.
a) The European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF)
To start with, what was the potential and the downsides of the EAGGF -both Guarantee and Guidance
section- for a regional use? The Guarantee section of the EAGGF aimed at securing the topping up of
producers' incomes after the setting, across the agricultural market, of common prices for several
agricultural products. A regionalisation of the Guarantee section as a measure of advantage for
problem regions, that is, establishing variations in prices within the market, was judged as clearly
counterproductive to a system resting on a level playing field, as well as being detrimental to what
was perceived as necessary structural "adjustments. The Commission recommended, however, that by
establishing a certain hierarchy in prices for different products, regional objectives could be indirectly
assumed. In its opinion regarding the shortcomings of the EAGGF0, Coreper also stated that the
Guarantee section was an instrument of regulation of the markets which ought not to be used for
regionalising the CAP.
However, apart from guaranteeing sufficient revenues for the agricultural work-force, the CAP also
covered a policy for agricultural structures accompanied by a financial envelope i.e. the Guidance
section of the EAGGF. It was, particularly, in the operation of the structural side of the CAP, namely,
in the tackling of those situations where the common organisation of the agricultural market and the
free movement of agricultural products were neither increasing revenues, nor improving the living
conditions of producers, where the Commission believed that Guidance resources could be mobilised
and effectively contribute to parallel sectoral and regional objectives. Clearly the object of the
Guidance intervention -and therefore the projects eligible for Guidance support- were duly sectoral;
yet, the modalities of intervention of the Guidance section ought to take into account the diverse
structural and natural conditions of agricultural production.
As seen before (point 10, chapter II), the modalities of intervention of the Guidance section of the
EAGGF were first laid down in 1964 by the Council regulation 17/64/CEE, yet this regulation was
replaced in April 1970 by the financial regulation 729/70'1, which established new rules for the
Guidance section interventions. In tire new regulation, old articles 14 and 16 of regulation 17/64/CEE
59 Coreper reviewed the Commission's 'Report on financial means for regional development' and exposed its
own conclusions in pages 11- 16 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des Representants pennanenis sur
les textes presentes par la Commission au sujet de Vorganisation de moyens d'action de hi Communaute en
matiere de politique regionale, 14 Octobre 1971 [R/1950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN 435) rev.2|.
60 See p. 15 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de movens
d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regionale el Note sur la politique regionale. Projet de
rapport du Groupe des questions economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R/1020/71 (ECO108)
(FIN223)].
61 Council Regulation (EEC) 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policv. OJ L
94/13 of 28.4.1970.
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-that is, the requirement of programming- were wiped out". The new regulation settled that new
structural actions were to hike the form of 'common measures' to be decided by die Council from a
proposal by the Commission (article 6)63. Although new guidelines for llie CAP had been put forward
in die Mansholt Plan and concrete proposals were made", all in all, by November 1970 die operation
of die Guidance section in conjunction widi regional objectives was limited to die narrower
possibilities offered by the new article 6.4 of regulation 729/70 -which retook die old article 15. even
if setting a concrete financial ceiling- which prioritised projects with co-ordinated regional and
structural objectives65. Therefore, from April in 1970 die potentiality of the Guidance section to target
sectoral as well as regional purposes was only feasible from an articulation of agricultural and
regional objectives as provided for in article 6.4 of regulation 729/70.
But die Commission also proposed in its report a much more far-reaching route, namely, die insertion
of a policy for agricultural structures into a wider elaboration of regional development programmes
for die Community. The Coreper's report on financial means concluded that, dirough die articulation
of agricultural and regional objectives, die Guidance section could contribute to die solution of certain
problems of regional development, notably, on the basis of die new CAP policy guidelines adopted by
62 As already seen (point 10, chapter II), under this regulation (17/64/CEE) structural operations were already
regionalised in two senses. A first sense of a regional approach of a policy for agricultural structures resided in
the priority accorded to projects which were part of a set of measures aiming at developing a given region (article
15). hi other words, through sectoral measures the development of certain regions could be facilitated, notably,
by the selection of operational objectives both agricultural and regional. A second sense, in which a certain
regionalisation of the Guidance interventions was already in place, consisted of the requirement (in article
14.1.(a) but not entering into force till 1966) to insert the projects eligible to be supported by the Guidance
section in the framework of Community programmes. That is, projects financed by the EAGGF ought to be
compulsorily inserted in the framework of Community programmes and, besides, these Community programmes
would specify the zones of special effort among other stipulations (the latter laid down in article 16). Co¬
ordinated Community programmes for agricultural structures could then be drawn bearing in mind areas with
special need. This latter provision of articles 14.1 and 16 was, however, never used. The Commission submitted
to the Council a proposal delimiting the areas of special effort which was never adopted by the Council. In their
absence, the Guidance section financed projects -rather than programmes- responding to the general criteria set
up in the regulation of 5 February 1964. In the end, rather than orienting structural transformations, Guidance
section financed particular projects of member states effectively missing a true Community policy of agricultural
structures.
63 See Bulletin of the EECC. 7- 1970, p. 25.
64 In May 1970 the Commission submitted to the Council five projects of directives and one project of regulation
all concerning the reform of agricultural structures which put into practice the essential principles of the
Memorandum on the reform of agriculture (Mansholt Plan) adopted by the Commission in December 68.
Notably: Proposition de directive concernant la modernisation des exploitations agricoles: proposition de
directive concernant 1'encouragement a la cessation de I'activite agricole el I'affectation de la superficie
agricole utilisee a des fins d'amelioration des structures agricoles; proposition de directive concernant
I'information socio-economique et la qualification professionnelle des personnes travaillant en agriculture;
proposition de directive concernanl la limitation de la supeificie agricole utilisee; proposition de directive
portant dispositions complementa ires a la directive 1 et 2; proposition modifiee de reglement concernant les
groupemenls de producteurs et leurs unions. Bulletin des CCEE 6-1970 p. 22. The proposals attempted a
regional differentiation in the interventions of the Guidance section. Notably, they made compulsory either a
modulation of sums of support or the exclusion of certain areas from support, and demanded the member states
expose the link between the economic situation and the characteristics of the agricultural structure of the region
in which projects applied for support and the measure as such. Not really programming but the Commission was
asking for the insertion of action in the agricultural structures to be inserted into a wider action of regional
development.
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the Council in its 146th session of 22-25 March 197166. Yet, Coreper did not share the second more
comprehensive conclusion reached by the Commission.
Thus, the first route, consisting of tire formulation of operational objectives, was going to be followed
up by tire Commission on 26 May 1971 with the submission of the proposal for the use of a fraction of
Guidance resources for operational -regional as well as sectoral- purposes. Notably, die Commission
proposed the Guidance section to contribute to the part financing of projects within tire framework of
development operations for the creation of non-agricultural jobs in priority agricultural regions'7.
b) The European Social Fund (ESF)
What was the potential of the ESF to address regional objectives? Article 123 of tire EEC Treaty
stated that the ESF had as mission to promote, within the Community, tire employment facilities and
the geographical and professional mobility of labour. In principle, therefore, the potential contribution
of the ESF for regional development purposes was possible from the point of view of being a measure
'cushioning' the implementation of Community sectoral policies in regions facing difficulties in terms
of job creation and geographical and professional mobility. However, die functioning of die ESF
during die transitory period was characterised by a sprinkling of die interventions while die
geographical impact of die interventions was left to member states' discretion68. Besides, certain
conditions of intervention of die Fund -exigency of a preliminary situation of unemployment or under¬
employment- had limited die situations in which die ESF could be used69. Nonedieless, the use of ESF
was not limited -as it was die case of die EAGGF- to a specific economic sector and, hence, it was
susceptible in principle to be used as part of wider regional development objectives.
On die other hand, article 126 of die EEC Treaty foresaw that, at die end of die transition period, a
revision of die functions of the ESF could be undertaken by die Council acting unanimously on a
Commission proposal. The Commission and Coreper coincided in diat die first reform of die ESF,
which took place by die Council decision of 1 February 197170, took on board regional concerns. In
particular in its new articles 4 and 5. New article 4 stated diat die Fund could intervene 'when die
employment situation is affected, or in danger of being affected, eidier by special measures adopted
previously by die Council in die framework of Community policies, or by jointly agreed operations to
furdier die objectives of die Community'. Aldiough article 4 was a cushioning or escorting specific
65 Let us recall that old article 15.1 of regulation 17/64/CEE stated: 'Projects which are part of a comprehensive
system of measures aimed at encouraging the harmonious development of the overall economy of the region
where such projects will be carried out shall be given priority for receiving aids from the Fund'.
66 Council Resolution of 25 March published on 27 May 1971, JO C 52 du 17 May 1971.
67 Let us note that such 'development operations' did not equate to programmes, because regulation 729/70 had
wiped out their requirement; rather, 'development operations' were understood as a coherent set of investment
projects economically viable having as a target the creation of infrastructures and industrial and service activities
while being a determinant element of the economic development of the agricultural priority region susceptible to
create a significant number of jobs for both those abandoning agricultural activities and their direct descendants
(articles 3, 4).
68 See also Commission, Bulletin des CCEE 8-1969, IH. Refonne du Fonds Social Europeen, p. 31-34.
69 See Report on financial means [XVI/19908/70], p. 16.
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measures adopted by the Council, a contribution of this provision to regional development objectives
could be gained, according to the Commission, by attaining a degree of coherence between regional
objectives and die contributions of die ESF. Concretely, as article 4 provided for die Council to take
ad hoc decisions for die intervention of die ESF, such coherence between regional and ESF
contribution could be de facto materialised through the usual procedure, by which die Council decided
on ESF intervention 011 a Commission proposal. The Commission would, dius, consider
unemployment situations from a regional perspective in its proposals and die specific contributions of
the Fund would be decided by die Council71.
Apart from die radier ad hoc character of die Council decisions of article 4 allowing ESF
interventions in specific cases, article 5.1 provided that die ESF could also intervene 'where the
employment situation in certain regions, in certain branches of die economy or in certain groups of
undertakings is affected by difficulties which do not arise from any particular measure taken by die
Council within the framework of a Community policy, but which result indirectly from die working of
die common market or impede die harmonious development of die Community'. .Article 5 provided
that for this second category of ESF interventions -radier dian in die form of an specific decision by
die Council as in article 4- a Council regulation would define die conditions for the intervention of die
ESF. Thus, 011 29 March 1971 a draft regulation laying down die modalities of intervention of die
ESF was transmitted to die Council and die final regulations were adopted 011 8 November 197F:.
c) The European Investment Bank's resources
The EIB offered die most direct means of intervention in regional development diat die Community
had in 1970. Through article 130 of die Treaty the autonomous EIB had as a responsibility die pursuit
of a balanced development of die Community regions by the issuing of either loans or guarantees for
loans to support projects widi a regional purpose. Its action could embrace all domains and
particularly infrastructures -ultimately a key element influencing die location of economic activities
and population.
In June 1970 die EIB submitted a Memorandum to the Medium-term economic policy Committee
proposing how its structural action could be streamlined. The EIB proposed, 011 the one hand, an
easier access to sufficient means by having a better access to die national market of capitals and. on
70 Council decision of 1 February 1971 on the reform of the European Social Fund, JO 1. 28/15 of 4.2.1971.
Especial Edition 1971(1) p. 52.
71 See article 4.1. of Council decision (71/66/CEE).
72 That is, Council regulation (2396/71) of 8 November 1971 implementing the Council decision of 1 February
1971 on the reform of the ESF and also Regulation (EEC) no. 2397/71 of the Council of 8 November 1971 on aid
which may qualify for assistance from the ESF, JO I. 249/54 du 10 November 1971. Special series 1971 fill) p.
929. Council Regulation 2396/71 noted that operations aiming at resolving the problems which were posed in
either backward regions, or where the dominant activities were in decline and maintaining a severe and
prolonged imbalance of employment (article 1.1) could benefit from the ESF. The regulation also noted that
these operations ought to contribute to the implementation of a specific programme which would aim to remedy
the causes of the disequilibrium affecting the employment in the concerned region. Programmes ought to reveal
the economic context in which the operations would take place as well as stating the objectives and the means to
be put into action (article 2.4).
151
the other hand, a more precise definition of Community policies to ensure operational success. And
the EIB continued:
Drawing from previously undertaken actions, one of the factors which would best facilitate the
interventions of the Bank would evidently be the possibility for the Community to define a
programme of concrete and co-ordinated actions. Such an eventuality would contribute to
facilitate the adoption of objective criteria of operational application. Besides, it would probably
allow a breakthrough of initiatives which ... could be directed by the financing of the bank in
relation to both resources and of modalities in conformity with Community orientations. It is in
this perspective that either, for instance, a system of interest allowances could be put in place or
otherwise an efficient system of granting of guarantees could be studied73.
However, the opinion of the EIB to extend its action by enlarging its resources -either facilitating its
access to capital markets, or by other appropriate measures- and by using the possibilities of interest
rebates further -either by a third party or by offering more facilities in the conditions of loans, interest
rebates or any other means with equivalent effect- was only shared by the Commission and by the
Italian delegation74.
d) Article 54 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
Through this article the Commission was able to facilitate investment programmes by either offering
loans to enterprises or guarantees to loans contracted by enterprises on the coal and steel sector. The
Commission could also contribute to the financing of works or installations with any of the three
following objectives: an increase of production, a reduction of prices or to facilitate the selling of
outlets.
Article 54 had, however, a direct sectoral target -the coal and steel sectors alone. Certainly, given the
fact that both these sectors were usually geographically concentrated, as well as being labour
dependent industries, their economic conjuncture had direct and vast regional effects. Nonetheless, as
also confirmed by Coreper, even though article 54 concerned an important sector and was susceptible
to have real impact, it did not allow financing of investments other than those linked to the coal and
steel industries.
e) Article 56 ECSC
Unlike article 54, article 56 was, in principle, open to any sector as a means for a Community
reconversion and re-adaptation policy i.e. on the creation of new activities or the transformation of
enterprises and labour whose difficulties were linked to the structural mutation of the coal and the
steel sector. On tire reconversion side, the Commission could facilitate the financing of approved
73 Quoted in the Commission's report on financial means p. 20 [XVI/19908/70J. French text in appendix.
74 See p. 19 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de movens
d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale. Projet de
rapport du Groupe des questions economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R/1020/71 (ECO108)
(FIN223)].
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programmes for the creation of new and sound economic activities likely to ensure the productive re¬
employment of labour shed from the coal and steel industry. On the re-adaptation objective, the
Commission could give non-repayable aids to contribute to the financing of professional re-education
of labour forced to adapt to a new sector.
Regarding the potentials of reconversion and re-adaptation of article 56 Coreper stated that although
this article did not have a sectoral limit to the investments, its objective was to offer re-employment
possibilities to the labour shed by the coal and steel industries and, because of that, this premise often
imposed a geographical location of the interventions. In addition, the field of application of article 56
was gradually narrowing down as the problems of reconversion of these industries were overcome.
Nonetheless, Coreper concluded that it was desirable to take into consideration regional policy
objectives in the application of article 56. In this sense, the German and Italian delegations proposed
the modification of the modalities of application of article 56 by modifying the modalities of
intervention i.e. adding new objectives to article 56 interventions, namely, to intervene with the
objective of creating jobs in the South of Italy for Italian miners and steel labour repatriated from the
north of the Community.
So all in all, what were the final conclusions for the Commission and for Coreper concerning the
sufficiency or not of the existing means to cover regional needs? The Commission concluded, on the
one hand, that although none of the existing financial means was uniquely and specifically targeting
regional objectives, the existing means -including the most sectoral instruments- could contribute to
regional development purposes if applying two related types of reform: one, consisting of a
regionalisation of specific interventions, and two, attaining a better integration of the existing means
by a more co-ordinated management.
Thus, first, the recommendation for a regionalisation of the existing specific interventions could be
easily undertaken by introducing modifications in lite modalities of intervention of some of the
existing financial instruments. According to the Commission, all existing means, which were not
specifically sectoral -article 56, the EIB and the ESF- offered a possible utilisation for regional ends.
But also for those instruments tied to a specific sector -like EAGGF and article 54- they also could
contribute to regional objectives particularly where they performed as regionally dominant sectors. In
other words, by the articulation of sectoral and regional objectives, all existing means could effectively
be instruments of a policy for the development of regions, particularly, where certain economic sectors
were dominant.
The second element of improvement was one pointing at the development of ultimate regional
objectives and the subsequent co-ordinated management of the funds towards regional purposes.
Certainly, this second improvement was going further than the simple and partial regionalisation of
specific financial interventions in the sense that it called for the adoption of general objectives and
priorities for the Community and a co-ordinated management of the Funds. The establishment of
concrete, co-ordinated and operational objectives would be in harmony with economic policy
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guidelines, would observe priorities in regarding regional problems and would facilitate the
simultaneous participation of Community resources which, although not devised to be regional in its
objective could, however, contribute in its financial capacity and in its consistency with development
objectives. The proposed Committee for regional policy would have to ensure die convergence of all
actions in the field of regional policy, or in oilier words, achieve the integration of sectoral objectives
and the management of the Community funds into general economic policy targets.
But finally, and beyond die recommendations on how the existing means could be better employed in
order to contribute to regional objectives, die Commission added a furdier remark. It concluded diat
'die existing financial means were not sufficient to put into action diose required measures for die
solution to Community regional problems'75. That is, even if die limitation of the sectoral specificity
of some means could be partly overcome, and even if they could and ought to be re-oriented on die
basis of co-ordinated objectives for regional development purposes, die existing means still were
insufficient. Effectively, die Commission was recommending die creation of additional new and
specific means for regional development because, even diougli diere was scope for reform, die existing
means were simply insufficient in relation to die problems to be addressed.
Expectedly Coreper's conclusions on its analsys of die existing means were much more modest.
Coreper concluded diat: (1) die existing financial instruments were susceptible to contribute to die
solution of certain regional problems; (2) diat although those interventions were sectorally determined
and, dierefore, limited -except diose of die EIB, still (3) diose means could be better used if die
various Community interventions were, each in die pursuit of their own finalities, also oriented
towards co-ordinated objectives of regional policy76. Coreper did not make any explicit mention on die
element of co-ordinated management -programming ultimately- neidier stated die insufficiency of
existing means.
In fact, die disagreement on die sufficiency of die existing financial means to address regional
problems appropriately had been apperceived by die Commission in various occasions. Thus, on 26
May 1971 die Commission was to going try two routes i.e. it was going to propose a partial adaptation
of die Guidance section for the part-financing on regional projects in agricultural priority regions, but
also, die creation of brand new means i.e. an Interest Rebate Fund.
75 In the Commission's words: 'en definitive, les moyens financiers existants ne sonl pas sujfisanls pour mettre
en oeuvre les mesures necessaires a la solution des problemes regionaux de la Cornmunaute . p.20 of Conseil,
Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de moyens d'aclion de la
Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale. Projel de rapport du
Croupe des questions economiques au Coreper. Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R/1020/71 (ECO108) (FIN223)].
76 See p. 15-21 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de tnovens
d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale. Projel de
rapport du Croupe des questions economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R/1020/71 (ECO108)
(FTN223)], or p. 11-16 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des Represenlanls peniuinents sur les textes
presentes par la Commission au sujel de I'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de
politique regionale, 14 Octobre 1971 [R/1950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN 435) rev.2].
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But, whether from adapted or l'rom brand new financial instruments, let us now see how a system of
Community aids was proposed to operate and its relationship with national aid systems.
14. The disputed materialisation of financial solidarity: establishing a Community aid system co¬
ordinated with national systems
In the introduction to this chapter we pinpointed the series of proposals submitted by the Commission
between 1969 and 1975. Irrespective of their proposing either an adaptation of existing financial
instruments or the actual creation of brand new means specifically for regional development purposes,
all the Commission's attempts proposed a function of promotion of regional development
accompanied by financial solidarity. Such a function of promotion meant the setting up of an aid
system in concert with national regional aid systems. This point 14 reviews the concrete proposals
concerning the operation of such a Community system of aids submitted by the Commission since
1969. Notably, it concentrates on the major pillars of the Community aid system as proposed by the
Commission, and exposes the discrepancies raised by delegations as well as alternative suggestions
brought throughout the long process of negotiation towards the regulations of 18 May 1975.
Subsequently (in point 15) the regional aid system finally emerging lfom the first regional regulations
is reviewed.
The Community system of aids proposed by the Commission since 1969 rested on three main pillars,
namely, on: 1) a confining of Community interventions to priority problems of common interest; 2) an
understanding of Community action on regional imbalances as complementary to national actions;
and 3) a flexible administration of Community resources i.e. a power of decision including a capacity
of both selection and modulation of Community support.
14.1. The confinement to priority problems and the definition ofeligible regions
The Commission never defended an intervention in all the different types of regional problems
appearing at national or Community level; rather, Community intervention would only apply to an
enclosed and pre-defined field of regional problems: the largest disparities in productivity.
Indeed, for the 1969 proposal only urgent regional imbalances were proposed as fields of intervention.
The 1969 proposal (article 1.1) defined as 'particularly urgent situations' those geographically
delimited scenarios where the development of the region or the zone as a whole was being jeopardised
by the dangerous decline of specific economic activities or sectors, when such a decline was the
consequence of the establishment of Community policies and the common market or the structural
transformations in dominant economic activities, often adding to an inherited background of failed
adaptation. Yet, tire inventory of regional situations put forward in the 1969 proposal, and upon which
Community financial instruments could intervene, was solely indicative of the categories of
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Community concern and far from listing actual eligible regions77. The 1969 proposal did not lay down
the forms and conditions of the intervention of the financial instruments proposed; in fact, it was
'simply' a framework decision proposing to organise national and Community means of action and
proposing the creation of a Regional development Committee and of specific financial means for
regional development purposes (an Interest Rebate Fund and a System of Guarantees). In other words,
draft regulations specifically laying down the modalities for the functioning and intervention of the
financial instruments proposed in 1969 were expected to be submitted in due time.
From die very beginning national audiorities accepted that the putting into effect of concerted actions
of development would necessarily be confined to a limited field of urgent problems, as so considered
from a Community perspective. Some wranglings occupied die first stages of die negotiations of die
1969 proposal relating to diis broad categorisation of Community intervention78. These early and
rather abstract discrepancies, however, were dispelled shortly afterwards by die adoption of die III
Programme in February 1971 where die Council noted various problems of common interest, and
among them, a priority for:
• problems posed by the considerable backwardness of certain large, less developed peripheral
regions;
• the difficulties that may result directly from Community integration, for example in frontier
regions;
• the regional impact of the principal common policies (and especially the CAP) which must be
co-ordinated with a regional policy aimed at promoting economically healthy activities in the
regions affected by the trend in agriculture;
• problems posed by changes appreciably affecting the economic potential of certain regions, in
particular as a result of the decline of a dominant economic activity in the region79.
These priorities were re-confirmed in die resolution of 22 March 1971 on die attainment of EMU by
stages (point 16,17.1, chapter IV) as die ones upon which die Community ought to concentrate on
during the first stage of EMU80.
77 The 1969 proposal put forward a rather conventional categorisation of regional problems in the Community
which was the result of previous exercises of confrontation with governmental officials and experts organised by
the Commission from 1959 to 1965 (point 8.1, chapter II).
78 National delegations wanted to see included or excluded from that categorisation particular national problems.
Thus, the Netherlands wished to include problems of over-congestion and Belgium insisted on problems of
frontier regions and industrial regions in decline. See these national positions at Council session of 26-27
October 1970: p. 2 Annex of Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation
de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regionale et Note sur la politique regionale.
Bruxelles 6 Novembre 1970 [R/2276/70 (ECO 229) (FIN468)].
79 III MTEP Programme, paragraph 119.
80 The report of 14 October 1971 shows that delegations accepted the priorities for Community intervention as
laid down by the 111 MTEP Programme. See Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des Represeritants
pennanents sur les textes presentes par la Commission au sujet de Vorganisation de moyens d'action de la
Communaute en matiere de politique regionale, 14 Octobre 1971 [R/1950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN
435) rev.2].
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However, even though this broad choice for priority regional problems seemed to be settled from the
adoption of the III MTEP Programme and the resolution on EMU, on 26 May 1971 arrived the
sectoral swing (point 11, chapter II). The Commission perceiving the reluctance of member states to
engage financial means into regional actions decided, acting collegiately, to grant a priority to one of
tire categories spelled out in tire III MTEP Programme. Notably, tire Commission proposed that
regional solidarity would favour, particularly during an initial period, those regions where economic
evolution was severely affected by agricultural transformations and where the active agricultural
population was in a large surplus81.
Such prioritisation of agricultural over other problems of common interest -particularly regional
problems relating to the industrial sector- was not very well received by all delegations. By September
1972 Belgium and the Netherlands in particular, were calling for a wider approach to regional
problems including industrial regions in decline and, overall, for an equal treatment of tire four
categories of problems earmarked by the III MTEP Programme82. In fact, the discrepancies regarding
the broad categorisation of regional problems and their prioritisation were not totally settled until 19-
20 October 1972, when the first Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the enlarged
Community in Paris extended tire agenda of priority regional problems beyond tire strictly agricultural
domain (point 17.2, chapter IV). Regional interventions by tire Community would certainly restrict its
scope of application and give its priority to those most important regional imbalances threatening tire
timely realisation of tire EMU, but clearly tire Paris Summit of October 1972 upheld that those
problems went beyond agricultural structures:
Community intervention, co-ordinated with national aid, must permit the gradual correction, as
economic and monetary union is realised, of major regional imbalances within the Community,
notably those resulting from agricultural predominance, industrial changes and structural
underemployment.
Thus, the major domains of the intervention of the ERDF were settled by the Paris Conference, the
main difference with previous categorisations being the equal treatment of all regional problems and
the exclusion of frontier regions.
But beyond the discrepancies on broad categories and the prioritisation of agricultural versus
industrial regional problems, the definition of actual eligible regions proved highly controversial. So
let us turn now to how the Commission dealt with the problem of delimiting eligible regions in bodi
the Interest Rebate and the ERDF proposal. As just mentioned above, the 1969 proposal did not enter
81 See exposition of motives of the proposals of 28 May 1971: Commission, Communication de la Commission
au Conseil concernant les actions communautaires de politique regionale dans les regions agricoles de la
Communaute, presente au Conseil le 28 Mai 1971 [COM (71) 500], JO C 90 du 11.9.1971.
82 See the opposition of a limitation of expenditures in agricultural regions in p. 18 of Conseil. Projel de Rapport
du comite des representants permanents au Conseil, Objet: Politique regionale. Bruxelles 20 Seplembre 1972
[R71867/72 (ECO 188) (AGRI 567) (FIN 493)] and in p. 9-10 of Conseil, Extrait du projet de proces verbal de la
206eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles, les 25/26 Septembre 1972, Bruxelles 31 Juillet 1973 [If/2387/72
(PV/CONS/R 2) Extr. 3],
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into laying down the conditions for the intervention of the funds proposed to be created. But, as a
matter of fact, in the actual proposals of 26 May 1971 proposing the technical manner of intervention
of the Interest Rebate Fund, only the wide categories as laid down in the 111 MTEP Programme
without any further delimitation were earmarked. The Commission was proposing a different method
to the one followed by the interventions of the Guidance section of the EAGGF. Notably, concerning
the Interest Rebate Fund the Commission proposed -rather than drawing up a list of eligible regions-
to establish pragmatically, and in co-operation with member states, regional development plans. If
approved by the Commission, these plans covering priority regions would simply be the object of
Community aid. This pragmatic method proposed in 1969 and maintained in May 1971 was,
however, unwelcome. By September 1972 delegations unanimously preferred the alternative method
of drawing up a list of eligible regions, for which, plans would then be subsequently drawn83.
Facing the delegations' refusal of a pragmatic common definition of plans for certain regions, in the
draft ERDF regulation of July 1973 the Commission converted to the method of using a list for the
delimitation of beneficiary regions. Thus, the ERDF draft regulation proposed straight away the
method of drawing a list of eligible regions and, hence, also defined both criteria and a procedure for
producing that list. Concerning tire procedure for the adoption of tire final list of eligible regions: the
Council would adopt such list from a Commission proposal, and after consulting the European
Parliament. Once the list of regions were adopted, the Council would still be able in the future to
amend that list by qualified majority, as need arose83.
Although by accepting the method of drawing a list of regions the Commission was following member
states' wishes, the adoption of the list of eligible regions was clearly perceived by die Commission as
a highly sensitive issue. Strategically, the Commission opted for earmarking in the draft ERDF
regulation the broad categories and general criteria as to where the ERDF could intervene, but it
delayed deliberately for some months the submission of both the specific criteria and the final list of
regions (for both the ERDF and the Guidance section) falling into the criteria85. Concerning the
delimitation of regions where the ERDF could intervene, the draft regulation noted:
These regions and areas must be chosen from among those which benefit from a system of
regional aids and whose gross domestic product per head is below the Community average. They
shall include particularly those with regional imbalances resulting from the preponderance of
agriculture and from industrial change and structural underemployment, taking in particular the
following criteria into consideration:
83 See p. 17 of Conseil, Projet de Rapport du comite des representants permanents cm Conseil. Object: Politique
regionale, Bruxelles 20 Septembre 1972 [R/l 867/72 (ECO 188) (AGRI 567) (FIN 493)] and p. 8 of Conseil.
Extrait du projet de proces verbal de la 206eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles, les 25/2C Septembre 1972.
Bruxelles 10 Novembre 72 [R/2387/72 (PV/CONS/R 2) Extr. 1 ].
83 Article 3.1 of Proposal for a Council regulation establishing a Regional Development Fund.
85 See Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission, Objet: -Projet de rapport sur les
problemes regionaux dans la Cornmunaute elargie. -Resultats de la reunion ad hoc des membres de la
Commission les plus interesses (vendredi 30 mars 1973), Bruxelles 2 avril 1973 [COM(73) 550/2], See also p. 6
of Europe No. 1306 (new series) of 18-19 June 1973 and Europe. No 1327 (new series) 18 July 1973, p.5.
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(a) heavy dependence on agricultural employment,
(b) heavy dependence on employment in declining industrial activities,
(c) a persistently high rate of unemployment or a high rate of net outward migration86.
Finally, on 11 October 1973, and in order to prevent negotiations over die regional dossier becoming
tainted by an over-politicised debate, die Commission submitted die draft list of regions eligible to die
ERDF and die EAGGF. Besides die above general criteria die Commission put forward (not free from
internal divergences87) an indicative set of criteria defining die range of die main Community-wide
regional imbalances, namely88:
for the first category of problems -'agricultural predominance':
• gross product per head below die Community average,
• strong dependence of employment in agricultural activities (when die percentage of active
population employed in agriculture is higher dian Community average -9.8%- and die percentage
of active population employed in die industry is below Community average -43.9%).
for die second category of problems -'heavy dependence on employment in declining industrial
activities':
• gross product per head below die Community average and
• strong dependence (20%) of employment in an industrial sector characterised by a reduction of
labour force and where a foreseeable reduction is likely to occur (like in coal and textile industries)
and
• a continuous rate of unemployment of at least 2% or a negative migratory flow for a long period of
time;
and for die diird category -'persistently high rate of unemployment or a high rate of net outward
migration':
• gross product below the Community average (2,420 u.a. in 1971) and
• unemployment rate above at least 20% of die national average and reached at least 3.5 % in
average for various years; or a large negative migratory rate of an annual average of at least 1%
during a long period; or an internal gross product per capita not exceeding 50% of the Community
average.
86 Article 3.2 of Proposal for a Council regulation establishing a ERDF, submitted by the Commission to the
Council on 31 July 1973, OJ C 86 of 16.10.73. The expression 'agricultural dominance' referred to those regions
or areas with a conspicuous absence of industrial centres. As concerns the categories listed above under (b) and
(c), the re-entering of regional problems related to industrial transformations -after the sectoral shift of 26 May
1971- seems most likely to have been pushed by British demands. Finally, the inclusion of a criterion of a high
rate of net outward migration responded possibly to the Italian and Irish cases.
87 See Europe. No 1324 (new series) Friday 13 July 1973, p.7, and Europe. No 1327 (new series) 18 July 1973,
p.5.
88 The proposal containing the criteria and the list of eligible regions was transmitted to the Council on 11
October 1973: Commission, Proposition de reglement du Conseil relatif a la liste des regions el zones prevue au
reglement en faveur desquelles le Fonds Europeen de developpement regional pent intervenir. 10 Octobre 1973
[COM(73) 1751],
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The list emerging from a geographical application of these above-mentioned criteria was, in fact, a
maximalist list opening the door to a large number of eligible regions and areas, covering 32% of the
total Community population and 52% of the Community territory. In other words, the Commission
was favouring a large list of eligible regions. Indeed, it declared that it had tried to establish a perfect
coincidence between regions eligible for ERDF support and those which benefited from aid at national
level89.
Spreading resources seemingly responded to the need to ensure that all countries would receive a
share of the ERDF. Yet the lack of concentration on areas with the greatest need -coupled by the
relatively small resources- seemed to put in question the purpose itself of Community financial
solidarity i.e. the correction of the most flagrant structural geographical imbalances which could
impede tire timely realisation of die EMU. The Commission, however, defended itself against
criticism of lack of concentration and of an unsatisfactory attention to the relative intensity of regional
imbalances across die Community by noting diat such a large list was, in fact, to be coupled widi a
power of modulation and, dierefore, of appreciation of die relative intensity of imbalances. In odier
words, die politically necessary inclusion in die eligibility list of a (far too) large area and population
of die Community would be balanced out at die time of granting ERDF aid by die operation of a
capacity to discriminate and modulate ERDF support in accordance widi comparative need. Thus,
dirough a standard procedure for decision making, die Commission would be able to select projects as
well as to distribute ERDF support bearing in mind die relative intensity of regional disequilibria and
die quality of die projects submitted. In odier words, die consideration of die intensity of die
imbalances was not materialised in die list of eligible regions or areas but, radier, in die power of
appreciation which the Commission was proposing to gain (point 14.3).
14.2. The principle of complementarity ofCommunity aid and its disputed materialisation
Undoubtedly, Community action never sought to replace states' legitimate competence to formulate
and carry out regional policy i.e. Community regional intervention could only complement national
actions and national policy and, consequently, Community means were understood as complementary
to national means. But the materialisation of such principle of complementarity, as just oudined,
proved, in fact, far from being straight forward.
Certainly, from die very beginning, in bodi die Guidance and die Interest Rebate proposals of 26 May
1971, die Commission conceived a system of aids by which Community action would be
89 Only in the case of Ireland did that coincidence not match because, from a Community point of view, the whole
national territory ought to be included due to the GDP per capita and the predominance of agriculture and
structural underemployment. See p. 18 of Conseil, Note, Objet: politique regionale. tichange de vues general sur
les propositions de reglements: -relatif a la liste des regions et zones agricoles prioritaires prevue an reglement
(CEE) concernant le Jinancement par le Fonds europeen d'orientation et de garanlie agricole, section
orientation, de projels s'inscrivant dans le cadre de programmes de developpemenl dans les regions agricoles
prioritaires; -relatif a la liste des regions et zones prevues au reglement (CEE) en faveur desquelles les Fonds
europeen de developpement regional pent intervenir, Bruxelles 25 Octobre 1973 [2039/73 ("ECO 2521 (FIN
660)].
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complementary to national action, namely in the sense of Community aid being additional to national
aid. That is, the Commission proposed in May 1971 that alter development plans had been examined
by the Regional development Committee and approved by the Commission, member states -or an
intermediary appointed by them- would submit to the Commission applications for Community
support to regional projects which fell under the previously approved development plans, and which
were also supported by national authorities. The Commission (in co-operation with a Committee of
tire Fund administering the Community resources as it will be seen later), would decide upon die
granting of an additional regional aid to projects which national authorities saw to support. If aid was
awarded it would be paid to the member state -or its intermediary- who would Uien transfer die
additional proportion of Community aid to die actual individual investors. Concretely, the
beneficiaries of Community aid would be -not simply ultimately, but directly- die investors i.e. while
state authorities would serve as channels of transmission between die Community and the
individuals90. In other words, Community aid would be clearly additional i.e. extra and distinct to die
aid dial individual investors received from dieir national audiorities. In short, individual investors
would be die direct beneficiaries of Community aid even though state audiorities would transfer
resources and mediate between investors and die Commission.
Not challenging die procedure proposed by die Commission, by May 1972 die German delegation
suggested, however, an extension of die system originally proposed by adding another parallel and
alternative procedure for both the Guidance and die Interest Rebate Fund which would, ultimately,
confer on member states die option to choose from eidier making individual investors die
beneficiaries of Community aid -as die Commission originally proposed-, or alternatively, integrating
Community aid directly into national budgets. Notably, die German delegation proposed diat
Community aid could be reimbursed to state audiorities if member states effectively preferred to
advance sums of Community aid to individual investors for projects which national audiorities had
decided to support and which fell under approved Community programmes. In diis case, member
states would address die Commission widi a request for a reimbursement to die State's coffers of the
sums already appropriated by national authorities. Certainly however, neidier die Commission nor die
Committee of die Fund would lose dieir statutory right to decide upon die soundness of die national
decision to pre-finance those projects; or what is die same, die actual decision to whedier, or not,
grant such reimbursement would remain a Commission competence. Indeed, ultimately, from the
German alternative system for discharging aid, bodi die Commission and die Committee of die Fund
were called to confirm whedier individual projects in question fell under die objectives and criteria set
widiin die development plan and whedier aid granted was compatible widi articles 92 to 94 and die
co-ordination principles resolved on 20 October 1971.
90 See article 8 of the Guidance proposal and article 6 of the Interest Rebate proposal.
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The system of Community aids proposed by Germany was modelled on the system functioning within
the FRG for the restructuring of agriculture". Thus, in the same way as die Federal Government, die
Council would establish criteria for die intervention of Community aid. Projects being drawn at local
or regional level -but inspired by Community criteria- would be first addressed to national
administrations which made the payments. National administrations would dien -dirough die
intermediary of die member state- request reimbursements for die sums already appropriated. The
Community would simply confirm diat die criteria had been observed and that aids were compliant
with competition rules and co-ordination principles. If diese conditions were fulfilled die Commission
would instruct diat a share of die sums committed by die member states were reimbursed.
The reimbursement route claimed that national actions ought to be able to be engaged by national
authorities from die moment of dieir approval and, subsequently, if Community criteria were met, a
reimbursement to die state could take place; odierwise, die financing of die projects would simply
remain national. Let us insist diat as initially presented by die German delegation, die reimbursement
route did not intend to replace die procedure proposed by die Commission but, radier, to offer a
second choice to diose member states for which die Commission's procedure was found inappropriate.
Indeed, die German delegation argued in favour of die reimbursement mediod in a number of fronts.
To start with, reimbursement was a more efficient mediod since it secured a full match of national and
Community regional actions; it was faster since financing could take place at die same time as
national grants were accorded, but, fundamentally, die model proposed by die Commission was
inappropriate -argued die German delegation- for it granted to Community institutions powers which
die Federal Government did not have itself2.
Such a proposed choice between reimbursed or additional aid was like music to French ears. From die
very beginning, die French had been die most reluctant delegation to accept any kind of Community
involvement on regional policy matters. Certainly, die technique of reimbursement was seen by
France as posing virtually no threat to national sovereignty, die latter being one of aspects which die
French were most sensitive about. Indeed, widiout a doubt die technique of reimbursement allowed
national audiorities to prevent aid going to places or in amounts not wished, it unloaded national
audiorities from regional commitments and, finally, it prevented a more direct link between die
91 See the presentation of the German position in p. 24 and 29- 30 of Conseil, Extrail du projel de proces verbal
de la 206eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles, les 25/26 Septembre 1972, Bruxelles 31 Juillet 1973
[R/2387/72 (PV/CONS/R 2) Extr. 3],
92 Only a difficulty was earmarked by the German delegation: how to solve a situation by which the number of
dossiers submitted involved expenditures superior to the amount already earmarked for regional policy in the
Community. Clearly not wishing to establish a 'first come first served' system, the real possibility of an
excessive amount of demands beyond limited resources previously earmarked seemed to call for the entry of an
element of selection among projects to be made nationally. Yet, to this difficulty, a simple reporting of
appropriations for the financing of projects to the following financial year seemed to be able to solve the
problem.
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investors and Community instances and the possible risks of a shift in loyalties -which France found
particularly difficult to admit93.
Yet, the reimbursement system proposed by Germany was opposed by the Italian, Belgian, Dutch and
Luxembourg delegations. Led by Belgium, these delegations claimed that the objective to facilitate the
realisation of EMU required that, rather than encouraging a reduction of national appropriations into
regional objectives, additional resources to those deployed by national authorities should be effectively
mobilised94. These delegations noted, in a effort to dispel the concerns on excessive political discretion
by the Commission, Lhat the Council still held the power to adopt the list of beneficiary regions and
that only Governments would submit the concrete dossiers, and thus mediate between individual
investors and die Commission. It was also argued that if aids were channelled through states there
would be no competition among projects, but rather, it would be the state who would decide where
ERDF would fall.
This debate on the appropriateness of a system based on additional aid directed to investors versus a
reimbursement to national efforts lingered until December 1972. National delegations were not able to
strike a compromise before tire Paris Conference of 19-20 October 1972 and neither did tire Heads of
State or Government for, after all, tire meaning of complementarity was a rather 'technical' matter
concerning tire operation and tire assimilation of Community resources. Shortly after tire Paris
Summit of October 1972, however, at tire Council session of 18-19 December 1972. a compromise -
half way between additionally and reimbursement- was reached. Notably, during tire negotiations on
tire Guidance proposal, delegations accepted that it would be left to member states to either
understand Community aid as additional or to, otherwise, integrate it in national aid, on condition
that Community aid was visibly individualised by their beneficiaries95. The principle of
complementarity had been twisted into an obligatory individualisation and adequate publicity of
Community aid. In fact, tire Council of 18-19 December 1972 did not discuss a standardised and
concrete form for such compulsory itemisation or notice of tire share of Community support. At first
sight surprisingly, Italy asked to pause in what seemed like a final agreement and to reopen the debate
again when the awaited Commission's proposals mandated by tire Paris Summit were submitted".
Thus, in July 1973, although tire Belgian request for a clear itemisation of the proportion of
Community aid in relation to national aid had emerged as a compromise solution, the debate on tire
93 Indeed, France had clearly stated the fear of a situation of contradiction between national and Community
policies: 'il importe pour les gouvernements qui depuis des annees onl rnene une politique d'amenagemenl du
territoire, que cette politique ne puisse se trouver a un moment donne en opposition avec un autre politique qui
pourrait sefaire au niveau de la Communaute entiere, or il s'agit d'eviter avant tout un systeme su niveau de la
Communaute qui puisse s'opposer aux systemes appliques dans les differents (stats'. See p. 27 and 30 of
Conseil, Extrait du projet de proces verbal de la 206eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles. les 25/26
Septembre 1972, Bruxelles 31 Juillet 1973 [R/2387/72 (PV/CONS/R 2) Extr. 3],
94 For the defence by the Belgian delegation of the principle of additionality see p. 36 of (R723S7/72
(PV/CONS/R 2)].
95 See Conseil, Extrait du Projet de proces-verbal de la 221eme session du Conseil des 18-19 decembre 1972. 22
Mars 1973 [R/2940/72 (PV/CONS/R6) Extr.2],
96 See p. 26-27 of [R/2940/72 (PV/CONS/R6) Extr.2],
163
interpretation of complementarity either as additionality or as reimbursement re-emerged again in the
context of the ERDF proposal. Indeed, the Thomson report re-opened the debate on complementarity
from the agreement struck on 18-19 December 1972 and underlined the importance that beneficiaries
of Community aid were able to identify unmistakably the fraction corresponding to Community
support97. The ERDF proposal noted that Community contribution ought to be complementary and, by
no means, a substitute for member state's interventions since the Community contribution resided in
accelerating the realisation of regional development policies beyond the point of what could otherwise
not be achieved by member states alone bearing in mind the disciplines of EMU imposed in the
employment of their own resources98.
But in July 1973, the debate over complementarity was about to take new elements on board. The
ERDF proposal put, in unequivocal terms, a point which was implicitly implied in previous proposals
and which had not raised opposition till that moment, namely, that Community assistance would be
complementary also in the sense that ERDF could not intervene wherever national governments did
not intervene. Or, in other words, Community financial contributions could only finance projects
which were beneficiaries of national aid. This was the position of tire Commission and all delegations,
except for Ireland99. Ireland argued that the drawback of the notion of complementarity, as above
interpreted, was one ofmaking of national assistance a condition sine qua non for Community support
or, in other words, of assuming that national Governments were not constrained to release budgetary
resources. Yet, as a matter of fact, argued Ireland, not all member states were spending -or could
spend- the same amount of national resources on regional policy, which also meant that these
countries were going to receive less resources than those who were most able to spend. The
Community, therefore, ought to be able to grant its aid to projects which did not benefit from national
aid i.e. to support projects which, beyond the national budgetary capacity, would aim at correcting the
imbalances compromising a timely realisation of EMU100. Ireland charged against die Commission's
U-turn on this aspect of complementarity for, aldiough die Thomson report had in fact envisaged
97 Point 32 of Thomson report: 'It is important that the element of Community aid, in whatever form it is
disbursed, should be clearly identifiable as such to the recipient' and exposition by George Thomson to the
Council: p. 7 of Conseil, Extra.it du projet de proces-verbal de la 412eme session du Conseil tenue a Bnixelles
les 14 et 15 rnai 1973, Bruxelles 26 juin 1973 [R/1558/73 (PV/CONS/R 7) Extr.l],
98 See preambles to the ERDF proposal of July 1973.
99 See p. 5 of Commission, Note a Vattention des Messieurs les Membres de la Commission. Objet: 707eme
reunion du Comite des representants pennanents -21.11.1973, Politique regionale. Bruxelles 23 novembre 1973
[SEC(73) 4412].
100 hi Irish words: 'Enjin la delegation irlandaise a estime qu'en definitive les propositions de la Commission ne
peuvent qu'avoir des effet assez marginaux. Meme lorsque I'urgence des besoins est universellement reconnue el
si le projet presente est impeccable, les fslals membres doivent eux-memes fournir le gros du montanl necessaire
a I'investissement. Cela pourrait placer certains fitats dans la necessile de ne pouvoir enlreprendre des actions
qui devraient pourtant etre ejfectues pour la realisation de I'union economique et monetaire. II en resulte que
plus un itat peut depenser, plus il pourra recevoir de la Communaute. Or, celle fa^on de voir est en
contradiction avec le principe que le Fonds doit concentrer ses interventions dans les regions qui. dans la
Communaute prise dans son ensemble, en ont le plus besoin. (...) Petal membre doit fournir le gros du monlant
des investissements publics necessaires et cela meme au cas ou. certains Istats membres declareraienl ne pas etre
en rnesure de lefaire'. See p. 19-20 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: echange de rue general sur les
propositions de la Commission, Bruxelles 20 septembre 1973 [1721/73 (ECO 217) (FIN 563)].
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'Community initiatives"01, the Commission had in the actual ERDF proposal distanced herself from
that notion102. The Irish delegation also recalled to those who argued that eliminating the precondition
of national aid for Community support would entail an inadmissible granting of competence for the
Commission, diat Community financial solidarity was manifestly marginal -quantitatively speaking.
However, for the rest of the countries the condition of being in receipt of national aid before being
eligible for Community support involved an element of control of the Commission's discretion on the
allocation of resources. And, in fact, tire Commission seemed to align with die majority by arguing,
on die one hand, diat die Paris Communique foresaw a close link widi national aids, and 011 die odier,
the fact dial being a beneficiary of national aid constituted a guarantee for co-ordinated and efficient
employment of Community resources103.
Indeed, die majority of delegations did not wish to yield 011 the link between national and Community
aid systems. On die odier hand, however, an aridimetical link between national and Community
support was equally inadmissible. Belgium, particularly, argued diat by proposing diat ERDF
assistance could be equal to a maximum of 50% of national aid, die Commission seemed to convey
not only a deliberate choice for reimbursement -versus additional aid- but, also, die inescapable link
between national and Community support could lead -if understood in aridimetical terms- to die
ironical situation whereby diose countries who could spend more would be in a position to also get
more in return from die ERDF which, as a matter of fact, would work in detriment to diose countries
where most investment was needed. Rates of national aid being very different among die Nine, one
ought to avoid a system of reimbursement which made Community support proporuonal to national
regional spending.
As a matter of fact, however, diis criticism led by die Belgium and Irish delegations was founded only
if the ERDF assistance was not modulated i.e. if an automatic system for granting of resources was
put in place -notably, if die rate of support was understood as a proportion of die nadonal effort. As a
matter of fact, however, die Commission was not understanding complementarity as an arithmetical
link, but radier, it was proposing a ceiling of maximum support which projects could draw from die
ERDF. Crucially, the support from die ERDF was proposed by die Commission to be variable from
project to project, to be decided from an appraisal of each project radier dian automaucally applied, in
short, to be modulated rather than uniform. For all die above die Commission was calling for a
capacity to examine and select projects and to decide on die granting of aid in variable measures.
14.3. The examination ofprojects: power ofdecision (selection and modulation)
101 Sec Thomson Report, IV, 29 (ix): 'At the same time a desirable flexibility in the use of the resources of the
Fund should be introduced by retaining a proportion of them for financing of regional plans or projects by the
Community concerning for example particularly intractable regional problems or trans-border schemes involving
more than one member state'.
102 See this claim by Ireland in p. 17 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: echange de vue.s general sur
les propositions de la Commission, Bruxelles 20 seplembre 1973 [1721/73 (ECO 217) (FIN 563;].
103 See p. 5bis of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portanl creation d'ttn
Fonds de developpemenl regionale, Bruxelles 19 octobre 1973 [1970/73 (ECO 245) (FTN 642)].
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Equally as the Guidance and the Interest Rebate Fund, die ERDF proposal attempted die gaining of a
power of examination and of decision-making for die Commission concerning bodi individual
investments and infrastructure projects. All delegations accepted diat die running of a system of
Community aids would have to rest on a Commission's power of inspection and. subsequently, of
decision on die granting of Community aid. Yet, die extent of such powers could span dirough a wide
a range of shades of acceptability.
The Commission had proposed in both the Guidance and Interest Rebate proposals diat projects
susceptible to benefit from Community resources ought, to begin widi, to be examined by die
Commission, who would iiave the power to decide on die granting of Community aid. after consulting
the Regional development Committee. Yet, no delegation found acceptable diat die Commission alone
could administer die financial resources dirough a procedure which simply foresaw consultation with
die Regional development Committee104. Instead, delegations demanded the incorporation into die
procedure of anodier committee working togedier widi die Commission in die performance of die
tasks of administering die Community resources -as in fact was die case in odier procedures for die
granting of Community Funds. In odier words, while die Regional development Committee would
remain an organ of consultation on die submitted invesdnent projects, a Committee of die Fund,
formed by national representatives, would intervene in die making of decisions relating to die
granting of rebates or capital sums'05. Thus, apart from die creation of a Regional development
Committee, whose 'habitat' was more on the co-ordination side, die creation of a Fund Committee
would work togedier widi die Commission in the running of die administration and die decisions
regarding individual projects.
Facing the unanimous opposition to die originally proposed procedure of May 1971 and die
alternative proposal, in June 1972 die Commission announced its disposition to modify die decision¬
making procedure for both die Guidance and the Interest Rebate Fund and accept the creation and
intervention of a Committee of die Fund assisting the Commission in the administrauon of financial
resources106. Thus, after reviewing various procedures in use, die Commission proposed not only a
new committee but, also, a new procedure, notably, the procedure in place for the interventions of die
Guidance section of die EAGGF as laid down in article 13 of regulation 729/70107. By diis procedure
die Commission produced a draft decision which was dien communicated to die administrative
Committee of die Fund. This Committee of die Fund, whose principle task was to formulate opinions
on die Commission's decisions, discussed die Commission's draft decision, while the Commission
104 See articles 7, 11 of the AEGGF Guidance proposal and article 6 of the Interest Rebate proposal.
105 See p. 26bis of Conseil, Note. Objet: £tat des Iravaux en matiere de politique regionale. Bruxelles 3 aout
1972 [R/l697/72 (ECO 164) (AGRI 530) (FIN 464)].
106 See p. 4 of Communication of 31 May 1972 [COM(72) 530 final], and p. 4 of Conseil. Note. Objet: Travaux
en matiere de politique regionale. Bruxelles 23 Juin 1972 [R/l337/72 (ECO 130) (AGRI414) (FIN376)].
107 That is, Council Regulation (EEC) 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural
policy, OJ L 94 of 28.4.1970. See the Commission's modified stance in p. 8 of Annex of Conseil. Projet Rapport
du Comite des representants pennanents au Conseil, Objet: Politique regionale, Bruxelles 20 Seplembre 1972
[R/l867/72 (ECO 188) (AGRI 567) (FIN 493)].
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could at any time modify it. If the Committee of the Fund approved the Commission's draft decision
then the decision became immediately applicable. If the Committee of the Fund disapproved of the
Commission's decision then it was submitted to the Council. The Commission, however, and
irrespective of the opinion of the Committee of the Fund, could still maintain its decision as
applicable or delay it, but ultimately it was the Council who -only by qualified majority- could
overturn the Commission's decision. Furthermore, if the Council did not rule within the time limit,
the Commission's decision prevailed'08. In short, by this procedure it was the Commission who overall
took the decisions of granting Community aid to individual projects, unless an opposing qualified
majority could be gathered in tire Council.
As in July 1973 the draft ERDF regulation replaced the previous Interest Rebate proposal. The
Commission, from die experience of die position of die delegations, maintained (in article 13 of die
ERDF proposal) bodi its concession of June 1972 of creating a Committee of die Fund and of using
die procedure laid down in article 13 of regulation 729/70109 which had reached a degree of
acceptance"0. In 1973 die Commission's procedure was supported by Italy and die Benelux countries.
They argued diat by die procedure proposed by die Commission, the Council was still able to overturn
die Commission in cases where a majority dissented widi Commission's decision. On die odier side,
Germany, France and Denmark proposed a different procedure. Any application to ERDF resources
would result in a provisional decision by die Commission (whether positive or negative) which would
not become applicable until so confirmed by the Fund Committee. If die Committee did not approve
die Commission's decision, or simply did not comment, die decision could not be implemented and
would be passed to die Council. The Council would decide by qualified majority on die provisional
decision, and if die Council did not take position widiin a mondi, ERDF support would be declined.
Clearly by this procedure die capacity of objection by die Committee of die Fund was increased at die
expense of die Commission, notably, by being able to overrule die Commission decision -which as
such would not be applicable per se, but dependent on die Committee's assent. Against diis
alternative procedure, it was argued, by the Commission and Italy, diat could lead to a larger number
of aid dossiers being submitted to die Council, for die decision would not be applicable until the
Council so ruled.
108 See the Commission's exposition of this procedure in p. 3 of Annex to Conseil, Note. Objet: politique
regionale, Bruxelles, 19 septembre 1972 [R/l872/1/72 (ECO 189) (AGRI 568) (FIN 494) rev. 1] and in p. 8 of
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de
developpement regional, Bruxelles 9 octobre 1973 [1862/73 (ECO230) (FIN 607)].
109 See the exposition by the Commission in p. 8 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de
reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de developpement regional, Bruxelles 9 octobre 1973 [1862/73
(ECO230) (FIN 607)].
110 See p. 9 of Conseil, Rapport du comite des representants pennanents au Conseil, Objet: Politique regionale.
Bruxelles 20 Septembre 1972 [R/1867/1/72 (ECO 188) (AGRI 567) (FIN 493) rev.l]. Since June 1972 the
French had proposed a whole alternative procedure based on the functioning of the EIB. Requests for loans
would be submitted by member states to the EIB who would take decisions in accordance to the procedures set
up in the Protocol on the Statutes of the Bank and following the orientations defined by the Council in the field
of regional policy. See p.5-7 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Travaux en matiere de politique regionale, Bruxelles 23
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But besides the aspects concerning the actual weight of Commission decision-making power versus
national interests, the procedure for the granting of aids also involved a power of examination of
projects by the Commission. Such a power of examination was understood by the Commission as
conveying a power of selection and also of modulation of assistance. Indeed, die Commission
proposed in both the Guidance and Interest Rebate proposals (article 7.1 and 4 respectively) a
modulation of Community support in function of a certain number of elements like tire relative
situation of regions and sectors and the importance of the projects. Equally, in die ERDF proposals
die Commission proposed diat the actual percentage of assistance would be decided on a case by case
basis.
The ERDF proposal set a ceiling of maximum support which any given project could gain from die
Community"1 and made a distinction between small and large projects"2. In accordance widi diis
distinction, two different procedures of selection and of modulation were proposed. All projects -
irrespective of dieir size- would, however, be submitted for examination to die Commission for
selection and Llie Commission -in co-operation widi die Committee of the Fund- would select or
decide whether diey would benefit or not from ERDF support.
Small projects would only be subject to an examination of conformity widi die already approved
programmes and would receive Community aid automatically and uniformly. Thus, in what it seems
an attempt to avoid die overload of having to select and modulate aid for small projects, die latter
could automatically benefit from a given percentage of Community support if diey were bodi
supported by national audiorities and established 011 die basis of Community criteria.
As far as large projects were concerned, however, die Commission -in co-operation widi die
Committee of die Fund- would hold die capacity not only to select i.e. to decide upon Community
assistance but also to modulate it, diat is, to apply different degrees of support. Indeed, for larger
projects die Commission proposed diat die contributions from die ERDF were not uniform but, rather,
diat an appraisal in relation to die interest of each dossier in its regional context were carried out by
die Commission. To start widi, die Commission would examine die consistency of projects widi
national programmes previously agreed within die Committee for regional policy. As mentioned
before (point 12.2), in die undertaking of concerted development actions, national programmes
offered the framework against which to consider concrete projects eligible for Community assistance.
Juin 1972 [R/1337/72 (ECO 130) (AGRI414) (FIN376)] and Annex 1 to Conseil, Note. Objet: politique
regionale, Bruxelles, 19 septembre 1972 [R/1872/1/72 (ECO 189) (AGRI 568) (FIN 494) rev. 1],
111 Notably, the support of the ERDF would not exceed 15 % of the cost of the investment in industrial and
service activities and in no case could ERDF support of individual projects exceed more than 50% of the support
already given by national authorities. Concerning infrastructures ERDF could not support more than 30% of the
expenditure incurred by national authorities.
112 The Thomson report noted that the criteria for the distinction between small and large projects could be
established by the Council on the basis of a proposal from the Commission and could rest on volume of
investment to be made, number of jobs to be created or the nature of the projects themselves. See point 31-32 of
Thomson Report. In the ERDF proposal the Commission defined small projects as those industrial and service
investments of less than 10 million u.a. and infrastructure investments of a value of less than 20 million u.a. On
the other hand, large projects were any investment above the latter figures.
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Such previous consideration of individual projects against the background of commonly agreed
programmes meant an examination of the degree to which national projects conformed to Community
objectives, that is, a general and indirect criterion of conformity with Community objectives.
Individual projects would then be subject to a second type of examination. The Commission proposed
that an evaluation of the merits of individual projects was undertaken at Community level too, so that
not only decisions in favour, or denying assistance, were made, but also a modulation of support were
administered according to the interest of the project from a Community perspective and the relative
intensity of the imbalance on the ground.
So, which would be the criteria susceptible to determine the modulation of ERDF assistance? In die
ERDF proposal the Commission proposed that the examination of projects would be made:
with reference to the relative severity of the economic imbalance of the region where the
investment is made and its direct and indirect effect on employment, and taking account of the
following considerations:
(a) the consistency of the investment with the development programmes and the objectives
referred to in article 6;
(b) the investment's contribution to the economic development of the region;
(c) the consistency of the investment with the Community's programmes or objectives,
particularly those adopted as part of sectoral policies;
(d) the investment's effect on the environment, particularly as regards living and working
conditions;
(e) the trans-national character of the investment, that is, the fact that it comes from another
Member State;
(f) the trans-border character of the investment, that is, concerning adjacent regions in different
Member States113;
In other words, a degree of discretion would be given to the Community by which the assistance from
the ERDF would be decided with reference to (1) the relative severity of the economic imbalance of
the region where the investment was made, and (2) its direct and indirect effect on employment, and
also taking into account the series of considerations above. Notably, argued DGXVI's director
general, the modulation would permit the Commission to apply a lower percentage than the maximum
rate of support to those investments which although, for instance, proved useful for the development
of the area in question they did not respond in a fully satisfactory manner to the criteria of the creation
of new employment114.
113 Article 5 of Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Regional development Fund, OJ C S6/8 of
16.10.73.
114 See p.3 of Commission, Note a. Vattention des Messieurs les Membres de la Commission. Objet: 707eme
reunion du Comite des representants pennanents -21.11.1973, Politique regionale, Bruxeiles 23 novembre
1973[SEC(13) 4412],
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Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands were in favour of this appraisal of projects by the Commission
-subject to the conformity of the Committee of the Fund, and thus, in favour of investment projects
being supported asymmetrically depending on the relative intensity of the regional disequilibria facing
each region, and relative also to the interest and quality that individual investment projects had for the
employment situation and the economic development of the region in question -and then by default
the balanced development of the Community.
But opposed to such capacity of selection and modulation, other delegations proposed, instead, an
automatic system. Indeed, refusing to grant a margin of discretion to the Commission, Germany,
France, Italy and the UK argued that such discretionary power ought to be limited for the sake of the
certainty that investors ought to have a priori to undertake investments in less favoured regions. Thus,
a more automatic process of decision by which the Commission would simply apply fixed rates of
support, with none or almost no power of appreciation, was more appropriate.
Within those who defended an automatic system a further option was opened, notably, between
automatic rates but variable in relation to the relative intensity of regional imbalances (defended by
Italy, UK, Germany and Netherlands), or otherwise, automatic and uniform rates, that is. not
observing regional situations relatively (defended by France). In the first case, automatic fixed rates
would vary depending on some categorisation of the relative regional situations, thus a list of regions
could be drawn up according to which distinct rates of aid could be then applied in an automatic
fashion. For the delegations who defended automatic rates of intervention but variable according to a
certain criteria, discrepancies appeared concerning the criteria of evaluation laid down in article 5.1.
Indeed, for Germany only an appreciation of the coherence of the investment with Programmes was
appropriate, and most delegations did not accept an appreciation of a trans-frontier or trans-national
character of investment projects.
The problem of the examination and decision was a question for opting between variable rates of
ERDF support or the operation of automatic rates115. If rates of support did vary a case by case
examination of projects ought to be made by the Commission and the Committee of the Fund, and
thus, an appreciation of various aspects of the project as such was required. If, on the other hand, one
opted for automatic granting of aid, then the examination was much simpler, and tire decision of tire
Commission was solely one on whether to grant aid or not, for tire varied rates according to relative
need would be automatically applied.
Against an automatic granting of aid, Belgium and Luxembourg argued that choices among projects
had to be made in order to solve tire problem of tire necessary limitation of Community resources or,
in other words, tire problem of avoiding a mismatch between applications for ERDF and available
resources. It clearly could not occur that projects submitted at tire end of tire financial year had less
chances to receive ERDF assistance, or one ought to avoid tire exhaustion of resources, or a first come
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first serve dynamic. Indeed, a problem appeared as to how the determination of the amount of granted
aid or refused aid would bear in mind the priorities arising from, on the one hand, the relative
intensity of economic disequilibrium and, on the other, the financial resources of the Fund"4. For
Germany, however, more appropriate than giving the Commission tire discretion to modulate
assistance or, alternatively, simply reporting projects to the following financial year, the best solution
providing certainty in relation to the global volume of resources and avoiding a mismatch between
ERDF resources and the requests for ERDF support was an external and previous national
partitioning of the Fund i.e. tire fixing of quotas per country117.
To recapitulate, apart from many other lesser disagreements"8, a number of major disagreements
arose as regards tire principles, die conditions and tire technical modalities of Community financial
interventions. These differences were finally settled at the beginning of 1975, after a long period of
negotiation which was troubled by additional external factors (point 18, chapter IV). Let us now see
finally tire choices and competence that resulted.
15. The role in regional economic policy emerging in March 1975
The Council of 4 March 1975 agreed to a first form of involvement in regional policy, namely, to a
form of co-operation on policy and to a form of promotion of individual investment projects which,
overall, was rather modest. On (lie one hand, the strength of policy co-operation was largely incipient
and, on the other, financial interventions were set to operate lacking an identified specific Community
dimension. Overall, the role of the Community in regional policy, as agreed by the Council in March
1975, had more the character of a net transfer of resources than the likes of a co-ordinated, well-
targeted and competent approach to regional imbalances in the Community. Keeping the distinction
between a task of co-ordination of national policies and one of promotion made so far. the role of the
Community in regional policy -as emerging from the regulations of 18 March 1975- is reviewed in
this final point.
Let us start with the policy side. In March 1975 the Community signed up to a new competence,
namely, to examine (permanently) policies, programmes and regional budgetary appropriations.
Acceptable to all delegations since 26 October 1970 (see point 16, chapter IV), a Committee for
regional policy would facilitate the addressing of common problems, the progressive development of
115 See p. 54bis of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un
Fonds de developpement regional, Bruxelles 7 novembre 1973 [2107/73 (EC0266) (FIN 687)].
116 See p. 3 of Conseil, Note, Objet: politique regionale. Infonnation de la Presidence sur Petal actuel des
travaux, Bruxelles 1 Octobre 1973 [R/2370/73 (ECO 223) (FIN 602)].
117 See p. 2-4, Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds
de developpement regional, Bruxelles 9 octobre 1973 [1862/73 (ECO230) (FIN 607)].
118 Such as: definition of industrial and service activities and infrastructures (article 4), different interpretations
of the notion ofmaintaining' jobs (article 4), the minimum size of eligible projects (article 4), rates of aid (article
4), the control by the Commission of the implementation of funded projects (article 10.1), modalities for the
recovering of aids (article 10.2), kinds of studies to be financed by the ERDF (article 11.1), the conditions for the
re-examination of the regulation (article 18), etc.
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common strategies, and the harmonisation of techniques and objectives of regional interventions. The
Committee for regional policy was set up, defeating French opposition, on the model of the Medium-
term economic policy Committee i.e. under national direction and the Commission's secretariat"9- as
an organ of reciprocal consultation with the responsibility of carrying out the co-ordination of policies
in a progressive manner. Such a task of co-ordination boiled down to a capacity to give opinions and
to deliberate on issues relating to regional policy120. The Committee was to report to both the Council
and the Commission and could also act on its own initiative.
But as well as this speculative side of the Committee's functions, the confrontation or comparison of
policies was to be effectively carried out through the examination of regional development
programmes, yet the scope of such an examination of programmes was agreed in rather incipient and
indeterminate terms. To start with, unable to agree on the concrete information to be supplied in
programmes and the technical methods for their elaboration (point 12.2.1), delegations decided to call
off the discussion and they commissioned the Committee for regional policy to study outlines for the
elaboration of regional development programmes and to propose, before tire end of 1975, methods and
guidelines for the elaboration of regional programmes121. Indeed, programmes ought to contain precise
indications on the objectives and the means of development of assisted regions, and yet, programmes
were only acceptable to delegations as indicative documents. The final regulation engaged that by die
end of 1977 member states would submit to the Commission programmes for all aided regions122 and.
thus, from 1978, member states had the obligation to accompany their demands to the ERDF with
programmes of regional development for the regions in which the projects were located. Before this
date, either through the mediod of programmes or from annual information reports, member states
would provide information on a) the evolution of the socio-economic situation of the regions eligible
for Community aid; b) the resources that member states had decided or projected to appropriate for
the development of these regions; c) the actions foreseen in the field of infrastructures and in the
creation of economic activities; and d) the ceilings of intensity of state aids -where appropriate-, and
on the results of actions taken on the previous year, noting there where the ERDF had participated123.
The problem of the harmonisation of programming methods, however, was by no means solved with
the adoption of the guidelines on programming in 1976. The Commission soon denounced the
119 See the Rules of procedure of the Regional Policy Committee in OJ L 320 of 11.12.1975.
120 A list of issues was proposed by the Commission in the 1973 proposal as an example of tasks to be performed
by the Committee rather than a rigid demarcation of its agenda. The final list of tasks adopted in 1975 was
almost literally the same as the list proposed in the 1973 proposal except in a couple of amendments. The first
one added the study of technical methods for the elaboration of regional development programmes so that a
common view on this notion could be made. The second amendment allowed the European Parliament to be
informed by the Commission in its annual report on the work of the Committee. The Committee had the faculty
rather than the obligation (as the European Parliament wished) to collect the opinion of the regional authorities
and social partners. Moreover, a representative of the EIB sat on it and its national presidency would run for a
two years period rather than by semesters as it was the case for the Council and its committees.
121 See article 2. I.e. of the Decision creating a Committee of regional policy of 18 March 1975 and article 6.4 of
the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975. The regional policy Committee draw the guidelines on 6-7 October
1975. See 'Outlines for regional development programmes', OJ C 69 of 24.3.1976.
122 Ar ticle 6.2 of the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975.
123 Article 6.6 of the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975.
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programmes submitted as being too broad in their indications of policy objectives124; in tact, the
problem of the degree of detail covered in the programmes raised already in 1977 was going to linger
for the years to come.
Beyond the problem of the detail to be contained in programmes, the examination to be undertaken by
the Commission and the Committee for regional policy was to consist of a general and consultative
test on consistency of the programmes with Community objectives, notably, the Commission would
examine the regional programmes 'having regard to the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions
adopted by Community institutions"25. The Commission was admitting that the content of national
regional policies and the concrete means of action were competence of member states; nonetheless,
the Commission was claiming the responsibility to ensure that regional development programmes
were compatible with the Treaty and also die need to insert structural policy actions into wider
economic policy guidelines.
Yet, aldiough fitting structural actions widiin die broader context of medium term economic policy
objectives was, since die mid 1960s, die leading objective of regional actions, neidier the negotiations
nor die final regulations of March 1975 made any concrete suggestion on how die conformity widi
Treaty provisions and Community decisions was going to operate. In odier words, die actual scope
and manner of the examination of programmes widiin die Committee for regional policy was left
largely undefined. A concrete procedure was not spelled out until 1977, at die time of die first reform
of die regional regulations of March 1975. Notably, in June 1977 die Commission would propose to
submit to die Council every two years -beginning in 1979- a draft Report on Social and Economic
Trends in the regions of the Community. In this report die Commission would draw proposals which
would set die priority objectives of regional development to be pursued at Community level as well as
die resulting Guidelines for national and Community regional policies. This Report and Guidelines
would, in turn, be inserted into broader economic policy guidelines. On die one hand, die draft Report
on Social and Economic Trends in die regions of the Community would be examined by die
Economic policy Committee126 which would deliver an opinion on it. But second, die Report on Social
and Economic Trends in die regions of the Community would accompany die Annual Report on the
Economic Situation in die Community provided for by die Council decision of 18 February 1974 on
die attainment of a high degree of convergence of die economic policies of die member states of die
124 According to the Commission, ERDF Third Annual report (1977), Brussels, 1978, point 122: 'The regional
development programmes and the annual information statements submitted by member states supplied basic
information of great value. However, they mostly lack the detail needed to serve as a guide to the allocation of
the Fund's resources or to co-ordinate them more closely with assistance from the other Community financial
instruments. For this reason the Commission considers that the programmes submitted in 1977 are not vet in
their final form but provide a basis for progressive development. The Commission also considers that grant
applications should be presented in a manner to show more clearly the link between the investment projects in
question and the achievement of the aims of the programme for the regions in which it is located'.
125 See article 6.5 of the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975.
126 The Economic policy Committee was born out of the merging of the Medium-term economic policy
Committee, the Short term economic policy Committee, the Budgetary Committee and the Monetary Committee
on 18 February 1974, OJ L63 of 5.3.1974.
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Community127, which ought to be drafted by the Commission and subsequently be adopted by the
Council. In sum, the two-yearly report on social and economic trends in tire regions of the Community
as well as the aims and guidelines fixed by the Council, would form the basis for the examination of
national regional policies and programmes128. This procedure for the insertion of regional policies into
broader economic policy guidelines proposed by the Commission was watered down by tire Council in
February 1979129.
Turning now to the function of promotion, in March 1975 a new and specifically regional financial
instrument -the ERDF- was set up for a trial period of three years130 and with an allocation of 1,300
million u.a.131. Although the Paris Summit decided to create a specifically regional financial
instrument in order to contribute to tire correction of those largest regional imbalances within tire
Community which were likely to prejudice tire attainment of EMU132, as a matter of fact, the
Community system of aids set up in 1975 resulted in not much more than a system allowing an
unconditional transfer of resources to supplement existing national regional policies.
Indeed, although the ERDF was originally justified on tire basis of correcting tire largest disparities at
Community level, tire final geographical eligibility came to cover virtually all tire areas under regional
support in tire Community133. In other words, although tire Commission had originally proposed that
eligible regions would be delimited on tire basis of criteria of revenue, structure of employment,
unemployment and migration -at Community level- (point 14.1), Community-wide criteria were
scrapped, and instead, tire final ERDF regulation simply noted that tire regions eligible to benefit for
ERDF assistance would be those regions aided by member states under their own systems of regional
aid. Community regional disparities, therefore, would not be defined from a relative evaluation of
imbalance but, rather, they would gather all imbalances across tire Community and include some
127 See point 18.2, chapter IV for this Council decision.
128 See p. 9 of Commission, Community Regional Policy: New Guidelines, Bulletin of the EECC 1977.
Supplement 2.
129 Council decision (79/136/EEC) of 6 February 1979 amending decision 74/120/EEC on the attainment of a
high degree of convergence of the economic policies of the Member States of the EEC, OJ L 35/8 of 9.2.1979.
130 It was the Paris Summit of December 1974 who agreed the setting up of the ERDF for a trial period of three
years. The ERDF regulation did not mention the life span of the ERDF, it simply stated the appropriations from
Community own resources for the period 1975-1977.
131 This amount included 150 million u.a. of the EAGGF Guidance section reserves which had been put pending
on the negotiation of the Guidance proposal of 14 May 1971. Yet as the ERDF regulation was approved, two
funds with different procedures but both aiming at the creation of industrial employment seemed unreasonable
and therefore the resources of the Guidance section were transferred to the new ERDF. See Council regulation
(EEC) 725/75 of 18 March 1975, on the transfer to the ERDF of 150 million u.a. out of the appropriations held
in reserve by the guidance section of the EAGGF, OJ L 73/8 of 21.3.75.
132 The programme of EMU had entered severe crisis in February 1974 when the FF withdrew from the European
snake. Yet the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975 justified regional solidarity in the light of the timely
realisation of EMU (point 18.2, chapter IV).
133 ERDF eligibility coincided with the geographical application of national aid systems, except for the exclusion
of the regions outside the Mezzogiorno in Italy and the 'development zones' in Belgium -Flanders- which the
Commission recognised in 1972 as areas 'not any more in need of aid', p. 181 Romus (1979) L'Europe et les
regions, Bruxelles, Editions Labor.
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overseas territories as well'34. The final ERDF regulation recognised the need to give a priority to
priority regions (as so-defined at national level) to benefit from ERDF support135, yet, the lack of any
delimitation of relative regional imbalances at Community level meant that the choice of the problem
areas to be assisted by the ERDF as well as the concentration of national and ERDF resources, was
left fully on States' hands, and thus, responding to national policy objectives.
Concerning the principle of complementarity, the regulation of March 1975 left member states the
choice to incorporate ERDF resources either in the form of an additional aid or, otherwise, reimburse
it against national bills. Thus, the preliminary agreement struck in December 1972 (point 14.2), by
which the interpretation of complementarity was avoided by insisting on an ilemisation of aid, was
maintained. ERDF assistance could be either added to die aid accorded by national audiorities or,
odierwise, be blended and remain integrated into national aid. In eidier case, die transfer of
Community resources would, however, only be made to member states, and not to die regions.
Second, individualisation in the form of information and publicity of die aid granted to die investor
was marked as an obligation for member states. Investors would be informed of ERDF support,
assistance on infrastructure provision would be publicly announced and die lists of financed projects
would be published in die Official Journal of the European Communities136. As regards the condition
imposed by die ERDF regulation that projects supported by die ERDF ought to be beneficiaries of
national aid, interventions outside nationally-supported projects were ruled out by die majority of
member states -as well as die Commission. In fact, Ireland had been die only party advocating diat die
ERDF be able to intervene where a member state was not able to finance certain projects due to
national budgetary limitations. Aldiough standing alone, Ireland held to its position until die
Commission proposed adding die possibility for any member state to apply for interest rebates on EIB
loans in order to finance infrastructure investments without a direct contribution of die member state
in question137.
The fact is diat, by 1977, no member state had made use of die 'additional' formula i.e. of die faculty,
foreseen by die regulation, to transfer directly receipts from die Fund to industrial investors138. Clearly
the understanding of Community assistance as complementary -in bodi die senses of being a
reimbursement and of being conditional on national aid- was curtailing die capacity of influence in
die selection of projects, but, in addition, die reimbursement technique, which had been largely
134 Council decision to apply Regulation (EEC) 724/75 establishing a ERDF to the French overseas departments
(75/186/EEC), OJ L73 of 21.3.75.
135 Article 3 of the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975.
136 Article 14 of the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975.
137 See p. 4 of Commission, Note a I'attention des Messieurs les Membres de la Commission. Objet: 707eme
reunion dit Comite des representants pennanents -21.11.1971, Politique regionale, Bruxelles 23 novembre 1973
[SEC(73) 4412]. This possibility seems to be covered in the final ERDF regulation under article 4.2.by
138 See point 37 of Commission, ERDF .Third annual report (1977), Brussels 1978.
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embraced as a shield against die Commission's interference, was resulting in an overall reduction of
national efforts139.
In addition, the system of aids agreed upon in March 1975 by the Council put in place a system
which, lacking a defined policy, imposed virtually no conditions over applicant projects. Indeed, the
granting of aids was, first, based on a mere confirmatory examination of die coherence of the
investment projects with overall national measures; second, aids were awarded (largely) in a uniform
and automatic manner; and third, the overall distribution of resources between countries was decided
a priori by die establishment of national quotas.
First, die ERDF was to contribute -eidier in the form of capital sums or of interest rebates- to die
financing of two categories of investments i.e. investments in industrial, handicraft or service
activities or, odicrwise, infrastructure investments"0. Eligible investments should aim at die creation
or maintenance of employment, namely, maintaining or creating at least 10 jobs or be above a
minimum size"1 and be submitted in accordance to dieir size142. All individual requests for ERDF aid
would have to indicate a varied range of information and, in particular, die coherence of projects widi
die whole of die operations led by die member state, die contribution of die investment to die
economic development of die region, its incidence on employment and die sectoral context to which
die investment fell into143.
But what was die concrete scope of die examination of projects? The refusal by a good number of
delegations to accept an appraisal of projects by the Commission (point 14.3) resulted in die
establishment of an automatic system for granting Community aid144. Flexible rates of ERDF
139 The Delmotte Report denounced the situation that individual investors were not receiving more than what
they used to receive in the national framework, OJ C 6 of 10.1.1977.
140 The definition of infrastructures had raised divergences among member states. Notably, Ireland, Italy and the
UK had demanded that under the notion of 'infrastructures' were covered large projects such as roads, channels,
ports; while Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands had insisted that infrastructure
ought to be understood as the provision of facilities directly linked to the creation of new economic activities and
employment. Eventually, in the final ERDF regulation infrastructures of the two types were covered: those
closely linked to the development of economic activities or, otherwise communications infrastructures in
mountainous areas or in regions characterised by a disfavoured agriculture (article 4.1.c).
141 No projects of a size less than 50,000 u.a. were eligible for ERDF support.
142 Individual investment projects would be submitted globally i.e. grouped by regions- if their size was of an
amount less than 10 million u.a., or otherwise, requests would be presented separately. Decisions would be made
by the Commission, on whether ERDF would be granted, in the aggregate for each request under global
submissions or case by case for the largest investments.
143 Article 7 notes the details for national applications: In respect of the investments on the first category
(industrial, handicraft and services) the requests ought to indicate the names of the undertakings concerned, the
sector of their activity and the location of each investment, also its character (foundations, extensions, conversion
or restructuring of the relevant concerns), the total amount of the investment involved, the predicted overall
effect on employment (creation or maintenance), estimates regarding the implementation schedule, total aids
granted for which a contribution of the Fund was requested and the schedule laid down for their payment. On the
other hand, in respect of investments in infrastructure, requests ought to indicate the location of each investment
and its character, the direct link with the development of activities in the first category, the predicted total costs
and the costs borne by public authorities and the schedule laid down for their payment, the name of the
responsible authorities, the total contribution requested from the Fund, and estimates regarding the
implementation schedule.
144 Thus, the ERDF regulation of March 1975 provided that aids to industrial and service investments could
receive from the F.RDF 20% of the cost of the investment, but never more than 50% of the all aids accorded by
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assistance were only accepted in a reduced number of cases i.e. in respect of infrastructure projects
larger than 10 million u.a.145. The examination of the larger infrastructure projects would seemingly
consist of ensuring that investments were effectively linked to industrial and service activities: but.
otherwise, no modulation would take place for the rest of the projects and, thus, die Commission
retained simply a power of selection. But, on which criteria did this power of selection rest? As most
delegations considered an examination of projects as an unacceptable interference in national
discretion, the Commission put the emphasis on the coherence of national actions, thus, projects were
to be examined on the grounds of their coherence with the range of actions undertaken by their
member state146.
After examining the coherence of individual projects with national programmes and taking account of
tlie contribution of the investment to the economic development of the region, its sectoral
repercussions and the economic soundness of the projects, the Commission would produce a decision.
The ERDF regulation laid down a staged procedure of decision-making by which the Commission's
decisions could be opposed by the Committee of the Fund and overruled by the Council - if a
dissenting majority to the Commission's decision was mustered147.
The granting of ERDF support seemed well under the control of national priorities, but still a further
aspect of die system set up in March 1975 removed all doubts that the distribution of Community
resources would leave any room for uncontrollable solidarity: the allocation of the ERDF resources
was pre-fixed in the form of national quotas. The quotas per country (in percentages) for the period
1975-1977 were allocated as follows: Italy 40%, UK 28%, France 15%, Germany 6.4%, Ireland 6%,
Netherlands 1.7%, Belgium 1.5%, Denmark 1.3%, Luxembourg 0.1%. Additionally, Ireland was to
receive 6 million u.a. from the quota of each member, except Italy.
A solution of quotas emerged as a feasible alternative when the capacity of appraisal -upon which the
fairness of the system rested- was largely challenged by various delegations. Indeed, a system of
quotas reconciled establishment of an automatic system, a large list of eligible regions, and the
observance of relative need. At the Coreper session of 27-28 September 1973 the German delegation
defended overtly, for the first time, the notion of quotas in order to avoid an appreciation of die
projects while respecting the relative intensity of die imbalances148, while Ireland and Italy in
particular, had criticised die insufficient account of die relative intensity of imbalances in die
Commission's draft map of eligible regions and areas. From die Council session of 15 October 1973 a
national authorities in applying their regional aid systems. ERDF assistance to small infrastructure investments
could reach 30% of the expenditure.
145 Investments in infrastructures higher than 10 million u.a could receive from 10% to 30%. See article 4.2.b;.
146 Article 5.1 of the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975 notes that the Commission was to take special account
of: a) the investment contribution to the economic development of the regions, b) the consistency of the
investment with the Community's programmes or objectives, c) the situation of the economic sector concerned
and the profitability of the investment, d) whether the investment fell within a frontier area, and e) other
contributions made by Community institutions or the EIB.
147 Article 12 of the ERDF regulation of 18 March 1975.
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system of quotas started to emerge as a viable solution. Indeed, Ireland (which until then had
defended a power of discretion for the Commission, notably, in so far as an appreciation of relative
disequilibria was concerned"") and also Italy became ready to support a system of national quotas as
die only solution to ensure that relative need was taken into account while a large list of eligible areas
was felt as a political imperative.
By November 1973, DGXVI's Director general, trying to strike a compromise with the delegations
who refused a power of appraisal (France, Germany, UK, Italy and Netherlands), conceded a
reduction in the margin of Commission's discretion; namely, R. Ruggiero proposed to limit the
application of the margin of appreciation solely to investment projects of a size larger than 10 million
u.a., thus, the number of cases under examination would become radically restricted and no
administrative costs could be adduced either150. Most delegations accepted in principle such
concession except France who still defended a full automatic system for all sizes of investments, and
Denmark who, alone, opposed the automatic system altogether and defended a case by case
examination of all types of projects with differential rates of intervention decided by the
Commission151. Negotiations through 1974 dealt with the size of the fund and, in particular, with the
allocation of national shares. But, all in all, as a system granting aids based on die appraisal of
projects by Community criteria was unacceptable to a core number of countries, die final regulation of
1975 set up an automatic system of aid in which die quotas guaranteed die observance of relative
imbalance.
Recurrently, after 1975 die Commission was going to propose reforms to bodi die system of
Community aids and die scope of policy co-ordination. Seen in dieir historical perspective, periodic
revisions tended to increase die effectiveness of die technical machinery put for die first time in place
in 1975 and to define die identity, die autonomy and die specificity of Community regional actions
side by side with national responsibilities.
Conclusions
148 The alternative of a system of national quotas was proposed on 27-28 September 1973 in relation to article 8
of the ERDF regulation.
149 See p.22bis of Conseil, Note, Objel: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un
Fonds de developpement regional, Bruxelles 19 octobre 1973 [1970/73 (ECO 245) (UN 642)].
150 Therefore, the rate of intervention in industrial and services investments inferior to 10 million u.a. would be
automatically fixed to 15% (the ceiling of 50% of national aid still applying), whereas for investments equal or
higher than such size a semi-automatic mechanism would apply, by which investments could benefit from
maximum rates except in exceptional cases where a lower rate could be granted. See p. 4 of Commission. Note a
/'attention des Messieurs les Membres de la Commission, Objel: 707erne reunion du Comite des representants
permanents -21.11.1971, Politique regionale, Bruxelles 23 novembre 1973 [SEC(73) 4412],
151 See Commission proposal and positions of delegations in p. 4-5 of Conseil, Note, Objel: Politique regionale:
resume des travaux du Groupe de travail 'politique regionale' au sujet de certains elements relatifs aux
problemes concernanl le Fonds de developpement regional actuellemenl soumis a Fattention du Comite des
Represenlanls Pennanents. Reunion des 22/23 novembre 1973, Bruxelles 27 Novembre 1973 [R/2911/73 tECO
302) (FIN 744)].
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Since October 1969 (lie Commission had proposed similar terms for a role in regional economic
policy. The core terms of a Community competence would essentially consist of a competence to co¬
ordinate national regional policies, programmes and budgetary appropriations and policies and, on the
other hand, a capacity to undertake development actions bringing along Community means in a
concerted manner with national actions. Certainly throughout the 1970s, the Commission altered and
amended in their 'technical' aspects die modalities of policy co-ordination and also the functioning of
financial instruments. Indeed, as the actual proposals underwent the scrutiny of national delegations,
modifications and concessions on various aspects of (lie Commission's proposals -such as the
institutional place of the Committee for regional policy, tire type of financial instrument, the eligibility
conditions, etc.- were made by the Commission but, substantially, the broad terms of tire Community
intervention on regional policy remained valid.
A role in regional economic policy for tire Community was laid down in tire regional regulations of 18
March 1975, but had tire Community actually gained a competence of pursuing an actual regional
policy? A form of solidarity had been attained at least in quantitative terms, because financial
solidarity worked in favour of those countries with tire deepest imbalances'". Nonetheless, die
operation of die ERDF was drawn up to unequivocally support die development measures of member
states. The Community system of aids put in place in March 1975 clearly gave no assurance diat die
Community was to effectively perform a regional policy apart from redistributing budgetary sums. To
start widi, no delimitation of specific Community regional imbalances was attained. The Commission
had proposed eligible regions as diose complying to die criteria of low revenue per capita,
unemployment and migration. In die end however, all nationally assisted regions became eligible for
ERDF. Second, die varied intensity of assistance in favour of die most needy regions at Community
level was also diwarted. Indeed, even diough the Commission had proposed die ERDF to apply
different rates of assistance, die modulation according to die relative necessity and to the Community
interest and quality of die projects (die effective contribution to job creation and maintenance) was
scrapped too. Interference in the political discretion to decide where and in which amount assistance
was to fall was feared and, dius, ruled out.
On die odier hand, die capacity of die Commission to influence national policies emerging in March
1975 had more of a potential than an actual force. The function of co-ordination, as proposed by die
Commission, allowed die Commission to be informed regularly on die socio-economic situation of die
regions of die Community as well as to be informed on development plans -even diough the capacity
to influence regional policies was going to prove dependent on die degree of detail of programmes
submitted for approval to die Community. Also, concerning the comparison of budgetary projections
for regional purposes, the Commission would gain die chance to know and to recommend
152 Through the quota system Italy, Ireland and UK were to receive 74 % of the total of the ERDF resources while
these three countries contributed to 34.9% of the total budget of the Community. Romus P. (1975). Introduction
a I'economie Europeenne from the Annual Budget 1975 -Budget pour Vexercice 1975, JO L 175 du 7 July 1975,
p.36-37.
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modifications in the expenditures, notably to propose changes in budgetary loads in so far as the
Community interest was concerned. National delegations -lar from accepting the original
Commission's proposal to chair the Committee for regional policy- accepted, nonetheless, to
institutionalise the Commission's right of opinion and proposition, notably, on issues of co-ordination
among national measures, on policy options, on budgetary policy, on the use of Community resources
and, overall, on the direction towards a Community regional policy.
Certainly, the Commission expected that the appropriations from Community own resources to the
ERDF would not only become permanent but increase in the future. Nonetheless, to start with,
financial solidarity was never envisaged as the paramount form of intervention. Indeed, it is hard to
see how an additional -but nonetheless clearly marginal- contribution of Community financial
resources to some individual development projects could be conceived as an adequate policy response
to the severe risks posed by the lack of approximation of regional structures upon both the
continuation of the common market and the timely realisation of EMU. Financial solidarity was
understood by the Commission not only as marginal in relation to national resources but aiming at tire
more pragmatic and less ambitious objective of unloading tire disproportionate budgetary efforts that
some countries had to face in order to prepare tire attainment of EMU while keeping up with common
market rules and EMU disciplines. Being fundamentally marginal, financial solidarity was conceived
by the Commission as secondary and dependent on a function of co-ordination to be performed at
Community level. In other words, tire true impact of Community intervention would rest, first, on tire
Community's involvement at the policy-making stage, namely, at tire putting into place of regional
programmes which had been consulted with tire Committee for regional policy and approved at
Community level; second, in tire common engineering of policies for tire encouragement of public and
private investment, and third, in tire concerted intervention of national with complementary
Community means.
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IV. THE NEGOTIATIONS: THE EMU PROCESS ANI) ECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL
PARALELLISM
The long process through which the Community came to adopt the first regional policy regulations of
March 1975 is the subject of this final chapter. Chapter III has outlined the concrete terms which
regional intervention was proposed to consist of as well as the main disagreements over the technical
aspects of Community intervention. But even without taking into account the concrete disagreements
over the technical forms of Community intervention and their resolution, the acceptance of a
Community competence in regional policy i.e. the acceptance by all delegations oj the principle of an
extension of Community responsibilities into a new policy area was certainly contested. However, an
agreement of principle, on both a form of co-ordination and of regional solidarity, was reached before
the Paris Summit of October 1972 and was linked to the process of unfolding and negotiation of the
EMU Programme. Section A below will deal with the period of vigorous negotiation leading to the
agreement of principle on a regional competence. Section B will deal with the final stages of the
negotiations revolving around the modalities of Community intervention -particularly the financial
aspect. Indeed, after the Paris Summit, from 1973 till 1975, once the Nine had reached an agreement on
the points of principle, a new stage began where the issues under contention -although certainly
involved highly politicised issues, such as the size of the ERDF- became of a more technical nature.
A) The agreement of principle on both a co-ordination of national regional policies and financial
solidarity (1970-1972)
Let us recall from chapters I and II that, at its own discretion, and via two successive Memorandums in
February and December 1969, the Commission warned the Council of the damaging effects of economic
policy divergence for the continuation of the common market and, thus, argued that incompatible
medium term -but also short term- economic policy choices were the reflection, among other causes, of
structural disparities. Notably, an uneven pattern of success in the achievement of structural
transformations played a decisive part in economic divergence and policy incompatibility. Then,
amongst the major structural disparities putting at risk the continuation of the common market, the
Commission pointed to structural rigidities at regional level and proposed two strands of action: a task of
co-ordination of national regional policies and the undertaking of concrete concerted actions of regional
development accompanied by a measure of Community regional solidarity. The negotiation of both
strands of action took different paces; the agreement of principle on the undertaking of co-ordination of
national regional policies was accepted relatively swiftly (point 16), whereas the agreement of principle
on financial solidarity proved much more arduous (point 17). Both however, were agreed before October
1972.
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16. The acknowledgement by the Council of DGII's conceptualisation and the acceptance of
principle of a co-ordination of national regional policies
The reception by the Medium-term economic policy Committee of DGII's structural diagnosis -of the
causes of the divergent performance of the economies of the Six put forward by the 1 Barre Plan- was
truly auspicious. The Medium-term economic policy Committee said in its opinion on the I Barre Plan:
A co-ordination, even if strengthened in the medium term, of the global economic policy objectives
(growth, employment, prices and balance of payments) risks to prove insufficient. Experience
shows, in fact, that compatible global orientations in themselves can hide, during a certain time,
certain structural disequilibria. The latter could run against, in the longer term, the mise en eettvre of
the concerted global objectives. The Committee therefore congratulates the Commission to have
underlined the need to search for, at the Community level and in accordance with the general
orientations of the medium term programmes, solutions to national structural problems.
The Committee considers that the most appropriate way to attain that result would consist of a
mutual and permanent consultation on decisions of structural character in the framework of the
development strategies followed in the long term. To this effect, it envisages to proceed, in
conformity with the mission that it has been trusted by the decision of the Council of 15 April 1964.
to exchange views regularly towards a concertation in this field1.
In the above statement the Medium-term economic policy Committee acknowledged die principle of
structural action by the Community institutions even though, as it will be seen below, the actual type of
structural action proposed by the Medium-term economic policy Committee was circumscribed to the
examination in common of structural policy guidelines.
The favourable terms of the Medium-term economic policy Committee were adhered to by the Council,
which on 26 January 1970, from the examination of the I Barre Plan, acknowledged the principle of
structural actions to be undertaken by the Community while the 1969 proposal had still not been
debated by the Council. The Council of 26 January 1970 accepted the assessment of the I Barre Plan and
agreed to the Commission's suggestion to elaborate the III MTEP Programme on the basis of global
compatible orientations. On this occasion the Council also accepted the laying down -in the III MTEP
Programme- of priority structural actions and it expressly directed the Medium-term economic policy
Committee to spell out priorities for Community action on structural geographical imbalances. In giving
this mandate to the Medium-term economic policy Committee, the Council was endorsing the
conceptualisation of a specific Community regional objective as arising from the concern for a balanced
and convergent expansion of the economies of the Six in the medium term.
The following stage would concern the range of possible Community actions in the structural field.
While the conceptualisation on regional imbalances in global structural terms i.e. linked to a search for
()' Commission, Rapport du Comite de Politique economique a moyen tertne sur le Memorandum de la Commission
au Conseil du 12 fevrier 1969 (avant-projet), Bruxelles 10 juin 1969 [OR II-133/69]. See original French text in
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convergence as brought up by the I Barre Plan, was being examined by the Council, the Commission
presented to the Council on 17 October 1969 a draft decision proposing a function of co-ordination for
the Community and the undertaking of concrete development actions concerted with national actions
and complemented with Community means. The 1969 proposal, although born out of differences
between DGXVI and DGIV (see introduction chapter III), was not a proposal aimed expressly at sectoral
(agricultural) objectives but, rather, it was a proposal for the tackling of the structural causes of
economic and policy divergence. In fact, the 1969 proposal can be understood as falling under DGII's
umbrella i.e. as putting forward regional actions as part of a package devised to effectively attain a
degree of compatibility among economic policy choices of the Six and the adequate functioning of a
common market which appeared to be at risk as a result of the divergent economic evolutions of its
members.
Before being examined by Coreper, the 1969 proposal was first examined by the Medium-term economic
policy Committee which, in April-May 1970 -while die III MTEP Programme was being prepared- gave
its opinion on it2. The reaction of the Medium-term economic policy Committee to die 1969 proposal
was lukewarm. Notably, aldiough die Medium-term economic policy Committee acknowledged die
importance of die link made by die Commission between balanced growth and structural geographical
imbalances i.e. aldiough die Medium-term economic policy Committee fully agreed with die
Commission diat die harmonisation of die orientations in the medium term ought to be coupled widi
structural actions tending to a harmonisation and to an improvement in die structures for die firm
realisation of die quantitative orientations drawn up, diis Committee believed diat radier dian pursuing
deliberate and concrete actions of development, die type of actions to be undertaken at Community level
ought essentially to be sought in die framework of general economic policy guidelines in the medium
term3. In odier words, regional action by die Community ought to consist purely of macro-economic
policy orientation:
The reduction of the existing disparities and the prevention of new disparities depends mostly on the
orientation itself of the general economic policies; besides the latter increasingly tend in all
countries to integrate in their objectives the organisation of the economic and human territory4.
Thus, in contrast to die Commission's proposal -for die latter intended a common examination of
concrete regional problems as well as, crucially, die undertaking of concerted interventions- the
Medium-term economic policy Committee advocated solely die task of examining in common national
appendix. Incidentally, the Council decision of 15 April 1964 referred to in the quotation, concerned the
establishment of the Medium-term economic policy Committee and the laying down of its tasks (point 2, chapter I).
2 Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Projet revise. Avis sur la proposition de decision
du Conseil relative a /'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional
(presentee par la Commission au Conseil), Bruxelles 23 avril 1970 [OR 11-397/70],
3 Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Reunion des suppliants du 30 janvier 1970.
Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 4 fevrier 1970, p. 1 [2243/11/70],
4 Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Projel revise. Avis sur la proposition de decision
du Conseil relative a I'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpemenl regional.
p.2 [OR 11-397/70], Original French text in appendix.
regional policies within medium term economic policy priorities and the opportunity to study first of all,
rather than to propose, specific actions5. Indeed, the choice made by the Medium-term economic policy
Committee -alter having been given the Council mandate of 26 January 1970- to opt in favour of dealing
with regional action within the scope of medium term economic co-ordination rather than in die
framework presented by die Commission in its proposal of October 1969 was a choice purely for issuing
structural policy recommendations. Nonedieless, die Medium-term economic policy Committee pointed
out diat Community intervention ought to be confined to problems of common interest and it approved
the Commission's intention to establish priorities'.
Regarding die concrete instruments proposed by die Commission in October 1969, and in particular
regarding die setting up of a permanent Committee for regional policy, the Medium-term economic
policy Committee underlined die utility of regular meetings among Slate representatives and die
Commission in order to study die elements of regional policy which deserved to be discussed in
common7. However, not all members approved of the competences diat die Commission wanted to grant
to such a body. Disagreement over die tasks to be undertaken by such a committee for regional policy as
well as in relation to its institutional location arose. Firstly, a Committee for regional policy animated by
the Commission caused institutional difficulties since regional policy remained a national responsibility.
Besides, according to die Medium-term economic policy Committee, since die ultimate aim was the
insertion of regional policy into medium term economic policy guidelines, such Committee ought to be
placed under die orbit of die Medium-term economic policy Committee or, odierwise, a part of its
members ought to be also seating at die Medium-term economic policy Committee itself. Only diis way
would die links and an effective articulation between regional policy and medium term economic policy-
be guaranteed. In sum, die Medium-term economic policy Committee opted to deal widi regional issues
in die context of global medium term economic guidelines and as a subcommittee of die Medium-term
economic policy Committee8.
Aldiough die type of regional actions advocated by the Medium-term economic policy Committee kept
regional policy widiin die confines of global economic policy orientations, die acceptance of the
undertaking of concrete actions of development was going to be agreed in die next months by die
Council. Indeed, die actual examination of die 1969 proposal by die Council, which was pending, began
just a few days after die project of III MTEP Programme had been transmitted. The first reactions widiin
Coreper were not promising: at die preparation of die Council session by die Coreper session of 25 July
5 Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Projel de compte-rendu succinct de la 38etne
reunion du Coinite (13 fevrier 1970), Bruxelles 18 fevrier 1970 , p.3 [2250/11/70].
' Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Reunion des suppleants des 11 el 12 Mars 1970.
Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 9 avril 1970, p.2. [OR 11-391/70],
7 Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen tenne, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la 39eme
reunion du Comite (28 avril 1970), Bruxelles 1 juin 1970 [OR 0- 408/70].
8 hi those same confines of global economic policy, making recommendations and retaining the globalist stance, the
Medium-term economic policy Committee submitted the preliminary draft of III MTEP Programme keeping
regional action to recommendations on the economic policy sphere rather than proposing the acquiring of concrete
capacities of action for the Community. The project of III MTEP Programme was transmitted -without amendment;
from the Commission- to the Council on 23 January 1970.
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1970 ihe French ambassador ruled out any concrete action on regional policy but accepted to take
regional policy to the Council for a general debate9. A questionnaire outlining a possible range of actions
by the Community in the regional domain was prepared by tire subgroup of economic questions of
Coreper and transmitted to the Council to facilitate the discussion of the ministers10. The Council of 26-
27 October 1970, however, found after holding a general debate on the 1969 Proposal that on the basis
of that questionnaire, delegations displayed a fair degree of agreement on various points of principle,
and indeed, on some common denominators. Thus, the Council made its very lirst choices regarding
regional action and accepted for the first time that the Community had a responsibility in regional policy
for the correction of severe (urgent) regional disequilibria within what had then become a programme
for EMU". Concretely, the Council agreed unanimously on four common denominators'2: (1) permanent
confrontation; (2) the undertaking of concerted actions and the co-ordination of regional policies: (3)
action in the field of regional aids; and (4) a better utilisation of existing financial means.
By (1) a permanent confrontation, the Council accepted the discussion in common of objectives, means,
methods and experiences of regional development among the Six on a regular basis. As concerns (2) co¬
ordination, the Council understood co-ordination as a progressive aim involving the undertaking of
concerted actions and appropriate solutions at Community level for some specific -but not agreed upon-
regional priorities. Regarding the creation of a Committee for regional policy as the instrument to carry
out the co-ordination, the Council noted the utility of such a Committee but it disagreed over its tasks
and its institutional location. Indeed, most delegations opposed a committee of regional development
within the orbit of the Commission. Regarding (3), the Council agreed on the need to continue the
search to attain a co-ordination of regional aid systems -as in fact was taking place under the direction of
DGIV (point 9, chapter II)- while the Commission promised to inform the Council on the conclusion of
these works13. As far as (4) tire creation of new financial instruments for specific regional purposes is
concerned, the Council displayed an overtly negative reaction and could only agree on the opportunity to
study the potentialities and the better utilisation of existing means
9 Commission, Note a /'attention des membres de la Commission, Objet: 565etne reunion du Comite des
Representants permanents 23/7/1970, Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a I'organisation de moyens
d'action en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale de la Convnunaute, 25 Juillet
1970 [SEC(70) 2884],
10 See Conseil, Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 568eme reunion tenue a Bruxelles, les 15-17 septembre 1970
[1683/70 (RP/CRS 30)] and Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a I'organisation de
moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional el Note sur la politique regionale dans
la Communaute [R/1791/1/70 (ECO 184) (FIN 335) rev.l],
11 Cros (1975) op. cit., p.43.
12 See Conseil, Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 129eme session tenue les 26/27 octobre 1970
[It/2457/70], Conseil, Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 129eme session tenue les 26/27 octobre
1970 [T/641/70] and Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de moyens
d'action de la Convnunaute en matiere de developpement regionale el Note sur la politique regionale, Bruxelles 6
Novembre 1970 [R/2276/70 (ECO 229) (FTN468)] including Annexe: Compte rendu sommaire des opinions et
commentaires exprimes par les dijferents delegations au cours de la session du Conseil des 26/27 Octobre 1970
sur la liste d'options en matiere de politique regionale.
13 These works were completed by 23 June 1971 and the Commission transmitted to the Council the
Communication of 30 June 1971: Communication de la Commission au Conseil concernanl les regimes generaux
d 'aides afinalite regionale, JO C 111 du 4.11.71.
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To sum up, the Council of 26-27 October 1970 displayed some basic common points of agreement (in
principle) and acknowledged regional actions beyond an intervention confined solely to policy
recommendations -as upheld by the Medium-term economic policy Committee. From national
preferences a minimal agenda of concrete actions had been agreed in principle.
By March 1971, these common denominators of preliminary agreement regarding action in the regional
domain were first confirmed by the adoption by the Council of the III MTEP Programme. Indeed, on 8-9
February 1971 tire Council adopted the III Programme14, and in its regional provisions, it confirmed tire
common denominator views that tire Council had recorded on 26-27 October 1970 (let us recall that
responding to tire Council's mandate of 26 January 1970, the Medium-term economic policy Committee
was entrusted to drawing up tire 111 MTEP Programme on tire basis of compatible macro-economic
objectives for tire period 1971-1975 as well as to define tire main structural actions which needed to be
undertaken at national and Community level). In a section devoted to tire role of the Community in tire
structural field15, (lie 111 MTEP Programme noted that tire main task of tire Community in tire structural
field consisted of favouring tire formation of a large unified market by primarily 'framework actions'.
Yet, framework actions alone were not sufficient to respond to the possibilities offered by the large
common market, neither to prevent increasing disparities nor to avoid national actions neutralising each
other. In fact, specific concerted actions, to deal directly with certain structural disparities which could
unbalance the process of economic and social development of the Community, needed to be engaged
urgently16. Concretely, the III MTEP Programme made a choice for certain types of structural actions
whose importance seemed paramount in order to favour a balanced social and economic development
and drew guidelines on them". Among other types of structural actions, and particularly as far as
regional actions were concerned, the III MTEP Programme chose: first, a better concertation regarding
infrastructures and the main sectoral policies bearing in mind their interactions with regional
development, and second, a co-ordination of aids in the sense of confronting major cases in order to
develop a doctrine in the field as well as co-ordinating regional aid systems as such. But beyond such
concertation and co-ordination, the III MTEP Programme stated a shared responsibility regarding
regional problems:
the balanced development of the Community implied that to the states' responsibility a Community
responsibility was added in relation to certain problems of common interest18.
All in all, the III MTEP Programme was laying down the acceptance in principle to confront i.e. to
examine in common, and to co-ordinate national regional policies", as well as defending the need for
14 Officially the III MTEP Programme was adopted on 22 March 1971, JO L49 du 1.3.71.
15 See paragraphs 107 to 125.
16 Paragraph 107.
17 Paragraph 109. See original French text in appendix.
18 Paragraph 119 of III MTEP Programme. See original French text in appendix.
19 Paragraphs 117 and 118.
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actual and concrete interventions on a number of priority problems of common interest20. Concerning
financial means, it also made recommendations on the national use of financial incentives, called for a
better use of existing Community means, and the study and reform of existing Community financial
resources and the creation of new ones -should the existing means proved insufficient21 -as had been
agreed on 26 October 1970. But it was particularly in the definition of the scope or the field of
application of Community intervention where the major contribution of tire III MTEP Programme would
reside. Indeed, a progressive co-ordination of regional policies and of regional aid schemes had been
agreed in principle by the Council on 26 October 1970, but disagreements in the definition of the
priorities to guide Community interventions remained unsettled. In fact, the delimitation of die common
problems of Community interest had so far proved controversial. But the III MTEP Programme laid
down an agreed set of priorities among problems of common interest, namely, die problems of large
backward agricultural regions, frontier regions, problems arising from die regional impact of principal
common policies (CAP), and regions in decline due to changes in dominant economic activities22. These
priorities were also re-confirmed by die resolution on the attainment of EMU by stages adopted by die
Council at die same Council session which officially adopted die III MTEP Programme.
Recapitulating, the agreement of principle to the co-ordination of national regional policies took place
officially on 22 March 1971 widi die adoption by die Council and die Governments of die member states
of die III MTEP Programme. Yet die engagements of principle made by die Council in die III MTEP
Programme were not going to change die fact diat disagreements remained on die manner in which die
co-ordination and die concertation of actions would take place. Indeed, die III MTEP Programme did
not enter into die materialisation of co-ordination, such technical work corresponded to Coreper in die
examination of the 1969 proposal; rather, die contribution of die engagements made in the III MTEP
Programme -even if diey were not binding- was to state die political intentions of principle.
Widi die co-ordination of national regional policies being accepted in principle from March 1971.
negotiations from dien onwards would concern only die modalities of such co-ordination. Particularly,
die disagreement regarding die institutional position of die Committee for regional policy, as die
instrument to promote the co-ordination of national regional policies (point 12.2, chapter III), was going
to become die main issue of contention among delegations, while die elements of concertation between
national and Community systems of aids in undertaking concrete development actions were going to be
discussed in die context of die setting up of die procedure for the intervention of financial instruments.
17. The agreement of principle on financial solidarity within the context of EMU
20 See paragraph 119 of III MTEP Programme.
21 See paragraphs 123-125.
22 See the quote of the priority problems of common interest as spelled out in the III Programme in point 14.1
(chapter III).
187
The process of EMU was instrumental to the acceptance of a regional policy for the Community. Not
only did the progress in the negotiations over the Commission's concrete proposals -particularly as far as
regional solidarity was concerned- proved dependent on progress in the EMU agenda but.
fundamentally, EMU offered the backdrop against which most delegations came to accept structural
actions, while also providing a crucial boycott value to turn into acceptance the opposition to the
regional dossier. Clearly, the linkage of regional policy to EMU originally made by the Commission in
the I Barre Plan proved determinant in the attaining of a convergence of views among delegations. So,
how and in which specific terms did the EMU agenda fuel the acceptance of a regional dossier?
17.1. The. first resolution EMU: structural parallelism and 'appropriate resources' in the first stage
EMU
On 1-2 December 1969 the Heads of State and Government at The Hague stated their political will to
endeavour to proceed by stages towards the achievement of economic and monetary union and entrusted
the Council to draw up a plan of action in order to attain by stages, and on die basis of Lite 1 Barre Plan,
an EMIT3. In fact, since the end of 1968 interest in monetary co-operation at Community level had
grown among EEC countries for internal reasons as well as conditioned by external developments,
namely, an international context of gradual collapse of the Bretton-Woods system.
From 22 July 1944 the Bretton Woods agreements provided the rules of an open and liberal post-war
economic order to govern the international monetary system24. Unlike the classic gold standard system,
die Bretton Woods system introduced a new monetary regime based on die gold-dollar standard25. In
fact, widi the introduction of die Bretton Woods system what was left of die gold standard was solely a
system for pegging exchange rates to one anodier by defining them in terms of fixed weights of gold, but
since die price of gold was low and no international transaction was settled in gold, in practice, a dollar
system was installed. Conspicuously, however, under die Bretton Woods system die US was, in practice,
exempt from maintaining the equilibrium of its balance of payments. Effectively the US could conduct
its monetary policy in die light of its national political objectives as well as enjoying an exceptional
advantage in terms of trade, as it could purchase odier countries' products by resorting to die issuing of
excessive quantities of paper money (Moussis, 1994). Thus a mass outflow of dollars, dirough the
balance of payments deficit, soon led to a mass of dollars accumulating from year to year outside die US.
23 See final Communique of The Hague Conference of 1-2 December 1969 in JO C 136/15 du 11.11.1970.
24 Through the creation the International Monetary Fund and the laying down of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the Bretton Woods system established a new multilateral trading system. The agreements set
out three main principles: the convertibility of currencies between one another, the equilibrium of balances of
payments and the maintenance of fixed parities, which meant that it was for each country to defend the parity of ils
currency as defined by a certain weight in gold. Moussis N. (1994) Access to European Union. Brussels, Edit Eur.
25 That is, gold remained the ultimate unit of account but only in the sense that the dollar was pegged to gold and
other currencies pegged to the dollar. Thus, while the US held its reserves in gold; other central banks could keep
their reserves either in gold or in dollars -or pound sterling- which could in principle be converted into gold. 'But
the new gold-dollar standard was very different from the classical gold standard. Gold coins were not to circulate;
there were tough restrictions on gold import and exports; national currencies could no longer be converted at central
banks; and citizens of participating countries could not even hold gold for most purposes. Under these new
arrangements gold reserves and domestic money supplies were even less closely linked than before'. Dyson (1994).
Op. cit., p. 42.
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especially in Europe26. Apart from Lhe shortcomings by the IMF in the collective supervision of the
exchange rates, ultimately, the downfall of the Bretton Woods system was attributable to the structural
problem of the anchor currency, Lhe US dollar (Dyson, 1994). That is, by providing reserves to the rest
of the world the US was incurring in persistent balance of payments' deficits which, aggravated by the
consequences of Lhe Vietnam War, led gradually to destroy both Lhe credibility of the Bretton Woods
system and, particularly, Lhe confidence in die dollar's convertibility. Already in 1968 the US Treasury
ceased to allow Germany and others to draw on US gold reserves. Although the concrete collapse of die
Bretton Woods system did not occur till August 1971 -with die suspension of the convertibility of die
dollar into gold- (point 17.2), die de facto end of die convertibility had already taken place in March
1968 witli die creation of a two-tier gold market (Tsoukalis, 1977).
Yet, although certainly influenced by die background of external factors, die consideration by die
Community of monetary co-operation in Lhe late 1960s targeted, in particular, die inlra-Community
effects of die international monetary turmoil, Unit is, the risks posed for die continuation of die common
market and die functioning of die CAP as arising from intra-EEC exchange-rate modifications. Indeed,
up to die late 1960s, exchange rates widiin die Community had remained relatively stable; but diis fairly
long period of exchange stability, as well as die Governments' widespread belief in die permanent fixity
of intra-EEC exchange rates, came to an end by 1968, as die Community came to experience die first
severe monetary crisis of its history.
The domestic political crisis of May 1968 in France and a substantial deterioration of die French balance
of payments (see point 1, chapter I) fuelled speculative attacks on die FF which led die French
Government to introduce exchange controls. Side by side with die worsening French evolution, die large
payments surplus trend in Germany not only underlined the structural power of Germany widiin die
EEC, but also propelled financial market operators to speculate on a devaluation of die FF and/or a
revaluation of die DM (Dyson, 1994). An emergency meeting of die Group of Ten (G-10) was convened
in November 1968 in Bonn. This meeting, in which Britain, France and die US put strong pressure on
die Federal government to revalue die DM and ended widiout Germany yielding, not only condemned
die FF to devaluation but, moreover, gave die evidence, to France in particular, diat German economic
power was to be feared (Tsoukalis, 1977). In May 1969 a new speculative crisis broke out. Funds from
odier European countries as well as die US flowed into Germany in prospect of a revaluation of die DM
and widi die objective of a speculative gain27. Once more, die pressure from US, Britain and France to
revalue die DM proved fruitless and die German Finance minister ruled out revaluation.
Crucially as well, die interest on monetary co-operation for the two countries which were going to lead
die process ofmonetary integration i.e. Germany and France, shifted by the end of die 1960s (Tsoukalis,
1977). On die one hand, in France the strong fear of a loss of national sovereignty and die reluctance to
26 These dollars in circulation outside the US gradually became the instrument for a market independent of any
monetary authority, the Euro-dollar market.
27 Tsoukalis (1977), Op. cit., p.75 notes that in May 1968, at the climax of the crisis, the daily inflow of funds into
Germany reached US$1,500m.
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accept any scrutiny in national economic policy was put aside as post De Gaulle French policy makers -
the General had resigned in April 1969- realised that, laced with a display ol" German might, neither the
strength of the French economy and balance of payments nor fixed intra-EEC exchange rates were
guaranteed any longer. On the odier hand, while for Germany, since the signing of the EEC Treaty, the
Atlantic Community was considered the ideal framework for economic and monetary co-operation, by
the end of the transition period, the perception of deteriorating altitudes towards Germany and a new
coalition of power saw the growing importance of EEC markets for Germany i.e. the increase of
economic interdependence between the EEC economies28.
In this context of growing interest and national responsiveness in monetary co-operation, the 1 Barre
Plan of February 1969, which originally had a lukewarm reception, came to be increasingly welcomed in
so far as it could provide tire framework for common economic policies and for the creation of a regional
monetary bloc. The governmental initiative and drive was taken, in fact, by Chancellor Brandt in
December 1969 at the Hague Summit2'. The German Chancellor emphasised the degree of
interdependence between die EEC countries and called for the creation of a European EMU in two
stages. The first would concentrate on die creation of die necessary conditions for die convergence of die
economies of die Six and, if die Community were successful in formulating common economic policies,
dien a complete EMU could be attempted in die second stage. President Pompidou also endorsed die
objective of EMU, aldiough putting die emphasis on immediate monetary action. At die end of die
Conference, Heads of State and Government gave die Council a mandate to elaborate of a plan of action
leading to EMU. The elaboration and negotiation of diis programme of action towards EMU, was going
to provide die optimal bargaining 'conditions' in which the acceptance of an expansion of Community
competences into regional policy became workable.
Effectively, regional actions entered die discussions on die programme of action towards EMU dirough
the disputes between 'monetarists' and 'economists'. Let us recall (from point 3.2, chapter I) diat, in die
I Barre Plan, DGII not only had coupled economic and monetary aspects in a package responding to die
direats being posed by divergent economic and monetary evolutions to the functioning of die common
market but, furdiermore, DGII had built in a direct link between a scenario of economic and policy
divergence and its structural roots. Such parallelism between economic and monetary aspects proposed
in die I Barre Plan, however, was by no means incontestable to national delegations -let alone a parallel
structural agenda. Indeed, die debate in the run up to die adoption of a plan by stages towards EMU was
characterised by two major positions. On die one hand, die monetarist approach: primarily defended by
diose countries undergoing monetary turmoil -mainly France- but also Belgium and Luxembourg; and.
on die odier, die economist position led by Germany, and followed by die Nedierlands and Italy, which
stressed die priority for economic policy co-ordination in order to procure die necessary policy
convergence which would securely lead to the realisation of a complete EMU.
28 Tsoukalis (1977) Op. cit., p. 80-81.
29 Although EMU was mentioned by almost all representatives of the member countries at The Hague Summit the
tone of the conference was clearly set by the German Chancellor. Tsoukalis (1977) p. 85.
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Disagreement in relation to the strategy to attain monetary unification was clearly revealed for die first
time at the Hague Summit30. As mentioned above, Chancellor Brandt proposed to proceed through two
stages. In the first stage, the Community would pursue the attainment of economic policy co-ordination
by the adoption of compatible macro-economic policy objectives in the medium term and an effective
harmonisation of short term economic policy as both proposed by the I Barre Plan. If. and only if, the
Community was successful in formulating common economic policies, a subsequent stage of completion
could be launched with the creation of a European Reserve Fund, to which Germany was in principle
prepared to transfer a proportion of its foreign reserves31. Yet, particularly for tire interests of this thesis,
by 1970 the German 'economist' position not only gave an absolute priority to economic co-ordination
measures but also advocated structural action, or what one could refer to as 'structural or regional
parallelism'. Namely, according to the German Federal finance minister Schiller3-, as die economies of
die Six had reached a high degree of interconnection, economic disequilibria among member states had
started to translate at Community level into distortions and restrictions to die circulation of goods,
services and capital, with die final consequence of influencing directly and immediately die evolution of
the Community as a whole, as well as disrupting die functioning of the common organisation of die
agricultural sector. In pure macroeconomic terms, decisive progress in the harmonisation and co¬
ordination of economic policies was vital. Yet, while divergences in die economic objectives were partly
die result of structural differences, die existence of severe economic disequilibria among die economies
of die Six could compromise die realisation of die common macroeconomic global objectives as well as
rendering monetary union illusory. Positive action was needed in order to place differences between
national structures within limits which would not hinder die general evolution of the Community. Thus,
a first stage of EMU needed to pursue die creation of die preparatory grounds for die harmonisation of
economic and monetary policies and, precisely to this end, action in die regional field was a
requirement. A second stage would concern die realisation of a more balanced economic development.
At tlie end of this second stage, the harmonisation and co-ordination of economic policies needed to be
so advanced as to exclude die occurrence of external disequilibria among the members. A diird stage
would allow die actual entering into an EMU. At this stage, appropriate structural policy measures
would be undertaken to improve economic structures of the Community and increase policy efficacy.
Not only in order to prevent a system of monetary support from becoming a bottomless pit, but also to
prevent 'irresponsible' economic policies thwarting the attainment of exchange and price stability.
30 T.soukalis (1977) Op. cit., chapter 5.
31 According to Tsoukalis although the first explicit declaration by the Chancellor accepting the creation of a
European reserve Fund to which the Federal Republic would be prepared to transfer a given proportion of its
foreign reserves did not take place until The Hague Summit, the setting up of a European Monetary Fund and the
institutionalisation of a system of mutual aid for balance of payments reasons was seemingly accepted at political
level in December 1968. Tsoukalis L. (1977), Op. cit. p.27. The readiness of Germany to contribute financially is
also noted by Kruse 1). C. (1980) Monetary Integration in Western Europe: EMU, EMS and Bey ond, p. 242.
32 See letter by M. Schiller, Federal minister of economic affairs to M. Jean Rey President of the Commission.
Brussels 18 February 1970 [SA(70) 1463] enclosing a Memorandum of the German Government on the realisation
of EMU: Le Ministre Federal des affaires economiques, Memorandum: Lignes generates d'un plan par etapes pour
la realisation de I'union economique et monetaire de la CEE, Bonn 12 fevrier 1970.
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structural actions were, in principle, welcome to German eyes. The first signs of a favourable German
reception of actions for the approximation of the structures of the members came at the time of the
examination of the I Barre Plan. Germany was, in fact, the only delegation insisting all throughout the
Council's examination of the I Barre Plan that the definition in common of macro-economic objectives
in die medium term was not sufficient to attain a real co-ordination of policies, but rather, that structural
actions ought to be launched in parallel33. Throughout the 1970s Germany would advocate paramount
importance to action towards economic and policy convergence and on the structural aspects which
contributed to both. All in all, in the run up to the embracing of the monetary programme, structural
actions were understood by Germany as part and parcel of the attainment of the co-ordination of national
economic policies. Besides Germany and DGII34, the Italian delegation would be the overt activist in
pushing for a regional competence for the Community in tire context of EMU. The Italian stance by the
late 1969 and the early 1970s is described by Tsoukalis as similar to that of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Indeed, although in the following years the Italian Lira would enter into severe balance of payments
difficulties, by 1969, Italy still enjoyed a situation of continuous payments surpluses35. The Netherlands,
however, despite displaying an overall economic performance very close to German evolution and siding
with Germany in its defence of priority for economic co-ordination, always proved very reluctant to
regional actions.
The 'economist' stance found in France the most direct opponent. Indeed, in opposition to the Italian
and German position, which considered parallelism and structural action as decisive to guarantee the
realisation of EMU35, the French felt unevenly attracted to the monetary flank of the EMU package.
Notably, particularly prone retain full sovereignty in economic policy and keen on the element of
monetary solidarity i.e. to the mechanisms of support in the short and medium term. France remained
reluctant to accept both institutional consequences as well as an interference on national structural
policies. For the French, monetary measures were of a vital interest and paramount for both die survival
of the common market and the operation of the CAP, while economic commitments and structural
actions were subsidiary and, thus, would follow in due time as EMU would gradually unfold. Indeed, at
the core of the row between economists and monetarists there was the controversial aspect of a mutual
aid system for the correction of disequilibria in national balances of payments. DGII had tried in the I
33 See p. 2 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Memorandum de la Commission an Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute -Resume des observations principales
presentees tors de la reunion du Comite des representants permanents le 17 juin 1969. Bruxelles 20 juin 1969
[R/1055/69 (AGRI 141) (FIN 134)], p.2 of Commission, Note a I'attention des Membres de la Commission. Objet:
517eme reunion du comite des Representants Permanents du 17 juin 1969 -Memorandum de la Commission au
Conseil sur la coordination des politiques economiques el la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute.
Bruxelles 19 juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2419], p.2 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil
sur la coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaule, -Examen
par le Comite des Representants pennanents, Bruxelles 14 juillet 1969 [If/1316/69 (AG 181) (FIN 187 jJ.
34 See points 3, 5 and 6 of Commission, Communication au sujet de I'elaboration d'un plan par etapes vers une
union economique et monetaire, Bruxelles 4 mars 1970 ]COM(70) 300],
35 Tsoukalis (1977), Op. cit., p. 74.
36 See Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objel: SHOeme reunion du Comite
des Representants pennanents: 9/10.12.1970, -Realisation par etapes de I.'union economique et monelaire dans la
Communaute, Bruxelles 12 decembre 1970 [SEC(70) 4596],
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Barre Plan to strike a balance between monetary solidarity and structural measures. The 1 Barre Plan
had proposed that within an EMU, situations of fundamental disequilibria and the risk of national
governments' resorting to parity modifications in order to recover equilibrium were addressed by the
establishment of a mutual aid system, ultimately, a monetary fund which would intervene in situations
where a member state was faced either with difficulties or with severe risks of difficulties in the balance
of payments37. Particularly concerning tire creation of such a monetary fund, the economist approach
held that the sole creation of such a financial instrument was insufficient and defended a parallel action
on the actual structural causes of disequilibria, notably, in order to minimise a tendency to a repeated
resort to such monetary instrument. Opposed to the economist approach, the monetarists defended
monetary solidarity vividly, while portraying a far less zealous attitude towards economic policy co¬
ordination -let alone structural solidarity. In brief, while the economist position perceived regional
action by the Community to prevent the loss of external equilibria and the over-resorting to monetary
solidarity, the monetarist approach would simply not accept structural actions linked to monetary
objectives.
All in all, although the I Barre Plan had placed the regional dossier within the considerations of a plan
by stages towards EMU, such policy linkage was only supported by Germany and Italy. Clearly the
'necessity' of regional action in the context of EMU, as from 1970, was by no means shared by all
delegations, as the priority -meaning also the simultaneity and efficacy- of economic policy co¬
ordination in a programme towards monetary union was questioned by the monetarists countries, and
particularly by France. Indeed, rather than inevitable, the concrete step to start up certain type of action
regarding the problem of unharmonised structures would have to result from the acquiescence of all
delegations, that is, as a result of a political decision which, to make any headway, was going to require
an imposition of political will over the most reluctant delegations.
So, while the EMU Programme was induced, by the policy linkage drawn in the I Barre Plan, to reflect
on the need -in principle- for regional actions, and concrete proposals for regional action were available
in the background (let us recall that just some months before, in October 1969, the Commission had
submitted to the Council a proposal to organise means of action towards regional development i.e. the
1969 proposal38), the EMU Programme started to unfold resolutely. Indeed, in order to devise a plan of
action leading to EMU, the Council set up an ad hoc working party gathering the five presidents of the
Monetary Committee, the Committee of governors of Central Banks, tire Medium-term economic policy
Committee, the Short-term economic policy Committee and the Budgetary Committee and the
Commission under the presidency of Pierre Werner39, through which all member states were represented.
The Council's mandate of 6 March 1970 instructed the drawing up of a Report (the future Wemer
37 The Commission had proposed in the 1 Barre Plan of February 1969 the creation of a medium term -as well as a
short term -mechanism of financial support (see point 3.2.). In March 1971 the Council adopted a decision in favour
of such creation. See particularly article 2 of Decision (71/143/CEE) du Conseil du 22 mars 1971 portant la mise
en place d'un mecanisme de concours financier a moyen terrne, JO L 73/15 du 27.3.71.
38 By mid 1970 only the Medium-term economic policy Committee had produced an opinion on the 1969 proposal
(point 16), that is, Coreper had not yet started the examination of the 1969 proposal.
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Report) on the realisation by stages of EMU, which would analyse different suggestions and lay down
the fundamental options for the realisation of an EMU by stages40.
While the Werner Group prepared its report, DGI1 submitted a new Memorandum -II Barre Plan-
which, for our interest, followed the contents of the 1 Barre Plan and insisted on the principle of
parallelism and on foe requirement to support economic and monetary measures by a policy to reduce
structural disparities among member states'". Clearly the fact that The Hague Conference of 1-2
December 1969 called for foe elaboration of a plan to attain EMU by stages on the basis of the I Barre
Plan must have encouraged DGII to press resolutely for foe policy linkage between regional and
economic aspects of an EMU plan of action.
On 20 May 1970 foe Werner Group transmitted an interim report42 -the conclusions of which were
adopted by foe Council on 8-9 June 197043- and a final report on 13 October 197044. From foe beginning,
the Werner Group shared common views on the final objective of EMU which it defined as 'die total and
irreversible convertibility of currencies, die elimination of fluctuation in exchange rates, die irrevocable
fixing of parity rates and die complete liberation of movements of capital', as well as on die time scale
for die completion of such an objective i.e. in die course of die decade. Yet, die Committee disagreed on
two major points: die strategy to follow in order to reach die final objective, and die political and
institutional implications of die running and attainment of a European EMU45.
Particularly concerning the strategies to reach monetary unification, economists and monetarists
disagreed on die contents of die first stage of EMU. For economists, monetary unification implied die
realisation of an economic union; whereas for monetarists, die Community could reach a de facto
39 At the time, Prime minister and Minister of finance in the government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
40 Notably: un rapport comportant une analyse des dijferentes suggestions et pennettant de degager les options
fondainentales d'une realisation par etapes de Vunion economique et monetaire de la Communaute. See Decision
du Conseil du 6 Mars 1970 relative a la procedure en matiere de cooperation economique et monetaire JO L 59/44
du 14.3.1970 and Bulletin des CCEE 5-1970 p. 50. In English in Annexe to Bulletin of the F.ECC 11-1970.
41 See the insistence on structural parallelism in point 3 and point 5 of Commission, Communication au sujel de
I'elaboration d'un plan par etapes vers une union economique et monetaire, 4 Mars 1970 [COM(70) 300],
42 Rapport interimaire au Conseil et a la Commission concernant la realisation par etapes de 1'union economique
et monetaire de la Communaute, Werner Report, Supplement au Bulletin des CCEE. 7-1970 or in JO C 94 du
23.7.1970.
43 See p. 10-11 of Conseil, Communication a la Presse sur la 116eme session du Conseil les 8 et 9 juin 1970.
Luxembourg 9 juin 1970 [1085/70 (AG 170)].
44 On 13 October 1970 the final Report Werner was submitted to both the Council and the Commission: Report to
the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community.
Luxembourg 8 October 1970. Supplement to the Bulletin of the EECC 11-1970, or French version: Rapport au
Conseil et d la Commission concernant la realisation par etapes de I'union economique et monetaire dans la
Communaute (texte final), 15 octobre 1970, JO C 136 du 11.11.1970.
45 The report outlined three stages, defined the final stage in so far as the final objectives were concerned, laid down
the options for the first stage and left the intermediary stage open. At the final stage, the principal decisions of
economic policy would be taken at Community level, which meant institutional changes and consequent transfers of
responsibility to Community institutions. In fact, the Werner Group did not find it difficult to define the ultimate
stage of EMU except as far as the institutional and political implications for the adequate running of an EMU were
concerned. On the institutional aspects as well as on the contents of the intermediate stages, the French reluctance
to make commitments that they considered 'premature' left the intermediate stages undefined. As far as stage one
was concerned, on the institutional aspect the Werner report envisaged the creation of two new organs of decision¬
making: a centre of decisions for economic policy accountable to the European Parliament and a Community system
of Central Banks.
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monetary union without having an effective system of economic co-ordination; namely, a quick progress
in tire monetary field, by an early narrowing of fluctuation margins accompanied by a form of balance of
payments aid, would oblige national governments to co-ordinate more effectively their economic
policies. The economists feared that tire establishment of such monetary solidarity could lead to a
situation where countries in surplus would end up financing tire deficit of other countries indefinitely
without being able to force tire latter to take any corrective measures'". Concerning tire first stage of
EMU, tire dispute was about tire priority of economic co-ordination measures over strictly monetary
measures. Monetarists proposed the immediate creation of a reduced intra-EEC margin of fluctuation
within the internationally agreed margins and tire institution of a 'Exchange Stabilisation Fund' or, in
other words, credit facilities for countries in severe deficit47.
The Interim Werner Report could not strike agreement between economists and monetarists on the
question of tire introduction of tire joint float (tire snake) and tire setting up of an 'Exchange Stabilisation
Fund' during tire first stage. The final Werner Report, also unable to approximate positions while at tire
same time trying to strike consensus between monetarists and economists to launch a European EMU.
considered that economic and monetary measures were to be interdependent and reinforce one anodier
i.e. die harmonisation, and finally die unification, of economic policies should be parallel to monetary
unification. In odier words, die invocation of die principle of parallelism enabled die members of die
Werner Group to present a unanimous report (Tsoukalis, 1977). Let us not forget diat radier dian
settling policy disputes die aim of die Werner report was to identify die basic issues for a realisation of
EMU by stages; in odier words, die negotiation of policy strategies would be a matter for die Council to
sort out.
All in all, by October 1970, as die Council had on its table a consensual plan of action towards EMU,
die balance between economists and monetarists seems to have turned in favour of the latter. Indeed,
comparing the original German position, bodi at The Hague Summit and by early 1970s, widi die final
recommendations of die Werner Report, France had managed to procure large concessions: first,
concerning the institutional reform and die long-term political implications of an EMU -on which die
French did not want to make premature commitments-; second, on the laying down of intermediary
stages -which die French also refused to spell out-; and diird, and most important for the interest of diis
diesis, on die order of priorities in which die different steps towards monetary union and die provisions
for die first stage were concerned. Indeed, die compromise on parallelism struck by die Werner Group in
as far as die measures for die first stage were concerned, secured for die monetarists an experimental
launch of die snake in stage one and, if proven successful, a monetary fund would follow to manage the
mutual aid mechanisms and take over the management of reserves at a later stage. In die end, die
46 Tsoukalis (1977), Op. cit., p. 92.
47 Tsoukalis notes that although an early narrowing of intra-EEC margins of fluctuation had been discussed at the
early stages of the preparation of the Interim Report, a Exchange Stabilisation Fund, or in other words, the creation
of creating a common Fund during the first stage of EMU was completely new. Proposed by Giscard d'Estaign.
neither the Commission nor any other member state had proposed such a Fund before May 1970. Tsoukalis (1977).
Op. cit. p. 91-92.
195
compromise on the measures associated with the first stage (the narrowing of margins and tire activation
of a medium term financial aid mechanism -on which only an agreement of principle had been made)
were accepted, but seemingly, not without a serious dislike by Germany and the Netherlands, for whom
'the idea of creating a regional monetary bloc without at the same time having tire benefits from an
advanced economic and political integration within this bloc was the worst of all worlds for both
countries'48.
On tire economic co-ordination side, die final Werner Report proposed diat the basis of diat co¬
ordination should be die carrying out of at least diree annual surveys on the economic situation in die
Community45. These surveys would allow the determining, adaptation and surveying of compatible
macro-economic objectives, on die basis of which a final Annual Report on die Economic Situation of
die Community would be produced. Co-ordination of medium-term and short-term economic policy
could be enforced in die manner suggested by die I Barre Plan, and co-ordination of budgetary policy
and fiscal policy would follow suit50 in the already existing panoply of co-ordinating Committees
functioning before die Commission and die Council. Thus, in order to successfully co-ordinate economic
policies, the Werner Group seems to have considered it sufficient to draw up compatible macroeconomic
policy orientations in die medium term and to reinforce short-term economic policy co-ordination by
generalising a compulsory prior character of consultations in die above major aspects of economic
policy. Indeed, no new proposals on die aim of co-ordinating economic policies, diat is, beyond diose
proposed for die attainment of economic policy co-ordination in die I Barre Plan, were proposed by the
Werner Group; and moreover (as it will be seen below) structural actions were reduced to a radier
minimalist presence. But, structural actions aside, die terms and die weight given by the Werner report
to die need for convergence of performances and policies do not seem to have been considered
unsatisfactory by die economists countries diemselves, who, radier dian questioning the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the existing infrastructure and procedures for policy co-ordination, seem to have objected
primarily to rushing into monetary actions at a stage considered too premature i.e. before a convergence
in economic policies had been effectively attained.
All in all, die Werner Group seems to have believed that the realisation of EMU consisted simply of a
matter of political will (Tsoukalis, 1991). Indeed, as a result of die compromise between economists and
monetarists, the Werner Group seems to have considered diat die maintenance of fixed exchange rates
was not only a feasible political option for national governments, but also diat die need for concrete
Community intervention was seemingly minimal. Probably foreseeing die governments' unwillingness
48 Tsoukalis (1977) Op. cit., p. 109.
49 See section V. The first stage of final Werner Report.
50 Concerning budget policy the final Werner Report defended quantitative guidelines on the pnncipal elements of
the public budgets 'notably on global receipts and expenditure, the distribution of the latter between investment and
consumption, and the direction and amount of the balance' with a special attention to the method of financing
deficits or utilising surpluses. On fiscal policy the objective was the progressive and complete suppression of fiscal
frontiers in the Community by, as regards indirect taxes, the generalisation of the value-added tax and the adoption
of a programme of alignment of rates of tax adopted, and as far as direct taxes were concerned, by the
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to enter into coercive forms or more extensive plans which would guarantee an effective co-ordination of
economic policies, the political prioritisation of price stability over national economic policy preferences
which would guarantee stable exchange-rates was a matter left to, and depending primarily on the
political will of, the national governments. Conceiving a tighter form of co-ordination of economic
policies as well as, two, stepping in those factors with a bearing on external equilibria (i.e. the economic
structures) was probably conceived unrealistic by the Werner Group at tire time. Thus tire Werner Group
seems to have believed that by committing to EMU, member states could simply succeed in bending
national policy preferences as regards employment, growth or price levels, together with their associated
domestic pressures, to tire common interest in maintaining price stability and fixed exchange rates51. In
sum, for tire Werner Group die conclusion was diat the abandonment of die tool of changes in exchange
rates was achievable by a simple harmonisation of economic policy preferences -as die elimination of
payments imbalances depended, essentially, on die national governments having the political will to co¬
ordinate national preferences and to maintain stable exchange rates; while other factors, such as the
divergence in economic structures and dieir effect on price levels, 011 productivity imbalances and.
finally, 011 exchange rates, remained well widiin national discretion.
But what were die concrete recommendations of die Werner report concerning structural actions? As far
as structural actions in die final stage was concerned, bodi die interim Werner report and die final
Werner report recognised die need for the Community to step into new policy domains in die final stage
ofEMU:
To ensure the cohesion of the economic and monetary union, transfers of responsibility from the
national to the Community level will be essential. These transfers will be kept within the limits for
the effective operation of the Community and will concern essentially the whole body of policies
determining the realisation of general equilibrium52.
And in fact, structural geographical imbalances were earmarked as a matter affecting general economic
equilibria:
The realisation of global economic equilibrium may be dangerously threatened by differences of
structure. Co-operation between the partners in the Community in the matter of structural and
regional policy will help to surmount these difficulties, just as it will make it possible to eliminate
the distortion of competition. The solution of the big problems in this field will be facilitated by
financial measures of compensation. In an economic and monetary union, structural and regional
policies will not be exclusively a matter for national budgets53.
harmonisation of the fiscal regimes having a direct influence on the movement of capitals. See section V Final
Werner Report.
51 See p. 162 of Tsoukalis L. (1991) The New European Economy. Hie Politics and Economics of Integration.
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
52 Section III: The Ultimate Goal, Werner Report, October 1970.
53 See section ID: The Ultimate Goal.
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So, the Werner Group accepted -but in particular for the final stage -a certain transfer of competence in
regional policy in so far as structural geographical distortions were likely to influence die realisation of
general equilibrium and affect the overall development of the Community as well as provoke -via the
national responses- distortions to competition arising from regional state aids. The Werner Group
accepted co-operation among national policies for structures and, in fact, a system of structural solidarity
was unanimously recognised for a future stage of EMU where, on the one hand, die resort to national
modification of parity to recover equilibrium in die balance of payments was ruled out and where, on die
odier hand, die presence of regional imbalances would run counter to and be likely to compromise die
objectives of growth, employment, stability and external balance. Indeed, on 20 May 1970 the interim
Werner Report recommended in slightly hazy terms, for the final stage of EMU, die establishment of a
form of financial perequation:
Structural disparities could well pose a dangerous threat to the achievement of overall economic
equilibrium. Co-operation between the Community partners in the field of structural policy will help
to overcome these difficulties, while at the same time allowing distortions of competition to be
eliminated. Financial offsetting measures will make it easier to solve the key problems in this field.
Structural and regional policies cannot be implemented solely under the national budgets54.
The final Werner report of 8 October 1970 noted, in almost identical terms to die Interim Report, that
for die final stage the solution of die larger problems in the regional and structural field would be
facilitated by measures of financial compensation55.
But, even if in die context of a plan by stages towards EMU die Werner Group was accepting the need
for the creation of some form of financial solidarity, such solidarity was perceived as a requirement for a
future stage of EMU. For die first three years of die staged process, however, -notably from 1971 till
1973- die report did not accept die principle of a requirement for regional action, and certainly not on
regional solidarity. In fact, die interim Werner report made no explicit reference to a structural agenda
of actions for stage one, and only competition considerations relating to regional measures were raised
in die conclusions. Following die Interim Report, die final Werner Report took die most minimalist
position mentioning only the need to draw up in die first stage 'an inventory of die aids and subventions
in order to harmonise and allow fair competition and an approximation of die criteria for granting aids
favouring certain regions or certain industries'. Indeed, from die lack of emphasis given to structural
considerations in the Werner report, die Werner Group seems to have subscribed to die belief dial
modifications in exchange rates were purely die result of lack of economic policy co-ordination or, in
odier words, that fundamental disequilibria and die subsequent exchange-rate instability were, in
essence, a consequence of lack of policy harmonisation. In turn, diis meant diat different policy
54 'The establishment by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community: Interim report to the Council
and the Commission', Bulletin of the EECC. Supplement 7- 1970.
55 See page 11 of 'Report to the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of economic and monetae
union in the Community', Luxembourg 8 October 1970, Bulletin of the EECC. Supplement 11- 1970.
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preferences were behind disequilibria in the balance of payments, and consequently, that if national
policies were harmonised, then alterations in exchange rate could be ruled out altogether.
Particularly concerning the poor profile given by the Werner Group to a regional agenda of actions for
the first stage, on 29 October 1970 the Commission argued that the first stage ought to be completed
with actions in the regional and structural domain, in the sense of the orientations gaining ground in the
context of medium term economic policy co-ordination56. Calling on the agreements on priority
structural actions being made in the project of III MTEP Programme the Commission pointed at the
insufficient emphasis given in the final Werner Report to regional and structural needs in tire first
stage57.
In fact, tire poor consideration of regional aspects given by die Werner Group, particularly concerning
regional solidarity in a first phase of actions towards EMU, was confirmed to be shared by most national
delegations at the Council session of 26-27 October 1970. Indeed, a general opposition to any immediate
engagement on regional actions was clearly displayed at die first general Council debate on die 1969
proposal of 26-27 October 1970 (point 16). Preparing for diat Council session, Coreper had re-casted a
range of possible regional actions in a questionnaire, and die Council had accepted a number of
minimum common denominators, namely, a co-ordination of national regional policies, some co¬
ordination of regional aid systems and die study of financial possibilities. Particularly concerning
financial interventions, national options ranged from die pure acceptance of principle of a better use of
die existing means towards solving regional problems, to supporting the creation of brand new financial
means -new and specifically regional in purpose- as die Commission was suggesting in the 1969
proposal. The Council of 26-27 October 1970 could only unanimously agree on die lowest common
denominator, diat is, on die need to use better die existing means and on a previous study of die
potential adaptation of die EAGGF and of die ESF for regional objectives. In relation to die creadon of
new financial instruments to target diose regional problems constituting a Community priority, die
delegations took dieir preliminary positions: some ruled it out altogedier (France), odiers considered it
premature (Belgium, Nedierlands, Luxembourg), odiers supported it (Germany58, Italy). In sum. in die
context of die examination of die 1969 proposal die reluctance to create a regional fund was being re-
56 See p.3 of Commission, Communication el propositions de la Commission au Conseil relatives a ['institution par
etapes de I'union economique el monetaire. Bruxelles 29 octobre 1970 [COM(70) 1250],
57 Let us recall that the Council of 26 January 1970 had asked the Medium-term economic policy Committee to lay
down in the project of HI MTEP Programme concrete priority actions of regional development (point 16). The
project of Id MTEP Programme had laid down those actions and had just been transmitted to ihe Council on 23
October 1970.
058 Lot us recall that during the examination of the I Barre Plan which took place throughout 1969, only Germany
had raised and insisted on the need for structural actions. The defence of regional solidarity, even if Germanv would
end up being the paymaster for regional appropriations, seems to show the conviction of the economist position
defended by Germany who had considered from the very beginning that economic policy co-ordination was
absolutely essential to the process towards monetary unification and to its consolidation. It also seems reasonable to
believe that Germany preferred the idea of a net financial contribution towards structural causes which would
minimise the use of monetary support in the long term than to use of resources to support the deficit of
'irresponsible' economic policies narrowly defined according to national preferences.
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directed into a debate on the adaptability or insufficiency of existing Community means to respond to
regional challenges.
So, by late 1970 not only did the requirement for regional action in (lie first stage of EMU look rather
inauspicious from the conclusions of the Werner Report, but specifically, tire Council of 26-27 October
1970 had expressed (apart from the recognition of some minimum common denominators) a clear
reluctance to engage in any financial aspect of regional action in tlie immediate future. In fact, the
discussion on regional financial resources had now moved to a study of the potential of existing financial
means for regional purposes. DGXVI started the drafting of a report on existing financial possibilities
i.e. on how the existing means could be improved, which it submitted to Coreper on 5 December 1970
(point 13.3, chapter III). Clearly, by the end of 1970, irrespective of the DGII's insistence on securing a
parallel attention to a regional agenda within the first stage of EMU, it must have seemed at die time
that the cause for a regional dossier and in particular for regional solidarity was lost, as all delegations
except Italy saw regional perequation as a matter to consider in the distant future.
Yet suddenly the unexpected happened; before Coreper had begun to examined the Commission's report
on existing financial means, on 9 February 1971 the Council passed a resolution on the attainment of
EMU by stages. In this resolution the policy linkage between the regional and EMU agendas,
particularly for the first stage of EMU, which DGII had drawn up and advocated unsuccessfully since
the I Barre Plan, was unexpectedly endorsed by the Council. Concretely, in the resolution on the
achievement of EMU by stages the Council accepted the principle that -particularly during stage one of
EMU- progress on monetary union would be parallel to progress in the field of economic union and that
such parallelism would entail regional action by the Community also in a financial sense. So, how was
such a leap forward achieved in tire context of the unpromising scenario and the reluctant positions of
the majority of the delegations of late 1970? Clearly, no functional inevitability had been set off but,
rather, this political engagement to address regional problems within the context of the first stage of
EMU was the result of tough intergovernmental negotiation.
The Council of 26-27 October 1970 discussed and accepted the final Werner Report. From then onwards
the Council proceeded to the adoption of a resolution which, based on the Werner Report, would express
(lie political will to establish an EMU by 1980 as well as laying down the programme of action for the
first stage (1971-1973)59. The Council of 23 November 1970 charged Coreper to prepare the debate for a
single Council session of 14 December 1970 which would adopt this resolution. Thus, from the
beginning of December 1970 Coreper began the negotiation of this draft resolution. Leaving aside
various other sources of disagreements among delegations over the plan of action for the first stage and
59 A draft resolution had been put forward by the Commission, namely, in Communication el propositions de la
Commission au Conseil relatives a I'institution par etapes de I'union economique et monetaire. Bruxelles 29
octobre 1970 [COM(70) 1250], However, due to the unwillingness of some delegations to define the competences
which ought to be transferred for the final stage the project of resolution presented by the Commission was in fact
redrafted altogether by Coreper for a new resolution dealing and stating the competences which ought to be
transferred in the first stage solely. See p. 3 of Commission. Note a Vattention de MM. les Membres de la
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on institutional aspects of the running of an EMU, as far as regional policy is concerned, the first draft
resolution prepared by Coreper transposed the poor consideration to regional actions within the plan of
action of the Community in the first stage towards EMU given by the Werner Group. Against this
background, from December 1970 the Italian delegation in Coreper announced that its approval of the
whole resolution would remain conditional on die making by the Council of precise engagements
concerning regional actions as from 1971. Indeed, from die Coreper session of 9-10 December 1970 die
Italian delegation stated, as non-negotiable condition for die endorsing of die EMU programme as a
whole, the prerequisite of a specific engagement by die Council to take on board regional objectives in
the framework of EMU, and to do so from die first stage60. Against this sudden hard-line reaction, die
most severe opposition came from die French delegation. Already widi Coreper's examination of die
1969 proposal die French had proven to be die least keen to open up regional policy to Community
interventions. But, at die same time, die French delegation was also die least keen to see monetary
measures made subsidiary to economic co-ordination concerns or delayed by other parallel dossiers, as
France in particular, felt most die urgency to unconditionally assist chronic deficits in national balance
of payments affecting die stability of exchange rates. Subsequent sessions of die Council and Coreper :
could not reach a compromise on die Italian veto. The Italians were blocking die proceeding of die
adoption of the resolution in an attempt to gain assurance that appropriate regional decisions would be
taken in stage one of EMU. Finally, die French gave some ground in their opposition to parallel regional
actions and die Council of 8-9 February 1971 agreed on die text of die resolution on the achievement by
stages of EMU, which was officially adopted by die Council and die representatives of die member states
on 22 March 1971, hereafter referred as first resolution EMU62. Through diis first resolution EMU.
regional objectives were brought into die EMU programme as from 1971.
Commission, Objet: 580eme reunion du Comite des Representants permanents: 9/10.12.1970. -Realisation par
etapes de I'union economique et monetaire dans la Communaute, Bruxell.es 12 decembre 1970 [SEC(70) 4596],
60 See the Italian boycott stance in: Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission. Objet:
580eme reunion du Comite des Representants pennanents: 9/10.12.1970, -Realisation par etapes de 1'union
economique et monetaire dans la Communaute, Bruxelles 12 decembre 1970 [SEC(70) 4596], Commission. Note a
I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Compte rendu de la 136eme session du Conseil -Bruxelles- du
14/12/70, Bruxelles 15 decembre 1970 [SEC(70) 4626]; Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la
Commission, Objet: 583eme reunion du Comite des Representants permanents: 14/1/1971 -Questions concernant
la realisation par etapes de I'union economique et monetaire dans la Communaute, Bruxelles 18 janvier 1971
[SEC(70) 117]; Conseil, Note, Objet: Questions concernant la realisation par etapes de I'union economique et
monetaire dans la Communaute. -lstat d'avancement des travaux, Bruxelles 18 janvier 1971 [T/21/71 (FIN)];
Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objet: 584eme reunion du Comite des
Representants pennanents: 21/1/1971 -Questions concernant la realisation par etapes de I'union economique et
monetaire dans la Communaute, Bruxelles 23 janvier 1971 [SEC(71) 234]; Commission, Note a I'attention de MM.
les Membres de la Commission, Objet: 586eme reunion du Comite des Representants pennanents: 4 fevrier 1971 -
Questions concernant la realisation par etapes de I'union economique el monetaire dans la Communaute.
Bruxelles 5 fevrier 1971 ]SEC(71) 416]; Conseil, Note, Objet: Questions concernant la realisation par etapes de
I'union economique et monetaire dans la Communaute. -Projet de resolution/decision du Conseil et des
Representants des Gouvernements des Istats membres. Istat d'avancement des travaux, Bruxelles 5 fevrier 1971
[If/228/71(HN 46)].
61 That is, of 14 December 1970 and of 14 lanuary 1971, 4 February 1971 respectively.
62 Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the member States on the achievement
by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community, JO C 28 du 27.3.1971 or in English in Bulletin o;
EECC 4-1971 p. 19-26.
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But what was it agreed exactly? The Council of 8-9 February 1971 resolved that during die first stage of
EMU die Commission would propose measures in die regional and structural domain in order to reduce
die tensions likely to compromise die attainment of EMU so diat to give a start of a solution to priority
regional problems -as outlined by die III MTEP Programme63. Particularly, the measures proposed by die
Commission would aim at giving die Community 'appropriate resources' and, crucially, die Council
committed itself to decide 011 die measures proposed by die Commission. That is:
I11 order to reduce, by taking action in the regional and structural sphere, any tensions which might
jeopardise the timely achievement of economic and monetary union, the Council shall decide, 011 a
proposal of the Commission, 011 the measures required to provide an initial solution to the most
urgent problems, due account being taken of the guidelines laid down by the III medium-term
economic policy programme, in particular by making available to the Community the appropriate
means under the Treaties currently in force6"1.
This paragraph -as it will be seen below- would become die object of wide ranging interpretations but it
seems, at least, to lay down an engagement by die Council to decide (statuer) on necessary measures
concerning priority problems as defined by die III MTEP Programme -among diem measures of
compensation- in die first stage of EMU. So, die resolution was, first, an engagement of principle on
regional action at Community level widiin die context of EMU, even diough die engagement by the
Council in die resolution did not specify die possible or actual contents of the so-called 'necessary
measures', or what was meant by 'appropriate resources'. But second, die resolution did also commit the
Council to a time scale: die Council had to decide 011 the contents of regional action during 1971-1973
as part of the development of die EMU Programme.
Aldiough die actual commidnent made by die Council in die first resolution EMU was left undefined,
die resolution did settle two elements of content which had caused disagreements in die technical
examination of the 1969 proposal which took place in the context of die subgroup of Coreper dealing
with the regional dossier. First, the resolution confirmed die object of Community intervention, namely,
to what the III MTEP Programme defined as 'priority problems' (point 14.1, chapter III), and second, by
introducing the notion of 'resources' the first resolution made die first formal commitment to undertake
concerted actions of regional development at Community level -which die Council had accepted
preliminary on 26 October 1970.
Regarding die final stage of EMU, die resolution stated diat die Community would contribute, along
widi die member states, to die balanced development of die Community in order to solve die most
important problems. The Community would undertake the necessary actions in the structural and
regional domain in the framework of a Community policy, secured widi appropriate means:
63 The III Programme was also adopted in the same Council session (see point 16).
64 First resolution EMU of 22 March 1971 i.e. Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the governments
of the member States on the achievement by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community, Section HL
4. Bulletin of the EECC 4-1971. n. 22. or JO C 28 du 27.3.71 p.3-4.
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the structural and regional measures called for in the context of a Community policy possessing
appropriate means, so that these, too, may contribute to the balanced development of the
Community, in particular with a view to solving the most important problems65.
Member states agreed that during stage one of EMU a European Monetary co-operation Fund could be
set up66, but as the EMU programme gradually advanced, the resort to litis form of monetary solidarity
would be gradually replaced by a stronger Community capacity regarding structural solidarity; thus, on
the final stage of EMU, the Community would contribute, along with member states, to the balanced
development of the Community in order to solve the most important problems.
The regional aspects of the resolution were by no means the most controversial at the time of the
negotiation of the resolution EMU; rather, the main disputes involved the French Government against
die other five countries and concerned the political and institutional aspects of the final stage of EMU.
In fact, member states did not challenge the compromise of parallelism struck by the Werner Group for
stage one. The negotiation of the resolution was instead marked by tire French refusal to make any
commitments on institutions, transfers of powers or revision of the Treaty. Indeed, a policy U-turn had
occurred on the French side as a result of a fierce and successful attack on the EMU Programme which
had been launched from October 1970 by Gaullists on the grounds of an inadmissible sell out of national
sovereignty. The Gaullist reaction forced a policy swing by the French Government which opened a wide
breach between France and its partners (Tsoukalis, 1977). Thus, in the face of the French lack of
commitment to the continuation of the EMU venture after the completion of the first three years and
their reluctance to consider institutional aspects67, Germany demanded the insertion of a 'safeguard
clause', by which the reversibility of the monetary measures in the first stage could be raised at the end
of a five year trial period, if the transition to the second stage and the desired parallelism between
progress in the economic and monetary fields had not been ensured. Clearly Germany was not willing to
renouncing the attainment of economic and policy convergence and, in practice, was warning
monetarists that without sufficient convergence no monetary measures would be allowed to proceed. The
resolution also noted that an assessment 011 the progress made during the first stage, notably on the
observance of parallelism and the distribution of powers and responsibilities between Community
institutions and member states as required for the functioning of an EMU68, would be undertaken by the
Commission before the end of the first stage.
65 Council Resolution of 22 March 1971, Section I.
66 The first resolution EMU notes for stage one: 'The Council invites the Monetary Committee and the Committee
of Governors of the Central Banks to draw up, in close collaboration and by June 1972 at the latest, a report on the
organisation, functions and statute of a European Monetary Co-operation Fund, to be integrated at a later stane into
the Community organisation of the Central Banks provided for under paragraph I, 2 above, in order to allow the
Fund, in the light of the experience gained with respect to the reduction of margins and the convergence of
economic policies, possibly to be set up during the first phase. They shall submit this report to the Council and to
the Commission'. See section V, 8.
67 The final resolution could only admit that institutional issues as well as the transition towards the final stage
remained to be resolved.
68 See section IV.
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To recapitulate, even if the adoption of the first resolution EMU of March 1971 revealed the meagre
commitment to the achievement of EMU, a backtracking France and a distrusting Germany,
nonetheless, against all the odds, in March 1971 the laying down of a plan of action for a first three-year
period towards monetary unification brought the forced entry of a substantial Council engagement on
regional action. At first sight, the adoption of the first resolution EMU had pushed forward the regional
dossier in various senses. First, the principle of structural parallelism was being institutionalised and
regional policy had become a structural component of EMU. Second, tire regional dossier, which had
been unanimously perceived as acceptable at a final stage of EMU, was becoming, in fact, a matter for
the present -indeed, the Council had engaged to decide on necessary measures as from 1971 and within
the following three years. These engagements, although certainly not concrete, placed regional policy
within the umbrella of EMU agenda and engaged the Council to decide on regional action by tire
Community before 1973 and to decide on 'appropriate means'.
Let us finally note that tire process of adoption of the first resolution EMU, as well as tire conception of
an EMU programme as such, was separate from enlargement negotiations. No observable direct
connection relevant for tire regional dossier occurred between them. Indeed, throughout tire process of
elaboration of the objectives and lire stages of an EMU programme, enlargement issues had been absent.
The candidate countries did not intervene and, in fact, they were also expected to take up tire EMU
objectives:
Mr. Barre has pointed out that in the terms of The Hague agreement, the establishment of an
economic and monetary union is one of the grand political options of the Community that ought to
be accepted by all the candidates to the enlargement69.
In the months after tire EMU resolution of 22 March 1971, tire examination by Coreper of tire 1969
proposal resumed. Even if the adoption of the first resolution was expected to bring a considerable
political impulse for the regional cause, the negotiation in Coreper on tire concrete proposals proved
unable to make any considerable progress beyond tire common denominator positions reached at tire
Council session of 25-26 October 1970. By October 1971 tire negotiations had reached deadlock.
Indeed, tire state of affairs of the regional dossier by October 1971 became as follows70: regarding the co¬
ordination of policies, delegations had confirmed their agreement to undertake at Community level 'a
confrontation of objectives, means, methods and experiences in order to reach progressively co-ordinated
objectives, modalities for undertaking concerted actions, appropriate solutions at Community level and
69 See p. 2 of Commission, Commission (iconomique du Parlement Europeen. Compte rendu sonunaire.
Luxembourg, 13 Juillet 1970 [SEC(70) 2767], Original French text in appendix.
70 The following points reflect the situation at the time of the report of 14 October 1971 prepared by Coreper for the
Council of 20 October 1971. In fact, this report had been charged by the Council of 25-26 October to Coreper, but.
due to subsequent changes - the adoption of the first resolution EMU and the Commission proposals of May 1971-
Coreper did not submit the final report until 14 October 1971. Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des
Representants perrnanents sur les textes presentes par la Commission au sujet de ['organisation de moyens d'action
de la Communaute en matiere de politique regionale, 14 Octobre 1971 [R/1950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN
435) rev.2],
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perspectives of development for the whole of the Community'71. The only step forward was the settling
of the disagreements regarding tire priorities to guide Community actions72. Delegations also agreed to
submit concrete regional development plans to the Committee for regional development for the regions
falling under the selected priorities and accepted their common examination. The institutional position
of the Committee for regional development remained, however, a matter of dispute.
Regarding state aids, a co-ordination of regional aid systems rather than a preliminary examination of
individual cases, was emerging as an alternative solution to the original DGIV's proposals. It was in the
context of a Commission's group bringing together DGIV and national experts on aid schemes that a
resolution on the co-ordination of regional aid schemes was drawn and accepted by the Council on 20
October 1971 (point 9.1.1, chapter II). The co-ordination of regional aid schemes emerged
independently of both (lie examination by Coreper of tire 1969 proposal and the unfolding of the EMU
Programme.
Regarding financial solidarity, the resuming of the negotiations after the adoption of the first resolution
EMU saw the reluctance of most delegations to honour the engagements made in die plan of action
towards EMU. Certainly, the principle of regional action involving financial resources had been
established by the first resolution, but the reluctance of most delegations to stand by this commitment
held on to various interpretations of 'appropriate means' as well as on the timing of introduction of
those means. Endless discussions on the interpretation of the resolution of 22 March 1971 followed, and
with it, the negotiation of the 1969 proposal developed into a discussion on the appropriateness of
existing means to cover regional needs, and into wrangles over the date from which financial resources
for regional purposes ought to be put in place. Although the Commission had pointed out that, since 17
October 1969, the Council had had on its table a first proposal for action in regional policy, and the
Council had therefore on its hands all the elements required to honour the engagements made at the first
EMU resolution, the tone of tire debates reflected the lack of national predisposition to provide the
Community with new financial instruments during the first stage ofEMU.
As regards the timing of the introduction of regional financial resources, for Italy the first resolution
conveyed the gaining of new means for regional development purposes as from the present i.e. as from
1971. A step away, for Germany, (lie terms of the first resolution EMU stated a commitment by the
Council to make concrete decisions, during the first stage EMU, on die modalities of the new means,
even though die new means would not be put into effect in die first stage EMU. The German delegation
proposed to draw up a final report at die end of the first stage of EMU to study eidier the 1969 proposal
71 That is, 'il doit etre procede, entre les Etats membres el la Commission, a une confrontation permanente des
objectifs, des tnoyens, des methodes et des experiences en matiere de politique regionale, cette confrontation devan:
conduire a la mise au point d'objectifs coordonnes, a des actions concertees et a des solutions appropriees au
niveau communautaire' See p. 6 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la
organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional el Note sur la politique
regionale. Projet de rapport du Groupe des questions economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 fR/1020/71
(ECO108) (FIN223)].
72 Indeed, these priorities had been agreed by the Medium-term economic policy Committee and confirmed by the
Council of 21 March 1971 in its adoption of both the 111 MTEP Programme and the first resolution EMU (point 16).
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or any other alternative proposals for the creation of new means. Although opposing the technique of
interest rebates, for Germany, the plan of action towards EMU entailed a parallel commitment to create
new means. The Belgian delegation considered that during the first stage, the Council could proceed to
the adaptation of Lhe existing means and to the laying down of the modalities for the new means while
continuing to work on the co-ordination of regional aid systems. For France, at the minimal end of die
range, die Council commitment was interpreted as an engagement only to study new financial
possibilities. Such a study would have to be undertaken by Coreper or by Lhe Committee for regional
development, die creation of which had been suggested by the 1969 proposal.
A clear commitment to regional solidarity was also undermined by the diverging national positions
concerning die sufficiency of a solution of adaptation of the existing means. Germany and Italy, taking
011 board die possibilities of amelioration that the Commission had pointed out in its report on die
Community financial means" (point 13.3, chapter III), and defending a concentration of Community
support on priority problems, agreed diat die existing means were insufficient. However, once again, die
difference between Germany and Italy was an important one: aldiough Germany -as well as
Luxembourg- were not opposed to a new fund, diey did not approve of its creation in the first stage of
EMU. Germany accepted a regional Fund at die second stage of EMU, diat is, from 1974 onwards. For
Germany and Luxembourg die first stage it would only decide on die technical modalities of intervention
of die new means, so diat it could start functioning from die second stage. Belgium's position was to
support die creation of odier means apart from the existing ones at its due time as well as to advocated a
more efficient utilisation of die existing means. The French and Dutch considered diat the
Commission's judgement on die insufficiency of die existing means was not fully justified since a good
number of possible improvements in die functioning of existing means was feasible. In dieir opinion,
diis analysis of die room for reform or amelioration of existing means ought to be continued by the
Committee to be created. The Dutch considered diat a better utilisation of the existing means in
combination widi die existing national means offered sufficient potential for resolving die emerging
regional challenges. The French supported die Dutch, adding diat although not opposed to die study of a
new fund, its creation should be dependent on and subsequent to die realisation of transparency in
national aid systems. The French tried to link and make any step towards regional financial solidarity
dependent on a previous attainment of a harmonisation of national systems of aids. Thus, die Italians
blamed die French for trying to delay decisions and for adding conditions which were definitely not
present at the time of die adoption of die engagements on the first stage of EMU74. The odier delegations
took die position diat a previous harmonisation of national aid systems could not be a condition for the
proceeding of die works on die 1969 proposal and its regulations of application". To sum up, although
73 See point 20.1 oil this report. That is Commission, Rapport sur les moyens financiers pour le developpernenJ
regional, Bruxelles 27 novetnbre 1970 [SEC(70) 4377],
74 At this stage the Commission was working on the technical elements for the future co-ordination of regional aids
which were agreed in June and adopted by the Council straight away (point 9.1.1, chapter 11).
75 See Coreper report of May 1971: Conseil, Note. Objel: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la
organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regionale et Note sur la politique
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regional solidarity had been accepted in principle in the context of the EMU programme and an
engagement had been made to start action from 1971, the engagements which had been gained in the
first resolution proved to be not concrete enough to force member states to turn their engagements into
actual decisions.
Yet, by May 1971 not only was the delegations' feet-dragging nullifying the general engagements of the
first resolution but, in fact, a major policy turn was prompted this time by the Commission, which
degraded the scope of the originally proposed regional actions. Indeed, while the majority of delegations
were disinclined to materialise the engagements of regional solidarity in the context of EMU,
collegiately tire Commission decided to switch its original conceptualisation of a global structural
objective for a narrower objective instead, namely, a regional continuation of tire reform of agricultural
structures (point 11, chapter II). Indeed, in an attempt to secure financial resources for a programme of
reform of tire agricultural sector which had been developing and gaining momentum, on 26 May 1971
the Commission submitted to tire Council two regulations outlining tire adaptation of tire Guidance
section for tire part-financing of projects of industrial conversion in agricultural regions, and also tire
intervention of interest allowances for tire same purpose.
But the concrete Commission proposals of 26 May 1971 were, once again, not very well received by tire
six delegations76. Belgium opposed tire restriction of tire regional interventions to agricultural related
problems while for Italy the new proposals still fell short. The Italians recalled that tire Council had
made a political engagement -by its decision concerning EMU's first stage- to provide tire Community
with 'tire appropriate means in the framework of tire existing Treaties in order to give a first solution to
priority problems, bearing in mind tire indications provided by tire 111 MTEP Programme'. From tire
letter of tire first resolution EMU therefore, tire Italian delegation demanded a precise and adequate
content to that political engagement by, firstly, adopting the necessary provisions for an immediate
utilisation of a special section of tire EIB in favour of tire less favoured regions; secondly by the adoption
of both proposals of 28 May 1971; and thirdly, Italy proposed the study of the creation of a Community
instrument which would complement the rebate fund and tire guarantee system, and which could take
tire form of a European financial company. On top of all these additional proposals, Italy demanded the
opening for immediate use of a special section of the EIB in favour of priority regions, with tire aim of
creating new industrial activities in less favoured regions77. In sum, to tire Italian delegation the
regional. Projet de rapport du Groupe des questions economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R/1020/71
(ECO 108) (FTN223)].
76 Finally on 14 October 1971 Coreper completed and updated the report which the Council had ordered back on 27
October 1970: Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des Representants pennanents sur les lextes presentes par
la Commission au sujet de I'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de politique regionale..
14 Octobre 1971 [R/l950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN 435) rev.2]. This report was discussed in the Council
session of 20 October 1971.
77 See p. 23, 24 of Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de moyens
d'aclion de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regionale et Note sur la politique regional. Projet de
rapport du Groupe des questions economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R' 1020/71 (ECO108)
(FIN223)].
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proposals of 28 May 71 were clearly insufficient to ensure a significant movement of financial means
towards the less developed regions.
Germany did not dispute in principle the narrowing down of priorities, and considered the proposals of
28 May 1971 as an acceptable first contribution to regional imbalances in the first stage of EMU as long
as die existing ceiling of 285 million u.a. for structural policy purposes was observed and a number of
technical aspects on the intervention of the Guidance section were modified"5. Germany and
Luxembourg argued that a decision on tire creation of a Committee for regional development could be
taken straight away, before reaching a conclusion on the creation of new means. The French position
was that the appropriateness of creating new means could be studied once the Committee for regional
development was up and running and sufficient experience was gained. Besides, the French (with Dutch
support) maintained their position that the new means should be subordinated to finding a solution to
tire problem of state aids i.e. they linked their acceptance of new means to the realisation of a better
transparency in tire application of regional aid systems.
Even if tire Commission had strategically lowered tire initial global structural conception of a regional
objective down to a sectoral aim, the delegations' reluctance to launch regional interventions straight
away was manifest at tire Council session of 20 October 1971 which debated solely on financial
solidarity, and almost entirely on the Guidance proposal79. Italy and tire Commission aimed at gaining a
decision of principle and a specific timetable for addressing tire creation of new means. For others
(Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg) appropriate means tor tire first stage were interpreted as an
adaptation of existing means -namely tire Guidance Fund- while new means -tire rebate fund or another
type- could only start from tire second stage. Others (France and tire Netherlands) accepted tire creation
of a Committee for regional development and tire partial use of EAGGF for regional actions, but
opposed tire creation of new means and tried to set aside for tire second stage of EMU any decision, even
of principle, regarding tire new means.
In sum, even if regional commitments to launch parallel regional action during stage one of EMU were
made in tire first resolution EMU of 22 March 1971, by October 1971 no remarkable progress had been
achieved by Coreper in the negotiation over tire concrete regional proposals. In fact, even if there was an
emerging consensus -subject to the negotiation on tire modalities of intervention- on the use of tire
EAGGF for regional interventions and on tire creation of a Committee for regional development, tire
positions of the delegations differed largely over the concrete time from when decisions had to be made
concerning regional solidarity, and also from when resources ought to become operational. Notably, tire
compromises that had been made at the time of tire adoption of a plan by stages towards EMU in March
1971 concerning stage one between economists and monetarists, and tire parallel engagements pushed
by Italy on regional policy, proved ineffectual to gain from France and tire Netherlands the acceptance to
78
Notably the intervention of a committee for administering the granting of aids and the procedure for granting aids
(points 12.1 and 14.3 respectively, chapter HI).
79 Conseil, Extrait de projet de proces-verbal de la reunion restreinte tenue a I'occasion de la 170etne session du
Conseil, 20 Octobre 1971 [R/2217/71 (PV/CONS/R 14) Extr.l],
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the creation of a new fund (interest rebate) -even if restricted to agricultural priority regions-; and also to
rally the acceptance of other delegations (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg) to put new resources in
operation immediately. Yet, a new wave of progress in the monetary field was going to provide die ideal
arena in which political deals, between die various national interests at play in die EMU set up, would
propel forward die regional dossier.
17.2. The second resolution EMU: the agreement of principle (7 March 1972) and the decision of
principle (10-12 October 1972) to create new and specific means.
After die adoption of die first resolution EMU followed die decision to narrow down die fluctuation
margins among Community currencies from 1.5% to 1.2 % to apply as from June 1971. Indeed, among
die monetary measures agreed upon for die first stage of EMU, die Governors of die Central Banks were
invited to launch die 'snake' in an experimental manner. However, die measure could not be put into
effect until April 1972. Notably due to the excessive inflow of short-term capital, two Community
currencies (DM and florin) were forced to move beyond die Community agreed margins of fluctuation,
and dius, on 9 May 1971 die Council decided to allow for a temporary widening of fluctuation
margins80. In fact, die German decision to float die DM, in defiance of die opinion of its EEC partners
who mainly proposed die introduction of capital controls to stop speculation, was not only a blow to die
EMU Programme which had been launched just some mondis before, but also caused disruption to CAP
payments as in 1969, and stirred up old French fears of German economic and political strengdi
(Tsoukalis, 1977). Anodier monetary crisis was reviving a strong interest in restoring EEC unity. Yet,
no consensus could be reached on a return to die snake for die DM and on die control of speculative
capital81, and dius die DM continued its float and die Italian Lira followed suit.
Some mondis after, and adding to such waves of speculation in die exchange markets, a second decisive
blow occurred: an international monetary crisis was unleashed by die US government decisions of 15
August 1971 to suspend die convertibility of US$ into gold. It has been mentioned before diat by die end
of 1960s die confidence in die convertibility of die dollar, and dius die credibility of the Bretton Woods
system, had been eroding gradually as a result of US Government's management of the dollar's
privileged position as international reserve currency. The precipitating event came in August 1971 when
Britain requested diat die Federal reserve swap a portion of the Bank of England's dollar holdings for
sterling. Perceiving in diese moves die beginning of a generalised run on die dollar, on 15 August 1971
President Nixon suspended die convertibility of dollars held in foreign official reserves into gold.
80 Resolution du Conseil du 9 mai 1971 concernant la situation monetaire, Bruxelles, 3 juin 1971. [R/1070/1/71
(HN234) rev. 1]
81 Tsoukalis notes that by May 1971, there were two possibilities for joint action among the EEC countries. 'They
could either float their currencies together with respect to the dollar or they could introduce controls to ward off
speculative flows. One option which was clearly not open to them was to continue with the status quo and start
applying the decisions of March 1971. A change in the external environment had made the narrowing of intra-EEC
margins irrelevant since no implicit assumption of stable exchange rates was no longer valid. The possibility of a
joint float was opposed by France and Italy and capital controls by the Federal Republic'. Tsoukalis (1977) Op. cit..
p. 117.
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President Nixon also announced his intention to alter the parity between US$ and other currencies and
to introduce unilateral protectionist measures82.
Amidst die monetary turmoil, immediately following the US decisions of 15 August 1971, the French
Government announced its intention to call a Conference at the highest level, that is, to call a Summit of
Heads of State and Government to address the monetary situation8'. Indeed, the final Werner report had
provided for tire replacement of the semester meeting of ministers by a Conference of Heads of State or
Government, if either the gravity of the circumstances or the importance of the issues justified it.
Pompidou considered the situation to be so and from this moment France assumed die leadership for die
resuscitation of EEC's monetary individuality. Organising a series of meetings at ministerial and
bilateral governmental level throughout die remainder of 1971 and 1972, die French advocated and
convened what was going to be -a year and a half later- the Paris Conference of 19-20 October 1972. In
fact, if in die period previous to die Werner Report, Germany had held the initiative and die leadership
on EMU, from diis time onwards, France was going to make of monetary union its flagship while
Germany remained observant. Indeed, Pompidou emerged as EEC spokesman in defence of die EEC's
monetary individuality and conducted negotiations widi die US to reach a settlement at die internadonal
level on die collapse of die Bretton Woods system.
A settlement to die international monetary turmoil was reached on 18 December 1971 with die
Washington Agreements at die Smidisonian Institute, by which new 'central rates' and a widening of
die margins of fluctuation to 2.25% on eidier side of die dollar parity were established84. Also on
December 1971 die US protectionist measures of mid August were wididrawn. Thus, aldiough die
monetary crisis had had its peaks in May and August 71, by December 1971 normality had returned to
the international markets, die DM returned to die snake, and dius the European currencies returned to
die margins of before 9 May 1971.
Yet, die settlement of die international monetary scene by die Washington Agreements among the G-10
on 18 December 1971 left diree issues unresolved which were of particular significance from an EEC
perspective. Firstly, die fact that the new fluctuation margins being agreed were too wide for an adequate
functioning of die common market; second, diat no measure for the return to die convertibility of USS
into gold was taken; and diird, diat no action for the regulation of die internal capital markets was taken
82 In order to reduce the deficit in the US balance of payments a 10% tax on imports was introduced. The US
measures were received with discontent by the Commission and by the GATT Council who, in 16 September 1971.
concluded that US' measures were not compatible with GATT provisions. The Commission questioned the grounds
of the US Government decisions by arguing that US balance of trade was sound and thai the latter had nor
contributed to the deficit in the balance of payments. See Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de
la Commission, 165eme session da Conseil -20 septembre 1971, Bruxelles 21 Septembre 1971 [SEC(71) 3321],
83 See Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, 165eme session du Conseil -20
septembre 1971, Bruxelles 21 Septembre 1971 [SEC(71) 3321], or otherwise Bulletin des CCEE 8-1972, Chapitre
II: Vers un Sommet a Dix, p. 16.
84 The Smithsonian agreements, which were the first multilateral negotiation of exchange rates, conveyed an
agreement on the realignment of EEC currencies, trade concessions to the US and a devaluation of the dollar i.e. the
price of gold was increased slightly in relation to the dollar.
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either85. Indeed, wide iluctuation margins created distortions to competition within the industrial
customs union86, damaging particular sectors, messing up CAP repayments and questioning the
preference for Community exchanges. Regarding the second point the need had emerged for an
intervention from the Central Banks of the members in Community currencies in a case of excessive
fluctuations of one currency in relation to another and, on the third point, a co-ordinated action of
Central Banks in the case of short capital movements -speculation- was perceived as necessary by some
countries.
The French who defended the reform of tire international monetary system as a first priority, who had
contributed to the reaching of the Washington Agreements of December 1971, and who had perceived in
tire lack of unity of tire Community of May 1971 tire warning, once more, of German might as well as
tire CAP disturbance, were now desperately keen to promote internal action to ensure that tire widening
of tire margins of fluctuation for tire dollar were accompanied by intra-EEC arrangements i.e. France
was very keen to re-launch tire snake. Indeed, for tire monetarists tire Community was developing its
own 'personality', its own monetary needs. As P. Harmel put it, tire safeguarding of the common market
could not be guaranteed que par une fuite en avant". Thus, on 12 January 1972 tire Commission
submitted a Communication and a project of resolution88 where it proposed a single regime of exchanges
for tire currencies of tire states belonging to the common market, and second, a concerted policy
addressing tire excessive influxes of capital89. The own regime of exchanges would consist of: narrower
margins of fluctuation (of +/- 2.5%) in order to prevent distortions to intra-Community trade96 i.e. a
Community band within the new international tunnel; a co-ordinated intervention in tire exchange
markets by Central Banks in Community currencies as well as in US$; and tire creation of a monetary
co-operation Fund91. As well as this, a concerted policy would aim to safeguard tire stability of this
system of exchanges and to prevent tire perturbations provoked by sudden and external short term capital
movements. In short, tire Commission was proposing tire re-launching of the EMU programme beyond
tire Washington agreements to attain an adequate functioning of tire common market and the defence of
exchange rates of the member states of tire Community. Concretely tire Commission was proposing two
types ofmonetary measures: an own regime of exchange and a concerted policy towards capital influxes.
85 See p.2-3 of Commission, Organisation des relations monetaires et financieres an sein de la Cotrununaute.
Bruxelles 12 Janvier 1972 [COM(72) 50].
86 The Council estimated that no significant perturbations would occur if the gap between arithmetical average
exchange rates between two currencies during a week did not exceed a 2.5% figure. [Commission. Seance du 8 niai
1971 [COM(71) PV 162 p. 31],
87 Words of Pierre Harmel, Belgian foreign affairs minister at the 165th Council meeting of 20 September 1971.
Commission, Note a Vattention de MM. les Metnbres de la Commission, 165eme session du Conseil -20 septembre
1971, Bruxelles 21 Septembre 1971 [SEC(71) 3321],
88 Commission, Organisation des relations monetaires el financieres au sein de la Communaute, Bruxelles 12
Janvier 1972 [COM(72) 50],
89 Commission, Note a Vattention de Messieurs les Membres de la Commission, Compte-rendu sommaire de la
lOlerne Session pleniere du Comite economique et social, Bruxelles 29fevrier 1972 [SEC(72) 8~2].
90 The margins previous to 9 May 1971 were of +/- 0.75% i.e. the gap between the highest value and the lowest
could not be larger than 1.5%. The Commission however, said that a 2% maximum of a gap was desirable.
91 See p. 3. of Commission, Organisation des relations monetaires et financieres [COM(72) 50].
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The Council of 31 January-1 February 72 confirmed the urgency of monetary measures and accepted tire
proposal of the definition of a monetary individuality beyond the Washington Smithsonian agreements.
Yet, as advocated by the economist countries, the Council instructed the Commission to insert these
monetary proposals into a wider framework i.e. tire context of the engagements of (lie first resolution,
the programme of action for the first stage of EMU. Thus, tire Council was re-stating die commitment to
parallelism between economic and monetary measures and instructed die Commission to elaborate a
wider document outlining die achievements as well as die pending homework for die realisation of die
engagements made in die first resolution EMU. This review was going to offer die chance for regional
policy engagements to be brought into the foreground once more at a time when die examination of die
1969 and 1971 proposals were in deadlock.
Indeed by February 1972, delegations -and particularly the French- were keen to return to European
monetary arrangements. The international monetary turmoil had revived die interest in specifically
European monetary measures and on 18 February die Commission submitted a report-prepared by R.
Barre- which, following die wishes of die Council of 31 January -1 February 72 set die above mentioned
monetary actions widiin die larger framework of realisation of die first stage of EMU. The previous
Commission Communication of 12 January 1972 had underlined diat die reinforcement of monetary
solidarity ought to be accompanied by progress in odier domains93, but the resolute Council demand that
die debate on furdier monetary action should be placed within die context of die realisation of die
engagements of die first resolution, brought back to die foreground die positions of monetarists and
economists in relation to die Programme towards EMU.
To be adopted in parallel widi monetary measures, die economists, and particularly Germany, had
proposed two additional measures to die existing arrangements for die higher degree of economic and
policy convergence, namely, die creation of a Steering Committee and die adoption of a directive on
stability and growth in die Community94. As far as the Steering Committee was concerned, Germany
proposed die setting up of a consultative group at Secretaries of State level widi a permanent presidency
which would not be too integrated widiin die existing infrastructure of committees for economic policy
co-ordination, and which would hold confidential deliberations with a small number of members -
including one Commission's representative, and would have, as its task, an efficient and continuous co¬
ordination of short-term economic policies95. Concerning the directive to promote stability and growth, it
would establish die possibility of adapting policies of public incomes and expenditures in relation to the
92 Commission, Vue d'ensemble sur les conditions de realisation de la premiere elape de I'union economique et
monetaire, Bruxelles 16 Fevrier 1972 [SEC(72) 622 final/2].
93 See p. 8, Commission, Organisation des relations monetaires et financieres au sein de la Communaute, Bruxelles
12 Janvier 1972 [COM(72) 50],
94 The Commission added full employment to the stability and growth proposed by Germany. See p.3M of
Commission, Note a /'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objet: 634eme reunion du Canute des
Representants pennanents: 2 Mars 1972, -Problemes economiques et monetaires, Bruxelles 4 mars 1972 [SEC(72 >
959],
95 See p. 1-2 of Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission. Objet: 633eme reunion du
Comite des Representants pennanents: 17/2/1972 -Problemes economiques et monetaire. Bruxelles 25 fevrier 1972
[SEC(72) 819].
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needs of short-term policy, second, the possibility to modulate fiscal policy in order to influence
consumption expenditure, third, a medium term programming for public budgets, and four, the
definition of a concertation between Government's economic policy and social partners' decisions in
revenues policy. In February 1972 at a meeting between Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou a
compromise emerged between economists and monetarists consisting of the introduction of capital
controls -on which Germany had always proved reluctant- as well as the narrowing of intra-EEC
margins of fluctuation while, Germany, more concerned with tire co-ordination of economic policies,
obtained the acceptance from France of the creation of a Steering Committee which would be
responsible for a more effective co-ordination of short-term economic policies9'.
On 1 March 1972 the Commission presented a draft of Council resolution97 putting forward four
categories of proposals: reinforcement of economic policies in tire short-term, actions in the structural
and regional domain, measures for tire organisation of financial and monetary relations within tire
Community, and some suggestions for procedure. This second resolution would state die political will to
implement tire scheduled EMU programme agreed in tire first resolution, and move forward on tire
engagements made in tire first resolution of 22 March 1971.
Thus, on 6-7 March 1972 tire Council met with an agenda to settle the final disagreements of a renewed
determination of tire Council and national Government representatives to implement the first resolution
EMU of 22 March 1971 and tire political compromises on tire basis of which it had been struck. Through
tire preparatory Coreper sessions for tire Council of 6-7 March 1972 various points of divergence came
up. Concerning the economic agenda, tire Steering Committee was finally accepted although some
objections were raised for tire creation of yet another Committee and partly on tire grounds of possible
conflicts of competence with tire already existing Short-term economic policy Committee. This Steering
Committee would work in secret and, its objective being to gather mutual and confidential information
at technical level, it would have a very restricted membership of tire collaborators most close to tire
national ministries. On tire other hand, as concerns tire monetary agenda, minor disagreements arose
over tire widdi of die European joint float, die creation of the European Monetary Co-operation Fund,
fiscal harmonisation and the regulation of capital movements. However, diese issues were all settled
widiout major conflicts.
Indeed, die compromise to undertake parallel action in die economic and monetary domains, upon
which national support on die EMU Programme depended, was religiously observed and, expectedly,
Italy did not miss the chance to push for its national preference. Regional policy was among die
contentious issues on die new resolution which Coreper left to be sorted out by die Council due to dieir
political nature. In fact, as had occurred in die process of negotiation of die first resolution EMU,
96 Tsoukalis L. (1977), Op. cit., p. 119.
97 Commission, Proposition de resolution du Conseil et des Representanls des Gouvernements des {slats membres
relative a Vapplication de la Resolution du 22 mars 1971 concernanl la realisation par etapes de I'union
economique el monetaire dans la Communaute (presentee par la Commission au Conseil). Bruxelles 1 mars 1972
[COM(72) 250],
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throughout the preparatory Coreper sessions examining the Commission's draft resolution for the re¬
launching of EMU the Italian delegation announced that its agreement on the final text of this second
resolution would be conditional to a parallel, simultaneous and precise engagement by the Council to
create an appropriate and specific form of financial means for regional development purposes'8. A more
precise re-stating of parallel regional commitments was certainly considered pertinent by Italy since the
resolution under negotiation conveyed a re-engagement on die programme of action towards EMU
adopted merely a year before. According to Italy, die engagements on regional actions had not been
honoured and, matters of principle on regional policy having been agreed in the first resolution, it was
time for a concrete implementation of die engagements taken on 22 March 1971. Thus, Italy made two
sets of demands. First, it demanded diat die Commission composed 'appropriate' proposals since,
according to Italy, die measures proposed by die Commission were not sufficient. Second, and
simultaneously to die adoption of die new resolution 011 the re-launching of EMU. die Italian delegation
demanded diat the Council move beyond die agreement on 'appropriate resources' struck in die first
resolution and die endorsement of a precise engagement, notably, pronouncing a decision of principle on
bodi die use of die Guidance section for regional purposes and die creation of new resources, and also
agreeing to a precise calendar for the Council to adopt the actual regulations for die operation of
regional solidarity. The demand by die Italian delegation clearly aimed to prevent die delegations' feet-
dragging over die Commission's regional proposals, and change dieir attitude to one of unambiguous
political endorsement of regional objectives parallel to monetary engagements and disciplines.
On die sitting of 7 March 1972 die Council held a long debate during which each delegation put forward
its position". Italy stuck to its original position, as did die French, who were die most eager to re-launch
an individualised monetary zone in die framework of international system, and notably, the launching of
die snake and of capital controls, while also being die delegation who expressed die strongest opposition
to Italian wishes. France was ready to recognise die compromise of parallelism of economic and
monetary measures as sanctioned in the first resolution EMU of 22 March 1971; yet, for France no other
issues could delay die urgency of the adoption of monetary measures. In odier words, aldiough measures
for more efficient co-ordination of short-term economic policies were accepted by monetarists including
France, a regional agenda was, particularly for the French, an issue which went far beyond die
98 See Coreper sessions: (Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission. Objel: 633eme
reunion du Comite des Representants pennanents: 17/2/1972 -Problemes economiques el monetaire. Bruxelles 25
fevrier 1972 [SEC(72) 819]), Council session of 28.2.1972, Commission, Note a Vattention de MM. les Membres
de la Commission, Objet: 634eme reunion du Comite des Representants pennanents: 29/2/1972. -Examen de la vue
d'ensemble sur les conditions de realisation de la premiere etape de I'union economique et monetaire. Brinelies I
mars 1972 [SEC(72) 819/2], and Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission. Objet.
634eme reunion du Comite des Representants pennanents: 2 Mars 1972, -Problemes economiques el monelaires.
Bruxelles 4 mars 1972 [SEC(72) 959].
99 On this crucial Council session see: Commission, A I'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission. Compte
rendu succinct de la 190eme session du Conseil de Ministres consacree aux Questions economiques et
monetaires': Bruxelles 6-7 Mars 1971, Bruxelles 10 Mars 1972 [SEC(72) 965], Commission, seance du S mars
1972 p. 14-15: Realisation par etapes de I'union economique et monetaire -Deroulement de la 190eme session du
Conseil avec la participation des ministres de finances (Bruxelles 6 et 7 mars 1972) [COM(72j PV199], Conseil
Note, Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 190eme session tenue les 6/7 nuirs 1972. Bruxelles H
mars 1972 [T/l 17/72],
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compromise of parallelism. On the other hand, Italy, backed firmly this time by Belgium, defended,
beyond the imperative of a co-ordination of economic policies, the recognition of structural problems100;
in other words, the monetary agenda would not be accepted unless precise simultaneous commitments
were made to accompany monetary disciplines with structural measures10'.
Let us recall that by March 1972 the regional dossier contained two concrete proposals on financial
interventions: one proposed the adaptation of a share of the Guidance section of the EAGGF for projects
of industrial conversion in agricultural priority regions and the other proposal concerned (Jie creation of
a brand new financial instrument which, taking die form of interest rebates, would part-finance projects
of either industrial conversion or infrastructure in agricultural priority regions (initially). In fact, die use
a share of the EAGGF for regional projects did not prove a major problem and die Council was ready to
make a simultaneous precise and parallel engagement on die adaptation of EAGGF resources. Indeed,
all delegations including die French accepted die principle of die use of die Guidance section for
regionally oriented projects in agricultural priority regions, aldiough still disagreements on die technical
modalities of die intervention had to be ironed out. Thus die Council stated its agreement of principle on
die use of a part of die EAGGF Guidance and accepted diat die technical decisions ought to be sorted
out straight away so diat Guidance resources could operate in die current year.
Clearly, die major bone of contention concerning die regional engagements was not die Guidance use
but die creation of new means specifically for regional purposes. Indeed, die proposal for die creation of
an interest rebate Fund had been examined by Coreper widiout success. Not only had opposition to die
principle of creating new means been clearly put forward by France and die Nedierlands, but also
objections were raised by Germany over the financial technique of regional interventions i.e. Germany
would not accept financial regional interventions in die form of interest allowances. In view of diese
varying degrees of acceptance of die principle of die creation of new means, Italy went to die Council of
7 March 1972 declaring itself ready to veto die adoption of die resolution altogether if no clear
engagements by die Council particularly concerning the creation of brand new means were made,
simultaneously to die adoption of die resolution to re-launch EMU. Thus die Council of 7 March 1972
held a long preliminary debate concerning die principle of die creation of new resources. Yet. after
perceiving die opposition of various delegations to put a new Fund in place during the first stage of
EMU, Italy came down from its initial position by accepting to leave for a second stage of EMU die
entry into operation of new resources. However, aldiough Italy conceded some ground, it maintained, as
non negotiable, die adoption, simultaneous to monetary measures, of first, a Council decision of
principle on bodi die use of the EAGGF and die creation of new means specifically for regional
purposes; and second, a calendar for die adoption of all die decisions concerning the modalities of
100 Commission, Seance du 16 fevrier 1972 [COM(72) PV 196],
101 Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objet: 630eme reunion du Cotnite des
Representants pennanents: 3/2/1972 -Communication de la Commission au Conseil sur I organisation des
relations monetaires et financieres au sein de la Communaute, Bruxelles 7fevrier 1972 [SEC(72<I 476).
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intervention adoption of the technical aspects of regional financial interventions (i.e. the structure, size
of die appropriations and life span) so that tire Fund could enter into force in the second stage of EMU.
France still would not accept the new compromise put forward by Italy and the meeting was suspended
for a pause. It was during the time out that, tire Italian, French and German ministers -Colombo.
Giscard d'Estaing and Schiller- held a separate discussion. From this restrained discussion another
compromise emerged proposed this time by France, which was eventually accepted by Italy and also by
die odier delegations'02. Notably, before 1 October 1972 die Council would make die decision of
principle 011 whedier to create die regional Fund proposed by die Commission -die interest rebate- or
anodier system of Community resources to devote to regional purposes'03. The final adopted text read as
follows:
In order to make an immediate start on the regional and structural actions required for the timely
achievement of economic and monetary union, the Council agrees in principle:
1. To the use of the EAGGF, as from 1972, for regional development actions;
2. To the creation of a Regional Development Fund, or alternatively recourse to any other system of
Community resources that can appropriately be used for regional development.
It asks the Commission to submit proposals in accordance with Point m.4 of the Resolution of 22
March 1971. It will take the necessary decisions on the Commission's proposals before Is' October
1972'04.
Let us note diat an implicit distinction was being made between an agreement of principle to create a
Fund -eidier a ERDF or any other system of resources- and an actual decision of principle for the
creation of such a Fund and, finally, die actual adoption of regulations laying down the conditions and
die technical manner in which such a Fund would intervene. But in die end, die first agreement of
principle to create additional regional resources to those of die Guidance section was made on 7 March
1972, while setting die deadline of 1st October 1972 to make die second set of decisions of creadon (i.e.
of eidier a brand new instrument, an interest rebate or another form); while finally leaving die adoption
of die regulations defining die conditions and forms of intervention of die additional financial
instruments for a later stage, and dieir final entry into force in die second stage of EMU. Italy had had to
accept to delay die entry into force of decisions on the modalities of intervention of the new means to a
second stage of EMU (i.e. die necessary regulations for die technical operation of the new resources),
and it did not succeed in establishing simultaneously to die acceptance of monetary measures, the
decision of principle to create new resources. But nonedieless, die French had conceded an agreement of
principle to put in place additional resources to diose of the Guidance section for regional purposes and
102 See the breakdown of this session in appendix.
103 See p.7-8 of Commission, A I'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission, Compte rendu succinct de la
190eme session du Conseil de Ministres consacree aux 'Questions economiques el monetaires': Bruxelles 6-7 Mars
1971, Bruxelles 10 Mars 1972 [SEC(72) 965]. See original French text in appendix.
104 Point II of Resolution du Conseil et des represenlants des gouvernements des fclals Membres du 21 Mars 1972
relative a /'application de la resolution, du 22 mars 1971, concernant la realisation par etapes de l union
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also, regarding the timing, the French had come to accept the making of a decision on principle in the
first stage of EMU (i.e. before 1st October 1972), on these additional resources (i.e. not on die actual
modalities of intervention, but a decision of principle on die creation of eidier a ERDF or anodier type of
financial instrument).
In fact, given die pattern of consistent refusal to accept new forms of regional solidarity, die French
concessions were not insignificant and, ultimately, diey seemed to have been given due to die interest of
France in die re-launching of EMU. Thus, witli die official adoption of die second resolution EMU on
21 March 1972 by die Council and die representatives of die Governments of die member states, die
Programme of EMU was back on track and, in fact, its negotiation had worked as a hodiouse for die
emergence of furdier political compromises, as a platform for die interaction and consenting of various
national preferences (Tsoukalis, 1977). Indeed, die French had first of all attained die European regime
of exchanges widiin an international monetary order which they had strongly pursued since August
1971. For France die snake in die tunnel was launched and die Council of ministers decided to limit
intra-EEC margins to 2.25% by July of that year. On die odier hand, Germany was rewarded with a
reinforcement of co-ordination of economic policies in die short term, namely, by extending die
procedure of prior consultations105, by creating die Steering Committee and by endorsing the principle of
adopting a directive aiming to promote of stability, growdi and full employment in die Community. And
particularly for the concerns of diis diesis, Italy, by direatening to veto monetary measures i.e. die
monetary regime which France had been pushing for, managed to lever a commitment to create
additional resources to diose of die EAGGF for regional purposes and an engagement to make
unequivocal decisions of principle by 1 October 1972. Thanks to die unfolding of die EMU Programme,
die regional dossier gained die first agreement of principle for die setting up of resources additional to
diose of die EAGGF Guidance.
From 21 March 1972 until die end of die year die regional dossier would concentrate on ironing out the
technical differences among delegations concerning die intervention of die EAGGF Guidance in
regional projects (indeed, die second resolution had set die deadline of 1 October 1972 to adopt die final
regulation); but also die issue of die creation of new means moved forward. On 31 May 1972 the
Commission submitted a Communication to die Council where, apart from proposing furdier regional
instruments as requested by Italy100, die Commission added a new turn to die agreement on the
establishment of additional means of die second resolution EMU. Let us recall diat the second resolution
had put a disjunctive as to die form of additional means, that is, it had stated diat die additional
economique et monetaire dans la Communaute, JO C 38 du 18.4.72. In English: Bulletin of EECC 4-1972. p. 42-
43. French text in appendix.
105 The resolution agreed that when a member country intended to take measures or decision diverging from
guidelines set by the Council of Ministers, prior consultations would have to take place within the Steering
Committee. Tsoukalis (1977), Op. cit., p. 120.
106 Commission, Communication en vue des decisions du Conseil concernant la Politique regionale de la
Communaute, Bruxelles 31 Mai 1972 [COM(72) 530 final]. In response to Italian criticisms of the insufficiency of
the Commission's proposals, the Commission proposed for the creation of a Regional Development Company and a
system of guarantees. See introduction to chapter III.
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financial resources could either be brand new means (a regional development fund taking the form of an
interest rebate as proposed by the Commission or another type of financial instrument) or, otherwise,
'any other system of Community resources'. This disjunctive seems to have been inserted in the final
text due to: first, the German refusal to accept financial interventions particularly in the form of an
interest rebate107, and second, the French strategy to open a escape route to the creation of a brand new
Fund108. Indeed, France understood by 'any other system of Community resources' any existent but
unemployed resources, and had demanded the addition to the Council minutes of the following
declaration:
The French delegation has estimated that the notion 'appropriate Community resources' referred to
in the resolution on economic and monetary union, can be employed in the text under discussion.
Indeed, it also covers resources currently unemployed (such as EIB reserves) which could be
appropriated for the financing of new activities. It is difficult to determine if sucli resources ought to
be considered as existent or as additional109.
The adaptation of existing financial instruments and also the setting up of 'additional' resources had
been for the French the escape route to prevent the creation of a brand new fund specifically devoted to
regional purposes. But, while in March 1972 this disjunctive, introduced by the French, was still an
escape route to the creation of a ERDF, on 31 May 1972 the Commission's announcement made this
alternative void. In the Commission's words:
The Commission has to note that regarding existing Community resources, as foreseen by the
resolution of 21 March 1972, the Community does not have currently unemployed resources. Indeed:
• the Community does not have budgetary reserves;
• existing financial instruments, although able to be directed also on the basis of co-ordinated
regional policy objectives, pursue their specific objectives; this is however not the case of the
EIB whose mission is more general;
• the EIB only has statutory reserves and provisions envisaged to cover its financial risks, whose
sums are currently employed "°.
In short, in May 1972 the Commission was removing the only remaining alternative to the creation of
specific financial means to be devoted to regional purposes. Thus solely the financial technique of
107 See Commission, 'European Regional Policy. Summary of a speech by W. Stabenow Head of Division in the
Commission of the European Communities during the Information Conference on Agriculture Policy of the
European Communities 22 lanuary 1973' [X/86/73],
108 This alternative to the creation of a ERDF was spelled out in point H.2.
109 Declaration made at the Council session of 6-7 March 1972 which was going to be added to the minutes of the
Council session officially adopting the second resolution EMU. See Annexe to Conseil, Note, Proposition de
resolution du Conseil el des Representants des Gouvernements des litats membres relative a I'application de la
resolution du 22 Mars 1971 concernant la realisation par etapes de I'union economique el monelaire dans la
Communaute, Bruxelles 16 Mars 1972 [R/564/72 (FIN 158)] French text in appendix.
110 See p. 3, 4 of Commission, Communication en vue des decisions du Conseil concernant la politique regionale de
la Communaute [COM(72) 530 final]. See the original French text in Appendix.
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interest allowances, which the Germans had been opposed to, remained to be sorted for die due
unequivocal decision of principle to take place.
With such a state of affairs on 19-20 October 1972 the Summit diat the French had been so eager to
organise since 18 August 1971, in order to gain a full commitment to maintain fixed exchange
relationships within the EEC, took place in Paris'". The Conference in Paris was die first Summit of die
enlarged Community and, first and foremost, it restated die political will to realise EMU irreversibly
widiin die following ten years. In die monetary field, die Paris Summit served as a declaration of
intentions which endorsed agreements already reached within die Community and did not reach
concrete agreement on the contents of a second stage of EMU"2. In die field of economic policies, die
Summit called for an effective co-ordination of economic policies and instructed die drawing up of a
common anti-inflation programme. Concerning the regional policy agenda, we know diat at die end of
the preparatory stages -on 12 September 1972- national delegations had not yet agreed on die text of die
conclusions to be approved by die Heads of State and Government"3, and diat even if die agreement of
principle to set up additional resources had been made in die second resolution of March 1972 and die
alternatives to diat creation had been removed by May 1972, die actual decision of principle had not still
been made. According to media coverage and odier sources, diat decision was struck at die highest level
and allegedly due to a resolute UK defence"4. That is, Heads of State or Government at the Paris Summit
made die final decisions upon which diey had agreed already in principle -seven mondis before- in the
second resolution EMU of 21 March 1972 and which were due for 1 October 1972 anyway. They
decided die creation of a ERDF before die end of stage one (31 December 1973) which would start
functioning from 1974, would be fed by Community own resources"5, and would act not only on priority
regions but also target industrial mutations and structural underemployment. Indeed. Heads of State or
Government
from now on they undertake to co-ordinate their regional policies. Desirous of directing that effort
towards finding a Community solution to regional problems, they invite the Community institutions
to create a Regional Development Fund. This will be set up before 31 December 1973. and will be
financed, from the beginning of the second phase of economic and monetary union, from the
Community own resources"6.
For the wholehearted support of France for a system of exchange rate stability see Tsoukalis (1977), Op. cit. p.
120-125.
112 Tsoukalis (1977), Op. cit., p. 125.
"3 See Bulletin des CCEE. 10-1972, p. 11.
114 See Introduction to this thesis (footnote 7).
115 From the Council decision of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of Financial contributions from Member States
by the Communities' own resources [OJ L 94/19 of 28 April 1970], as from 1 January 1975 the Community budget
was to be fully financed by own resources -as opposed to a 87.5% in 1974. The resources were to be composed of:
agricultural levies, customs duties, a maximum of 1% VAT resources. Acceding countries would not contribute
fully to the Community budget till 1 January 1978.
116 Point 5 of the final Communique of the Conference of Heads of State or of Government. Paris 19-20 October
1972.
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So, from a consideration of the state of the negotiations, both through 1971-1972 and on the eve of the
Paris Summit, one can only conclude that (lie decision of principle for the co-ordination of national
regional policies, and particularly, tire decision of principle made by the Heads of State and Government
for the creation of the ERDF, was simply the finishing 'touch' in a process of forced
intergovernmentally agreement at the time of adoption of two successive resolutions on the realisation of
EMU by stages previous to the Paris Summit of October 1972.
But not only agreements of principle had been made before the Paris Summit, in fact, there are good
grounds to argue that by May 1972 the decision for the creation of a ERDF had become somehow
inevitable or unstoppable. Certainly this thesis does not defend any automaticity in EU policy
developments, and clearly a critical mass of governmental support was an asset brought by enlargement
but, undoubtedly, tire path for a decision in favour of an extension of Community objectives into regional
aspects was clearly marked by October 1972. Indeed, an agreement of principle for the appropriation of
resources for regional development had been struck, alternatives to the creation of a ERDF had been
removed, and finally, there was a deadline (1st October 1972) for the decision of creation to be
unequivocally made. From all the above, we see that the occasion of the Paris Conference was not
fundamentally decisive for the setting up of a ERDF but rather, it appears that the extension of
Community actions into a new policy area was substantially justified by and linked to the EMU
Programme. Indeed, looking at the adoption of the resolutions EMU one reaches tire conclusion that the
acceptance of regional solidarity -through the creation of a ERDF- responded directly to EMU
considerations, took place before the Paris Summit and was not fundamentally influenced by Community
enlargement.
Does all the above mean that enlargement did not influence in any sense the establishment of the ERDF?
Particularly, it is our concern to search for the influence of the UK Government regarding the adoption
of the resolutions EMU and its contribution to the decisions made at the Paris Summit.
To begin with, no concrete influence from new acceding members seems to have occurred in the passing
of the resolutions EMU. Point 17.1 has argued that acceding members did not perceptibly influence the
adoption of the first resolution. The same conclusion seems valid as far as the passing of the second
resolution is concerned. Indeed, although on January 1972 the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway
signed Accession Treaties, on 24 February 1972 Coreper examined the procedure to inform and consult
these countries on EMU developments and it decided that regarding the Council session of 6-7 of March
72 acceding members would be 'immediately informed on the conclusion of the works of the Council'"7.
In other words, the ministers of the acceding countries were not present at the Council meeting of 6-7
March 1972 and were only informed and consulted a posterioriEven though one would expect that
117 See p.7 of Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objel: 633eme reunion du
Comite des Representants pennanents: 17/2/1972 -Problemes economiques el monetaire, Bruxelles 25 fevrier 1972
[SEC(72) 819].
"" Concretely acceding countries were consulted on 15 March 1972. They all accepted the resolution. See p.2 of
Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objel: 636eme reunion du Comite des
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the weight of diplomacy and the impact that the declarations of intentions and preferences from the
countries acceding the EEC6 would have created a positive background in favour of completing the due
decisions on the regional dossier, as a matter of fact, the actual bargaining at the Council session of 6-7
March 1972 took place beyond the concrete and direct influence of acceding countries. In fact, at the
session of 21 March 1971 when the resolution was officially adopted, a note records the UK
government's wish to be involved in the works of this session 'in a less discrete fashion' particularly for
public opinion considerations"9.
Nonetheless, even if there was no evident direct influence as far as the adoption of tire resolutions EMU
are concerned, there is no doubt that die acceding members were all in favour of launching a regional
agenda in the Community. Indeed, the resolution agreed on 7 March 72 and officially adopted on 21
March 1972 was clearly welcome by tire acceding members:
The British delegation has declared that its government attaches the utmost importance to the
development of a common regional policy and it is keen to contribute to it in an essential manner,
not only due to the close links between monetary and regional policy but also due to the fact that the
UK has significant regional problems, hi the UK, these problems are essentially in the old industrial
regions while in the rest of the Community, regional problems concern mostly agricultural zones.
Consequently, the UK estimates that the regional measures adopted by the Community should be
conceived in a manner which contributes in equal measures to the solution of the problem of the
reduction of employment in the old industrial regions as well as in agriculture120.
Likewise, the Irish and Norwegian delegations:
have particularly underlined the interest that they accord to regional policy and have given their
support to the efforts for the progressive establishment of concrete means which could be associated
with the national efforts in this domain121.
Turning now to the Paris Summit and to the particular case of tire UK, the grievances concerning the
CAP and the interest in a regional policy dossier were certainly not new by October 1972122, and the
Conservative Government in office, as well as various interest groups, had already overtly demonstrated
Representants pennanents: 16 Mars 1972, -Problemes economiques et monetaires, Bruxelles 17 Mars 1972
[SEC(72) 1125],
119 See p. 8 of Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objet: 633eme reunion du
Comite des Representants pennanents: 17/2/1972 -Problemes economiques et monetaire, Bruxelles 25 fevrier 1972
[SEC(72) 819], Original French text in appendix.
120 See p. 2-3 of Commission, Note a I'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objel: 636eme reunion du
Comite des Representants pennanents: 16 Mars 1972, -Problemes economiques el monetaires. Bruxelles 17 Mars
1972 [SEC(72) 1125]. French text in Appendices.
121 See p.3, op. cit. [SEC(72) 1125], Original French text in Appendices.
122 See: Warley T. K. (1967) Agriculture: The cost of joining the common market, London, Chatham House; or
Pisani E. 'The agricultural problems involved in British membership of the Common Market' p. 7-42. in Problems
of British entry into the EEC. Report to the Action Committee for the United Slates of Europe (1969), European
Series No. 11, London, Chatham House.
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their policy preferences123. Indeed in the UK, integration into the common market and the terms of this
accession, far from being a low profde matter, had by mid 1972 become an openly public and highly
politicised debate, dividing the country along left-right lines, provoking schisms within the parties, and
threatening to stir up deep regional reproaches124. In fact, regional policy arguments became well at the
core of national debates questioning the benefits of accession and the terms of entry, particularly in
relation to budgetary contributions. Indeed, the Community budget as agreed in 1970 (deliberately
negotiated before UK's entry and largely dependent on agricultural levies) meant, for a net agricultural
importer as was the case of die UK, a large contribution to Community own resources. But Prime
Minister Headi's strategy in response to die sensitive question of budgetary contributions seems to have
been one of not allowing die problem of budgetary contributions to block die way to accession but,
radier, to seek for changes once accession had been secured125. Admittedly, Headi's aim was to gain a
compensation to the UK's net contribution to Community own resources by trying to open and enlarge
Community expenditures into alternative areas which would benefit die UK, diat is, by targeting die
domination of die budget by die CAP126. In diis sense, a ERDF tackling industrial-related regional
problems would return contributions to Britain.
A regional agenda was also a priority for die UK in anodier sense. Aldiough Britain had secured a
transition period before applying die principles of co-ordination of regional aid systems agreed on 20
October 1971 by die Six (point 9.1.1, chapter II)127, die control of regional aid schemes exercised by die
Commission, became die target of fierce criticisms for it was perceived as an illegitimate interference in
and an inadmissible renunciation of national sovereignty128. Regional policy considerations, in
particular, had been captured by opponents to endy into die common market. In diis context of domestic
hostility to entry, as well as to die terms of accession, die Conservative Government of Edward Headi
saw the launching of regional acdons as a priority in an attempt to calm down domesdc opposition.
Beyond die fact diat die launch of die regional dossier was reported as a personal triumph of Headi and
a specific merit of the UK in die attempt to prove tangible benefits from Community membership and
123 For instance the CBI notes as a serious drawback of the first resolution EMU 'the lack of explicit statement on
the role and implementation of regional policy' and defends the need for Community regional involvement. See
Confederation of British Industry Scotland, 'Scotland and EEC Entry. Report of a Study group on the effects on an
assisted area of the United Kingdom', 1971.
124 For the use of regional aids control by both Labour and Conservative parties to exploit anti-market or nationalist
feelings see p.3-4 of Commission, Rapport de la delegation de la Commission aupres du Royaume Uni, No. 887.
Objet: Reactions britanniques apres les negociations de Luxembourg, Bruxelles 16 juillet 1971 [SEC(71) 2755],
For the dominant place of regional policy on accession discussions see also 'Rich get richer and poor get poorer,
says Labour MP', The Guardian 8.7.1971.
125 According to Hayward there is no evidence that in negotiating for British EEC entry, the regional policy
implications were investigated by neither the Labour nor the Conservative Government, see p. 288 of Hayward J.
'The prospects for British regional policy in the EEC context', Journal of Common Market Studies. June 1973
126 George S. (1990) Op. cit., p. 56.
127 See the particular problems that the principles of transparency and the ceilings of national support provoked in
certain types of regional incentives in p. 248-257 D.C. MacLennan & J. B. Parr (eds.) (1979). Regional Policy. Past
Experience and New Directions, Glasgow Social and Economic Research Studies 6, Oxford, Martin Robertson.
128 See p. 2 of Commission, Rapport 888 de la delegation de la Commission des Comnmnautes Europeennes a
Londres, Objet: Situation en Grande-Bretagne apres les accords de Luxembourg, Bruxelles 20 Juillel 1971 [SA(71)
5643],
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thus to legitimise entry in the eyes of tire British electorate (George, 1990), a review of the history of the
regional dossier as well as its negotiation reveals that its emergence, as well as its basic justification and
nature, were other than motivated by enlargement or by British influence. A recollection of the state of
the negotiations on the regional dossier on the eve of the Paris Summit shows that agreements of
principle concerning the two main strands of Community competence -co-ordination and solidarity- had
already been reached before October 1972. These agreements of principle were struck beyond the
concrete influence of acceding members and from a logic independent of enlargement. On the one hand,
a fundamental regional objective -an approximation of regional structures- was justified primarily in the
context of the functioning of the common market in a search for economic and policy convergence, and
subsequently, as a structural component of the EMU programme (points 5, 6, chapter I). On the other
hand, financial regional solidarity in particular was justified and accepted as a requirement for the
timely achievement of EMU (point 13.1, chapter III). In other words, enlargement did not give rise to
either a co-ordination of regional policies or the creation of new and specific resources for regional
development, even though enlargement supported -mainly with additional political will- a regional
policy dossier upon which the decision of principle was pending. Concretely, concerning the creation of
the ERDF, the agreement in principle to create this new and specific financial instrument resulted from
intergovernmental bargaining in March 1972 and took place away from the influence of acceding
members. As no other financial alternative was available and, furdiermore, time engagements were
made in the second resolution EMU, the final decision scheduled to take place at the Paris Summit,
where allegedly British influence was determinant, was arguably the last stage in a process which had
been triggered by the I Barre Plan and elbowed through by Italian boycott tactics. Yet, in two ways
enlargement appears to have contributed to the final acceptance of a regional competence, namely, by
bringing additional political support but, above all and particularly to UK's credit by succeeding in
superseding the domination of the regional policy dossier by strictly agricultural problems. Indeed, after
enlargement regional policy opened up its scope of action i.e. moved beyond the sectoral approach that
the Commission had strategically shifted to from May 1971.
So, if enlargement was not the determinant factor for the acceptance of an expansion into a new policy
area, what was? The ultimate factor which permitted a unanimous acceptance of the expansion of
Community competence into a new policy area seems to have been the successful linkage of regional
policy to the programme of EMU. First, the broader objective of EMU allowed the regional policy
agenda to gain sufficient support from most of the countries (Germany and Lire small countries) and
second, it provided a powerful boycott value against tire French unwillingness to accept regional
interventions. Precisely tire EMU Programme came to offer tire framework to justify regional actions as
well as tire package of policy compromises in which intergovernmental bargaining could operate in
favour of Italian preferences.
To start with, let us recall that a first degree of consensus on the need in principle for regional action
emerged on 26 October 1970 and in tire Werner report. In fact, tire Werner report and the III MTEP
Programme outlined tire necessity to establish a true system of regional solidarity and of financial
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perequation for the final stage of EMU129; yet most delegations proved reluctant to launch regional
operations in the first stage of EMU. Converging views on die need for regional action seem to have
been the result of both die defence of economist positions and from a seemingly accepted smaller vetoing
power of the small countries. From an economist perspective, die need to ensure die co-ordination of
economic policies was die ultimate justification for Germany to launch regional actions. The priority of
die attainment of an adequate co-ordination of performances and of policies was raised constantly by
Germany from die early days of die examination of die I Barre Plan and all diroughout die early 1970s.
Indeed, from die start, Germany had stressed die need to act on a structural level and had been prepared
in principle to launch regional actions, and dius, seemed ready to contribute financially towards diem -
aldiough, as it will be seen later (point 18.2), for Germany financial solidarity could not equate to a large
fund. The Nedierlands, die odier economist supporter, aldiough it shared French views in the early
stages of die negotiations, came to adopt a more lenient attitude probably reflecting 'economist'
concerns. Indeed, aldiough Lhe Dutch delegation displayed from die very beginning a reluctance to
embrace regional objectives, eidier because small countries seem to hold a lesser power to veto, or
odierwise, for die French self-assumed die leadership in die defence of lull national sovereignty 011
regional aspects, die Netherlands shielded behind die French and let France lead die opposition. Yet, for
die Dutch who had originally opposed any move towards regional action, as die policy linkage between
regional actions and EMU emerged more clearly, economist arguments seem to explain die shift from
original opposition into complacency over regional actions. On die odier hand, Belgium also altered its
interest on a regional dossier: originally reluctant, it became a strong defender by early 1972.
Luxembourg seems to have taken a radier non-participatory attitude. All in all, die Benelux countries
did not make regional policy eidier a priority or a contention. They were keen to stress die conditionality
of die regional policy on EMU progress yet, generally speaking, followed die negotiations led by Italy
and France.
Indeed, only France proved to held a substantial reserve on regional actions beyond their justification
within EMU. Ultimately, die negotiations about die acceptance of a regional dossier boiled down to die
process of gaining die acceptance of die French delegation, and only to a much lesser extend, of die
Dutch, for die odier delegations eidier accepted, in principle, a regional competence from die very
beginning (Germany) or odierwise came to accept it (Belgium, Luxembourg, Nedierlands). Yet,
particularly after die first resolution EMU of March 1971, side by side widi die French opposition to a
role for die Community on regional economic policy, the French had made of die maintaining of a
system of fixed exchange relationships widiin the EEC and asserting die Community's monetary
independence vis-a-vis the rest of die world a wholehearted priority (Tsoukalis, 1977). A number of
reasons seem to account for die French interest in EMU and its eagerness to return to die commitments
of the first resolution. To begin with, according to Tsoukalis, die fear of German might must have had a
strong influence 011 die French psique, as France saw how Germany was not afraid to adopt unilateral
129 HI MTEP Programme, paragraph 124. Original French text in appendix.
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positions (floating of the DM in May 1971) even at the expense of the recently passed resolution and
despite the pleas of European partners. Clearly as well, exchange rate instability disrupted CAP
payments and the crisis of May 1971 and August 1971 probably served to weaken the Gaullists
reproaches against Giscard d'Estaign's pro-EMU stance and revived the French interest in specifically
European monetary arrangements. Equally, the expectation of the setting up of a European Monetary
Co-operation Fund and the introduction of capital controls at Community level to halt speculative waves
may have been additional reasons for the French Government to push resolutely for tire re-launching of a
EMU'30. Irrespective of which of the previous reasons weighed more, undoubtedly, the French took the
leadership of the re-launch of EMU after the crisis of May and August 1971. The French eagerness in
the realisation of EMU was a strength as well as a weakness, and Italy certainly exploited the boycott
value of delaying or vetoing the re-launching of EMU in tire interest of tire regional dossier.
B) The negotiation of the modalities of Community intervention (1973-1975)
Decisions of principle for tire co-ordination of regional policies and for tire creation of new financial
means having been taken by tire Paris Summit of October 1972, tire period starting from 1973 was one
concerning the settling and concrete technical materialisation of tire two agreed strands of intervention.
Because first, this period is a period of negotiations over tire concrete forms of intervention, second,
because access to internal documentation was severely hampered by rules of tire declassification of
information and, third, because this period has, in fact, been covered by other authors, this Uresis will
only summarise these final stages of the negotiation, relying inevitably on secondary sources.
18. The process leading to the eventual adoption of the 1975 regulations
The adoption of die final regulations to establish die operation of co-ordination of regional policies and
of fire ERDF was expected to be a speedy process. In fact, die Paris Summit had set a deadline for fire
adoption of die necessary measures for the end of December 73, so that dre ERDF could start
functioning at die beginning of the second stage of EMU, which was scheduled to start from January
1974. But member states failed to stick to the agreed timetables, and not till 1975 were die final
regulations defining die modalities of operation of die Community system of aids adopted. Keeping die
130 One month before the Paris Conference of October 1972, the EEC finance ministers decided to set up a European
Monetary Co-operation Fund which, at least in its initial stages, would be limited to technical functions. By April
1973 the decision to set up a European Monetary co-operation Fund was confirmed and the Commission was asked
to submit two reports, one on the adjustment of the short-term monetary support mechanism and another on the
progressive pooling of reserves. Tsoukalis (1977) Op. cit., p. 125. Yet the initial French enthusiasm for the creation
of the Monetary Fund seems to have faded, and by 7 March 1972 only Belgium and Italy supported the principle of
its creation. France, Germany and the Netherlands considered a decision of principle on its creation premature. See
p. 9 of Commission, A I'attention de MM. les tnembres de la Commission, Compte rendu succinct de la 190eme
session du Conseil de Ministres consacree aux 'Questions economiques el monetaires': Bruxelles 6-7 Mars 1971.
Bruxelles 10 Mars 1972 [SEC(72) 965],
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distinction being made so far between the co-ordination strand and, on the other hand, the establishment
of a Community system of aids, the final stages of the negotiations follow.
18.1. The laying down of the modalities of co-ordination
As seen before, the agreement of principle for a task of co-ordination at Community level was made
previous to the Paris Summit. Indeed, since the Council session of 22 March 1971, which adopted the
first resolution EMU and the III MTEP Programme, only the modalities of that co-ordination and, in
fact, disagreements over the institutional footing of the Committee for regional policy remained to be
resolved.
Let us recall from the state of affairs regarding the disagreements over the setting up of the Committee
for regional policy, that the Commission perceived, from the earliest stages in die negotiations, the
resistance from various delegations to the model of a Committee for regional development put forward
in die 1969 proposal, notably over milking diis Committee belong to die Commission (point 12.2,
chapter II). Despite the opposition, die Commission maintained its original position until 21 June 1972
when it announced a concession131. Seeking a compromise solution, die Commission abandoned die
aspiration to chair die Committee for regional policy and proposed die creation of die Committee for
regional development answerable to bodi die Council and die Commission. This concession was
welcome by most delegations as a decisive positive step to resolve die contention. However, no thorough
discussion widiin Coreper regarding diis new turn in die negotiations occurred before 1973. In fact,
from die first resolution EMU and following the proposals of 1971, die ironing out of die disagreements
concerning die Community intervention in die form of co-ordination became of secondary priority.
Indeed, die negotiation on die co-ordination function was shifted to die background, and it remained
diere in hibernation while all efforts were directed to die striking of an agreement on financial solidarity
and on die concertation of national and Community systems. The Commission itself had suggested to
leave aside die minor unresolved differences regarding die co-ordination of regional policies in the belief
that a deal could be reached on die few remaining disagreements ifmore controversial problems such as
die use of the existing means and the creation of new means were first resolved'32. In short, die
modalities of undertaking die co-ordination of regional policies were deliberately left for a later stage133.
Indeed, not until die end of 1973 was die issue of die institutional place for die Committee on regional
policy purposely brought up to be resolved. By July 1973, however, die situation had slightly changed. In
July 1973 die Commission withdrew die 1969 proposal and submitted new proposals as the Paris
Summit had instructed. Indeed die first Summit of the enlarged Community of October 1972 had
131 See Annexe p.4 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Travaux en matiere de politique regionale, Bruxelles 23 Juin 1972
[R/1337/72 (ECO 130) (AGRI414) (F1N376)].
132 That is the position explicitly defended by Commissioner for DGXVI A. Borschette on 20 October 1971
[Conseil, Extrait de projet de proces-verbal de la reunion restreinte lenue a Voccasion de la 170eme session du
Conseil, 20 Octobre 1971 [ R/2217/71 (PV/CONS/R 14) Extr.l], In fact, not till 18 September 1972 did the first
examination of the 1969 proposal article by article take place. Conseil. Note, Objet: (hat des travaux en matiere de
politique regionale, Bruxelles 18 septembre 1972 [11/1839/72 (ECO 180) (AGRJ 559) (PIN 489)].
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confirmed the task of co-ordination, in die sense of progressive co-ordination agreed upon back in 26-27
October 1970, thus, making the decision of principle for the co-ordination of regional policies, while an
agreement on the institutional location of the Committee remained pending. The new Commission's
draft decision setting up a Committee for regional policy of 31 July 1973 differed from the 1969
proposal in the substantial point that the Commission no longer proposed to chair the Committee for
regional policy, but maintained the concession made in June 1972 i.e. a committee for regional policy
having an analogous institutional position to tine Medium-term economic policy Committee
In the enlarged Community, eight delegations accepted the hybrid institutional responsibility of a
Committee for regional policy as proposed in July 1973. The French, however, stuck to their original
position and only found acceptable the creation of such a co-ordinating committee in lire orbit of the
Council. Throughout the examination of the draft decision in September and November 1973, positions
remained unchanged, while the French put a reserve on the whole decision subject to an agreement on
the institutional place of die Committee134. On 10 December 1973 the Press announced that Coreper had
made a certain amount of progress on the functions and the statutes of the Committee for regional
policy135. Whether at this stage or later, finally on 18 March 1975 the Council adopted a decision
whereby the Committee for regional policy was set up under the Council's presidency and the
Commission's secretariat.
18.2. The eventual laying down of the modalities ofCommunity financial solidarity
The settling of the operation of a function of financial regional solidarity through die establishment of a
Community aid system was a long process which borrowed from the experience and deals struck through
the negotiations of the proposals of 1969 and May 1971. As it had happened in period previous to the
Paris Summit, the progress on the negotiations proved linked to parallel developments in the context of
EMU and dependent on intergovernmental drive.
Let us recall that at the Paris Summit of October 1972, Heads of State or Government had made the
decision of principle to set up a ERDF before 31 December 1973 which would be funded from the
Community own resources and begin working from the beginning of the second stage of EMU i.e. from
1 January 1974. After the Paris Summit, on 4 May 1973 the Commission submitted the report that the
Heads of State or Government had called for analysing the regional problems of the enlarged
Community. The so-called Thomson report136 was an extension of the Cros Report of 19 October 1971
(point 11, chapter II) to cover the Community of Nine137 and comprised an analysis of the regional
133 See p.5 of Conseil, Rapport du comite des representants pennanents au Conseil, Objet: Politique regionale.
Bruxelles 20 Septembre 1972 [R/1867/1/72 (ECO 188) (AGRI 567) (FIN 493) rev. 1 ].
134 See Conseil, Rapport du Groupe de travail 'politique regionale' presente au Comite des representants
pennanents, Objet: politique regionale: projet de decision du Conseil porlanl creation d'un comite de politique
regionale, Bruxelles 29 novembre 1973 [R/2955/73 (ECO 396) (FIN 751)].
135 See Europe. 10/11 December 1973 No. 1417 New series.
136 Commission, Report on the regional problems in the enlarged Community, Brussels 4 May 1973 [COM(73) 550
final],
137 See p. 44 of Cros (1977) Introduction a I'economie europeenne. Borschette also seem to confirm this point when
he says in February 1973 that 'the analytical report demanded by the Summit could be prepared rapidly, since the
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imbalances in die Community and the guidelines for a regional policy for the Community. The Report,
however, did not include the actual proposals mandated by die Summit. The actual proposals were
transmitted to the Council in the form of a Communication containing a number of documents: a
proposal for a Council regulation establishing a regional development Fund, a draft decision by the
Council on the creation of a Committee for Regional policy and a project of financial regulation of
special provisions to be applied to the ERDF on 31 July 1973138. These new proposals repealed all tire
previous proposals except the one concerning the adaptation of die Guidance section of die EAGGF. The
Commission proposed to set aside die examination of the Guidance proposal to give priority to die
ERDF and so was accepted by die Council'39. In July 1973 die Commission also proposed a budgetary
size for die ERDF of 500 million u.a. for 1974, 750 million for 1975 and 1 billion for 1976. which
together widi 150 million from die Guidance section added up to 2,400 million u.a. for regional
purposes for die period 1974-1976.
Aldiough die Council held a first exchange of views on die Thomson report in May 1973"°, die true
process of examination of the regional dossier did not actually start until all die proposals were
submitted. A subgroup of Coreper began die examination of die 1973 proposals in September 1973 with
the ambition to struck an agreement before the end die year141. Coreper divided die preparation for die
Council debates as follows: die proposal for financial regulation was passed to die budgetary committee
so diat a technical examination could take place before Coreper examined its substance. On die odier
hand, die examination of die ERDF regulation and of die draft decision on die regional Committee were
undertaken separately142. Even dien, till 11 October 1973 die discussions within Coreper were confined
to die technical aspects of the intervention of die ERDF and die proposal on die Committee for regional
policy. Fearing diat die debate could be hijacked by over politicised considerations the Commission had
deliberately postponed for some mondis die submission of die complete set of proposals i.e. of die
proposals for die concrete criteria delimiting die list of regions and zones susceptible to benefit from
bodi the ERDF and die Guidance Fund. The actual draft lists and die criteria for drawing up the list of
eligible regions for bodi die ERDF and die EAGGF Guidance were submitted at last on 11 October
Commission and its departments have already several studies and monographs prepared on the regional problems in
the former Community of the Six and in the new Member States'. See p.9 of Europe of Thursday 1 February 1973
No. 1213 (new series).
138 See OJ C 86/7 ff. of 16.10.73.
139 See p. 6,7 of Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: echange de vue general sur les propositions de la
Commission, Bruxelles 20 septembre 1973 [1721/73 (ECO 217) (FIN 563)]. In fact, the Guidance proposal of 28
May 1971, although it had been scheduled for adoption -by the second resolution EMU- by the end of 1972
differences among delegations remained unsolved. Even if from Summer 1973 the new regional policy dossier
prepared by the Commission contained the new 1973 proposals and the proposal of 28 May 1971 for the use of a
share of Guidance resources for regional purposes, the Commission itself proposed that the Council set aside the
Guidance proposal for a later stage, and to reach agreement first on the 1973 proposals. The prioritisaticn of the
1973 proposals was accepted and the examination of the 1973 proposals took priority over the Guidance proposal.
140 Conseil, Extrait du projet de proces-verbal de la 412eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles les 14 el 15 mai
1973, Bruxelles 26 juin 1973 [R/1558/73 (PV/CONS/R 7) Extr.l)].
141 Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: echange de vues general sur les propositions de la Convnission.
Bruxelles 20 septembre 1973 [1721/73 (ECO 217) (FIN 563)].
142 Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de
developpement regional, Bruxelles 26 septembre 1973 [1722/73 (ECO 218) (FIN 564)].
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1973'43. So, in fact, die true negotiations on die modalities of intervention of die ERDF did not fully
begin until October 1973.
The main points of disagreement regarding die establishment of a Community regional aid system as
they had appeared and evolved since 1970, as well as die positions of die delegations regarding die
ERDF regulation have been mapped out (point 14.2, chapter III). But rather than die most technical
aspects, three major elements determined die progress towards die adoption of die regulations: die size
of die ERDF, the list of eligible regions, and linked to both, die Commission's capacity to select projects
benefiting from die ERDF. Indeed, by die end of November 1973 it became obvious that die technical
points to be resolved were still very large and Coreper suggested that die of Council of 3-4 December
1973 concentrate on trying to strike compromises on the most prominent political aspects, so diat work
could progress at technical level144. Technical 'refinements' would be left for a subsequent session of die
Council to sort out, while negotiation could concentrate on die three closely linked elements of die size
of die ERDF, die delimitation of eligible regions and die Community power of appraisal of regional
projects. Negotiations started on die list of eligible regions and die power of appreciation straight away,
while die size of die Fund was not thoroughly discussed till December 1973 at die Copenhagen Summit.
Concerning die list of regions and areas, as noted before (point 14.1, chapter III), die Commission had
opted to draw up a large list coupled with a power of appreciation, thus involving a relatively large fund.
Yet, from die preparatory sessions at Coreper it emerged that die majority of the delegations wanted
stricter criteria; indeed, only France accepted die list as drawn up by die Commission. The French
wanted to state in the regulation that die regions to be aided by die ERDF should coincide with those
classified as priority regions at national level and aided as such at national level. France did not accept
that die general criteria for eligibility were die proposed regional GDP per capita and demographic
density.
Those defended a shorter list made three types of criticisms145. The first position, taken by Germany and
the Netherlands did not object to the criteria as such but to their actual application, diat is, some criteria
used were simply too wide. These delegations called for die redrawing of maps which highlighted die
regions where GDP was inferior to 5%, 10% and 20% of die Community average and where die
percentage of active working population employed in agriculture was clearly superior to die percentage
proposed by die Commission146.
The second type of criticism raised by die UK argued Uiat die criteria proposed by die Commission did
not cover die major regional disparities as identified by the Paris Summit satisfactorily. Notably, diat
143 Commission, Proposition de reglemenl du Conseil relatif a la lisle des regions et zones prevue an reglement en
faveur desquelles le Fonds European de developpement regional pent intervenir, 10 Octobre 1973 [COM(73)
1751],
144 Commission, Note a Vattention de MM les Membres de la Commission, Objel: 708eme reunion du Comite des
Representants pennanents -29/11/1973, Politique regionale, Bruxelles 30 Novembre 1973 [SEC(73) 4431 ].
145 See p. 1 of Conseil, Corrigendum au Rapport du groupe de travail 'politique regionale' presente au Comite des
representants pennanents, 30 Novembre 73 [R/2736/73 (ECO 275) (FIN696) Corr.l].
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there was a substantial asymmetry between agricultural predominance on the one hand and, on die
other, industrial mutation and structural underemployment. The UK called for the identification, in a
new map, of those regions where the industrial sector was in regression, as well as those zones where
unemployment rates were 20% higher than national and Community average.
The third type of objection considered that, beyond the fact that criteria were too wide, the list did not
reflect appropriately the relative importance of regional disequilibria. For the Irish and Italian
delegations modulation of aid was considered insufficient to satisfactorily address die intensity of
regional imbalances; therefore, eidier a solution had to be produced from the re-definition of stricter
criteria as die German and Dutch delegation proposed, or odierwise, if die proposed list was maintained,
an absolute priority had to be given to some regions by introducing a classification 011 the basis of die
relative importance of disequilibrium. This identification of die most disfavoured areas was essential and
beyond any capacity to modulate assistance at die time aid was granted. The Italian proposal, widiout
contesting die need of having a larger list, was nonetheless ensuring a priority to diose most critical
regions and was accepted by most delegations, including die Irish. I11 odier words, die list proposed by
die Commission was acceptable if first, a priority widiin die existing list was determined and if, second,
at die time of granting aid, a part of the Fund was reserved for die most critical regions widiin die
Community. However, a relative classification of regions was creating a new problem i.e. defining and
agreeing on criteria for delimiting critical regions and dius on die distribution of resources between
critical and non-critical regions.
But in fact, most delegations had already expressed dieir refusal to a flexible system of aids i.e. to die
capacity by die Commission to select and modulate aid. As stated before (point 15, chapter III) by
November 1973 die Commission had lowered down its proposal and conceded to die establishment of a
semi-automatic system, whereby an automatic rate of 15% of support was granted in die majority of
submissions while, for large infrastructure projects, a modulation would lake place. Indeed, on die eve of
die Council meeting of 3-4 December 1973 die debate on how to distribute ERDF resources had
established a close link between the list of regions and the modulation of aid. Coreper had narrowed
down die options to be considered by die Council to two fundamental policy choices: eidier a list of
regions relatively large in which die rates of aid could eventually be strongly modulated by die
Commission in die benefit of die less favoured regions or, odierwise, a much shorter list responding to
more strict criteria and widiout modulation of rates of intervention147.
By December 1973, aldiough the size of the Fund had not been discussed thoroughly, it became clear
diat some of diose who defended a concentration of ERDF in die most disfavoured areas - Germany
mainly- also wanted a smaller fund. In fact, die concentration 011 die most critical problems hid an
146 Commission, Note a Vattention des Messieurs les Membres de la Commission, Objel: 707eme reunion du Cornite
des representants pennanents -21.11.1971, Politique regionale, Bruxelles 23 novembre 1973 [SEC(73) 4412],
147 See p. 2 of Commission, Note a /'attention de MM les Membres de la Commission Objet: 708eme reunion du
Comite des Representants permanents -29/11/1973 Politique regionale, Bruxelles 30 Novembre 1973 [SEC(73)
4431],
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attempt to reduce the size of the Fund proposed by the Commission"8. UK, Italy and Ireland had
expressed that the proposed amount was too modest while France and Germany considered the figures
proposed by the Commission to be too high. The size of the Fund was, particularly for the German
delegation, a matter that ought not to be discussed before the Copenhagen Summit of 14 December
1973'« ancj (jlus Coreper had only examined the question as to whether the Fund ought to be financed on
an annual or pluriannual basis'50.
Discussions on Lhe size of the ERDF were held at the Copenhagen Summit of 14-15 December 1973.
Although in its Communique the Summit confirmed the agreement that the ERDF ought to be set up on
1st January 1974, no agreement regarding the size of the ERDF, nor on the list of regions, was reached.
In fact, die Summit was dominated by the energy crisis. As a result of the massive increases in oil
prices151, the Community entered a a spiral of inflation and a period of economic recession which made
Governments over-conscious of costs and over-protective of national interests. Calls for and reproaches
to the lack of Community solidarity were interchanged among governments less prone to compromise as
a result of the economic crisis. Germany boldly stated its unwillingness to be the paymaster for
Community policies and particularly for a large ERDF152, while there were no signs of good will from
those who had been most vociferous in dieir demands for the establishment of a ERDF153. No
compromise on the size of the Fund could be struck while uncompromising attitudes prevailed.
Time was running out for agreements on the ERDF, which according to the letter of the Paris
Communique had to take place before the 31 of December 1973, and start functioning in parallel with
the beginning of die second stage of EMU. Thus, immediately after die failure of die Copenhagen
Summit to reach a compromise on the diree crucial intertwined aspects of die regional dossier, on 17-18
December 1973 die Council sat again. In diis last session of die year die Council debated die size of the
Fund again. There were diree main positions: an ERDF of 3,000 million u.a. proposed by UK, Italy and
Ireland; 600 million for diree years as proposed by Germany to which would add the sums already
allocated to hill farming and the share of the Guidance proposal of 28 May 1971 i.e. 150 million u.a.
each; and the original 2,500 million proposed by die Commission, eventually backed by all die
remaining delegations. Aldiough alternative solutions were put forward154 delegations were not ready to
148 See p. 6, Europe. Saturday 1 December 1973 No 1411 (new series).
149 Europe. 29 November 1973 No. 1409.
150 Europe. 21 November 1973, No 1403 (new series).
151 Fuelled by the Arab-Israeli war of 1972, the Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) unilaterally doubled the price of oil in October 1973 and doubled it again in late December
1973.
152 Europe. Wednesday 19 December 1973 (new series).
153 Germany seems to have felt the lack of co-operation of the British Government at the peak of the oil crisis while
the oil resources in the North Sea were seen as a source of alternative supply.
154 The Danish Presidency proposed a compromise solution according to which the Fund would be apportioned 800
million u.a. for a duration of three years, 150 of which out from the Guidance reserves. However, out of this total
400 million would have to be paid out in the first year. The Council would then have engaged to examine whether
an increase of the Fund might be appropriate, around mid-1975, in the light of the progress achieved in EMU. A
second compromise formula was presented by Luxembourg which took up the main part of the German proposal but
for an experimental period of two years, it being understood that during 1975, and following an effort to harmonise
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give ground. Those calling for a Fund adequate to the severity of the regional realities of Italy, Ireland
and the UK would not accept anything short of a considerable size155. On Lhe other hand, the German
foreign affairs minister had been instructed by tire German cabinet not to alter their position'". The
Council finally decided to close the session, stop the clock and meet within the following weeks, to try to
reach a solution before 7 January 1974 which, if achieved, would apply retrospectively from 1 January
1974157.
As the negotiations over the concrete regional proposals became a fiasco and the engagements on
regional policy to became operational by 1974 were not met -this time due to disagreements mainly over
the size of the ERDF-, at the same Council session on 18 December 1973, the Italian delegation decided
-as it had done in previous occasions- to suspend its acceptance to the transition to die second stage of
EMU. Concretely, the Italian delegation refused to grant its agreement on a resolution on the content of
a second stage EMU, which the Council of finance ministers had agreed upon the day before ". By
refusing to approve the text of this resolution, Italy was once again blocking the progress of the EMU
agenda. Indeed, the old boycott tactics, which had been successful in the institutionalisation of structural
parallelism and of financial solidarity on previous occasions, were tried out again by the Italians and
supported this time by the UK and Ireland159. Unlike previous times, the boycott was not targeting the
French reluctance to accept regional action, but mainly, the German reluctance to pick up a large bill for
regional appropriations. Unlike previous occasions as well, the boycott would be unsuccessful, and more
importantly, the regional dossier would lose its closest ally and best asset, the EMU Programme.
Throughout the negotiations over the ERDF, Italy had reminded national delegations of the importance
of observing the agreed deadlines and insisting that regional policy was indispensable in making
progress along the road to EMU. Indeed, from the Paris Summit of October 1972 the creation of a ERDF
was linked to the transition to the second stage of EMU. However, progress towards EMU was at least
questionable by the end of 1973 since those countries most eager to set up a ERDF -Great Britain.
Ireland and Italy- had left the European exchange regime and the remaining countries had entered into a
joint float160. In fact, the Italian strategy to resort to EMU when the regional agenda reached deadlock
the national regional policies, the question of changing the ERDF into a large Fund would be considered. See
Europe. Wednesday 19 December 1973, p.4, No. 1423 (new series).
155 Europe. Wednesday 19 December 1973, p.4 No 1423 (new series) noted: 'At one time, one had the impression
that the UK, as well as Ireland and Italy, would rather have agreed to a total failure than to a Fund which in their
view is completely inadequate in relation to the size of the problems at stake'.
156 Europe. Monday/Tuesday, 17/18 December 1973, p. 5, No. 1422 (new series). Europe. Wednesday 19 December
1973, p.4 No 1423 (new series) notes German foreign affairs minister arguing that 'the German proposal
represented a contribution of 204 million DM -the equivalent of the weekly wage for 900,000 German workers.
This was a considerable amount of money, particularly if it was considered that there was no legal authority by
which it could be demanded. As for Community solidarity in the energy sector, it was one of the very foundations of
the Community, and had no need whatever to be bought, Mr Apel pointed out. Just as in a marriage, neither partner
expects payment for the other's faithfulness, which is part and parcel of the marriage contract'.
157 Europe. Wednesday 19 December 1973, p.4. No. 1423 (new series).
158 See p. 5 of Europe. Wednesday 19 December 1973, No. 1423 (new series).
159 Tsoukalis (1977), Op. cit., p. 153.
160 In fact, the first currency unable to fulfil both the commitments of the Washington agreements and the European
snake had been the pound, which on 23 June 1972, following massive speculative pressure was left to float
temporarily. Denmark left from June to October 1972 and Italy followed on 14 February 1973. In March 1973 the
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could now effectively be reversed against the regional dossier, i.e. the principle of structural parallelism
could be conveniently re-interpreted to make regional actions conditional on monetary obligations"".
Thus, especially for the French and Dutch, recognising regional policy as solidly attached to EMU
progress, regional action, and particularly the creation of a ERDF, remained conditional on EMU
progress; in other words, there would be no question of regional aid if the disciplines concerning
monetary matters were not fully respected.
Irrespective of the new deadlock reached by the regional dossier at (lie end of 1973, as the first stage of
EMU (1971-1973) was coming to its end, the Community was occupied with (lie transition to the second
stage. The first resolution EMU of March 1971 had laid down the second stage was due to start from 1st
January 1974 and had charged the Commission to submit a report on the progress achieved during first
stage as well as proposals to the Council on the programme of action for the second stage162. Thus, on 30
April 1973 tire Commission submitted a Communication containing an outline programme of action for
stage two, as well as a review of tire progress achieved and of tire institutional reform essential to tire
functioning of tire EMU163. Debated by Coreper and by tire Council from June 1973, the transition to the
second stage of EMU soon raised scepticism. Indeed, although die Commission's report favoured a move
forward to tire second stage, clearly tire progress achieved up until 1973 was far from successful.
As far as tire co-ordination of economic policies was concerned, through tire structures of tire Medium-
term economic policy Committee tire III MTEP Programme had achieved tire quantification of a handful
of global macroeconomic objectives (point 3.1, chapter I) but, undeniably, tire co-ordination carried out
through tire existing institutional arrangements and through the quantified objectives -ultimately tire
search for compatibility- had certainly not delivered its prime objective: tire stability of prices. In fact,
not only had the guidelines in the III MTEP Programme not been followed, but tire Community had
entered a spiral of inflation. As far as short-term economic policy co-ordination was concerned, tire
Steering Committee had been set up, but 'few concrete measures were adopted beyond recommendations
of a very general nature', and as regards tire co-ordination of budgets, tire 'budgetary guidelines adopted
by tlie Council reflected more national concern than Community interest considered as a whole'1".
six remaining countries in the snake decided to engage in a joint float and the interventions to maintain fixed
margins against the dollar were discontinued.
161 The parallelism with progress in EMU is noted by Netherlands (p. 3 Council of 15 October 1973). See Europe
29 September 1973. Let us note as well that this opposed interpretation of the linkage between regional action and
EMU had emerged already in the aftermath of the adoption of the first resolution EMU.
162 See first resolution EMU of 22 March 1971, point IV. In fact, this point also asked for 'a report on the allocation
of powers and responsibilities among the Community institutions and the Member States essential to the proper
functioning of EMU'.
163 Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council on the progress achieved in the first stage of
economic and monetary union, on the allocation of powers and responsibilities among the Community institutions
and the Member States essential to the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union and the measures to
be taken in the second stage of economic and monetary union, Brussels, 28 April 1973, Supplement to Bulletin of
the EECC 5-1973.
1M Commission, Communication on the progress achieved ..., p. 6.
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On the monetary side, the situation was not much better165. Notably, concerning the snake, it had not
been possible to keep the fluctuations of rates between Community currencies within die margins agreed
at the time for its launching in April 1972. Indeed, by April 1973 the currencies of UK, Ireland and Italy
floated outside the Community regime while the other were floating jointly. In fact, one month after the
end of the first stage five currencies were floating jointly and tire remaining four were floating
independently.
In this scenario of defections and dismaying progress on both the monetary and economic agendas, the
transition to the second stage was opposed by Germany, France and the Netherlands, who considered
that progress had been too disappointing to move to the second stage. The other countries, however,
were in favour of proceeding. The opposition to the transition to the second stage ofEMU was argued on
different grounds166. For France the transition could not be made while various countries -Britain. Italy,
Ireland and Denmark- remained out of the snake. As far as the traditionally economist countries were
concerned, for Germany there had been an unsatisfactory progress in the co-ordination of economic
policies, and for the Netherlands also institutional developments were insufficient. All in all, the
conclusion was that (lie legal and institutional machinery introduced for die realisation of an EMU had
produced very mediocre results and had had little influence on national decisions.
An agreement of principle by finance ministers for the transition to 'a' second stage of EMU was
reached, however, at the Council session of 17 December 1973. It was at this stage that Italy and the UK
decided to veto the adoption of the resolution laying down the transition to 'a' second stage which, in
fact, had already lost much of its appeal, much of its boycott power. Still, as had occurred on previous
occasions, the situation of deadlock in the regional agenda led to the call for structural parallelism, as
endorsed by the Paris Summit. The vetoing of Italy, the UK and Ireland had the effect of blocking the
entering of 'a' second stage by 1 January 1974 and, as such, tire veto was maintained until early
February while the Council sessions of 14-15 January 1974 and 30-31 January 1974 tried to strike a
compromise on tire size and eligibility for tire ERDF. For tire vetoing delegations the resolution EMU
would only be adopted once the ERDF regulations were adopted.
165 According to the Commission (see Communication on the progress...', p. 7), at the end of the first stage,
consultations, particularly with reference to parity, had hardly acquired either a prior nor a compulsory character as
originally planned, and the co-ordination of monetary policies remained insufficient. Tax harmonisation proposals
on direct and on indirect taxes (proposals on taxation on dividends and interest from bonds and. on the other hand,
a harmonisation of the VAT assessment basis) were delayed and only some progress was made on tax exemptions
and on proposals for excise duties. Capital controls, rather than being eliminated, had increased in the face of
massive speculative movements and no progress was made in the co-ordination of member states capital market
policies either. Li order to maintain the stability of their exchange rates virtually all capital transactions within the
Community were either prohibited or subject to a strict system of controls while neither a common system of
controls was adopted by all EEC countries nor the stability of exchanges was attained. Tsoukalis (1977) Op. cit., p.
136. Furthermore, mutual assistance was ineffective. The European Monetary Co-operation Fund was set up in
April 1973 with the narrow objective of administering very-short-term and short-term credit facilities, and when the
Commission proposed a transfer to it of reserves as part of the transition to the second stage in November 1973, this
initiative was firmly blocked by France, Germany and the Netherlands. Dyson (1994), Op. cit., p. 83.
166 See Europe. Wednesday 10 October 1973, p.4, No. 1375 (new series).
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Yet, the critical blow came in 19 February 1974 when the French government decided to leave the FF
float. With the withdrawal ol' lite FF from the EMU snake, the EMU Programme entered severe crisis.
Not only did only five out of the nine countries remain within the snake, but clearly no programme of
monetary integration could be carried out without the French, who had also been its major partisan.
From this date onwards, EMU would gradually slip into oblivion until 1977 -even if various initiatives
were tried for its resuscitation. The consequences for the regional dossier of the EMU crisis ought to
have been felt immediately. Not only did the boycott maintained by Italy, UK and Ireland become
meaningless but, more importantly, the regional dossier had somehow lost its "big brother', supporting
its erratic progress through tire early 1970s. Indeed, the regional dossier had suddenly lost the powerful
boycott power provided by EMU and all engagements on deadlines.
Although tire support of a EMU agenda for a Community regional competence vanished in February
1974 with tire substantial defections from tire EMU programme, neither die Commission nor the
member states remaining in die European system of exchange abandoned die EMU objectives. The FF
float was interpreted as a temporary crisis which would be overcome when economic conditions became
more favourable, and from February 1974 measures to progress on die co-ordination of economic-
policies continued. On 18 February 1974, when only five member states remained in die Community
exchange system, die Council restated its commidnent to attaining a stronger convergence of economic
policies which, once again, called for die need for structural action167. Clearly die logic of die I Barre
Plan, by which regional actions would contribute to economic and policy convergence, remained valid.
DGXVI's Commissioner Thomson 'continued to argue diat die judicious use of die ERDF would
facilitate economic convergence and in diat way help to pave die way to EMU in die long run'168. In
brief, die EMU agenda, which had escorted regional policy until its final stages, entered into crisis, but
die logic of regional interventions did not lose its substantial validity.
By early 1974 furdier external developments direatened die pending technical agreements on a now
orphan regional dossier. A widespread economic recession as a result of die oil crisis, die change in
government in the UK, and die disputes over die extension of aid rules to die new members, had
significant effects on die final stages of die negotiations. By March 1974 not only was die support of
EMU wididrawn but also UK support, as general elections in die UK put a labour Government in office
which, radier dian aiming for a compensation to die net contributions to Community budget through
regional policy, had pledged a re-negotiation on die terms of entry altogedier.
The extension of aid co-ordination rules to die new members emerged as an additional stumbling block
in die process of negotiation of die final regional regulations. In fact, since die very early days in die
negotiation on die Commission's regional proposals, some delegations -France and die Netherlands in
167 Council decision of 18 February 1974 on the attainment of a high degree of convergence of the economic policies
of the Member States of the European Economic Community (74/120/CEE), OJ L 63 of 5.3.74. The Council also
adopted the directive on growth, stability and employment which had been accepted in principle in the second
resolution of 21 March 1972.
168 Wallace (1977) Op. cit., p. 154
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particular- attempted, in order to delay Community regional expansion, to draw policy links between
regional interventions and the liarmonisation of regional aid schemes. Although this link was repeatedly
brought up by the French throughout 1972, most delegations did not accept the realisation of the
transparency of regional aid systems as a condition for progress on the negotiation of the regional
regulations. The co-ordination of regional aid schemes was, in any case, achieved before any adoption of
regional measures on 20 October 1971 (point 9.1.1, chapter II). Yet, in June 1973 this same link was
risen again at the time of the extension of the co-ordination of regional aid systems to tire new
Members'69. Indeed, from article 154 of the Treaty of Accession, Lhe solution for the co-ordination of
aids attained by die Six in October 1971 had to be extended to the Nine by 1 July 1973 at the latest. In a
Communication of 27 June 1973 the Commission offered a provisional compromise concerning the
extension of the principles of co-ordination to all regions of the enlarged Community170. The definition
of peripheral regions for Ireland and Denmark did not cause difficulties'"; yet, pledging to find a
definitive solution before the end of 1974, the Commission was granting the UK the permission not to
apply tire resolution of October 1971. Justifiable, according to tire UK, in terms of industrial decline, but
in essence because tire UK Government made of the co-ordination of regional aids a political matter of
tire highest importance, this temporary solution allowed tire UK to carry on applying its existing system
in its 'development areas' and 'special development regions'172, and to maintain tire levels and tire
coverage of assistance which, in fact, were one of tire most generous in tire enlarged Community173.
The Commission's solution infuriated (lie other delegations, whose regional subsidises were certainly
subject to tire disciplines of 20 October 1971. Although Italy, Germany, Denmark, Ireland and tire UK
declared tire wish that new principles of co-ordination were established by common agreement before tire
end of 1974, France and tire Benelux countries denounced tire unequal treaUnent and tire biased
imposition of different disciplines to different members174, and argued that transparency and a limitation
of aid for regional purposes in central regions to 20% of tire investment ought to be equally applied
across tire Nine. Particularly for France, a resolution laying down concrete engagements should be
adopted at tire same time that tire ERDF was created175. In fact, France argued that without equal co-
169 See Europe. Friday 22 June 1973, p. 8, No 1309 (new series).
170 Commission, General regional aid systems (Communication from the Commission to the Council), Brussels 27
June 1973 [COM(73) 1110], This Communication amends and makes additions to the Communication of 23 June
1971 (point 9.1.1, chapter II).
171 Ireland as a whole was considered as a peripheral region so that there was no limitation of aid for regional
purposes and in the case of Denmark the Commission defined central and peripheral regions without difficulty.
172 The latter covering 55% of Great Britain and accounting for 20% of the total employment.
173 Overall Italy and the UK operated by far the largest volume of aid in Europe. According to a French official 'the
difference was so large that their system of aids was not comparable to the other member States'. See p. 14 of de
Castellbajac Ph. (1972), Les aides a I'expansion industrielle regionale dans les pays du Marche convnun. La
documentation Franfaise, Paris.
174 These countries demanded that concertation continued so that an appropriate solution was found. Conseil. Note.
Objet: Communication de la Commission au Conseil sur les regimes generaux d'aides a finalite regionale. Rapport
du Croupe des questions economiques au Comite des Representants Pennanents, Bruxelles 22 Octobre 1973
[R/2565/73 (ECO 247)].
175 On 14 November 1973 the Commission was asked to prepare a draft resolution while the French delegation
declared that would present one itself, although not all delegations agreed on the necessity and the utility of this
resolution. See p.2 of Annexe I to Conseil, Rapport du Groupe de travail 'politique regionale' presente au Comite
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ordination for all countries no ERDF would be set up and, thus, made a solution in the field of regional
aids a pre-condition for any discussions on regional policy. The UK argued that tire works to attain tire
co-ordination proposed by France would take most of 1974 and, thus, they could not be made to coincide
with the adoption of the ERDF which, besides, had not been deliberately linked to tire aids dossier by tire
Paris Summit. The dispute seems to have been solved through a trade-off between UK and France in
which tire UK accepted tire extension of tire ERDF to overseas territories176. The final settling of tire co¬
ordination of aid schemes was produced in 1975'".
The agreement on tire size of tire Fund did not occur until the Paris Summit of 9-10 December 1974. and
it proved once more to need a resolute intergovernmental drive to be imposed. The Irish and Italian
governments -while the UK distanced itself from the previous militancy on the regional cause-
threatened not to attend tire planned Summit in Paris unless a firm political engagement was made to set
up tire ERDF. Finally, on 12 December 1974 tire heads of government decided on the size of tire ERDF -
1,300 billion u.a. over a three year period- and also agreed on tire quotas for tire members: Belgium
1.5%, Denmark 1.3%, Germany 6.4%, France 15%, Ireland 6% (plus 6 million u.a. from each country's
shares except from Italy), Italy 40%, Luxembourg 0.1%, Netherlands 1,7%, and UK 28%. It was agreed
at tire Summit that the Fund would be set up for a three-year trial period starting from January 1975. To
this agreed size of the ERDF would be added 150 million u.a. from tire Guidance reserves. Regional
policy had lost tire drive from EMU in February 1974 but, by December 1974, strong intergovernmental
pressure led to a breakthrough.
Once tire size and tire national shares had been agreed, tire remaining details were sorted out in the
following two months. A final discrepancy -once all the details had been sorted- concerned tire required
authorisation of tire European Parliament in order to approve tire supplementary budget regulation to
How own resources into tire ERDF. After conciliation between tire Council and tire European Parliament,
the ERDF regulations were formally adopted on 18 March 1975.
Conclusions
des representants permanents, Objet: politique regionale: projet de decision du Conseil portant creation d'un
comite de politique regionale, Bruxelles 29 novembre 1973 [R/2955/73 (ECO 306) (FIN 751)]. The project of
Resolution is Annexed too.
176 The proposal to extend the eligibility to the ERDF to overseas territories was raised by the French delegation in
1973, but it was conspicuously absent throughout all the ERDF negotiations. However, it was only on 24 February
1975 that the Commission submitted a proposal to allow the covering of overseas territories by the ERDF.
According to Talbot, as the UK delegation opposed such extension of the Fund's geographical boundaries, the
French counter-attacked by raising the issue of inadequate co-ordination of regional aids. A trade-off emerged in
which the UK accepted the eligibility of overseas territories and France accepted the provisional co-ordination of 23
June 1973. See p. 255-256 of Talbot R. B. 'The European Community's Regional Fund. A study in the politics of
redistribution', Progress in Planning. 1977, Vol.8, Part 3, Pergamon Press.
177 On 26 February 1975 new principles of co-ordination valid for all the Community were defined which also began
to apply to peripheral areas. The resolution put forward five new principles forming a coherent set: differentiated
ceilings of aid intensity, transparency, regional specificity, sectoral repercussions and a system of supervision. See
Commission's Communication of 26 February 1975, informing the Council of the principles of co-ordination valid
for all regions of the Community which would apply from 1 January 1975 [COM(75) 77 final] and chapter 1 of
Commission, Fifth Report on Competition Policy, Luxembourg.
237
The regulations of 1975 are the result of a long process of negotiation which by 1973 reached its final
materialisation stage. In other words, from 1973 till 1975 -the period in which the existing literature has
concentrated- the Community employed itself to the -relatively speaking- 'minor' task of settling and
laying down the technical details for both tire operation of tire co-ordination of national regional policies
and tire ERDF interventions. But more interestingly, Lhe period 1970 to 1972 sheds light on tire
substantial justification of regional interventions and tire relative importance of enlargement in tire
acceptance of a regional policy dossier as well as revealing a string of continuity in tire logic of a
regional objective for the Community.
To begin with, tire period 1970-1972 saw tire actual agreement of principle of a regional objective for tire
Community in both tire strands of co-ordination and of regional solidarity. The first Council
acknowledgement of a Community concern over regional imbalances arose within tire context of
economic policy co-ordination on 20 January 1970. From 1970 till 1973 a series of intermittent advances
of tire regional dossier followed. This irregular, rather than gradual, pattern of advancement was in fact
paired with successive negotiations over monetary unification i.e. in tire process towards EMU which
had been launched at The Hague Summit of December 1969. First tire principle of parallelism -by which
regional action became a structural requirement of tire EMU programme from tire first stage i.e. as from
1971- was institutionalised in March 1971. Then in March 1972 an agreement of principle followed on
tire putting in place of either additional or brand new resources for regional purposes. On tire eve of tire
Paris Summit of October 1972, tire Heads of State or Government were not only confronted with time
engagements on tire creation of new means, but were also virtually left without alternative halfway
solutions. Decisions were due in October 1972 which had become unavoidable to a large degree. In this
state of affairs tire quantitative support of new acceding members for tire expansion into a new policy
competence provided tire final decisive straw to impose tire political will to undertake regional actions
over a reluctant minority.
The period 1970 till 1972 also shows that a strand of regional action, namely, a co-ordination of national
regional policies, was acceptable in principle to all delegations as early as 26 October 1970. The Council
confirmed this acceptance of principle in its adoption of tire III MTEP Programme of 22 March 1971,
although the technical details were postponed until agreement could be reached on the financial
solidarity side.
As concerns the acceptance of the principle of regional solidarity, DGII and the Italian delegation linked
it to progress in the EMU agenda. The principle of parallelism which, by default, conveyed a
simultaneity of monetary measures with economic measures had been stretched since the I Barre Plan to
include structural parallelism too. Explicitly for the Commission and tire Italian delegation, but
implicitly for tire 'economists' the logic of parallelism led to regional actions in so far as tire co¬
ordination of national economic policies called for an approximation of structural evolutions. By
implication tire programme ofmonetary unification provided an additional and compounding motive for
regional actions. Even if there was a substantial theoretical implication, by no means did EMU
inevitably imply a Community financial intervention on structural geographical imbalances. Rather, tire
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long negotiation of the regional dossier shows that until 1975 the success of the regional dossier
depended for its advancement on the bold operation of power politics and on the use of
intergovernmental boycott threats. Deadlock and feet dragging in 1971 and 1972 regarding the regional
dossier were only effectively countered by progress in the EMU agenda, as EMU offered the chance to
force those delegations less keen on the launching of monetary measures -France mainly- to make
concessions on other policy areas.
Aiming at the re-launching of the EMU programme, the Paris Summit finally managed to pin down a
regional decision for the creation of a ERDF. But although the decision to create a ERDF was made by
the Heads of State or Government, and seemingly the UK had a direct influence on its outcome, the
agreement of principle to create new and specific financial instruments for regional solidarity purposes,
as well as a concrete time commitment, were both made previous to the Paris Summit, in the context of
the EMU programme and outside the influence of acceding members (UK, Ireland and Denmark). It is
certainly fair to state that acceding'members entered a Community which by the end of 1972 had already
defined the terms of a regional objective for the common market and its particular context of
justification -economic policy co-ordination within the EMU programme. In other words, the British
delegation supported an option that had already been fought over and pushed forward
intergovernmentally and 'relatively' successfully by Italy and Belgium. Nonetheless, confirming the
broadening of the scope of regional concerns beyond the predominantly agriculture related problems of
the Six seems to be to the UK's credit. In sum, the period 1970-1972 seems to show that, rather than
enlargement, the critical aspect which brought along the acceptance from all delegations of an expansion
into regional objectives was the success of the link drawn between regional policy and EMU.
Nevertheless, even if a decision of principle for the creation of the ERDF was made at the Paris Summit,
the period 1973-1975, which dealt with the adoption of the final regional regulations proved to be highly
laborious too. Technical decisions regarding its functioning were delayed by disagreement over the most
politically controversial issues, namely, the size and geographical application of the ERDF. Besides,
these latter decisions were hijacked by other developments, namely, the energy crisis, the abandoning of
the EMU objectives and the shift in British support. Eventually, boycott tactics forced an agreement on
the size and the geographical application and to that followed a swift agreement on the remaining
technical aspects.
All in all, for both the periods before and after the Paris Summit of October 1972. the process of
examination and negotiation on the regional dossier displays clear signs of an undeniable governmental
command over the unfolding of a regional competence. Indeed, the process of examination and
negotiation of the Commission's conceptualisation of a regional competence and its concrete proposals -
which had begun by mid 1969 in the context of the examination of the I Barre Plan and was completed
in 1975- was a process dominated by governments and their national preferences, a process where both
the pace and the outcomes were set by, on the one hand, the will of the most reluctant amongst
delegations, and on the oilier, by the ability to win acceptance from the most hostile countries. Notably,
progress in the regional dossier depended on, first, a leading governmental will, second, on support or at
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least complacency from other delegations and third, on the ability to overturn stubborn opposition.
Before October 1972 EMU provided this landscape of national positions and thus an agreement of
principle on the creation of new means was struck by the Six. The final negotiation and agreement in
1974 on the modalities of intervention of the ERDF was also a governmentally dominated process where
resort was made, once more, to boycotts in order to gain compromise agreements.
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Conclusions: the development of a policy competence
The theme of this thesis has been the development of a regional competence for the Community.
Consequently it has searched for the emergence of a regional agenda and has examined the
construction and the negotiation which led to the first form of regional competence as agreed by the
Council on 18 March 1975. Conclusions have been drawn in each of the chapters identifying: 1. the
historical co-ordinates in which a global structural 'philosophy' of a regional responsibility emerged:
2. the contest between policy agendas and strategies in the definition of a regional responsibility until
1972; 3. die major elements of disagreement on the Commission proposals and their negotiation; 4.
the influence of both the programme of EMU and the first enlargement in the acceptance of an
expansion of competence into regional objectives.
Moving beyond the empirical and historical data, (A) how is this policy expansion into regional
objectives of March 1975 accounted for? And (B) what knowledge can we collect about regional
concerns for tire Community from the review of this historical process?
(A) Although from various policy areas (agricultural reform and state aids control in particular
(points 9, 10, chapter II)) a regional agenda had been put forward, a global structural definition of
regional aims in the search for economic and policy convergence was the conceptualisation finally
endorsed by the Council in the early 1970s. The final acceptance by national delegations of a regional
competence for the Community in global structural terms was owed particularly to the linkage
between a regional dossier and the EMU Programme. Rather than enlargement into die Nine, EMU in
particular contributed decisively to die endorsement of a new competence for the Community
institutions in two senses. First, intrinsically, a plan of action towards EMU reinforced die need for
economic and policy convergence, upon which the fundamental justification for structural regional
actions resided. But, second, and beyond diese sound but ultimately conceptual grounds, die
negotiation on die programme of action towards a European EMU effectively provided an ideal
landscape allowing national views to converge, as well as a decisive bargaining lever to be put to use
in favour of the regional dossier.
1. The regional agenda entered the negotiation over die EMU Programme through die policy quarrels
between 'economists' and 'monetarists' over policy preferences for die timely realisation of a EMU.
Especially for the 'economist' approach to EMU, regional action became justified in the search for
economic policy co-ordination, die latter being understood as die paramount necessity for die
successful embarking on monetary union. Countries defending an economist approach to EMU tuned
widi die global structural justification of regional actions in the search for economic and policy
convergence as defended in die I Barre Plan. That is, monetary union depended not only on policy
compatibility but also on delivering die structural conditions for diat necessary convergence to ensue.
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By no means, however, was this intrinsic policy logic of the need for regional action as a structural
component of EMU alone, sufficient to rally member states into a regional agenda for tire Community.
In fact, the documentation gathered shows that, clearly, an intrinsic logic per se did not led to the
acceptance by all member states of an intervention on regional issues. Yet enlargement did not either.
Indeed, at the time of entry, acceding members came across a logic of Community regional
involvement and an ongoing negotiation process which had started back in early 1969 on the basis of
(lie I Barre Plan and which had reached, by the end of 1972, a good number of milestones. In fact,
acknowledgement by the Council of some form of regional action had taken place as early as 26
January 1970; agreement of principle on some common denominators of regional action was reached
on 26-27 October 1970; the entrenching of the principle of parallelism had occurred in 22 March
1971 (that is, in the first resolution EMU); and, finally, the agreement of principle in a form to be
determined on regional financial solidarity was struck on 21 March 1972 (in the second resolution
EMU). All in all, seen in its historical perspective, the Conference of Heads of State or of Government
of tire enlarged Community which took place in Paris of 19-20 October 1972 confirmed the path
which had been marked from the early 1970s. The Heads of State or Government of the Nine made no
more than the final decisions, the agreement of principles having been already made by tire Six. The
influence from acceding members in producing those final decisions of principle, particularly
concerning regional solidarity, seems, nonetheless, to have been significant in the sense of having
provided quantitative support for die regional dossier. As far as specifically the UK's influence is
concerned, the contribution seems to have consisted of having broadened regional concerns and
superseded the dominance in the regional agenda of agricultural related imbalances. In short, the
logic of structural parallelism within the EMU Programme and its imposition developed
independently of enlargement, and away from the influence of acceding members.
2. Rather than a substantial logic alone, or the policy preferences of acceding members, it was the
scenario of the elaboration of a policy plan for the attainment of EMU which came to provide the ideal
bargaining conditions for gaining the acceptance from all delegations on the extension of Community
competence to regional objectives. The definition of a plan of action towards EMU provided die
landscape against which, on die one hand, national preferences came to converging positions, and on
die odier, die most reluctant delegations could be forced into accepting an extension into a new policy
domain.
Let us recall die terms of die negotiations. A co-ordination of regional policies was acceptable as early
as October 1970 and die elements of disagreement concerned technical aspects which were by no
means considered insurmountable (point 16, chapter IV). On die odier hand, an initial recognition of
die opportunity of regional solidarity- had been stated in die Werner Report. Indeed, all delegations
had accepted regional interventions in a future stage of EMU, but a majority were either disinclined or
opposed to an immediate operation of regional financial instruments in die first stage of EMU. In
odier words, although a generalised acceptance of a regional objective per se in structural terms
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emerged in October 1970, the major discrepancies resided in tire opportunity of bringing about
regional solidarity in the first stage of EMU i.e. as from 1971.
A compromise -by which regional resources would not enter into force till the beginning of the second
stage although the required regulations would be adopted during the first stage of EMU- was,
however, forced out from the Council by Italy in March 1971. But crucially, even though by early
1971 most delegations rallied behind France's opposition to a regional dossier and watched with
complacency the French refusal to financial solidarity and any interference with national regional
policies and methods, the fact is that, ultimately, only France was effectively vetoing the conclusion of
an agreement of principle on a regional competence. Indeed, the negotiations on both the
Commission's proposals and the EMU resolutions reveal that by 1971-1972 the major hostility to tire
regional dossier came from the French delegation. In other words, not the unenthusiastic position of
the majority of delegations, but the fierce opposition offered by the French, was revealed to be the
major obstacle to the launching of a regional competence. The prominent French refusal to launch any
type of regional action, beyond a minimalist examination in common of national regional policies,
was grounded in the fear ofCommunity interference with the national discretion to grant resources, to
chose where to grant them, and to decide on the intensity considered politically appropriate by French
central authorities.
As far as the other delegations were concerned, since 1969 Germany declared itself to be in favour in
principle of regional actions. The Dutch and the Belgians, originally opposed to regional actions,
shifted their views from opposition to indifference (and even support in the Belgian case) from 1972.
Italy seems to have endorsed any development possibly leading towards regional action i.e. either
coming from the sectoral framework of a policy for the reform of agricultural structures or within the
context ofEMU in the larger structural sense of its contribution to convergence. Nonetheless, as plans
for a European EMU were laid down by the Werner Committee which entrenched the principle of
parallelism, by the end of 1970 Italy must have perceived the instrumental boycott value that EMU
offered for the regional cause. In fact, it would seem that the context of the EMU Programme offered
distinctly better chances of success (for the acceptance of a regional dossier) than the chances on offer
in the context of agricultural structures. Indeed, France in August 1971 had vested interests on the
launching of a European 'snake' and was making EMU its flagship. In other words, tire paramount
interest of France in monetary measures seems to explain tire surrendering of the compromise reached
at die time of the adoption of the second resolution EMU of March 1972 -by which France came to
accept both tire creation of either a ERDF or of another type of resources specifically devoted to
regional purposes and an engagement to make tire decisions of principle before 1 October 1972. Thus,
the feet-dragging policy imposed by the French throughout tire negotiations of tire Commission's
proposals of October 1969 and May 1971 seems to have conceded to tire imposition by Italy of a veto
on die adoption of monetary measures, only dianks to die powerful boycott value provided by die
EMU Programme.
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Consideration of the above points would seem to lead to the conclusion of policy expansion in the
Community as being the result of intergovernmental bargains, as being driven by governmental
actors' preferences and as being fought through in the boldest manners of power politics. But how
legitimate is this conclusion?
In general terms, according to a liberal intergovernmentalist account1, policy and institutional
development in the Community can be explained by the combination of both an analysis of States'
preferences and their intergovernmental interaction. On the one hand, the formation of national
preferences is the result of a rational and liberal analysis of both costs and benefits of further policy
co-ordination in a context of increasingly interdependent economies. On the other hand, the chances
to realise national preferences depend on the wider intergovernmental scenario where member states
interact and bargain i.e. they depend on the three main factors: the relative intensity of national
preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity for issue linkages. Yet.
particularly concerning tire expansion of structural and regional policies, intergovernmental accounts
have argued that regional and structural policies 'since they are neither significant enough to provide
major benefits to the donors, nor widely enough distributed to represent a policy of common interest-
are most plausibly interpreted as side payments extended in exchange for other policies'2. In odier
words, the demand for regional policy co-operation would be motivated and be the result of
intergovernmental deals in the fringes of other major conflicts over policy preferences. Transposing
this analysis to the particular case of the development of a regional competence, it results that overall
the demand for the extension of co-operation into this new area coming from Italy -but also from
Germany- was the result of a rational and liberal analysis of the potential costs and benefits of policy
co-operation on the regional field, while, on the other hand, the pressures from the demand for
regional co-operation depended to be realised on two main factors: the relative intensity of national
preferences -i.e. the French hostility and a large degree of complacency from die odier delegations-,
and on die opportunity of issue linkages or side payments.
To die credit of an intergovernmental account, one has to concede diat die documentation collected
demonstrates diat in 1972 -and outside die UK's direct influence- a regional dossier was
intergovernmentally fought and finally accepted by die Six as a result of an imposition of die Italian
national preferences through a side-payment in die context of die negotiation over the EMU
Programme. Also in an analogous manner, in 1974 die last major bone of contention hindering die
adoption of die modalities of ERDF interventions -die size and distribution of the ERDF- was
overcome by bold intergovernmental boycott tactics. Nonedieless, identifying die Italian preferences
and reducing the policy expansion of regional concerns to die saga of the negotiation stage is a partial
account of die process leading to die adoption of die 1975 regulations.
0' Moravcsik A. 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach',
in Bulmer S. & A. Scott (eds.) Economic and Political Integration in Europe. Internal Dynamics and Global
Context, Oxford, Blackwell Ltd., p. 29-85.
2 Moravcsik A. Op. cit. p. 52.
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Undeniably, the process of" acceptance by national governments of a regional dossier shows that, on
the one hand, without obstinate and sufficient governmental support, development per se of the
Community into new policy areas is chimerical. However, it is no less true -as regards the case of the
regional policy dossier- that intergovernmental negotiation was effectively the later stage in a long
process leading to the adoption of the 1975 regional regulations. In a stage prior to the actual
negotiations, the Commission's influence proved substantially decisive in various ways, notably,
providing the initiative, defining the nature of regional objectives and triggering policy linkages
which eventually made possible its acceptance by all delegations.
Whether a regional agenda would have emerged, had the Commission not conceptualised it, is pure
speculation; but clearly, there is strong evidence showing that from 1959 the Commission was in
search of a regional dossier. All die evidence points to the conclusion that the first initiatives in the
search for a regional policy dossier came from the Commission. But, beyond who was first, the power
of initiative of the Commission was determinant on the sense that it was the Commission which, at its
own discretion, picked up 'a plot' i.e. a distinct, fundamental and specific regional aim for the
Community at the time and in the context of the preparation of the III MTEP Programme and who
subsequently brought it, at its own discretion, to the table of the Council to be considered by national
governments.
Secondly, apart from this independent self-assumed cause, it was also the Commission who defined
the terms of a regional objective for llie Community by elaboration of various options. The
formulation of policy developments entailed die making of choices among a range of alternative
conceptualisations. Surely from die early days die definition of a regional objective for the Community
was not an unequivocal matter. A major conflict of strategies i.e. between eidier a sectoral or a global
structural objective, led to internal divisions widiin die Commission while die developments in die
field of regional-aid control did not interfere with die major disputes between die conceptualisations
put forward by DGVI and DGXVI. Overall the Commission raised a regional agenda and made policy
choices in a largely technocratic and discretionary manner.
Thirdly, die Commission's capacity to conceptualise and develop policy links to wider agendas proved
not to be an inconsequential power in die case of regional policy, since die acceptance of policy
expansions proved dependent precisely upon diese deliberately built links. Indeed, aldiough clearly
die contents of die regional dossier were fought intergovernmental^, it is no less true that die Italian
and German defence of parallelism followed die conceptualisation of a regional objective as
constructed by DGII in die I Barre Plan. The contribution of regional imbalances to economic
divergence and, dierefore, die need for tackling regional imbalances in parallel with policies and
instruments for economic and monetary convergence was a policy link originally drawn by DGII and
developed in die early 1970s by DGXVI. That is, even if die outcome of the process of
intergovernmental negotiation displayed a diaphanous state-centric pattern, it is nonetheless clear that
die acceptance of a regional competence was die result of a successful policy linkage which produced
a combination of indifference and convergence of views for the majority of die countries while
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allowing to force France to agree on regional solidarity. Policy expansion certainly was negotiated in
the most pure intergovernmental fashion but the construction and also the triggering of the dossier
through the link to EMU -as well as other routes- was fully the initiative, the choice and under tire
management of the Commission.
It seems fallacious to argue however, that by February 1969 die I Barre Plan could foresee die fuelling
of die regional dossier that die unfolding of die EMU Programme was going to bring or even die
reactions of national delegations -particularly of die large countries- in relation to the proposals for
monetary co-operation. The I Barre Plan was originally not well received by all delegations, and
although a positive reaction to die link between EMU and structural actions was probably to be
expected from Germany and Italy, die reaction of die French Government to the EMU programme
must have appeared by 1969 as a matter depending on die turns of domestic politics and die economic
conjuncture. Indeed, events both in die international and domestic scenes were going to increase tire
interest in monetary integration and, hence, die chances of success of die policy linkage. All in all,
rather than machinating an orchestrated plan, it rather seems that die Commission simply adopted die
strategy of scattering seeds in various fields in die hope that some would take root. As a matter of fact,
it seems dial die Commission actually misjudged die potentiality of die EMU context and played its
cards in favour of regional actions as a continuation from die reform of agricultural structures.
In any case, once die seeds took root, die influence of die Commission at (lie negotiation stages was,
comparatively speaking, much less decisive than in die period previous to die Paris Summit of
October 1972. Particularly after die Paris Summit, die role of die Commission in the process of
acceptance of a regional competence turns into one of a negotiator where die Commission constructed
packages in die search for consensual acceptance of regional instruments (H. Wallace 1977).
Seemingly driven by a political need to deliver, die Commission pursued the production of an
agreement among widely diverging positions.
In sum, it appears that it was not in its power to negotiate but, rather, in its capacity of initiative and
in the power to define and launch dossiers while controlling die management and die links to wider
agendas, where die decisive influence of the Commission in die process leading to die adoption of the
regional regulations of 1975 resided. Particularly on the grounds of its privileged proximity to
decision making centres it is difficult to accept a more influential role from other supranational bodies
like die European Parliament. All in all, die expansion into a new policy area seems to display a
pattern of 'division of labour' by which fundamentally die Commission, with political support from
die European Parliament, influenced substantially die emergence, die meaning and the timing of die
release of policy linkages to wider agendas, while, on die other hand, governmental drive and
strategic bargaining settled die discrepancies between die proposals by the Commission and die extent
to which national delegations were prepared to go.
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(B) So, all tilings considered, how accurate is the perception of a regional responsibility for the
Community as being the result of a side-payment? In the light of the history of the regional dossier as
reviewed in the thesis, the understanding of the emergence of a regional competence in purely
intergovernmental terms appears as a truly partial interpretation. Accounting for the emergence of a
regional competence in the terms of a side-payment seems to miss out a much broader reality
characterised by, first, the decisive role of the Commission in other senses than its weak bargaining
power; and second, by the presence (apart from the most visible aspects of Community inter-state
bargaining) of much deeper and substantial phenomena in the dynamics of economic integration
which, in fact, display a clear continuity from the end of the transition period until the present.
Indeed, a concern over regional imbalances in the sense of the effects that regional disparities can
have on economic and policy convergence and, therefore, targeting an approximation of economic
structures, appears as a leitmotif throughout the history of the Community. Unravelling this
interesting continuity would deserve a thorough study which can not be undertaken at this stage, yet
the signs already seem clear. At the end of the transition period, and for the first time in the history of
the Community, tire need for attaining economic and policy convergence justified substantially a
regional competence in the attempt to prevent the breaking up of tire common market and tire
attainment of the economic union. Since 1987 tire need for convergence has evolved into tire need for
economic and social cohesion whereby such a notion of 'cohesion' is understood as die pursuit of a
process of convergence not only nominal and apparent, but also real between nations and regions
(Buzzelay and Hannequart, 1994)3.
This diesis has argued diat die first evidence of die risks involved for a Community where its
members and regions were not growing harmoniously emerged at die end of the transition period in
1968. The merging of die markets of die Six signatory countries of die EEC Treaty aiming (apart
from other political considerations) at achieving economic performances comparable to those in the
US, had rested on die conviction that within a larger European market -organised under competition
rules and where factors of production were unhampered in dieir mobility- factors of production
(capital and labour) would be located according to market rules, division of labour and economies of
scale would ensue, productivity per capita would increase, and all of these togedier would have an
immediate and positive effect on GDP levels and on living standards. Community institutions were
charged, mainly, to ensure die removal of obstacles to the four freedoms, to establish a legal
framework to allow die common market to function, and to co-ordinate die economic policies of its
members to die degree necessary for the attainment of die objectives of the Treaty. Inevitably die
merging of die markets meant structural transformations (international division of labour, unequal
growdi of sectors, geographical mobility of factors of production, professional mobility, reconversion
of enterprises and of sectors, etc.), yet die EEC Treaty did not provide for action on the structures -
3 That is, Buzzelay A. & A. Hannequart (1994), Problematique regionale et cohesion dans la Communaute
Europeenne, Paris, TEPSA, Economica.
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apart from dispersed actions such as a co-ordinated policy for tire reform of agricultural structures and
a social policy to promote labour adaptation and mobility. But by the end of the transition period, it
became no longer sufficient that the economies of the members of tire common market grew but,
rather, that they grew harmoniously. Notably, a disparate pattern of structural evolutions had started
to translate (in a situation of exposure to imports and where traditional national protection devices
became ruled out) into die loss of external equilibria in some countries. The I Barre Plan warned diat
unless die structural evolutions and the pace of economic development were harmonised, structural
disparities would fuel economic and policy divergence, dius, may threatening die continuation of the
common market.
Aldiough originally Community intervention on regional imbalances was not designed as a
requirement for die timely achievement of EMU objectives but, radier, to guarantee die adequate
functioning and continuation of die common market, die objective of monetary unification indirectly
raised again die substantial problem of attaining as well as maintaining die necessary degree of
economic and policy convergence. The problem of economic and policy divergence featured at die
heart of die devising of a plan of action for die attainment by stages of EMU. In fact, die paramount
importance of ensuring a high degree of economic and policy convergence was questioned in early
1970. The Werner Group relied on achieving a monetary union primarily from an effective co¬
ordination and progressive harmonisation of economic policies in die short and medium term. That is,
not recognising die need to act upon die conditions needed to deliver an effective and continuing
convergence, die Werner Group believed die political will of die member states sufficient to bend
national priorities to die requirements of an adequate co-ordination of economic and monetary
measures. Through die compromise of parallelism, however, different national preferences were
combined in a plan of action including monetary and parallel economic measures and also with die
commitment to decide on structural measures to accompany die scheduled entry of monetary
measures. All in all, die necessary convergence of economies and policies -put into practice in the III
MTEP Programme- was to be carried out dirough an infrastructure of Committees and attained by
improvements in consultation procedures in die short-term and by die formula of macro-economic
compatibility in die medium term, namely, by die subscribing to compatible macro-economic
objectives approximating national priorities in relation to growdi, employment, prices and balance of
payments.
Although by die early 1974 die attempts at bodi monetary and economic union proved to have failed,
die substantial philosophy of regional interventions did not elapse. Indeed, die governments of die
Nine had failed to maintain stable exchange relations among dieir currencies while die recipe of
macroeconomic compatibility and die improvement of consultation procedures in die short-term did
not deliver the sought convergence of national price trends. On 18 February 1974 the Council decided
to substantially improve and strengdien policy co-ordination procedures in order to attain and
maintain a high degree of convergence of die economic policies. A number of changes took place,
mainly: die infrastructure of co-ordinating committees set up diroughout die 1970s was unified into
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one single Economic Policy Committee; consultation machinery on economic and monetary policy
was reinforced; and macroeconomic compatibility was completed with the issuing by the Council of
statements of national annual economic guidelines. In the structural field, the logic by which the
harmonisation of orientations in the medium term needed to be accompanied by an improvement in
the structures was maintained, the purpose of medium term economic policy programmes became to
facilitate and guide structural changes -sectoral, regional and social- to ensure the convergence of
overall economic policies but overall a structural agenda as a requirement to economic convergence
was paid a rather weak determination. The ERDF was not set up until 1975 with such a modest
budget and lack of Community purpose that its medium and long term contribution to policy
convergence was clearly rather questionable.
A qualitative and quantitative breakthrough arrived in 1987 in the context of a programme for the
completion of the single market which opened a new phase for Community regional policy and. more
broadly, for structural actions. The need for real economic convergence i.e. beyond the nominal recipe
of macro-economic compatibility, developed into the need to take a decisive action on die structural
conditions which would deliver a real convergence. The Single European Act (SEA) inserted in the
EEC Treaty the new objective of 'economic and social cohesion' and provided that cohesion was to be
attained by (1) an enhanced co-ordination of macro-economic policies of tire member states, by (2) the
implementation and contribution of common policies and of the internal market and (3) by the use of
structural instruments, especially the structural funds (ERDF, ESF and Guidance section of EAGGF)
and the EIB4.
Beyond the largely inconsequential reforms of 1979 and 1984 which modified the modalities of
intervention of tire ERDF and its total appropriations, tire SEA provided for a thorough reform. The
reforms of 1988 increased resources and embodied die logic of an integrated structural policy which,
combining die structural dimensions of previously dispersed policy instruments, superseded die role of
support of national development actions for die specific targeting of structural disparities at
Community level.
In sum, a review on die genesis and history of die regional dossier dirows a corollary of regional
concerns for die Community as going well beyond the pure short-term and tactical considerations diat
an explanation in terms of a side-payment seems to convey. Certainly, it is not die case diat die
intergovernmental manner in which agreements are struck at Community level can be denied; yet a
review of die history of die regional dossier casts fundamental doubts on a pure intergovernmental
account of policy development in die Community. Far from resting in die opportunities opened by
strategic bargaining, regional concerns as to die need for a balanced development in the Community
(i.e. for national and regional economies to grow harmoniously) appear as an almost constitutional'
requirement lor die functioning of the common market, diat is, as a concern upon which the operation
of die common market and die long term perspectives of die process of integration rest. It cannot be
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denied that the continuity in the nature and the conceptualisation of a regional concern reveals a
broader reality that a side-payment fails to unveil.




Before listing the documentation used for this thesis it is important to note that documents below,
apart from being referred to by the name of the originating institutions, their title and date, they are
defined by a code in square brackets. This coding in square brackets (used for internal purposes) is
particularly significant because it reveals the nature of the document.
Thus, various types of documents are used throughout the thesis:
• minutes of Council meetings [R/no./year (PV/CONS no.) Extr. no.]:
By minutes of Council meetings is not meant the actual verbatim of a given meeting since
verbatims are not open to public access; rather, minutes of a Council correspond to what is
referred as the 'proces-verbal' of a Council session. Notably, this type of documents records -in
indirect speech- the interventions of national delegations and the representative of tire Commission
as they occurred in a given Council session. In addition and apart from these minutes (or 'proces-
verbal') there are also other types of Council documents laying down tire final decisions made at
any given Council session. These are normally referred as 'releve des decisions' or list of
decisions taken by tire Council and are coded as: [T/no/year],
• minutes of internal DGs meetings involving Commissioners and heads of DGs [COM(year) PV
no.]:
Where 'COM' stands for Commission and PV for 'prods-verbal' as defined above.
• Commission's accounts of Coreper and Council meetings [SEC(year) no. |:
Documents produced by the College of Commissioners' Secretariat are catalogued as "SEC'
documents where SEC is an abbreviation to denote the office of the General Secretary of tire
Commission. They can be any type of document addressed to the College, but the ones collected
for this thesis are mostly accounts or summaries of Coreper or Council meetings directed to
Commission's officials and specifying the positions of the delegations in issues dealt with in a
given session of Coreper or Council.
• Working documents and reports produced by Coreper or its subgroups for die preparation of
Council deliberations [R/ no./year (AGRI no. or FIN no.)]:
These type of documents me either working papers containing the positions of die delegations and
die amendments proposed by diem to die proposals by die Commission; recaps of die 'state of die
art' in die negotiations; or otherwise documents putting forward proposals from die nafional
delegations.
• Reports of die Legal Service [R/no./year (JUR no)]:
• Letters among Commission's officials and among Council's officials;
• Minutes of the sessions of the Medium-term economic policy Committee and some of its
subgroups such as the Group for structures [no./11/ year];
The Commission (notably DGII) provided the secretariat for the Medium-term economic policy
Committee. If the document originated from another DG then tire coding would change the roman
number by the number of the DG which produced the document.
• Meetings of ad hoc Commission's Committees like the 1959 Group, the Three Committees of
Experts of 1964, etc.[no./II/year]:
All these committees were set up by and answerable to DG11 and, therefore, they are catalogued as
DGII documents.
In order to reveal in die most bold manner die documentation that has been used to build and argue
various points diroughout die diesis, die listing and sorting of the primary source material below has
not followed die chapter and section headings used diroughout die diesis, but instead, documents are
sorted, first, by chapter number, and second, by die wider topic to which die individual documents
have provided evidence for. Always bearing in mind diat often individual documents contain
information that could fall under various different headings, diis listing provides a quick guide of die
empirical data gadiered under each topic.
1. On the scenario of economic and policy divergence
1.1. The incompatibility ofevolutions
Commission, Premiere syndiese sur les projections en valeur pour 1970, Bruxelles 11 decembre 1967
[17015/1/II/67]
Groupe d'Etude des perspectives economiques a moyen terme, sous-groupe 'Projections',
Organisation des travaux pour les projections 1973-1975, (Note du Secretariat, Bruxelles 10 avril
1968 [5680/11/68]
Commission, Strategies alternatives devolution a moyen terme du niveau des prix et leurs
consequences pour le march6 commun, Bruxelles 24 janvier 1969 [21535/11/68]
Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil au sujet de la politique susceptible d'etre poursuivie au
sein de la Communaute pour faire face aux problemes economiques et monetaires actuels, Bruxelles 5
decembre 1968 [SEC(68) 3958 final]
Commission, Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute, Bruxelles 12 fevrier 1969
[COM(69) 150]
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Comite Monetaire, Avis du Comite monetaire sur le memorandum de la Commission au Conseil du
12 fevrier 1969, Bruxelles 10 mai 1969 [9856/11/69]
Commission, Rapport du Comite de politique conjoncturelle relatif au Memorandum de la
Commission au Conseil en date du 12 fevrier 1969, Bruxelles 5 juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2155]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme: Premieres indications sur le contenu
possible du memorandum de la Commission sur les problemes que font apparaitre pour la
Communaute les perspectives d'evolution a moyen terme (Note des services de la Commission),
Bruxelles 2 mai 1969 [9000/11/69]
Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM les membres de la Commission, Objet: 515 reunion du Comite
des Representants Permanents du 5 Juin 1969. -Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la
coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute,
Bruxelles 6 juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2190]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute. -Resume des observations
principales presentees lors de la reunion du Comite des Representants permanents le 17 juin 1969,
Bruxelles 20 juin 1969 [R/1055/69 (AGRJ 141) (FIN 134)]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM les membres de la Commission, Objet: 517eme reunion du
comite des representants permanents du 17 juin 1969. -Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil
sur la coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la
Communaute, Bruxelles 19 Juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2419]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Premieres indications sur le contenu
possible du memorandum de la Commission sur les problemes qui font apparaitre pour la
Communaute les perspectives d'evolution a moyen terme dans les pays membres, (Note des services
de la Commission), Bruxelles 2 mai 1969 [9000/11/69]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM les membres de la Commission, Objet: 518eme reunion du
Comite des representants permanents, 24 juin 1969 -Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur
la coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute,
Bruxelles 26 Juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2528]
Commission, Rapport du Comite de politique economique a moyen terme sur le Memorandum de la
Commission au Conseil du 12 fevrier 1969 (avant-projet), Bruxelles 10 Juin 1969 [OR 11-133/69]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute. -Resume des observations
principales presences lors de la reunion du Comite des Representants permanents le 3 juillet 1969,
Bruxelles 7 juillet 1969 [R/1251/69 (AG 168) (FIN 170)]
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Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM les membres de la Commission, Objet: 519eme reunion du
Comile des representants permanents 3 juillet -Preparation du Conseil Economique et Financier du 17
juillet 1969, Bruxelles 7 juillet 1969 [SEC(69) 2695]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute. -Resume des conclusions
principales du Groupe de travail lors de I'examen technique du projet de decision annexe au
Memorandum, Bruxelles 10 juillet 1969 [R71288/69 (AG 174) (FIN 181)]
Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM les membres de la Commission, Objet: 520eme reunion du
Comite des representants permanents: 10/7/1969 -Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la
coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire, Bruxelles 14 juillet 1969
[SEC(69) 2813]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute. -Examen par le Comite des
Representants Permanents, Bruxelles 14 Juillet 1969 [R/1316/69 (AG 181) (FIN 187)]
Conseil, Communication a la Presse: 75eme session du Conseil du 17 juillet 1969, Bruxelles 17 juillet
1969 [1129/69 (AG 186)]
Commission, Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur les orientations globales a moyen terme
(1971-1975) de la politique economique dans la Communaute, Bruxelles 15 decembre 1969
[COM(69) 1250]
Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme , Avis concernant le memorandum de la Commission
au Conseil sur les orientations globales a moyen terme (1971-1975) de la politique economique dans
la Communaute, Bruxelles 13 Janvier 1970 [660/11/70]
Commission, Deroulement de la 99erne session du Conseil consacree aux affaires economiques et
financieres (Bruxelles 26 janvier 1970), Seance de la Commission du 29 janvier 1970 [COM(70) PV
108]
1.2. The IMedium-term economic policy Programme
1.2.1. The origins ofMedium-term economic policy co-ordination
Commission, Extrait du proces-verbal de la 201eme reunion de la Commission le 10 Octobre 1962
Commission CEE, 'Politique economique a moyen terme de la Communaute, Recommandation de la
Commission au Conseil, Bruxelles, le 25 juillet 1963 [ II/COM(63) 271 final]
Commission, 'La politique economique a moyen terme de la Communaute', Note d'information
Porte-parole de la Commission, 31 Juillet 1963
Conseil Note. Objet: Recommandation de la Commission au Conseil sur la politique economique a
moyen terme de la Communautd, Bruxelles, 13 Septembre 1963. [R/735 f/63 (AG 291) (ECO 25)]
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Secretariat General des Conseils des Communautes europeennes, 'Note a I'attention du President du
Comite des representants Permanents', Objet: Recommandation de la Commission au Conseil sur la
politique economique a moyen terme de la Communaute, Bruxelles, 16 Septembre 1963.
Conseil, Note. Objet: Recommandation de la Commission au Conseil sur la politique economique a
moyen terme de la Communaute, Bruxelles 19 septembre 1963
Extrait du compte rendu sommaire de la reunion (269eme) du Comite des Representants Permanents,
tenue a Bruxelles les 17, 18, 19 et 23 Seplembre 1963 [1242/63]Conseil, Aide-memoire de la reunion
du Groupe des questions economiques tenue le 22 novembre 1963 concernant la recommandation de
la Commission au Conscil sur la politique economique a moyen terme de la Communaute, Bruxelles
le 20 decembre 1963 [R/1204/63 (AG 445) (ECO 46)] [ R/762/63 (AG 302) (ECO 27)]
Extrait du compte rendu sommaire de la 294eme reunion du Comite des representants permanents a
Bruxelles les 6,7,8,9, et 10 Avril 1964 530/64
Conseil, Note. Objet: Recommandation de la Commission sur la politique economique a moyen terme
de la Communaute, Bruxelles le 27 fevrier 1964 R/209/64 (AG 82) (ECO 14
Secretariat general des Conseils des Communautes europeennes, Note a l'attention du President du
Comite des Representants Permanents Point 111/12: Recommandation de la Commission sur la
Politique economique a moyen terme de la Communaute, Bruxelles, le 17 mars 1964
Decision du Conseil du 15 Avril 1964 creant un comite de politique economique a moyen terme
(64/247/CEE) JO 1031/64 du 22.4.64
Commission, Note pour la Commission economique et financiere du Parlement Europeen sur
l'organisation et les travaux du Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles. 31
decembre 1965 15.671/11/ 65
1.2.2. The I Medium-term economic policy Programme
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la premiere reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (11 decembre 1964), Bruxelles 6 Janvier 1965 [292/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 26.1.65.
Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 27 Janvier 65 [1502/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la deuxieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique k Moyen terme, (29 Janvier 1965), Bruxelles 16 Fevrier 1965 [2479/11/65]
Commission, Comit6 de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 25-
26.2.65. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 4 Mars 65 [3062/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la troisieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (5 Mars 1965), Bruxelles 23 Mars 1965 [4294/11/65]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique & moyen terme. Reunion des .suppleants des 1 et 2
Avril 1965. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 5 avril 65 [4928/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la quatrieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (9 Avril 1965), Bruxelles 27 Avril 1965 [5629/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants en date du 14
mai 1965, Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 17 mai 1965 [6769/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la cinquieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (21 mai 1965), Bruxelles 8 juin 1965 [7649/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants tenue le 18
Juin 1965. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxclles 21 Juin 65 [8414/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la sixieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (25 juin 1965), Bruxelles 28 juin 1965 [8417/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 13 Juillet
1965. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 15 juillet 65 [9586/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la septieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (23 juillet 1965), Bruxelles 28 juillet 1965 [10.049/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 10
Septembre 1965. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 15 septembre 65 [11.402/11/65 ]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la huitieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (17 septembre 1965), Bruxelles 21 septembre 1965 [11.881/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 7 et 8
octobre 1965. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 12 octobre 65 [12.873/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la neuvieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (15 octobre 1965), Bruxelles 18 septembre 1965 [13.197/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 29 octobre
1965. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 3 novembre 65 [13697/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la dixieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (5 novembre 1965), Bruxelles 9 novembre 1965 [14.112/11/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppieants du 26
novembre 1965. Rdsume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 29 novembre 1965 [14.639/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la onzieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (2 ddcembre 1965), Bruxelles 9 decembre 1965 [15.342/11/65]
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Commission, Comit6 de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 7 Janvier
1966. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 10 Janvier 1966 [258/11/66]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la douzieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (14 janvier 1966, [929/11/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 4 fevrier
1966 Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 7 levrier 1966 [992/11/66]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la treizieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (15 fevrier 1966), Bruxelles, 17 fevrier 1966 [2577/11/66]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la quatorzieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (24-25 mars 1966), Bruxelles, 31 mars 1966 [4132/11/66]
Problemes de 1'emploi Document de travail a l'attention du Comite de Politique economique a moyen
terme [821/11/65]
Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Problemes de l'emploi (premiere synthese des
travaux des suppleants) 26 mars 1965 [4.397/11/65]
Comite de Politique Budgetaire document de travail: Les investissements des administrations,
Bruxelles, 28/8/1965 [10.728/11/65]
Comite de Politique budgetaire: Evolution des recettes et des depenses publiques de 1960 a 1970.
Document de travail [Confidentiel 10.005/11/65]
Projet de Mandat pour un Groupe de Travail sur les problemes de la Politique des Structures sous ses
aspects sectorielles [ 886/II/65/F]
Mandat pour un groupe de travail sur les problemes de la politique des Structures sous ses aspects
sectorielles, 18.2. 1965 [ 2482/11/65]
Groupe de travail 'Aspects sectoriels de la Politique des Structures'. Commontaires relatifs au mandat.
Note elaboree par le President des suppleants [ 4.340/II/651
Commission, Comitd de Politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe 'Politique des structures
sectorielles; Depenses des administrations publiques au titre des interventions economiques, Annexe
statistique au projet de synthese des informations fournies par les Etats membres sur les politiques de
structures sectorielles, Extrait de l'etude par le Groupe de travail pour la comparaison des budgets
sous le titre 'Les recettes et les depenses publiques dans les pays membres de la CEE', Bruxelles [
9446/11/65]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Synthase des informations fournies par les Etats membres sur leurs politiques
des structures sectorielles, 5 Novembre 1965 [ 9446/2/II/65]
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Commission, Dormees statistiques relatives a 1'application des regimes generaux d'aides [
9.293/IV/65]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Resume des conclusions. Seance du 1 octobre 1965 [ 12 874/11/65]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Projet de synthese definitive des informations fournies par les Etats membres
sur leurs politiques des structures sectorielles, 14 Juillet 1965 [ 9946/1/II/65]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Conclusions relatives a la politique des structures sectorielles dans la
Communaute (projet du secretariat), 16 Septembre 1965 [11.399/11/65]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles' Reunion du 19 Novembre 1965. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 23
Novembre 1965 [ 14.637/11/65]
1.3. The IIMedium-term economic policy Programme
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Preparation du second programme de
politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles le 13 mai 1966 [6398/11/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 24 mai
1966. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 25 mai 1966 [6400/11/66]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la quinzieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (7 Juin 1966), Bruxelles 13 Juin 1966 [8080/1/II/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Resume des grandes orientations du
projet de premier programme de Politique economique a moyen terme (1966-1970), Bruxelles le 15
juin 1966 [8081/11/65] and [[8081/1/II/66] of 29 Juillet 1966
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Questionnaire complementaire en
matiere de finances publiques, Bruxelles 20 Juin 1966 [8496/1/II/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du ler juillet
1966 et reunion commune des suppleants et du groupe de travail 'Aspects sectorielles de la politique
des structures du 15 Juillet 1966. R6sum6 des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 20 juillet 1966 [8500/11/66]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 16eme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (29 juillet 1966) Bruxelles 1 aout 1966 [10318/11/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique 6conomique a moyen terme, Note 6tablie par le Secretariat en vue
de preparer la reunion Commune des Suppleants avec les experts nationaux pour les previsions
budgdtaires H moyen terme (reunion du 16 Septembre 1966), Bruxelles 5 Aout 1966 [ 10554/11/66]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Problemes poses par l'adaptation
structurelle des entreprises dans le Marche commun, Bruxelles 19 septembre 1966 [10322/11/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Themes de travaux envisages pour le
groupe d'Etude des perspectives economiques a moyen terme, Bruxelles 23 Septembre 1966
[11018/1/11/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 16 et 30
septembre 1966. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 4 oclobre 1966 [11361/11/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique Economique a Moyen terme, Etat des travaux de reponse aux
questionnaires en matiere de finances publiques, Bruxelles 7 octobre 1966 112768/11/66]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 17eme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (14 octobre 1966) Bruxelles 21 octobre 1966 [ 13121/11/66]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 18 et 2
decembre 1966. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 6 decembre 1966 [15582/11/66]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la IBeme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (20 janvier 1967) Bruxelles 30 janvier 1967 [1521/11/67]
Commission, Budget economique pour 1967, Synthase et commentaires, presente par les services de
la Commission, Janvier 1967 (Confidentiel [13933/1/II/66])
Commission, Comite de Politique Economique a Moyen terme, Declaration faite par M. Langer,
ancien president du Comite, a l'occasion de son depart (18eme reunion du Comite du 20 janvier
19670, Bruxelles 15 fevrier 1967 [2593/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Politique du marche des capitaux,
Delimitation des questions susceptibles d'etre traitees par le Comite (document elabore par les
services de la Commission), Bruxelles 2 fevrier 1967 [1523/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Adaptation structurelle des entreprises
(Document elabore par les services de la Commission), Bruxelles 7 fevrier 1967 [1524/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Les incidences sociales des operations
de concentration document elabore par les services de la Commission), Bruxelles 13 fevrier 1967
[1582/11/67]
Commission, Comitd de Politique dconomique a moyen terme, Schema d'un projet de chapitre sur la
politique d'adaptation structurelle des entreprises industrielles document elabore par le secretariat),
Bruxelles 10 fevrier 1967 [1530/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 10 et 24
fevrier 1967. Rdsume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 27 fevrier 1967 [2597/11/67]
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Commission, Comite dc Politique Economique a Moyen terme, Projet de table de matieres provisoires
de l'avant-projet de second programme, Bruxelles 6 mars 1967 [3639/1/II/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique Economique a Moyen terme, Aperfu des mesures de politique
economique adoptees ou envisagees par les Etats membres entre octobre 1966 et fevrier 1967,
Bruxelles 13 Mars 1967 [2595/11/67]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 19eme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (17 mars 1967) Bruxelles 22 mars 1967 [3798/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppliants du 14 avril
1967. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 18 avril 1967 [5554/11/67]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 20eme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (28 avril 1967) Bruxelles 11 mai 1967 [7253/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppliants du 26 mai
1967. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 31 mai 1967 [6200/11/67]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 21eme riunion du Comiti de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme, (9 juin 1967) Bruxelles 14juin 1967 [8704/11/67]
Commission, Comiti de Politique iconomique a moyen terme, Projet d'avis iventuel sur le
renforcement des moyens du secretariat, Bruxelles 21 Juin 1967
Commission, Comite de Politique iconomique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppliants du 23 juin
1967. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 28 juin 1967 [8711/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique iconomique a moyen terme, Projet de chapitre I: Aperpu giniral,
24 Juillet 1967 [3799/II/1/67]
Commission, Comiti de Politique iconomique a moyen terme, Projet de chapitre II: politique
d'adaptation structurelle des entreprises, Bruxelles 26 Juillet 1967 [5548/II/1/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique iconomique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppliants des 7-8
septembre 1967. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 13 septembre 1967 [10030/11/67]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct des 22eme et 23eme reunions du Comiti de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme (21-22 septembre 1967), Bruxelles 29 septembre 1967 [13490/11/67]
Commission, Groupe d'Etude des Perspectives Economiques a moyen terme, Avis sur la periodicite
des projections economiques, Bruxelles, [392/2/II/67]
Commission, Groupe d'Etude des Perspectives Economiques a moyen terme, Avis sur les projections
economiques alternatives [393/1/II/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Abolition d'entraves de caractere fiscal
aux processus d'adaptation structurelle dans l'economie de la RFA (Contribution de la delegation
allemande a l'avant-projet du chapitre II) 20 and 26 septembre 1967
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Commission, Comit6 de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 12-13
octobre 1967. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles le 13 octobre 1967 [13495/11/67]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 24eme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme (6-7 noveinbre 1967), Bruxelles 9 noveinbre 1967 [ 13498/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 30
novembreet 1 decernbre 1967. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 8 decembre 1967 [16719/11/67]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 25 feme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme (14-15 decembre 1967), Bruxelles 11 Janvier 1968 [16722/11/67]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 18 et 19
janvier 1968. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 23 janvier 1968 [794/11/68]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 26eme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme (29-30 janvier 1968), Bruxelles 9 fevrier 1968 [2361/11/68]
Commission, Groupe des problemes de l'economie gen6rale, Note a l'altention de MM Hellwig,
Mansholt, Levi-Sandri, Coppe, von der Groeben, Colonna di Paliano et Haferkamp, Bruxelles 7
fevrier 1968 [SEC(68) 440 (ECO 6)]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projection des recettes et des depenses
de l'Etat jusqu'en 1970, Bruxelles 23 fevrier 1968 [2920/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique 6conomique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants des 21 et 23
fevrier 1968. Resume des Conclusions, Bruxelles 24 fevrier 1968 [2897/11/68]
Commission, Avant-projet du second programme de Politique economique a moyen terme
(Communication de M. Barre), Bruxelles 7 mars 1968 [COM(68) 148/2]
Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Avant-projet de second programme de politique
economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 15 mars 1968, [COM(68)148/3]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la 27eme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme (29 fevrier 1968), Bruxelles 20 mars 1968 [2900/11/68]
Commission, Projet de second programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 20
Mars 1968 [COM(68) 148 final]
Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission, Objet: 463eme reunion du
Comite des representants permanents du 2 avril 1968. Projet de second programme de politique
economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 3 avril 1968 [SEC(68)1220]
Comite economique et social, avis sur le projet de second programme de politique economique a
moyen terme, Bruxelles 20 mars 1968, JO C74/3 du 14.6.1969
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Commission, Note pour MM. les membres de la Commission, Objet: Corrigendum au projet de
second programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 6 decembre 1968 [SEC(68)
3885/2]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission, Objet: 509eme reunion du
Comile des representants permanents du 24 avril 1969. Second programme de politique economique a
moyen terme, Bruxelles 28 avril 1969 [SEC(69)1620]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'aspects sectorielles
de la politique des structures', Schema pour l'analyse des depenses publiques au titre de la politique
sectorielle (note du secretariat), Bruxelles 14 octobre 1966 [11363/11/66]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du ler Juillet
1966 et reunion commune des suppleants et du groupe de travail 'Aspects sectoriels de la politique des
structures' du 15 juillet 1966, Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 20 Juillet 1966 [8500/11/66]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'aspects sectorielles
de la politique des structures', Preparation du deuxieme programme. Note du secretariat en vue de la
reunion commune du 15 juillet 1966 avec les suppleants du Comite, Bruxelles 28 Juin 1966 [
8.498/11/66]
Note a l'attention de Monsieur Robert Marjolin par M. Guido Colonna di Paliano, Objet: Programme
de travail pour les annees 1966-1967 du comite de politique economique a moyen terme. Politique
sectorielle, Bruxelles 25 juillet 1966
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet du lettre du president du Comite
au president du Groupe de travail 'Politique des structures sectorielles', Bruxelles le 5 aout 1966
[10.319/11/66]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Seance du 26 septembre 1966, Resume des conclusions. Bruxelles 3 octobre
1966, [11.362/11/66]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'aspects sectorielles
de la politique des structures', Reunion du 7 Novembre 1966. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 11
novembre 1966, [ 13.955/11/66]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', La politique des structures sectorielles actuellement appliquee par les pays
membres (Synthase des informations fournies par les Etats membres sur leurs politiques des structures
sectorielles), 1 fevrier 1967 [ 15.585/II/3/66]
Commission, Comite de politique 6conomique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Projet r6vis6 de rapport du Groupe de travail 'aspects sectorielles de la
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politique des structures au Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 23 fevrier 1967
[1584/1/II/66]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Resume des conclusions de la reunion tenue les 14 avril 1967 par les
suppliants avec le groupe de travail de politique des structures sectorielles, Bruxelles 17 avril 1967
[5552/11/67]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Rapport du groupe de travail 'Aspects
sectorielles de la politique des structures' au Comite de politique economique a moyen terme,
Bruxelles 20 Mars 1967[5584/2/II/66-F]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', Resume des conclusions. Reunion du 12 mai 1967, Bruxelles 19 mai 1967 [
6.197/11/67]
Commission, Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
structures sectorielles', La politique des structures sectorielles dans le contexte des depenses
publiques, Bruxelles 1 Mars 1967 [3792/11/67]
Commission, Problemes de la Politique industrielle, communication de M. Colonna di Paliano,
Bruxelles 27 fevrier 1967 [SEC(67) 672]
Commission, Note pour MM les chefs de cabinets, Objet: amendements a la note 'Problemes de la
politique industrielle', Bruxelles 28 Mars 1967 (Confidentiel [SEC(67) 672 Add.])
Commission, Note pour MM les chefs de cabinets, Objet: amendements a la note 'Problemes de la
politique industrielle', Bruxelles 6 Avril 1967 (Confidentiel [SEC(67) 672 Add.2])
Commission, Problemes de la politique industrielle, communication de M. Colonna di Paliano,
Bruxelles 6 avril 1967 [SEC(67) 672 final]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM les membres de la Commission Objet: Problemes de la
politique industrielle, Bruxelles 12 Avril 1967, [SEC(67) 1201]
Commission, La politique industrielle de la Communaute. Memorandum de la Commission au
Conseil., Bruxelles 18 Mars 1970 [COM(70) 100 final]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique industrielle de la Communaute. Rapport du Groupe 'Politique
industrielle' au Comite des Representants Permanents, Bruxelles 30 Mars 1971 [R/579/71 (ECO 62)]
1.4. The III Medium-term economic policy Programme
Commission, Comitd de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du 10 mai
1968. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 13 mai 1968 [6980/11/68]
Commission, Comitd de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
28eme reunion du Comite (16-17 mai 1968), Bruxelles 10 juin 1968 [6983/11/68]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Expose du Dr. Arndt, President sur
1'eventail des mesures d'assainissement des charbonnages, y compris les mesures d'encouragement au
developpement des structures regionales, Bruxelles 12 juin 1968 [6985/1168]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du 12 Juillet
1968. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 16 Juillet 1968 [10070/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Note du secretariat en vue d'introduire
la discussion du memorandum de la delegation allemande sur la compatibilite de la politique
economique allemande avec les orientations definies au premier programme de politique economique
a moyen terme, Bruxelles 3 Juillet 1968 [10286/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
29eme reunion du Comite (19 Juillet 1968), Bruxelles 22 Juillet 1968 [10071/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Memorandum de la delegation
allemande au comite de politique economique a moyen terme au sujet de la compatibilite de la
politique economique allemande avec les lignes directrices du premier programme de politique
economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 1 Juillet 1968 [10282/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
30eme reunion du Comite (11 octobre 1968), Bruxelles 28 octobre 1968 [18085/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Liste des questions susceptibles d'etre
posees a la Delegation neerlandaise en vue d'introduire la discussion de son memorandum
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants des 30 et 31
janvier 1969. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 7 fevrier 1969 [2576/11/69]
Commission, Strategies alternatives devolution a moyen terme du niveaux des prix et leurs
consequences pour le marche commun, Bruxelles 24 janvier 1969 [21535/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Premieres propositions de la
Commission pour le choix des themes du troisieme programme de politique economique a moyen
terme, Bruxelles 10 decembre68 [18094/11/68]
Commission, Comite de Politique dconomique a moyen terme, Avant-projet de mandat pour le
Groupe de travail charge d'etudier les problemes des relations economiques exterieures, Bruxelles 14
janvier 1969 [626/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
31eme reunion du Comite (13 et 14 fevrier 1969), Bruxelles 17 mars 1969 [5255/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
32eme reunion du Comite (ler avril 1969), Bruxelles 14 Avril 1969 [6637/11/69]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Memoire du secretariat sur les travaux
envisages par le groupe de travail 'Politique des echanges exterieurs' dans le cadre de 1'elaboration du
Troisieme programme de Politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 27 fevrier 1969
[5246/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
33eme reunion du Comite (23 mai 1969), Bruxelles 4 juin 1969 [10107/11/69]
Commission, Comite dc Politique economique a moyen terme, Note d'introduction a l'examen des
memorandums des delegations beige et luxembourgeoise, Bruxelles 25 mars 1969 [6631/11/69]
Commission, Memorandum de la Commission au Comite de Politique Economique a moyen terme sur
1'execution du Premier Programme de Politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 13 mars 1969
[191/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme. Reunion des suppleants du 16 juin
1969. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 23 Juin 1969 [OR 11-153/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Etat d'avancement des travaux pour la
preparation du troisieme programme, Bruxelles 11 Juin 1969 [OR 11-134/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
34eme reunion du Comite (27 Juin 1969), Bruxelles 10 juillet 1969 [10120/11/69]
Commission, Resume du memorandum de la Commission au Comite de Politique economique a
moyen terme sur Pexecution du premier programme de Politique economique a moyen terme,
Bruxelles 3 juin 1969 [11359/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
35eme reunion du Comite (19 septembre 969), Bruxelles 25 septembre 1969 [14474/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Note d'introduction a l'examen du
Memorandum de la delegation italienne, Bruxelles 6 Juin 1969 [11546/11/69]
Commission, Memorandum sur les problemes et les orientations de la Politique economique a moyen
terme, Schema preliminaire, [16335/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Mandat pour le groupe de travail
charge d'etudier les problemes des relations economiques exterieures [6639/11/1969]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
echanges exterieurs', Premieres conclusions concernant le Politique commerciale commune, Bruxelles
15 Juillet 1969 [10115/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de travail 'Politique des
echanges extdrieurs', Objcctits en matierc de Politique des echanges exterieurs dans les secteur
agricole, Bruxelles 15 Juillet 1969 [10117/11/69]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants des 9 el 10
octobre 1969. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 16 octobre 1969 [OR 11-327/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Expose de M. Toulemon, Directeur
general des affaires industrielles, lors de la reunion des suppleants du 9 Octobre 1969, Bruxelles 24
Octobre 1969 [19786/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Evaluation globale du cout de la
politique agricole de la CEE pour les Etats membres en 1970, Contribution de la delegation
Neerlandaise a la discussion sur les prix agricoles [13875/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, La politique regionale dans la
Communaute (Note de la direction generale de la Politique regionale), Bruxelles 22 aout 1969 [OR II-
189/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
36eme reunion du Comite (14 novembre 1969), Bruxelles 17 novembre 1969 [19789/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Objet: Projet de memorandum sur les
orientations a moyen terme , Bruxelles 7 novembre 1969 [17902/11/69 rev.]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
37eme reunion du Comite (12 decembre 1969), Bruxelles 20 janvier 1970 [662/11/70]
Projet d'avis presente par la delegation allemande concernant le memorandum de la Commission au
Conseil sur les grandes orientations a moyen terme dans la Communaute
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Etat d'avancement des travaux des
groupes de travail du Comite, Bruxelles 23 janvier 1970 [OR 11-361/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du 30 janvier
1970. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 4 fevrier 1970 [2243/11/70]
Commission, Note du travail du secretariat sur la question du rapport existant entre revolution des
prix et l'equilibre exterieur' [17852/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
38eme reunion du Comite (13 fevrier 1970), Bruxelles 18 fevrier 1970 [2250/11/70]
Commission, Note de la direction generale des affaires economiques et financieres concernant la
preparation du 3erne programme et le programme de travail pour les annees 1970, Bruxelles 24
janvier 1970 [OR 11-362/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants des 11 el 12
Mars 1970. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 9 avril 1970 [OR 11-391/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Document de travail concernant
certains problemes de politique economique exterieure, Bruxelles 26 fevrier 1970 [3717/11/70]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
39eme reunion du Comite (28 avril 1970), Bruxelles 1 juin 1970 [OR II- 408/70]
Commission, Comit6 de Politique economique a moyen terme, Schema developpe pour le chapitre IV
du 3bme Programme 'Les conditions de realisation au niveau de la Communaute, Bruxelles 24 Avril
1970 [OR 11/399/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du 5 juin 1970.
Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 11 juin 1970 [10324/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique 6conomique a moyen terme, Scheme detaille pour l'avant projet de
troisifeme programme [9763/11/70]
Commission, Groupe de travail pour la comparaison de budgets Rapport elabore a la demande du
Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme sur les aides fmancieres aux entreprises et leur
repartition par activites economiques, Bruxelles 8 avril 1970 [19967/2/II/69]
Commission, Comit6 de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
40eme reunion du Comite (19 juin 1970), Bruxelles 25 juin 1970 [10 330/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants des 9 et 10
juillet 1970. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 15 juillet 1970 [11970/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Avant-projet pour le chapitre III du
programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Les orientations pour la politique economique,
Bruxelles 3 juillet 1970 [10325/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
41eme reunion du Comite (23 et 24 juillet 1970), Bruxelles 30 Juillet 1970 [11972/11/70]
Commission, Projet de texte sur les relations entre 1'agriculture et le developpement economique de la
Communaute, [OR 11-419/70]
Commission, Comitd de Politique 6conomique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
426me reunion du Comite (17 et 18 septembre 1970), Bruxelles 21 septembre 1970 [OR II- 431/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de redaction, Avant-projet de
troisieme programme ,Chapitre I: Vers une strategic coherente pour la Communaute [11980/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de redaction, Avant-projet de
troisieme programme, Chapitre II: Les perspectives economiques globales et leur compatibility
[11981/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Groupe de redaction, Avant-projet de
troisieme programme, Chapitre III: Les orientations pour la politique economique [11982/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
43eme reunion du Comite (5 et 6 octobre 1970), Bruxelles 12 octobre 1970 [18794/11/70]
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Comite des Organisations Professionnelles agricoles Note sir le projet de second programme de
Politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 12 septembre 1968
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Liste de themes cites lors des dernieres
reunions du Comite ou de suppleants comme pouvant etre eventuellement inclus dans l'avant projet
de troisieme programme, Bruxelles 11 septembre 1968 [13530/11/68]
Commission, Liste des requetes des directions generates au sujet des themes a retenir pour le
troisieme programme de politique economique a moyen terme, (Communication de M. R. Barre a
messieurs les Membres du Groupe de l'economie Generale), Bruxelles 15 Novembre 1968 [SEC]
Commission, Groupe d'etude des perspectives economiques a moyen terme, Note du secretariat
concernant le calendrier des travaux des pays membres pour la preparation des projections 1975 pour
le 3e programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 14 Avril 1969 [8177/11/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Premiers indications sur le Contenu
possible du Memorandum de la Commission sur les problemes que font apparaitre pour la
Communaute les perspectives devolution a moyen terme dans les pays membres, Bruxelles 2 Mai
1969 [9000/11/69]
Commission, Rapport du Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme sur le memorandum de la
Commission au Conseil du 12 fevrier 1969, Bruxelles 10 Juin 1969 [OR 11-135-69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Prise de position de la Delegation
italienne au sujet de la constitution d'un groupe de travail pour la politique regionale aupres du
Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 13 aout 1969 [OR 11-184/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Delais pour les travaux du
groupe 'Politique des structures sectorielles', Bruxelles 30 Juillet 1969 [OR 11-175/69]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet revise, Avis sur la proposition
de decision du Conseil relative a l'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de
developpement regionale (presentee par la Commission au Conseil), Bruxelles 23 Avril 1970 [OR II-
397/70]
Conseil, Troisieme programme de politique economique a moyen terme, JO L 49 du 1.3.71
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Introduction a la discussion sur le
programme de travail du Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme (reunion de suppleants du
18 decembre 1970), Bruxelles 16 decembre 1970 [18797/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du 18
decembre 1970. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 19 Janvier 1971 [11-20/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Complement a la note concernant le
programme de travail du Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 20 Janvier 1971
[11/45/71]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants des 4 et 5
fevrier 1971. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 25 fevrier 1971 | II-69/71 ]
Commission, Note a 1'attention du comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Objet:
Orientations et objectifs des ler et 2eme programmes de politique economique a moyen terme en
matiere de politique industrielle, repris et developpes dans le memorandum de la Commission au
Conseil sur la politique industrielle, [11932/111/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique budgetaire, Groupe de travail 'Projections de finances publiques'
Rapport Interimaire au Comite de politique budgetaire et au Comite de Politique economique a moyen
terme sur les projections de finances publiques dans les Etats membres (1970-1975), Bruxelles 22
septembre 1970 [13343/1/11/70]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Preparation du programme de travail
du Comite, Bruxelles 26 fevrier 1971 [11/66/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants des 11 et 12
mars 1971. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 10 mars 1971 [11-145/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
44eme reunion du Comite (29 et 30 mars 1971), Bruxelles 6 avril 1971 [11-218/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du 10 mai
1971. Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 19 mai 1971 [292/11/71]
Commission, Introduction a la discussion du point 5 du projet d'ordre du jour de la 45eme reunion du
Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Problemes structured et developpement de la
Communaute [OR 11-222/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
45eme reunion du Comite (1 juillet 1971), Bruxelles 12 juillet 1971 [11-391/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Etat d'avancement des travaux en
matiere de politique regionale, Bruxelles 2 Juin 1971 [11/323/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Etat d'avancement des travaux en
matiere de politique industrielle, Bruxelles 3 juin 1971 [11/325/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, 'Tableau de bord structurel' et Analyse
des problemes structured dans la Communaute' Remarque preliminaire [OR 11-387/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Lettre du president du Groupe de
travail 'Politique des echanges exterieurs' au president du Comite de Politique economique a moyen
terme, Bruxelles 11 juin 1971 [11/328/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Previsions des travaux pour les
prochaines reunions [11/458/71 [
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion preparatoire des suppleants
du 1 Octobre 1971, Resume des conclusions, Bruxelles 7 Octobre 1971 [11/514/711
Commission, Rapport annuel sur la situation economique de la Communaute, Proposition de la
Commission au Conseil, Bruxelles 14 septembre 1971 [COM(71) 1100]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
46eme reunion du Comite (12 octobre 1971), Bruxelles 18 octobre 1971 [11-591/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Resume des conclusions de la reunion
preparatoire des suppleants du 25 novembre 1971, Bruxelles 16 decembre 1971 [11/723/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, La mise a jour des orientations
compatibles -les elements du debat-, Bruxelles 17 novembre 1971 [11/598/711
Commission, Mecanismes d'accroissement des Prix (Italie), Bruxelles 16 novembre 1971 [11/665/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Resume des conclusions de la reunion
preparatoire des suppleants des 11 et 12janvier 1972, Bruxelles 18 janvier 1972 [11/41/72]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Introduction a la discussion du point 3
du projet d'ordre du jour sur le 'Programme de travail du Comite pour 1972', Bruxelles 31 decembre
1971 [11/725/71]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de compte-rendu succinct de la
47eme reunion du Comite (27 janvier 1972), Bruxelles 9 fevrier 1972 [11/85/72]
Commission, Avant-projet de communication de la Commission au Conseil concernant I'adaptation
des orientations de la politique economique pour 1972, Document de travail des services de la
Commission, Bruxelles 17 fevrier 1972
2. On the role of the Commission
2.1. The earliest stages
Letters by Marjolin, Bobba and DGII to Permanent representatives and Commission officials
Commission, Les regions dans la CEE [II/COM(59) 113]
Commission, Les politiques regionales des Etats membres de la CEE [II/COM(59) 114]
Commission, Reunion des Responsables nationaux de politique regionale, Ordre du Jour, Bruxelles 7
Septembre 1959
Commission, Note a I'attention de M. Bobba, Objet: Politique regionale de la Communaute, Bruxelles
9 Septembre 1959 [06196]
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Commission, Extrait du Proces-verbal de la 72eme reunion de la Commission le 9 Septembre 1959,
Problemes de la Politique regionale (docs. COM(59) 113 et COM(59) 1140), Bruxelles 17 Septembre
1959
Commission, Document reserve a 1'attention de Ms. Marjolin et Bobba, Objet: Decisions auxquelles il
serait desirable d'aboutir lors de la Reunion des Responsable Nationaux des politique regionales,
Bruxelles 10 Septembre 1959 [II/lO/BB/2122]
Commission, Groupe de travail Inter-Directions Generales: Politique regionale, Note. Objet: Compte-
rendu de la reunion n.l du 16.9.59 au Bureau du Directeur General II, Bruxelles 21 Septembre 1959
111/ 2226/59]
Commission, Reunion des responsables nationaux des politiques regionales, Projet de compte rendu
de la reunion n.l du 25 septembre 1959, Bruxelles 6 Novembre 1959 [11/5038/59]
Commission, Groupe de travail Inter-Directions generales, Ordre du jour no.2 Reunion du 14 Octobre
1959, Objet: Delimitation des regions socio-economiques, Bruxelles 9 Octobre 1959 [11/4441/59]
Commission, Elements d'une politique de developpemenl regional,
Commission, Delimitation des regions de la CEE, Document de travail, Bruxelles 13 Octobre 1959
[11/4465/59]
Commission, Groupe de travail des experts nationaux des politiques regionales, Projet de compte
rendu de la reunion no.l du 16 Octobre 1959, Objet: Delimitation regionale, Bruxelles 19 Octobre
1959 [11/5117/59]
Commission, Politiques regionales des Etats membres de la CEE. Etude Preliminaire, Redaction no.2,
Bruxelles Novembre 1959 [11/5387/59]
Commission, Note pour M. Bobba, Objet: Compte rendu des entretiens sur la delimitation des regions
socio-economiques de la CEE du 14 au 18 Decembre 1959, Bruxelles 6 Janvier 1960
Commission, Groupe de travail des experts nationaux des politiques regionales, Projet de compte
rendu de la reunion no.2 dul5 Janvier 1960, Objet: Delimitation regionale, Bruxelles 15 Janvier 1960
[11/1163/60]
Commission, Groupe de travail des experts nationaux des politiques regionales, Compte rendu resume
de la rdunion no.3 du 28.3.1960, Objet: Delimitation regionale, Bruxelles 9 Avril 1960
Commission, Avant-projet de rapport du groupe de travail des experts nationaux en matiere regionale,
Bruxelles 12 mai 1960
Commission, Groupe de travail des experts nationaux en matiere regionale, Projet de compte rendu de
la reunion no. 4 des 23 et 24 Juin 1960, Bruxelles 6 Juillel 1960 [11/4017/60]
Commission, Groupe de travail des experts nationaux des politiques regionales, Projet de compte
rendu de la reunion no.5 du 7 Fevrier 1961, Objet: Delimitation regionale, Bruxelles [11/2129/61 ]
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Commission, Note, Etat d'avancement des travaux en matiere de delimitation regionale, Bruxelles 30
Novembre 1960
Commissione, Nota, Oggetto: Gruppo degli alti funzionari responsabili della politica regionale nei
paesi membre. Attivita del Gruppo fra il 1959 ed il 1965, Bruxelles
Commission CEE (1962) Documents de la Conference sur les economies regionales, Bruxelles 6-8
Decembre 1961, vol. I & vol. II.
Commission, Extrait du Proces-verbal de la 185eme reunion de la Commission le 11 Avril 1962,
Bruxelles 18.4.1962
Commission, Note pour la Commission. Objet: Organisation des travaux relatifs a la politique
regionale entre les diverses directions gendrales, Bruxelles 29 Juin 1962 [S/04261/62]
Commission, Extrait du Proces-verbal de la 194eme reunion de la Commission les 18-19 juillet 1962
[S/04816/62]
Commission, Extrait du proces-verbal de la 219eme reunion de la Commission les 25,26,27 Fevrier
1963, VIII. Developpement des travaux en matiere de politique regionale [S/0764/63]
Commission, Extrait du proces-verbal de la 293eme reunion de la Commission les 9 et 13 Novembre
1964, XVII Problemes de politique regionale dans le secteur des Transports [S/02703/64]
Commission, (1964) Rapports de groupes d'experts sur la politique regionale dans la CEE, Bruxelles
Commission, Extrait du Proces verbal de la 316eme reunion de la Commission le 5 mai 1965.
Commission, Extrait du Proces verbal de la 317eme reunion de la Commission le 11 mai 1965
Commission CEE, Premiere Communication de la Commission sur la Politique regionale dans la
Communautd Economique Europdenne, Bruxelles 11 mai 1965 [II/SEC(65) 1170 final]
Parlement European, 'La politique regionale dans les Etats membres de la CEE, janvier 1966 [PE
15.044]
2.2. The regional chapter of the IMedium-term economic policy Programme
Mandat du groupe de travail 'Politique economique regionale' (proposition du president), [774/11/65 ]
Comite de politique economique a moyen terme, Expose de M. Mansholt, Problemes de la Politique
agricole commune, Reunion du 21 mai 1965 [10272/VI/65]
Commission, Comitd de politique economique a moyen terme, Reunion des suppleants du 18th Juin
1965 [8414/11/65]
Commission, Document destine au Groupe des hauts Fonctionnaires responsables de la politique
regionale dans les Etats Membres. Problbmes de la politique regionale dans le cadre de la politique
economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles [8892/11/65]
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Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Avant-projet de programme, chapitre
VI, 21 Octobre 1965 [13269/11/65]
Commission, Projet de compte rendu succinct de la dixieme reunion du Comite de Politique
Economique a Moyen terme (5 novembre 1965), Bruxelles 9 novembre 1965 [14112/11/65]
Commission, Avant-projet de premier programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Projet de
chapitre VI, 15 decernbre 1965 113269/1/II/65]
Commission, Problemes de la politique regionale, 17 decembre 1965 [ 3255/2/II/65]
Commission, Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Avant projet de programme de
politique dconomique a moyen terme [787/11/66]
2.2.1. The examination of the Commission's draft of I Medium-term economic policy Programme
Commission, Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen terme (1966-1970), Bruxelles 29
Avril 1966 [II/G(66) 186 rev.]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen terme pour la periode
1966-1970, Bruxelles le 6 Mai 1966 [R/445/66 (ECO 36) (AG 117)]
Conseil, Note, Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen terme pour la periode 1966-
1970, Bruxelles le 12 mai 1966 [R/474/66 (ECO 44) (AG 120)]
Commission, Note a l'attention de M. Marjolin Objet: Reunion du comite des representants
Permanents du 11 mai 1966, Bruxelles le 13 mai 1966 [SEC(66) 1498]
Conseil, Note, Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen terme pour la periode 1966-
1970, Bruxelles le 2 Juin 1966 [R/558/66 (ECO 52) (AG148)]
Conseil, Comite des Representants Permanents Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 388eme
reunion tenue & Bruxelles les 15, 16, 17 Juin 1966, Bruxelles, le 6 Juillet 1966 [747/66 (RP/CRS 20)]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission Objet: Reunion du Comite
des Representants permancnts du 21 Novembre 1966, Bruxelles le 23 novembre 1966 [SEC(66)3655]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission Objet: Reunion du Comite
des Representants permanents du ler decembre 1966, Bruxelles le 3 decembre 1966 [SEC(66) 3789]
Conseil, Note, Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen terme. Bruxelles le 16
decembre 1966 [R/1464/66 (ECO 118) (AG 351)]
Conseil, Comite des representants Permanents, Note. Objet: Mise en oeuvre des decisions prises par le
Conseil de la CEE lors de sa 202eme session tenue le 20 decembre 1966, Bruxelles 6 Janvier 1967
[18/67]
Conseil, Extrait du procds-verbal de la 202dme session du Conseil CEE tenue a Bruxelles le 20
decembre 1966 [R/l527/66 (MC/PV/R 13)]
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Conseil, Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la reunion restreinte tenue a l'occasion de la 406eme
reunion (Bruxelles 30-1 decembre 66) [R/1361/66 (RP/CRS/R38)]
Conseil, Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 406eme reunion tenue a Bruxelles 30-1-2-5
decembre 66 Bruxelles, le 14 decembre 66 [1378/66 (RP/CRS 37)]
Commission Note a 1'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission Objet: Reunion du Comite des
Representants permanents du 5 Janvier 1967, Bruxelles 6 Janvier 1967 [SEC (67) 32]
Conseil, Comite des representants permanents (5, 6, 9,10 Janvier 1967) [doc.30/67 (RP/(CRS1) du 18
janvier 67]
Conseil, Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 409eme reunion tenue a Bruxelles 5,6,7,10 Janvier
67 [30/67 (RP/CRS 1)]
Conseil, Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 410eme reunion, Bruxelles 17-18-19 Janvier 67,
Bruxelles 1 fevrier 67 [70/67 (RP/CRS 2)]
Conseil, Extrait du Compte rendu sommaire de la 410eme reunion du Coreper, Bruxelles 17, 18, 19
Janvier 1967 [70/67 RP/CRS 2]
Conseil, Document de travail, Objet: Amendements proposes par les delegations au projet de
programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles 20 janvier 1967 [T/27/67 (ECO)
(AG)]
Conseil, Objet: Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles le 30 Janvier
1967 [R/113/67 (ECO 15) (AG 32)]
Conseil, Proces verbal de la Reunion restreinte tenu a 1'occasion de la 207eme session du conseil de
CEE, (Bruxelles le 8, 9 Fevrier 67) [R/179/67 (MC/PV/R 2) final du 6 fevrier 68]
Conseil, Note, Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen terme, Bruxelles le 7 fevrier 67
[R/144/67 (ECO 21) (AG 39)]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM les membres de la commission, Objet: Reunion du Comite de
representants permanents du ler fevrier 1967. Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen
terme, Bruxelles 4 fevrier 1967 [SEC(67) 390]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM les membres de la commission, Objet: Reunion du Comite de
representants permanents du 7 fevrier 1967. Projet de programme de politique economique a moyen
terme, Bruxelles 8 fevrier 1967 [SEC(67) 405]
Conseil, Note, Programme de politique 6conomique a moyen terme, Bruxelles le 20 Mars 1967
[R/341/67 (ECO 48) (AG 82)]
Conseil, Note, Programme de politique 6conomique a moyen terme, Bruxelles le 20 Mars 1967
[R/199/1/67 (EC025) (AG52) rdv.l + Corr.l]
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Conseil, Note, Programme de politique economique it moyen terme, Bruxelles le 4 Avril 1967
[R/410/67 (ECO 57) (AG81)]
Commission, Note a l'attention de M. Marjolin et de M. Levi-Sandri, Objet: Reunion du Comite des
Representants Permanents du 4 Avril 1967, Bruxelles 6 Avril 1967 [SEC(67) 1124]
Programme de Politique economique a moyen terme (1966-1970), JO du 25.4.67 1531/67
2.2.2. The examination of the 1965 Communication simultaneously to the I Medium-term economic
policy programme
Conseil, Coinile des Representants Permanenls Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 388£me
reunion tenue a Bruxelles les 15, 16, 17 Juin 1966, Bruxelles, le 6 Juillet 1966 [747/66 (RP/CRS 20)]
Commission, Note it 1'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission. Objet: Reunion du Comite
des Representants permanents du 16 juin 1966, Bruxelles 18 Juin 1966 [ SEC(66) 1937]
Conseil, Comite des Representants Permanents Projet de comple rendu sommaire de la 388eme
reunion tenue a Bruxelles les 11 et 12 juillet 1966, Bruxelles 20 Juillet 1966, [899/66 (RP/CRS 24)]
Commission, Note a l'attention de M. Marjolin Objet: Reunion du comite des representants
Permanents du 12 juillet 1966, Bruxelles le 14 Juillet 1966 [S/023941/66]
Conseil, Comite des Representants Permanents Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la reunion
restreinte tenue a P occasion de la 396eme reunion (Bruxelles le 14, 15, 19 et 21 septembre 1966),
Bruxelles le 23 Septembre 1966 [R/947/66 (RP/CRS/R 28)]
Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission. Objet: Reunion du Comite
des Representants permanents du 15 Novembre 1966, Bruxelles 17 Septembre 1966 [SEC(66) 2844]
Conseil, Rapport du Groupe des Questions economiques au Comite des representants Permanents sur
la Politique regionale dans la CEE, Bruxelles le 8 novembre 1966 [R/1214/66 (ECO103) (AG 296)]
2.3. DGIV and regional policy
Commission, Note, Objet: Moyens d'intervention de la C.E.E. en matiere de reconversion des regions
touchees par la fermetures des mines de charbon, Bruxelles 2 fevrier 1960 [904/60]
Projet de note pour le Groupe de travail 'Investissements Americains' Bruxelles 1963.
Commission, 'La politique de concurrence, partie integrante de la politique economique dans le
Marche commun', Discours prononce par Hans vor der Groeben, Membre de la Commission de la
CEE, President du groupe concurrence devant le Parlement Europeen a Strasbourg le 16 Juin 1965
Commission, H. von der Groeben, Lettre adressde le 9.7.1965 aux gouvernements de la Belgique, de
la France, du Grand Duche de Luxembourg [12803/IV/65]
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Commission, Note d'information pour la Commission, Objet: Essai d'interpretation de la disposition
d'exception de l'article 92.3.c) du Traite CEE et possibilites d'action de la Commission au titre de
cette disposition, Bruxelles Avril 1966
Commission, Proposition d'un reglement du Conseil fixant en application de Particle 94 CEE les
condition et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de 1'article 93 CEE (presentee par la
Commission au Conseil), Bruxelles 30 Mars 1966 [C()M(66) 95 final]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Communication de la Commission au Conseil sur les criteres pour
l'etablissement d'une politique commune d'aides en agriculture. Proposition de reglement portant
modification du reglement n 26 du Conseil, Bruxelles 20 avril 1966 [R/379/66 (AGR1 160)]
Commission, Note Objet: Remarques concernant le document SEC(66) 3281 du 21 Octobre 1966
'Essai d'interpretation de Particle 92.3.c), Bruxelles Octobre 1966
Commission, Note resumee des problemes et des resultats de la reunion des 13 et 14 octobre 1966
[13494/1V/66],
Commission, Modification a la proposition d'un reglement du Conseil fixant, en application de
Particle 94 CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93
CEE (presentees par la Commission au Conseil au titre de Particle 149, alinea 2 CEE), Bruxelles 10
Novembre 1966 [COM(66) 457]
Commission, Les investissements Americains dans la CEE, Bruxelles 15 mars 1967 [3152/111/67]
Commission, Les aides dans le domaine des transports, Bruxelles 8 mai 1967
Ememdamenti proposti dal governo Italiano al testo presentato dalla Commissione CEE per il
regolamento ex art. 94, 11 ottobre 1967
Conseil, Note, Objet: Proposition de reglement du Conseil fixant, en application de Particle 94 du
Traite CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93 du
Traite CEE, Bruxelles 1 decembre 1967 [R/1677/67 (ECO 176)]
Commission, Rapport 2/67 sur l'etat des regimes d'aides existantes, Bruxelles 20 decembre 1967
[SEC(67) 5002]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Proposition de reglement du Conseil fixant, en application de Particle 94 du
Traite CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93 du
Traite CEE, Bruxelles 6 juin 1968 [R/l014/68 (RC 23)]
Conseil, Document de travail, Objet: Proposition de rbglement du Conseil fixant, en application de
Particle 94 du Traite CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de
Particle 93 du Traitd CEE, Bruxelles 1 aout 1968 |T/452/68]
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Conseil, Note, Objet: Proposition de rbglement du Conseil fixant, en application de Particle 94 du
Traite CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93 du
Traite CEE, Bruxelles 30 septembre 1968 [R/1675/68 (RC 33)]
Conseil, Aide-memoire, Objet: Proposition de reglement du Conseil Pixant, en application de Particle
94 du Traite CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93
du Traite CEE. Reunion du groupe des questions economiques du 7 novembre 1968, Bruxelles 12
novembre 1968 [R/1965/68 (RC 36)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Proposition de reglement du Conseil fixant, en application de Particle 94 du
Traite CEE, les conditions et les modalites d'application de certaines dispositions de Particle 93 du
Traite, Bruxelles 14 fevrier 1969 [R/262/69 (RC 5)]
Communication de la Commission au Conseil concernant les regimes generaux d'aides a finalite
regionale JO C 111 du 4.11.71
Conseil, Note, Objet: Communication de la Commission au Conseil concernant les regimes generaux
d'aides a finalite regionale, Bruxelles 7 Octobre 1971 [R/1983/71 (ECO 203)]
Commission, Competition Reports (1971 until 1975)
Conseil, Communication a la Presse sur le Conseil du 20 Octobre 1971, Luxembourg 20 Octobre 1971
[2034/71 (Presse 99)]
Commission, Proposition d'un reglement du Conseil fixant Papplication de Particle 94 CEE. les
modalites de surveillance par la Commission de Papplication, dans les regions centrales de la
Communaute, des principes de coordination des regimes generaux d'aides a finalite regionale,
(presentee par la Commission au Conseil, Bruxelles 4 decembre 1972 [COM(72) 1523 final]
Commission, General regional aid systems (Communication from the Commission to tire Council),
Brussels 27 June 1973 [COM(73) 1110]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Communication de la Commission au Conseil sur les regimes generaux d'aides
a finalite regionale. Rapport du Groupe des questions economiques au Comite des Representants
Permanents, Bruxelles 22 Octobre 1973 [R/2565/73 (ECO 247)]
Commission's Communication of 26 February 1975, informing tire Council of die principles of co¬
ordination valid for all regions of tire Community which would apply from 1 January 1975 [COM(75)
77 final],
2.4. DGVI and regional policy
Commission, Comite de Politique Economique a Moyen terme, Esquisse d'un plan de chapitre sur les
problemes agricoles (Gabore par le secretariat) Bruxelles 6 avril 1967 [5546/11/67]
Commission, Les aides dans le domaine de Pagriculture, Bruxelles 28 avril 1967
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Commission, Resume des conclusions des reponses aux questions 1 a 7 -agriculture-, Novembre 1966
[11019/1/VI/66]
Commission, Esquisse d'un plan de chapitre sur les problemes agricoles, Bruxelles 6 avril 1967
[5546/11/67]
Commission, Projet de texte sur les relations entre l'agriculture et le developpement economique de la
Communaute, [OR 11-419/70]
Resolution du Conseil du 25 Mai 1971 concernant la nouvelle orientation de la politique agricole
commune [JO C 52 du 27 mai 1971]
Commission, Comite de Politique 6conomique a moyen terme, Reunion preparatoire des suppleants
du ler Octobre 1971, Note de presentation des services de la Commission pour l'examen des actions
communautaires de politique regionale dans les regions agricoles prioritaires de la Communaute,
Bruxelles 24 septembre 1971 [11/521/71]
3. The Commission's Proposals and their negotiation
3.1. The Negotiation of the 1969, 1971 and 1972 proposals
Commission, Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a l'organisation de moyens d'action de la
Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale dans la
Communaute, Bruxelles 15 Octobre 1969 [COM (69) 950], [R/l 887/69 (ECO 200) (FIN 339) + Add.
1], Commission (1969) A Regional Policy for the Community.
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission, Objet: 531eme reunion du
Comite des Representants permanents -Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a 1'organisation de
moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et note sur la politique
regional dans la Communaute, Bruxelles 31 Octobre 1969 [SEC(69) 3985]
Conseil, Communication a la presse sur la 86eme session du Conseil des 10-11 Novembre 1969,
Bruxelles 11 Novembre 1969 [1816/69 (AG 306)]
Comite de Politique economique a moyen terme, Avis sur la proposition du Conseil relative a
l'organisation de moyens d'action de la Communaute en matiere de politique regional (presentee par
la Commission au Conseil), Bruxelles 23 avril 1970 [OR 11-397/70]
Conseil, Communication a la Presse sur la session du Conseil des 8-9 Juin 1970 [1085/70 (AG 170)]
Conseil, Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 116eme session tenue les 8-9 juin 1970
[T/347/70 Add]
Consiglio, Memorandum del Governo Italiano sulla politica regionale della Communita, Bruxelles, 7
luglio 1970 [R/1492/70 (ECO 149) (FIN 259)]
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Commission, Note a 1'attention des membres de la Commission, Objet: 565eme reunion du Comitd
des Representants permanents 23/7/1970, Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a l'organisation
de moyens d'action en matiere de developpement regional et note sur la politique regionale de la
Communaute, 25 Juillet 1970 [SEC(70) 2884]
Conseil, Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 568eme reunion tenue a Bruxelles, les 15-17
septembre 1970 [1683/70 (RP/CRS 30)]
Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a l'organisation de moyens d'action
de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale dans la
Communaute [R/1791/1/70 (ECO 184) (FIN 335) rev.l]
Conseil, Communication a la presse sur la session du Conseil tenue les 26 el 27 Octobre 1970,
Luxembourg le 27 Octobre 1970 [1946/70 (AG 327)]
Conseil, Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 129eme session tenue les 26/27 octobre
1970 [R/2457/70]
Conseil, Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 129eme session tenue les 26/27 octobre
1970 [T/641/70]
Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de moyens d'action
de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale, Bruxelles
6 Novembre 1970 [R/2276/70 (ECO 229) (FIN468)] et Annexe: Compte rendu sommaire des opinions
et commentaires exprimes par les differents delegations au cours de la session du conseil des 26/27
Octobre 1970 sur la liste d'options en matiere de politique regionale
Commission, Rapport sur les moyens financiers pour le developpement regional. Bruxelles 27
novembre 1970 [SEC(70) 4377]
Commission, Rapport sur les moyens financiers pour le developpement regional, 5 Decembre 1970
[R/2586/70 (ECO 267) (FIN 534)]
Conseil, Decision du Conseil (71/66/CEE) du 1 fevrier 1971 concernant la reforme du Fonds Social
Europeen, JO L 28/15 du 4.2.71
Resolution du Conseil et des representants des gouvernements des etats membres concernant la
realisation par etapes de l'union economique et monetaire dans la Communaute, [JO C 28/1 du
27.3.71]
Conseil, Note. Objet: Proposition de decision du Conseil relative a la organisation de moyens d'action
de la Communaute en matiere de developpement regional et Note sur la politique regionale. Projet de
rapport du Groupe des questions economiques au Coreper, Bruxelles 26 Mai 1971 [R71020/71
(ECO108) (FIN223)]
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Commission, Communication de la Commission au Conseil concernant les actions communautaires
de politique regionale dans les regions agricoles de la Communaute, presente au Conseil le 28 Mai
1971, [COM (71) 500], [R/1095/71 (ECO 114) (AGRI 369) (FIN 241)], JO C 90 du 11.9.1971
Conseil, Note. Objet: Rapport du Comite des Representants permanents sur les textes presentes par la
Commission au sujet de 1'organisation de moyens d'aclion de la Communaute en matiere de politique
regionale, Bruxelles, 14 Octobre 1971 [R/1950/2/71 (ECO 197) (AGRI 596) (FIN 435) rev.2]
Conseil, Extrait de la note. Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 170eme session le 20
octobre 1971 [R/2218/71]
Conseil, Extrait de projet de proces-verbal de la reunion restreinte tenue a l'occasion de la 170eme
session du Conseil, 20 Octobre 1971 [ R/2217/71 (PV/CONS/R 14) Extr.l]
Commission, Proposition de resolution du Conseil et des representants des Etats membres relative a
1'application de la resolution du 22 Mars 1971 concernant la realisation par etapes de 1'union
economique et monctaire dans la Communaute, Bruxelles 1 Mars 1972 [COM(72) 250]
Conseil, Communication a la Presse sur la session du Conseil du 6-7 mars 1972, Bruxelles 7 mars
1972 [489/72 (presse 20)]
Conseil, resolution du Conseil et des gouvernements des Etats membres du 21 Mars 1972 relative a
Tapplication de la resolution du 22 Mars 1971, concernant la realisation par etapes de Tunion
economique et monetaire dans la Communaute, JO C 38/3 du 18.4.1972
Conseil, Comite des representants permanents, Projet de compte rendu sommaire de la 642eme
reunion tenue a Bruxelles les 8 et 10 mai 1972, Bruxelles 12 Juillet 1972 [931/72 (RP/CRS 17)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Etat des travaux en matiere de politique regionale, Bruxelles 10 mai 1972
[892/72 (ECO 92) (AGRI 276) (FIN 265)]
Commission, Communication en vue des decisions du Conseil concernant la Politique regionale de la
Communaute, Bruxelles 31 Mai 1972 [COM(72) 530 final ]
Commission, Proposition de resolution du Conseil relative a des moyens de politique regionale de la
Communaute, presentee par la Commission au Conseil le 19 Juin 1972, JO C 94/7 du 9.9.1972
Conseil, Note, Objet: Consultation a titre facultatif de TAssemble et du Comite 6conomique et social
sur la Communication de la Commission au Conseil en vue de ses decisions concernant la politique
regional de la Communaute, Bruxelles 23 Juin 1972 [R/1336/72 (ECO 129)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Travaux en matiere de politique regionale, Bruxelles 23 Juin 1972 [R/l 337/72
(ECO 130) (AGRI414) (FIN376)]
Conseil, Communication a la presse sur la 201eme session du Conseil des 26 et 27 Juin 1972,
Luxembourg 27 Juin 1972 11156/72 (Presse 54)]
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Conseil, Note. Objet: Etal des travaux en matibre de politique regionale, Bruxelles 3 aout 1972
[R/1697/72 (ECO 164) (AGRI 530) (FIN 464)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Etat des travaux en matiere de politique regionale, Bruxelles 18 septembre 1972
[R/1839/72 (ECO 180) (AGRI 559) (FIN 489)]
Conseil, Note. Objet: politique regionale, Bruxelles, 19 septembre 1972. [R71872/1/72 (ECO 189)
(AGRI 568) (FIN 494) rev. 1]
Conseil, Projet de Rapport du comit6 des representants permanents au Conseil, Objet: Politique
regionale, Bruxelles 20 Septembre 1972 + Annexe 1: Aperfu synthetique des problemes cles qui
doivent etre resolus pour que les travaux sur les propositions t'aites par la Commission puissent etre
menees a bonne fin [R/1867/72 (ECO 188) (AGRI 567) (FIN 493)]
Conseil, Rapport du comite des representants permanents au Conseil, Objet: Politique regionale,
Bruxelles 20 Septembre 1972 [R/i867/1/72 (ECO 188) (AGRI 567) (FIN 493) rev.l]
Conseil, Extrait de la Note. Releve des decisions prises par le Conseil lors de sa 206eme session a
Bruxelles les 25-26 Septembre 1972 [T/403/72]
Conseil, Extrait du projet de proces verbal de la 206eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles. les
25/26 Septembre 1972, Bruxelles 10 Novembre 72 [R/2387/72 (PV/CONS/R 2) Extr. 1]
Conseil, Extrait du projet de proces verbal de la 206eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles. les
25/26 Septembre 1972, Bruxelles 31 Juillet 1973 [R/2387/72 (PV/CONS/R 2) Extr. 3]
Bulletin des CE 8-1972, Chapitre II: Vers un Sommet a Dix, p. 15-39
Bulletin des CE 10-1972, La Premiere Conference au Sommet de la Communaute elargie, I. p.9-27.
Bulletin des CE 11-1972, La Premiere Conference au Sommet de la Communaute elargie, II. 9-76
Conseil, Projet du Rapport du Groupe des questions economiques (Politique regionale) au Comite des
Representants Permanents Objet: Politique regional, Bruxelles 20 Novembre 1972 [T/518/72 (ECO)
(FIN)]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM les Membres de la Commission Objet: 665eme reunion du
Coreper: 30/11/72, Bruxelles 4 Decembre 72 [SEC(72) 4362]
Commission, Note a l'attention de MM les Membres de la Commission Objet: 666eme reunion du
Coreper: 7/11/72, Bruxelles 9 Decembre 72 [SEC(72) 4508]
Conseil, Extrait du Projet de proces-verbal de la 221eme session du Conseil des 18-19 decembre 1972,
22 Mars 1973 [R/2940/72 (PV/CONS/R6) Extr.2]
Conseil, Extrait no. 1 du projet de procbs-verbal, Objet: Politique regionale, Bruxelles 12 Mars 1973
[R/2940/72 (PV/CONS/R6) Extr. 1]
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Conseil, Document de travail, Objet: Proposition d'un reglement du Conseil, Bruxelles 16 Mars 1973
[T/158/73 (ECO)]
3.2. The Proposals ofJuly 1973
Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM. les membres de la Commission, Objet: - Projet de rapport sur
les problemes regionaux dans la Communaute elargie. -Resultats de la reunion ad hoc de membres de
la Commission les plus interesses (vendredi 30 mars 1973), Bruxelles 2 avril 1973 [COM(73) 550/2]
Commission, Report on tire regional problems of the enlarged Community, Brussels 3 May 1973
[COM(73) 550 final], Bulletin EC supplement 8/73, [R/l 152/73 (ECO 116) (AGR1 371) (FIN 288.)]
Conseil, Extrait du projet de proces-verbal de la 412eme session du Conseil tenue a Bruxelles les 14 et
15 mai 1973, Bruxelles 26 juin 1973 [R/1558/73 (PV/CONS/R 7) Extr.l]
European Parliament, Resolution on Community regional policy, OJ C 62/33 du 31.7.73
Commission, Communication au Conseil relative a la politique regionale [R/2055/73 (ECO 200) (FIN
571)] JO C 86/7, 86/11 and 86/12 du 16.10.73
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: echange de vues general sur les propositions de la
Commission, Bruxelles 20 septembre 1973 [1721/73 (ECO 217) (FIN 563)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de
developpement regional, Bruxelles 26 septembre 1973 [1722/73 (ECO 218) (FIN 564)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de
developpement regional, Bruxelles 9 octobre 1973 [1862/73 (ECO230) (FIN 607)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: politique regionale. Information de la Presidence sur l'etat actuel des travaux,
Bruxelles 1 Octobre 1973 [R/2370/73 (ECO 223) (FIN 602)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: politique regionale: rapport sur l'etat des travaux, Bruxelles 9 octobre 1973
[R/2427 (ECO 234) (FIN 614)]
Commission, Proposition de reglement du Conseil relatif a la liste des regions et zones prevue au
reglement en faveur desquelles le Fonds Europeen de developpement regional peut intervenir. 10
Octobre 1973 [COM(73) 1751]
Commission, Communication au Conseil en matiere de politique regionale, 10 Octobre 1973
[R/2474/73 (ECO 239) (FIN 628)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique r6gionale, Consultation de I'Assemblee et du Comite economique et
social, Bruxelles 12 Octobre 1973 [R/2483/73 (ECO 242) (FIN 630)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: politique regionale. Echange de vues general sur les propositions de reglements:
-relatif h la liste des regions et zones agricoles prioritaires prevue au reglement (CEE) concernant le
financement par le Fonds europeen d'orientation et de garantie agricole, section orientation, de projets
s'inscrivant dans le cadre de programmes de developpement dans les regions agricoles prioritaires: -
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relatif a la liste des regions et zones prevues au reglement (CEE) en faveur desquelles les Fonds
europeen de developpement regional peut intervenir, Bruxelles 25 Octobre 1973 [2039/73 (ECO 252)
(FIN 660)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de
developpement regional, Bruxelles 19 octobre 1973 [1970/73 (ECO 245) (FIN 642)]
Commission, Note de Fattention de Messieurs les membres de la Commission, Objet: 257eme session
du Conseil -15 octobre 1973, Politique regional, 16 octobre 1973 [SEC(73) 3726]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale. Information de la Presidence sur l'etat actuel des travaux,
Bruxelles 29 octobre 1973 [R/2634/73 (ECO 260) (FIN 673)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: proposition de reglement portant creation d'un Fonds de
developpement regional, Bruxelles 7 novembre 1973 [2107/73 (EC0266) (FIN 687)]
Commission, Note a Fattention des Messieurs les Membres de la Commission, Objet: 707eme reunion
du Comite des representants permanents -21.11.1973, Politique regionale, Bruxelles 23 novembre
1973 [SEC(73) 4412]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: resume des travaux du Groupe de travail 'politique
regionale' au sujet de certains elements relatifs aux problemes concernant le Fonds de developpement
regional actuellement soumis a l'attention du Comite des Representants Permanents. Reunion des
22/23 novembre 1973, Bruxelles 27 Novembre 1973 [R/2911/73 (ECO 302) (FIN 744)]
Commission, Note a Fattention de MM les Membres de la Commission Objet: 708eme reunion du
Comite des Representants permanents -29/11/1973 Politique regionale, Bruxelles 30 Novembre 1973
[SEC(73) 4431]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: etat des travaux su Comite des Representants Permanents
sur les principaux problemes concernant le Fonds europeen de developpement regional, Bruxelles 30
novembre 1973 [R/2970/73 (ECO 309) (FIN 758)]
Conseil, Rapport du Groupe 'politique regionale' au Comite des representants permanents, Objet:
Politique regionale: proposition de reglement (CEE) n .../... du Conseil portant creation d'un Fonds
europeen de developpement regional, Bruxelles 4 decembre 1973 [R/2910/73 (ECO 301) (FIN 743)]
Conseil, Objet Politique regionale, -Principaux points devant etre discutes par le Conseil, Bruxelles
Decembre 73 [R/2978/73 (ECO 312) (FIN 760)]
Conseil, Note du President du Comite des representants permanents, 10 Decembre 1973 [R/3080/73
(ECO 319) (FIN 702)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique Regional: projet de decision du Conseil portant creation d'un comite
de politique regionale, Bruxelles 3 octobre 1973 [1859/73 (ECO 227) (FIN 605)]
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Conseil, Note, Objet: Politique regionale: projet de decision du Conseil portant creation d'un Comite
de politique regionale, Bruxelles 6 octobre 1973 [2108/73 (ECO 267) (FIN 688)]
Conseil, Projet de Rapport du Groupe de travail 'Politique regionale' presente au Comite des
Representants permanente, Objet: politique regionale : projet de decision du Conseil portant creation
d'un comite de politique regionale, Bruxelles 16 novembre 1973 [2211/73 (ECO 290) (FIN 717)]
Conseil, Rapport du Groupe de travail 'politique regionale' presente au Comite des representants
permanents, Objet: politique regionale: projet de decision du Conseil portant creation d'un comite de
politique regionale, Bruxelles 29 novembre 1973 [R/2955/73 (ECO 306) (FIN 751)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Proposition de reglement financier portant dispositions particulieres applicables
au Fonds europeen de developpement regional, Rapport interimaire du Comite budgetaire, Bruxelles
13 novembre 1973 [R/2764/73 (ECO 281) (FIN 699)]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Proposition de reglement financier portant dispositions particuliers applicables
au Fonds de developpement regional: litre II (articles 6 a 8), Bruxelles 16 Novembre 1973 [2224/73
(ECO 272) (FIN 722) ]
4. On EMU and regional policy
4.1. The negotiation of the I Barre Plan and of the first and second resolution EMU
Commission, Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil au sujet de la politique susceptible d'etre
poursuivie au sein de la Communaute pour faire face aux problemes economiques et monetaires
actuels, Bruxelles 5 decembre 1968 [SEC(68) 3958 final]
Commission, Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute, Bruxelles 12 fevrier 1969
[SEC(69) 150]
Commission, Note a 1'attention de MM. les Membres de la Commission, Objet: 504eme reunion du
Comite des Representants permanents du 6 mars 1969. Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil
sur la coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la
Communaute, Bruxelles 7 mars 1969 [SEC(69) 988]
Comite economique et social, Annexe au proces verbal de la 77eme session pleniere du Comite
economique et social du 26 et 27 mars 1969, Expose de M. Barre, Vice-president de la Commission
sur la politique monetaire de la Communaute, Bruxelles 18 avril 1969 [CES 184/69 annexe2]
Parlement europeen, proces verbal de la Commission economique reunion du 14 avril 1969, Bruxelles
14 mai 1969 [PE/II/PV/69]
Commission. Avis de Comite monetaire sur le Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil du 12
fevrier 1969, Bruxelles 14 mai 1969 [SEC(69) 1884]
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Commission, Note a l'attention des Membres de la Commission, Objet: 515e reunion du comite des
Representants Permanents du 5 juin 1969 -Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la
coordination des politiques economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute,
Bruxelles 6 juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2190]
Commission; Note a l'attention des Membres de la Commission, Objet: rapport du Comite de
politique conjoncturelle relatif au memorandum de la Commission au Conseil en date du 12 fevrier
1969, Bruxelles 5 juin 1969 [SEC(69) 2155/2]
Conseil, Note, Objet: Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil sur la coordination des politiques
economiques et la cooperation monetaire au sein de la Communaute -Resume des observations
principales presentees lors de la reunion du Comite des representants permanents le 17 juin 1969,
Bruxelles 20 juin 1969 [R/1055/69 (AGRI 141) (FIN 134)]
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Original French text for footnote 19:
II y a lieu de s'attendre a ce que, toutes choses egales par ailleurs mais 1'hypothe.se d'un
suppression des mesures de protection recemment adoptees, le cumul des divergences annuels
entre les niveaux des prix des pays membres, de 1966 a 1975, provoque des desequilibres
exterieurs. Bien que revolution generale des prix ne determine pas, a elle seule, le commerce
exterieur, les differences apparaissant d'ici 1975 (en particulier entre l'Allemagne et 1'Italie
d'une part, la France et les pays du Benelux de l'autre) seraient trop importantes pour que ces
evolutions puissent encore se concilier sans entrainer de perturbations dans l'equilibre intra-
communautaire. D faut par ailleurs escompter que les desequilibres que Ton peut attendre en
matiere de commerce exterieur soient renforces par de brusques mouvements speculates.
French original for footnote 27:
Si l'ecart des fluctuations dans les differents pays en cause restait au-dessous d'un niveau de 2 ou
de maximum de 2,5%, ils serait vraisemblablement possible d'eviter Fintroduction de ces
mesures compensatoires et pourtant de fractionner le marche agricole sans perturbations sensible.?
des marches agricoles.
French text for footnote 30:
L'evolution du niveau general des prix (Indice implicite de prix du produit national brut au prix
de marche tel qu'il est defini dans le cadre de la compatibilite nationale. Le critere conventionnel
devaluation des prix, l'indice du cout de la vie, ne s'applique qu'a une partie du produit
national) constitue ainsi un indicateur du degre de compatibilite des objectifs et preferences
internes et externes des different? pays et compte tenu de leur situation de depart et du contexte
social, institutionnel et structurel. L'ordre de priorite donne a l'objectif de la stabilite des prix
depend de la mesure dans laquelle les autres objectifs globaux (croissance satisfaisante, plein
emploi, equilibre exterieur, etc.) pourront etre atteints. La stabilite du niveaux des prix est
extremement difficile a realiser car il suppose la solution des problemes de repartition et de
structure ainsi que 1'application d'une politique de concurrence efficace. Cette difficulte conduit
souvent a sous-estimer l'importance economique et la justification de la stabilite des prix.
The French original for the text of footnote 33:
Si l'harmonisation effective des orientations a moyen terme s'averait impossible au cours des
prochaines annees, le developpement de la Communaute risquerait d'etre compromis. soit par
1'adoption de mesures protectionnistes, qui mineraient le marche commun et aboutiraient en
definitive a un ralentissement de la croissance de l'ensemble de la Communaute, soit par des
politiques rigoureuses d'adaptation a revolution des pays partenaires, dont les consequences
economiques et sociales seraient penibles, soit par des modifications de parite monetaire. qui sont
en principe contraires a la logique du marche commun et a la perspective de 1'union economiques
et monetaire, soit enfin par le recours a de nouveaux types de relations de change, qui
compromettraient la poursuite de l'integration monetaire.
La harmonisation des orientations a moyen terme, de meme que la coordination des politiques
economiques a court terme, est la consequence ineluctable du choix fait par les pays membres de
la Communaute en faveur de la mise en place d'une union douaniere englobant leurs economies.
Refuser cette harmonisation revient en fait a remettrc tot ou tard en question ce choix.
Chapter ii:
French text for footnote 4:
l'ecart peut au contraire s'accroitre cumulativement si les conditions fondamentales d'un
developpement de la production ne sont pas d'abord crees par des moyens publics, c'est-a-dire
une infrastructures de routes, de ports, de moyens de transmission, des operations de drainage,
d'irrigation et d'amelioration du sol, la creation d'ecoles et d'hopitaux. Une action positive et
collective est au contraire a l'avantage commun des regions dont le developpement est recherche
et des regions plus favorisees elles memes; (...)
French text for footnote 5:
II importe ici de rappeler que certains plans de developpement regionaux sont en cours et que
d'autres pourraient etre entrepris dans 1'avenir. Lc probleme de la coordination entre le
developpement de ces plans regionaux et celui, progressif, du marche commun de\ra etre regie
afin que les different.? efforts ne se contrarient pas et qu'au contraire les plans regionaux puissent
se developper favorablement dans un cadre de cooperation et d'unite economiques europeennes.
Des propositions a ce sujet pourraient etre presentees par les Etats membres interesses et par la
Commission europeenne.
French text for footnote 15:
La troisieme condition qu'il importe de reconnaitre, c'est qu'entre des regions inegalement
developpees il n'est pas vrai qu'un mise en communication subite permette d'elle-meme aux
moins favorisees de rattraper leur retard. C'est seulement si elles sont dotees, par une politique
deliberee, de 1'infrastructure necessaire a leur developpement, qu'elles beneficieront a plein des
differences de cout de main-d'oeuvre, ou d'un plus grande productivite des investissements. De la
l'importance des actions de developpement regional ct de creation d'emploi sur place, qui seules
eviteront d'accrottre cumulativement l'ecart entre les niveaux de production et entre les niveaux
de vie des differentes regions.
French text for footnote 19:
La Commission, en vertu de l'article 155, a done le devoir de se preoccuper des effets des
politiques economiques nationales et communes sur le developpement de l'activite economique
dans les differentes regions, et de prendre les initiatives necessaires pour que faction concertee
des autorites regionales et nationales d'une part, des institutions europeennes de f autre, assure
un developpement harmonieux des regions de la Communaute.
French text for footnote 25:
Quelques points m'ont particulierement frappe. Le premier (...). Le second est la tendance pour
la politique regionale a devenir partout une partie integrante de la politique economique
nationale, alors que jusqu'au present la politique regionale etait plutot une espece de correctif
que l'on apportait aux politiques economiques nationales une fois que celles-ci avaient produit
leurs effets centralisateurs. Les regions peripheriques se depeuplant, les grandes agglomerations
centrales se gonflant toujours davantage, les gouvernements etaient amenes a reagir: une
politique regionale etait elaboree, distincte, differente, isolee de la politique economique
nationale.
French text for footnote 47:
La Commission suggere, tout d'abord, que lorsque le Comite prevoit une confrontation des
politiques regionales et, si possible une coordination, l'on emploi sans equivoque le terme de
coordination. Elle s'appuie, a cet effet, sur plusieurs dispositions du traite, en particulier les
articles 3 littera g), 105, 145, aux termes desquels les Etats membres se sont engages a
coordonner leurs politiques economiques et, par consequent, leurs politiques regionales, si Ton
admet -comme la chose parait en effet normale- que la politique regionale est une politique
economique.
Original French text for footnote 96:
La Commission a exprime le voeu, le 14 fevrier 1962, que la DGII et la DGIV precedent a un
etude sur les limites existant entre la politique de concurrence et la politique regionale. On a fait
observer qu'il pourrait etre difficile, dans l'etat actuel des choses de definir des limites precises
entre la politique de developpement regionale, qui demeure d'ailleurs surtout de la competence
des Etats membres, et les regies de concurrence du Traite. II serait sans doute premature de lier
la Commission par une definition trop rigide des criteres enumeres a T article 92, alinea 3. Etant
donne la diversite des situations regionales, une attitude souple et pragmatique semble, pour le
moment, preferable, et ce n'est qu'a un stade plus avance de la coordination des politiques
regionales des Etats membres qu'une definition plus precise des apports entre politique regionale
et politique de concurrence pourrait etre operee.
(...)
La Commission attache surtout une grande importance aux objectifs de politique regionale. Ici
apparaTt la liaison etroite entre la politique de concurrence et la politique regionale et de
structure. L'experience montre que l'une et l'autre se completent judicieusement pour autant que
la politique regionale ou de structure tient compte des necessites de la politique de concurrence.
Un amenagement judicieux de la politique regionale d'aide ne sera possible dans de nombreux
cas que sur la base de plans regionaux de developpement englobant dans un vue d'ensemble
toutes les mesures d'encouragement en faveur d'une region.
French text for footnote 121:
Propositions concretes:
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a) Proposer la poursuite, a intervalles reguliers, de reunion a haut niveau, dont celle du 25
Septembre 1962 constituerait le prototype. Ces reunions pourraient constituer Pamorce d'une
Commission regionale de la CEE.
French text for footnote 126:
Le nouveau Commissaire a la politique regionale, Luxembourgeoise (M. Borschette) est un peu
enclin a forcer les Gouvernements sur la base de la proposition de la Direction generate dont ils
sont saisis.
D'autre part, M. Mansholt sait tres bien qu'il a besoin d'un volet regionale pour faire avancer ses
propositions. 11 offre done a son collegue d'utiliser 500.000.000 d'u.c. du FEOGA pour des
actions regionales dans les regions agricoles pour 5 ans.
D'ou les propositions de la Commission du 28 Mai 1971 abusivement presentees comme mesures
concretes d'application des propositions generates de 1969 mais constituant en fait, une refutable
et dommageable deviation (..:)
French text for footnote 129:
II importe de noter qu'il y a une difference fondamentale dans la fapon de considerer ces actes
legislatifs selon que l'on se place au point de vue de la commission economique ou a celui de la
commission de P agriculture. Du point de vue agricole, les propositions apparaissent comme
parachevant la reforme de 1'agriculture europeenne. Du point de vue economique elles ne
constituent qu'un premier pas tres timide dans le sens de la realisation d'une politique commune
des structures. La commission economique ... recommande-t-elle au Parlement d'approuver les
deux propositions de reglement, en raison de leur importance sur le plan de 1' agriculture, tout en
faisant observer qu'elle n'est pas absolument convaincue que ces reglements doivent avoir des
effet favorables sur le plan des structures.
Chapter iii:
French text for footnote 27:
L'activite des Etats membres dans le domaine de la politique regionale est tres diverse. Us se sont
occupes de programmes, de plans generaux de developpement et d'objectifs, mais aussi de plans
de developpement tres realisables qui ont deja ete executes en partie.
Pour la Commission, il importe done,
a) d'amener les Etats membres, lorsque e'est necessaire, a etablir, completer et mettre en oeuvre
des plans de developpement regionaux,
b) de coordonner les mesures des Etats membres et de les orienter sur la politique
communautaire
c) de ne pas donner la impression que nous voulons accaparer la politique regional et la
centraliser sur le plan administratif ou que nous continuerions de nous contenter de discussions
theoriques.
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D s'agit de laisser aux Etats membres toute leur responsabilite, mais de vciller a ce qu'ils
assurent cette tache et I'orientent sur la realisation de la union economique.
French text for footnote 74:
Compte tenu de Taction entreprise, un des facteurs qui faciliterait le mieux les interventions de la
Banque serait evidemment la possibilite pour la Communaute de definir un programme d'actions
concretes et parfaitement coordonnees. Une telle eventualite serait de nature a faciliter T adoption
de criteres objectifs et d'application operationnelle. En outre, il permettrait probablement
l'eclosion d'initiatives que ... tant en ce qui concerne les ressources que les modalites, la Banque
pouiTait etre amenee a financier en conformite aux orientations communautaires. C'est dans un
telle perspective que pourrait prendre place, par exemple, un systeme de bonifications d'interet
forfaitaires ou l'etude d'un systeme efficace d'octroi de garanties.
French text for footnote 54:
quelle que puisse etre l'importance du Fonds, vu les sommes globales a mettre en ceuvre pour
Taction regionale, ses interventions sont marginales et, en tout hypothese, dependantes du succes
de la coordination organisee au niveau de la Communaute.
Chapter IV:
French text for footnote 1:
Une coordination a moyen terme meme poussee des objectifs globaux de politique economique
(croissance, emploi, prix, balance de paiements) risque dans certains cas de s'averer insuffisante.
L'experience montre en effet que des orientations globales compatibles en elles-memes peuvent
cacher, pendant un certain temps, certains desequilibres structurels. Ceux-ci pourraient
contrecarrer, a plus longue echeance, la mise en oeuvre de la concertation des objectifs globaux.
Le Comite se felicite done que la Commission ait souligne la necessite de rechercher, sur le plan
communautaire et selon les orientations generates de programmes a moyen terme, des solutions
aux problemes structurels nationaux.
Le Comite estime que la forme la plus appropriee pour aboutir a ce resultat consisterait en une
consultation mutuelle et permanente portant sur les decisions de caractere structurel dans le cadre
de strategies de developpement suivies a long terme. A cet effet, il envisage de proceder
conformement a la mission que lui a ete confiee par la decision du Conseil du 15 avril 1964. a
des echanges de vues reguliers aux fins d'un concertation en la matiere. [10 juin 1969. OR H-
133/69].
French text for footnote 4:
La reduction des disparites existantes et la prevention de nouvelles disparites dependent surtout
de Torientation meme des politiques economiques d'ensemble; d'ailleurs celles-ci dans tous les
pays tendent de plus en plus a integrer dans leurs finalites Tamenagement de Tespace
economique et humain.
French text for footnote 17:
II s'agit ici de choisir des orientations relatives a certaines types d'actions structurelles dont
l'importance parait majeure pour favoriser un developpement economique et social equilibree
dans la Communaute; ces actions devront etre engagees ou moins preparees rapidement. Elles
visent les objectifs suivants: a) l'unite du marche interieur: la libre circulation, l'adaptation des
entreprises; b) la promotion d'activites nouvelles en s'attachant a: l'aspect regional des activites
communautaires, l'adaptation des hommes aux exigences des emplois nouveaux, c) une meilleure
utilisation des instruments financiers de la Communaute.
French text for footnote 18:
le developpement equilibre de la Communaute exige que, a la responsabilite des Etats membres,
s'ajoute une responsabilite de la Communaute a l'egard de certaines problemes regionaux
d'interet commun.
French text for footnote 67:
M. Barre a precise qu'au termc de l'accord de La Haye, l'instauration de l'union economiquc et
monetaire est une des grandes options politiques de la Communaute qui doivent etre acceptees
par touts les candidats a 1'adhesion.
French text for footnote 100:
Ce point a ete l'objet d'un long debat, etant donne que la delegation italienne avait conditionne
son accord sur l'ensemble des problemes monetaires a un engagement precis de la part du
Conseil dans le domaine regional, notamment par l'utilisation du FEOGA pour des operations en
matiere regionale et par la creation d'un fonds de developpement regional comme propose par la
Commission.
Devant l'opposition de certaines delegations au sujet du fonds regional la delegation italienne,
tout en acceptant de renvoyer a une deuxieme stade la fixation des modalites, de la structure, des
quantites et des temps pour le fonctionnement de ce fonds, a insiste pour que le Conseil adopte le
principe de sa creation combinee avec un calendrier precis pour les decisions a prendre pour sa
mise en oeuvre. Cette delegation a egalement mis l'accent sur la signification politique d'un
decision du Conseil dans ce sens qui interesse aussi bien les Etats membres que les pays
adherents.
La position italienne a ete appuyee par la delegation beige qui a manifeste seulemenl la
preoccupation d'eviter le double emploi entre les differentes formes d'aides communautaires et
nationales.
Apres une suspension de seance pendant iaquelle les Ministres Colombo, Giscard d'Estaign et
Schiller ont eu un echange de vues, la delegation fran9aise a assoupli sa position et a presente un
compromis qui a ete accepte par la Commission et par les autres delegations et, apres quelques
hesitations, egalement par la delegation italienne. Ce compromis prevoit entre autre que le
Conseil prendra les decisions necessaires avant le ler Octobre 1972 ou bien sur la creation du
fonds regional propose par la Commission, ou bien tout autre systeme de ressources
communautaires a consacrer au domaine regional.
Une declaration de la delegation franfaise qui sera inscrite au proces-verbal du Conseil definit les
'ressources communautaires appropriees' qui couvrent egalement les ressources actuellement
inemployees, comme par exemple les reserves de la BEI.
La Commission a confirme la validite des propositions en matiere regionale et a demande qu'une
decision du Conseil a cet egard soit prise, tout en s'engageant a lui soumettre des propositions
complementaires.
A cet egard, M Borschette a declare que la proposition de la Commission concernant la creation
d'un fonds de politique regional reste en discussion au Conseil, et qu'il en sera decide en meme
temps que sur les autres propositions que la Commission sera amenee a faire, en demandant que
cela figure au proces-verbal comme declaration de la Commission.
M. Borschette a demande en outre qu'au proces-verbal figure egalement la declaration de M
Giscard D'Estaign, selon laquelle 'a des actions nouvelles doivent s'accompagner des nouveaux
moyens'.
French text for footnote 102:
Afin d'engager, sans attendre, les actions dans le domaine regional et structurel necessaires a la
realisation a terme de 1'union economique et monetaire, le Conseil marque son accord de
principe:
1) pour que le FEOGA puisse etre utilise des 1972 pour des actions de developpement regional;
2) pour que ou bien soit cree un Fonds de developpement regional, ou bien soit mis en ceuvre tout
autre systeme de ressources communautaires appropriees a consacrer au developpement regional.
H invite la Commission a le saisir de propositions conformement au point HI. 4 de la resolution
du 22 Mars 1971. II prendra les decisions necessaires sur les propositions de la Commission
avant le ler octobre 1972.
French text for footnote 107:
La delegation franfaise a estime que le terme 'ressources communautaires appropriees' qui est
repris de la resolution sur 1'union economique et monetaire, peut etre employe dans le texte en
discussion. En effet, il couvre aussi les ressources actuellement inemployees (comme par
exemple les reserves de la BEI) qui pourraient etre affectees au financement d'actions nouvelles.
II est difficile de determiner si de telles ressources doivent etre considerees comme existantes et
additionnelles.
French text for footnote 108 :
La Commission doit constater qu'en ce qui concerne les ressources communautaires existantes,
visees par la resolution du 21 mars 1972, la Communaute ne dispose pas de ressources
actuellement inemployees. En effet:
la Communaute ne dispose pas de reserves budgetaires
les instruments financiers existants, tout en pouvant etre orientes aussi sur la base des objectives
coordonnes de la politique regionale, poursuivent des objectives specifiques; il en va
differemment de la Banque Europeenne d'investissement dont la mission est plus general,
la banque Europeenne d'investissement ne dispose que de reserves statutaires et de provisions
destinees a couvrir ses risques financiers et dont les montants sont actuellement employes.
French text for footnote 117:
Le Chancelier de l'echiquier a fait comprendre a M. Werner, lors de sa recente visite a Londres,
que le Gouvernement britannique souhaiterait etre associe aux travaux de cette session "d'une
maniere moins discrete", pour des raisons d'opinion publique.
French text for footnote 118:
La delegation britannique a declare que son gouvernement attache la plus grande importance au
developpement d'une politique regionale commune et tient a y contribuer de facon essentielle.
tant a cause des liens etroits entre les politiques monetaire et regionale que du fait que le
Royaume-Uni connait des problemes regionaux importants. Au Royaume-Uni, ceux-ci se posent
essentiellement dans les vieilles regions industrielles, tandis que dans la Communaute ils
concernent principalement les zones agricoles. Pas consequent, le Royaume-Uni estime que les
mesures regionales adoptees pas la Communaute devraient etre confues de fajon a contribuer,
dans un egale mesure, a regler le probleme de la reduction d'emploi dans le vieilles regions
industrielles et dans 1'agriculture.
French text for footnote 119:
Les delegations norvegienne et irlandaise ont particulierement souligne l'interet qu'elles portent
a la politique regionale et ont donne leur adhesion aux efforts pour la mise en place progressive
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COMMISSION
Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Regional Development Fund
(Submitted by the Commission to the Council on 31 July 1973)
')• THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
| COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
J Economic Community and in particular Article 235
g: thereof;
7 Having regard to the proposal from the Commission ;
I -
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parlia-
If1 ment;
exchange parities can be achieved only if resources
inscribed in the Budget of the European Communi¬
ties are devoted to regional development to supple¬
ment the resources which the Member States can
devote ;
Whereas regional development requires on the one
hand investment in industrial and service activities, so
as to ensure the creation or maintenance of employ¬
ment, and on the other hand infrastructure required
for the development of these activities ;
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and
Social Committee ;
Whereas, by virtue of Article 2 of the Treaty, the
Community has been assigned the task of promoting
throughout the Community a harmonious develop¬
ment of economic activities ; ,
Whereas the Conference of Heads of State or of
Government in October 1972, desirous of finding a
Community solution to regional problems, invited the
Community Institutions to create before 31 December
1973 a Regional Development Fund whose interven¬
tion, in coordination with national aids, should
permit, progressively with the realization of Economic
and Monetary Union, the correction of the main
regional imbalances in the Community and particu¬
larly those resulting from the preponderance of agri¬
culture and from industrial change and structural
underemployment;
Whereas, since the Treaty has not provided the neces¬
sary powers for this purpose, it is necessary to give the
Community such powers by applying Article 235 of
the Treaty ;
Whereas the realization of these objectives within the
framework of coordinated economic policies and fixed
Whereas the principle should be adopted that the
Fund's assistance should be allocated on the basis of
the relative severity of regional imbalances, and
account should also be taken of other factors deter¬
mining the interest of investments from the region's
and the Community's point of view ;
Whereas the management of the Fund should be the
responsibility of the Commission assisted by a Fund
Committee ;
Whereas the Fund's assistance will be effective only if
investments "benefiting from the Community's aid are
included in the regional development programmes, or,
failing such programmes, meet specific regional deve¬
lopment objectives ;
Whereas the Fund's assistance should not lead
Member States to reduce their own total regional deve¬
lopment efforts but should be complementary ;
Whereas the extent of the Community's activities
requires specific information to be provided to the
Council and to the European Parliament in the form
of an annual report,
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HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION :
Article 1
A European Regional Development Fund is hereby
established.
Article 2
1. Financial appropriations shall be provided each
year in the budget of the Communities for the Fund's
operations in that year.
2. A Financial Regulation adopted in pursuance of
Article 209 of the Treaty shall determine the means
whereby expenditure from the Fund shall be autho-
' rized.
Article 3
1. On a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, and without
prejudice to the application of Articles 92 to 94 of the
Treaty, the Council shall, acting unanimously, adopt
the list of the regions and areas which may benefit
from the Fund, and shall, acting by a qualified
majority, amend this list as need arises.
2. These regions and areas must be chosen from
among those which benefit from a system of regional
aids and whose gross domestic product per head is
below the Community average. They shall include
particularly those with regional imbalances resulting
from the preponderance of agriculture and from indus¬
trial change and structural underemployment, taking
in particular the following criteria into consideration :
(a) heavy dependence on agricultural employment;
(b) heavy dependence on employment in declining
industrial activities ;
(c) a persistently high rate of unemployment or a
high rate of net outward migration.
Article 4
1. The Fund may contribute to financing:
(a) investments, in industrial or service activities,
which benefit from a national system of regional
aids, provided that the amount of the investment
exceeds fifty thousand units of account and that it
involves creating or maintaining jobs ;
(b) infrastructure investments, required for the deve¬
lopment of industrial or service activities, and
totally or partially financed by public authorities.
2. The amount of the Fund's contribution shall be :
(a) in respect of an investment of the kind referred to
in paragraph 1 (a), at most 15 % of the cost of the
investment. The amount shall, however, not
exceed 50 % of the aid accorded to the invest¬
ment by public authorities under a national
system of regional aids. The national aids to be
taken into consideration in this connection shall
be interest rebates, and grants determined either as
a percentage of the investment or according to the
number of jobs created;
(b) in respect of an investment of the kind referred to
in paragraph 1 (b), at most 30 % of the expendi¬
ture incurred by public authorities.
3. The Fund's assistance may, in respect of infra¬
structure, take in whole or in part the form of a rebate
of three percentage points on loans made by the Euro¬
pean Investment Bank pursuant to Article 130(a) and
(b) of the Treaty.
4. The above provisions shall not prejudice the
application of Articles 92 to 94 of the Treaty.
Article 5
1. The Fund's assistance shall be decided by the
Commission in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 13, with reference to the relative
severity of the economic imbalance of the region
where the investment is made and its direct and indi¬
rect effect on employment, and taking account of the
following considerations :
(a) the consistency of the investment with the develop¬
ment programmes and objectives referred to in
Article 6 ;
(b) the investment's contribution to the economic
development of the region ;
(c) the consistency of the investment with the
Community's programmes or objectives, particu¬
larly those adopted as part of sectoral policies;
(d) the investment's effect on the environment, parti¬
cularly as regards living and working conditions ;
(e) the trans-national character of the investment, that
is, the fact that it comes from another Member
State ;
(f) the trans-border character of the investment, that
is, concerning adjacent regions in different
Member States.
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2. In the examination of each request, account
shall also be taken of other assistance provided by the
Community institutions or by the European Invest¬
ment Bank pursuant to Article 130(a) and (b) of the
Treaty.
3. ' In respect of infrastructure costing more than
twenty million units of account, the Commission
shall, before obtaining the Opinion of the Fund
Committee referred to in Article 13, consult the
Committee for Regional Policy.
Article 6
1. Investments may benefit from the Fund's assis¬
tance only if they form part of a regional development
programme whose implementation may contribute to
correcting the structural and regional imbalances
which may affect the realization of Economic and
Monetary Union. In the absence of such a programme
and until 31 December 1975, investments eligible for
the Fund's assistance must meet specific regional
objectives. In the latter case, Member States must
provide the Commission annually with all relevant
information about the resources they are making avail¬
able, and propose to make available, for the develop¬
ment of the regions on the list referred to in Article 3,
and also with all relevant information about the deve¬
lopment of the economic and social situation in those
regions.
2. Regional development programmes or specific
regional objectives shall be communicated to the
Commission by the Member States. A first such
communication shall be made before 1 October 1974.
3. The programmes shall indicate the objectives
and the means for developing the region. To this
effect, they must contain sufficiently detailed indica¬
tions of:
(a) the development of the economic and social situa¬
tion of the region, particularly in respect of demo¬
graphy, employment, regional product, sectoral
structure, infrastructure, ecology and land usage;
(b) the measures proposed in respect of infrastructure
and the creation of economic activity, together
with an implementation schedule ;
(c) the intended financing;
(d) the authorities, organizations or institutions respon¬
sible for these measures.
4. The Committee for Regional Policy must be
consulted about the programmes or specific objectives
for regional development. The Commission must
confirm their conformity with the Community's objec¬
tives.
Article 7
Public expenditure referred to in Article 4 which has
been incurred more than six months before the date
of the presentation of the request, or which concerns
investments completed more than twelve months
before this date, shall not be eligible for assistance
from the Fund.
Article 8
1. Requests for the Fund's assistance shall be sent
to the Commission accompanied by the information
provided for in the Financial Regulation referred to in
Article 2. In respect of industrial and service invest¬
ments of an amount less than ten million units of
account and infrastructure of an amount less than
twenty million units of account, Member States shall
group their requests in quarterly statements for each
of the regions referred to in Article 3.
2. The Fund's assistance shall be decided ;
(a) case by case, in respect of industrial and service
investments of an amount of ten million units of
account or more, and infrastructure investments of
an amount of twenty million units of account or
more ;
(b) in the aggregate, in respect of other requests.
Article 9
The Commission shall make payments to the Member
State, an agency designated by the Member State for
this purpose or the European Investment Bank, as the
case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the
financial regulation referred to in Article 2.
Article 10
1. The Commission shall, with the cooperation of
Member States, make sure that investments benefiting
from the Fund's assistance are properly implemented.
2. If an investment on which a decision about assis¬
tance has been taken is not carried out as planned, or
if the public authorities recover from the investor all
or part of the aid which they have themselves
accorded, that assistance may be suspended, reduced
or cancelled by decision of the Commission after
consulting the Fund Committee. Any sums to be
repaid shall be recovered by the Member State and
paid over to the Commission within the six months
following the decision to suspend, reduce or cancel.
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Article 11
1. The Commission may use a part of the resources
of the Fund, provided for this purpose in the budget
of the Communities, to promote or carry out studies
closely related to the operations of the Fund or to
regional development in the Community.
2. When a study is undertaken at the request of the
Member State the Fund's assistance may not exceed
50 % of its cost.
Article 12
1. There shall be established a Fund Committee,
composed of representatives of Member States and
presided over by a representative of the Commission.
2. Within the Committee the votes of Member
States shall be weighted in accordance with Article
148(2) of the Treaty. The Chairman shall not vote.
Article 13
1. Where the procedure laid down in this Article is
to be followed, the Chairman shall refer the matter to
the Committee either on his own initiative or at the
request of the representative of a Member State.
2. The representative of the Commission shall
submit a draft of the decision to be taken. The
Committee shall deliver its Opinion on such deci¬
sions within the time limit to be set by the Chairman
according to the urgency of the questions under
consideration. An Opinion shall be adopted by a
majority of 41 votes.
3. The Commission shall adopt decisions which
shall apply immediately. However, if these decisions
are not in accordance with the Opinion of the
Committee, they shall forthwith be communicated by
the Commission to the Council. In that event the
Commission may defer application of the decisions
which it has adopted for not more than one month
from the date of such communication. The Council
may take a different decision within one month by
qualified majority.
Article 14
The Committee may consider any other question
concerning the Fund's operations referred to it by its
Chairman either on his own initiative or at the
request of the representative of a Member State.
Article 15
Member States and the Commission shall make
public the assistance given by the Fund and shall
inform the investors concerned that part of the aid
they receive comes from the Community.
Article 16
1. Before 1 July each year the Commission shall
present a report to the European Parliament and to
the Council on the implementation of this Regulation
during the preceding year. This report shall, in parti¬
cular, indicate the extent to which the allocation of
the Fund's resources has taken account of the relative
severity of regional imbalances, and make clear what
progress has been made towards correcting those
imbalances and also the regional development
measures which seem to be required, by economic
and social trends in the Community, in one or more
of the regions on the list referred to in Article 3.
2. This report shall also cover on the one hand the
financial administration of the Fund and on the other
hand the conclusions drawn by the Commission from
the financial inspections carried out on the Fund's
operations.
Article 17
The necessary steps for the implementation of this
Regulation shall be taken in accordance with the
procedure laid down in Article 13.
Article 18
The Council shall re-examine this Regulation not
later than three years after it enters into force.
Article 19
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January
1974.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States.
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Draft Decision by the Council on the creation of a Committee for Regional
Policy
(Submitted by the Commission to the Council on 31 July 1973)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community and in particular Article 145
thereof;
Having regard to the draft of the Commission ;
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parlia¬
ment ;
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and
Social Committee ;
Whereas, at their Conference in October 1972, the
Heads of State or of Government undertook to coordi¬
nate the regional policies of the Member States ;
Whereas to this end coordinated objectives, means of
concerted action and overall assessments of regional
development in the Community should be proges-
sively defined ;
Whereas it is necessary to define the principal fields
in which this coordination should be exercised
Whereas it is necessary to establish a procedure for
consultation on problems of regional policy and on
the measures to be taken at Community level,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION :
Article 1
With a view to contributing to the coordination of the
regional policies of the Member States, a Committee
for Regional Policy, attached to the Council and the
Commission, is hereby set up.
Article 2
1. The Committee's task shall be to examine, at the
request of the Council or of the Commission, or on
its own initiative, problems relating to regional deve¬
lopment. Without prejudice to the provisions of the
Treaties, it shall study in particular :
(a) the aims, means, methods and experiences of the
Member States in the field of regional policy,
taking account of the Community's other policies;
(b) on a continuous basis, economic and social trends
in the various regions of the Community ;
(c) the development programmes or specific develop¬
ment objectives presented by Member States, parti¬
cularly in respect of the regions referred to in
Article 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) No ...
creating a European Regional Development Fund ;
(d) the financial resources which Member States and
the Community propose to provide for regional
development over a period of years ;
(e) the impact of Community financial instruments in
regional terms ;
(f) the coordinated implementation of Community
measures, together with measures by Member
States, with a view to facilitating the implementa¬
tion of programmes or the achievement of specific
objectives ;
(g) systems of aid which are regional in their purpose
or incidence ;
(h) disincentive measures in regions of heavy concen¬
tration ;
(i) the promotion of better information services for
both public and private investors in the field of
regional development.
2. The Committee shall report to the Council and
to the Commission on the results of its work.
Article 3
1. The Member States and the Commission shall
each appoint two members to the Committee. They
may appoint alternates. The members of the
Committee, and the alternates, appointed by the
Member States shall be selected from among senior
officials responsible for regional policy.
2. Except where the Commission shall decide other¬
wise, the members may be accompanied by experts.
3. The European Investment Bank shall appoint an
observer to the Committee.
Article 4
1. The Committee shall by majority vote appoint
its Chairman and Vice-Chairman from among its
members for a period of two years. Their period of
office may be renewed.
2. The Committee may entrust the study of parti¬
cular questions to working parties composed of
certain of its members or alternates or experts.
3. The Committee's secretariat shall be provided by
the Commission.
4. The Committee shall draw up its own rules of
procedure.
Article 5
The Committee may, in accordance with the provi¬
sions of its rules of procedure, take evidence from
interested parties from the regions and from trade
union and business organizations.
